TELOS

Number 38 Winter 1978-79

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a quarterly journal of radical thought

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INTRODUCTION

Since the Great Depression, increasing state intervention in the economy has assured steadily expanding growth, relatively high employment, and internal political stability throughout advanced industrial societies. By cushioning cyclical fluctuations in business and insuring employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors, monopoly capital has also succeeded in bringing about widespread depoliticization through consumerism, thus ruling out even the consideration of alternative socio-economic modes of organization. Carlo's "Unemployment," however, points to several trends that threaten to shake the system's stability. In advanced capitalist societies Carlo traces an inherent tendency toward centralization, overcapitalization and unemployment, which can no longer be remedied through increasing public employment in the service sector. With the expansion of capital-intensive multinational enterprises, combined with the state's inability to raise expenditures and revenues, Carlo sees the system becoming engulfed in a growing crisis. Similarly, the Third World faces even bleaker prospects. Unable to generate jobs, raise capital or attract foreign investments, Third World nations integrated into the world capitalist system must cope with their population explosion in a context characterized by the migration of capital, skilled labor and talent to more developed centers. Although Carlo has elsewhere prefigured possible socialist alternatives, a more likely solution to the structural crisis in the Third World may be partial or full "de-modernization" as envisioned by Khomeini's Iranian Islamic republic or "democratic" Kampuchea. In these cases the real question is whether such developments can be successfully integrated by monopoly capitalism or whether they give rise to qualitatively different socio-economic alternatives. Recycling the past to pump new life into the corrupt present is rapidly becoming capitalism's most urgent socio-political task. Future contributions will develop this theme in various directions.

Castoriadis' theses in "The Social Regime in Russia" schematically explore the nature of bureaucratic centralism. After quickly but effectively dismissing the usual leftist analyses of the Soviet regime as state socialism, state capitalism, or a degenerate workers' state, Castoriadis describes the USSR as a regime retaining much of bourgeois capitalism — antagonistic social class and commodity relations — as it attempts to modernize an agrarian economy from above. In continuing the capitalist project, the Soviet regime has become irrationally preoccupied with rationalization. Castoriadis argues that the barbaric and inefficient aspects of that society engendered by the fetishism of rationalization have been mystified by the very same Marxist ideology that originally aimed at demystifying capitalist relations.

In a similar vein, Konrad and Szeleny focus on the role of intellectuals in bureaucratic administrations by calling for a redirection of emphasis from "ownership" to directorship, from "property relations" to control relations, and from the "mode of production" to the mode of economic integration. Suggesting that property relations are decisive only in certain historical phases, "The Intelligentsia and Social Structure" suggests that relations of control over distribution and legitimation in economic integration are far more important than the forms of property. Given the redistributive economy of early socialism, Konrad and Szeleny find the intelligentsia to be the foremost agents of rational management and legitimation, constituting the decisive class of rational redistributors. Even though Konrad and Szeleny fail to distinguish sufficiently between the "red" and the "expert" intelligentsia, their discussion of

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both the Soviet and the Chinese intelligentsia as a rationalizing class sheds light on developments in the "socialist" bloc.

In a rather different field, Levi investigates the relation between Wittgenstein's homosexuality and his ethics — an area either ignored or repressed by Wittgenstein's followers. Although he limits himself to an analysis of the early works, Levi's analysis applies even more forcefully to Wittgenstein's later works, thus providing valuable interpretive tools. Ironically, the effort to separate life sharply from ethics is seen by Levi as the very foundation of much of Wittgenstein's philosophical reflection — a view that successfully torpedoes the distinction itself.

Adorno's "Metacritique of Epistemology" was originally published as the introduction to a book by the same title in 1954 and sought to drive the last nail into the coffin of phenomenology. Unfortunately, here Adorno falls into the very same traps that he spent most of his life warning against. Not only does he fail to grasp the profoundly revolutionary nature of Husserl's phenomenology, but he misses a golden opportunity to provide his own Critical Theory with the kind of foundation that would have prevented the abysmal outcome of his negative dialectic. Adorno systematically misrepresents Husserl's phenomenology as a crypto-Nazi "philosophy of origins." That, as Paci, Kosik and Sartre have indicated, Husserl's phenomenology systematically articulates the very structure of "praxis" never occurs to Adorno, whose consciously fragmentary and self-contradictory work thereby remains a brilliant philosophical effort locked into the brief and frightening transition stage between entrepreneurial and monopoly capitalism.

Much more faithful to the original philosophical intent of the authors, Vajda shows how Lukács and Husserl shared similar critiques of science based on its objectivistic pretenses. In tracing out how the two developed their respective critiques, however, Vajda shows how Lukács remained trapped in the very objectivism that he otherwise indicted and was consequently forced into the holistic position which led him first to Bolshevism and then to Stalinism. By shifting the emphasis from the class, the party or whatever collectivity whose primacy tends to annihilate individuality to the individual as a *social* being, Vajda proposes a phenomenological foundation for the emancipatory side of *History and Class Consciousness.*

In this issue, the Notes and Commentary section includes several informal interviews and discussions which provide a more readily accessible exposition of otherwise difficult ideas. The first interview deals with Eurocommunism, which, notwithstanding recent setbacks, remains a crucial political project in Europe. Its eventual success, however, hinges on the possibility of unifying the European Left. Salvadori, a leading theorist of the Italian Socialist Party, discusses some of the differences separating the Socialists from the Italian Communists as well as the nature of the obstacles to a Socialist Europe. The second discussion, on the occasion of Marcuse's 80th birthday, goes over his career as one of today's most powerful thinkers and, under Habermas' untiring probes, touches on allmost all of Marcuse's main ideas. The third interview, with Agnes Heller — the first detailed and systematic one done since she left Hungary for Australia — recounts the problems of Eastern European intellectuals and the trajectory of her own work within the context of the Budapest School. Last, Cygan and Fernandes outline the logic behind Polish censorship as a preface to a selection of directives to censors, which show both the logic and limitations of totalitarian controls.

Tim Luke
Paul Piccone

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UNEMPLOYMENT*

by Antonio Carlo

It is widely accepted that in monopoly capitalism there is a tendency toward growing accumulation and production without an adequate and proportional rise in employment. According to one law,[1] a minimum increase of 4 percent in the GNP is necessary to prevent an increase in unemployment, and a much larger one to reduce it. This has been confirmed by the small recovery of 1976-77.[2] This state of affairs, however, was already evident during the 1960s when, despite the boom, there were already clear indications to discourage the optimism of that period and to infer that, in terms of employment, capital was heading for disaster.

The most sensational example of this optimism concerning "development" during the 1960s was the monumental Japanese twenty-year plan (1966-85). The first version of the plan projected a five-fold increase of the GNP in just twenty years, with only an 18 percent increase in employment, while the population was expected to grow by approximately 20 percent.[3] In other words, the rate of increase in the GNP was 27 to 28 times larger than that of employment.

But that is not all. The composition of the labor force was to witness a radical reduction of productive workers. Thus, agriculture was to go from 24.7 percent of employed workers to 8.9 percent, industry from 31.9 percent to 42-44 percent and the tertiary from 43.4 percent to 47-49 percent — close to an absolute majority. Industry was to absorb only a part of the jobs eliminated in agriculture. Shortly thereafter, the Japanese Economic Planning Agency (EPA) altered its expectations: the previous plan was unrealistic because it was too moderate. The new objective was to increase the GNP nine times by 1985. The labor force was to increase 26 percent (3.5 million more than what was expected in the first version) instead of 18 percent which means a rate of increase of the labor force of 1:35 in relation to the GNP. This also means that the previous projection — which was considered "moderate" — foresaw a fate of non-utilization of the labor force of at least 8 percent in relation to the "small" increase of the GNP of 500 percent in twenty years!

This is even more impressive if one considers that Japan in the 1950s and 1960s had rates of increase of the GNP higher than any of the other Western countries. Even in the context of a frantic rate of development, expectations

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*Translated by Vicky Totah and Eleni Mahaira-Odoni.

1. On this, so-called, Okun's law, cf. Barry Commoner, *The Poverty of Power* (New York, 1976), p. 239 et. passim.

2. Cf. "L'Evoluzione della Congiuntura Internazionale e i Riflessi sulla Crisi Italiana," *Bollettino CREL*, 1977, No. 5, pp. 1ff.

3. For data on the 20-year plan, cf. H. Hedberg, *La Sfida Giapponese* (Milan, 1971), pp. 213ff.

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concerning employment were disastrous and were prophetic in terms of what really has happened. If exceptional rates of development do not permit substantial proportional increases in employment, it is easy to guess what can happen with average, normal, or low rates of development — or even during phases of stagnation.

But these are not the only signs which should have suggested prudence to those who thought that the post-WWII boom was eternal. Let us take as examples two countries which in the 1950s and 1960s represent two extremes in the developed world: the United States and Italy. In the U.S. the employment situation after WWII worsened in relation to the beginning of the century: the number of years during which there was full employment diminished, and the average rate of unemployment was 4.4 percent during the 1940s, 4.5 percent during the 1950s, 4.8 percent during the 1960s, and 6.2 percent during the first half of the 1970s.[4] During the two years of recovery (1976-77) the rate of unemployment was 7.7 percent and 7.4 percent respectively[5] but some think (with good reason) that during the middle 1970s the true rate of unemployment was 15-16 percent — i.e., double the statistical one.[6] The employment collapse in the 1970s was preceded and prepared by a slow but clear historical tendency toward deterioration. In Italy, after WWII, employment statistics are as follows: In 1951 the employed were 19,693,000, while in 1970, despite the continual population increase, there is a decrease to 19, 457,000. In January 1976 there are little more than 18.6 million employed, and the following year they increase about one million. This, however, is not a real statistical increase, since a million people previously considered unemployed were subsequently considered employed because they were working irregularly and precariously. The first statistic is therefore more exact. But even accepting statistical "miracles," there is no doubt that in absolute figures we are at the 1951 levels and in relative figures (in relation to the increase of the population) the collapse of employment is a sharp and serious historical tendency.[7]

The reason why these tendencies in the U.S. and Italy are important is the following: The U.S. is the country of automation and of big monopolistic and multinational capital;[8] on the other hand, Italy is a border-line country (it was the last of the advanced countries and is now the first of the underdeveloped ones) where even though monopoly capital prevails, it has a very small employment base (in 1970, 69 percent of those employed worked in

4. Cf. Richard Du Boff, "Unemployment in the United States: A Historical Summary," in *Monthly Review* Vol. 29, No. 6, November 1977, pp. 10-24.

5. Cf. "L'Evoluzione della congiuntura..." *op. cit.*, p. 11.

6. Cf. Howard Sherman, *Stagflation*, (New York, 1976), pp. 8-11.

7. In the early 1960's, the Italian working population was 43%; this dropped to 37% in 1975, according to the same "doctored" data. Cf., *I conti degli Italiani*, (Roma, 1976), p. 6.

8. This is well known. See the data provided by André Piettre in "Les Grands Problèmes de l'Economie Mondiale" in *Où va le capitalisme?*, (Paris, 1975), p. 111 which shows that, in 1973, among 250 enterprises with more than 10 billion dollar business annually, 167 (two-thirds) were U.S. owned.

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small or medium industries).[9] Therefore, these two countries explain the tendency of capital to produce little employment when it uses either capital intensive (U.S.) or labor intensive technologies (Italy). Obviously, these statements are schematic: in the U.S. there is also a large number of small or medium labor intensive industries, and in Italy monopoly capital also uses capital intensive technologies. The two tendencies are therefore present in both countries. Yet, the U.S. is a good example of the first aspect of the tendency, and Italy of the second one.

In the U.S., the development of automation requires enormous quantities of capital, which is almost solely available to big monopolies — but little employment so that the development of automation and of monopolies precedes simultaneously, thus threatening the rate of employment.[10] The optimistic thesis whereby automation does not threaten employment, has been strongly argued by a team of Swedish economists in the middle 1960s. They claimed that from 1900 to 1963 labor productivity in the U.S. increased steadily — despite the fact that after 1947 there was a certain acceleration.[11] Now, it so happens that, after the war, automation developed massively along with productivity. As even the Swedish researchers pointed out, there occurs some worrisome phenomena in employment. During the period between 1947 and 1964 global industrial production increased 96 percent, production per worker and the number of workers went (with some intermediary oscillations) from 12,900,000 to 12, 813,000.[12]

It is clear, therefore, that a doubling of industrial production does not create employment. Given the constant decrease in agriculture, the growing population can only flow into the tertiary sector. But this tertiary sector is not a bottomless well. If the well dries up, we are in trouble. It is not necessary to argue that automation increases labor productivity even more than mechanization. With the latter, too, productivity increased by leaps and bounds and created employment problems since the 19th century.[13] For our

9. Cf. Antonio Carlo, *Il Capitalismo Impianificabile* (Rome, 1976), p. 131.

10. On this, see Fredrick Pollock, *Automation*, (New York, 1957).

11. See, *Sindacati e Progresso Tecnico*, (Milano, 1969), pp. 99-100, which notes that even in U.S. agriculture, where mechanization is still in progress, productivity has grown more rapidly during the last decade. This is correct, but it is due more to the fact that the starting point of agriculture was immensely lower than that of industry and, as it is well known, the rationalization brought about by mechanization has caused an enormous drop in the manpower employed in this sector. This confirms that, in the capitalist context, automation as well as mechanization result in the decline of employment in the productive sectors (at least, relatively and in the long term) and this can only be balanced by a swelling of the tertiary, unproductive sector.

12. Cf. Harry Magdoff, "Problems of U.S. Capitalism" in Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, *The Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism* (New York, 1972), pp. 7-29. Also in *Socialist Register*, 1965.

13. Cf. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, (New York, 1967), p. 391 and 429 which read: "Before Eli Whitney invented the cotton-gin in 1793, the separation of the seed from a pound of cotton cost an average day's labor. By means of his invention one Negress was enabled to clean 100 lbs. daily; and since then, the efficacy of the gin has been considerably increased. If it be said that 100 millions of people would be required in England to spin with the old spinning-wheel the cotton that is now spun with mules by 500,000 people, this does not mean that the mules took the place of those millions who never existed. It means only this, that many millions of work people would be required to replace the spinning machinery. If, on the other hand, we say, that in

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purposes, it is enough to point out that, with automation, productivity continues to increase (as shown in the example of the U.S. during the period between 1947 and 1964) so that industrial employment stagnates, and the need for jobs can be met only by broadening the tertiary sector. Thus, if this sector is saturated, the system enters into a crisis.

Nevertheless, during this phase of crisis, some optimistic positions which could have been held during the 1960s boom must give way to worries: during the period between 1945 and 1960, the U.S. railroad eliminated 540,000 jobs (40 percent of those employed in 1945) through automation; and in the decade 1965-75 there was a need to create 5.3 million jobs (in the tertiary sector) so as to absorb the workers displaced by automation.[14] According to a recent study by the Rand Corporation, 2 percent of the active U.S. population could produce the country's present wealth by the massive application of modern technology.[15]

Let us now move to the other extreme: the Italian case. This country suffers from an economic and occupational crisis as a result of the fragile Italian productive apparatus characterized by the presence of many internationally non-competitive small and medium industries. Italian participation in the European Common Market has exposed these enterprises to a competition which they cannot meet, thus rendering them increasingly marginal. Consequently, these enterprises merely survive at the market's periphery and, to the extent that they are not very dynamic, they do not produce a consistent demand for labor. In other words, the labor-saving technologies of big capital demand little labor-power (relative to what they produce) while the labor intensive industries require a lot of it, but are not very rational or competitive so that they produce an inadequate aggregate demand for labor-power since they are marginal and weak.

In this respect, the Italian case is not exceptional. Another country with a high percentage of small and medium industries is France, which chose to enter the world market through the European Common Market, and underwent a similar process of marginalization of its small and medium industry. In 1964 the French small and medium industry accounted for 39.8 percent of business, in 1971 only 29.7 percent.[16] We can see now how the interaction of the two policies functions for employment: the capital intensive one of large enterprises and the labor intensive one of small and medium industries. During the period between 1960 and 1970, which is one of strong economic development, in four major capitalistic countries (West Germany,

England the power loom threw 80,000 weavers onto the street, we do not refer to existing machinery, that would have to be replaced by a definite number of work people, but to a number of weavers in existence who were actually replaced or displaced by the looms."

14. Cf. D. Giori, "Automazione e sviluppo economico" in *Classe*, No. 13, pp. 35-7, where it is stated that the 5.3 million reconverted jobs were distributed as follows: 24.5% for environmental protection and ecology, 22.6% for sanitary activities, 20.7% for education, 13.3% for welfare activities, 12.3% for urban renewal and reclamation, and 6.6% for public security. All of which are obviously public or semi-public activities.

15. Cited by B. Kapp, "Comment travaillerons-nous demain?" in *Economia*, No. 30, p. 80.

16. Cf. André Piettre, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

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England, Belgium and Sweden) labor intensive industrial activities eliminated 700,000 jobs, but industrial employment grew by 600,000 units.[17] This means that big business expansion created 1.3 million jobs. This may seem like a lot, but it amounts to relatively few. In fact, the net balance is only 60,000 jobs per year (70,000 are substitutions and not additions) for four countries which have 110-120 million inhabitants — and it should also be noted that this was during a phase of rapid growth. It is clear that in the long run, employment levels will decrease if jobs in the tertiary sector do not increase, even though there are low rates of population growth in the rich countries of Europe and America (i.e., 0.4 percent per year against about 1 percent in Japan).

As for agriculture, it is well known that this sector retains an extensive character in relation to industry so that its capitalist rationalization means a further reduction of its labor force. Even for the U.S. which has a very advanced agriculture in relation to other Western countries and which employs about 5 percent of the total labor force, there is talk of rationalization, i.e., the destruction of a broad spectrum of small agricultural enterprises which produce $5,000 dollars worth of goods per year.[18] If this is the situation in the U.S., it is easy to guess what could happen in countries like France and Italy where the weight of employment is greater in agriculture, which is also much more backward than in the U.S.[19] These tendencies have been further confirmed by the world "recovery" of 1976-77. Between 1970 and 1975 capitalism responded to the crisis by increasing even more the organic composition of capital, i.e., the use of capital intensive technologies. This means that big business has had the largest share, and it could not have been otherwise. During the recession of 1973-75 in the U.S., prices in the monopoly sector showed an increase of 27 percent and those in the competitive sectors one of only 1.8 percent.[20] This means that the phenomena of unequal exchange between the monopoly sector and that of small and medium enterprises increase and small and medium industries become increasingly poorer. Thus, the crisis ends with small and medium industry increasingly marginal while large enterprises become increasingly capital intensive. The tendencies already identified in the earlier development are intensified and there is the serious and relatively new fact of an economic recovery without an increase in employment — which means a breathless recovery, or a pause between two phases of recession.

Today it is normal for employment to increase, even in countries other than Japan, when the GNP increases at a rate of over 10 percent and to decrease suddenly at the first indication of a slow-down. This phenomenon is not

17. See BIT, *L'Emploi, la Croissance et les Besoins Essentiels*, (Genève, 1976), p. 93.

18. See N. Vargas, "La Mort du Petit Paysan des Etats Unis" in *Dossier Economia*, No. 5, pp. 72-3. This policy of rationalization concerns 55% of U.S. agricultural enterprises.

19. According to the 1970 agricultural census, for example, in Italy agricultural firms cultivate on the average 4.69 hectares, which is absurd in an epoch when one man can work about 30-40 hectares.

20. See Sherman, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

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conjunctural, but structural, so that an equilibrium in the labor market can be maintained only if the tertiary absorbs the labor force displaced in other sectors.

Let us now analyze the tendencies within the tertiary sector and in the immense field of unproductive labor, beginning with people employed in industry with bureaucratic and supervisory functions. In a sense, the case of Fiat is typical: clerical workers constitute about one-seventh of the employees before the war, in 1958 they grow to almost a third, then the tendency is reversed and in 1974 they are about 21.4 percent.[21] This is not an isolated case since in the last decade, both in the U.S. as well as in other advanced countries, there has been a slowdown in the increase of the number of white-collar workers — at least in the private sector (the public sector will be discussed later). In the case of Fiat, the slow-down (or, rather, the reversal of the tendency) in the growth of white collar workers is due, at least in part and most recently to the computerization of office work: of course, because of political reasons, Fiat did not fire the surplus employees but transferred them. This means, of course, that Fiat has avoided hiring new personnel so that the depressive effect in employment remains hidden. This is a tendency which will become widespread since the phenomenon of computerization of office work has been growing rapidly since the 1950s: the assembly line spared the offices but the computer did not, and the automation of the office allows enormous savings in the labor force.[22]

Computerization now allows similar important savings even in supervisory labor. Electronic systems and close circuit televisions allow the control of the productive labor force while reducing (or not increasing) the number of supervisors. This does not mean that the relative number of clerical workers will necessarily decrease in relation to factory workers (as in the case of Fiat): it could increase in some cases but there is no doubt that the spreading of automation to unproductive functions in the industries (as indicated by people such as Pollock and Braverman) is a major brake to increases of white-collar workers in industry. Thus, it is not possible to look forward to miraculous solutions in this area by means of extrapolations and projections from "old" statistics. This is all the more true if one considers that automation can also be applied to office jobs in the service industry (banks, commerce, insurance firms,) so that some operations (e.g., accounting) require considerably less labor.

Of course, it is not possible to totally automate all jobs in the service sector: it is possible to automate internal jobs (administration, accounting, control, etc.) but not "external" jobs, i.e., those requiring contact with the public and

21. See E. Deaglio, *La Fiat Com'è*, (Milano, 1975), pp. 215-17.

22. See Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies* (London, 1973). See also Fredrick Pollock, *op. cit.*, p. 125ff; Harry Braverman, "Labor and Monopoly Capital" *Monthly Review*, Vol. 26, No. 3, July-August, 1974. The previously mentioned example at FIAT shows that the increase of white-collar workers in relation to blue-collar workers is neither an irreversible nor an uncontainable fact. The use of computers allows large firms to contain unproductive costs, and the spreading of automation to offices verifies this logic.

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dealing with people. Yet, a very important element comes into play here: the centralization of capital even in the service sector. If large scale is the most rational in terms of maximizing profits, it is understandable how it would extend to other sectors where capital operates with the same aim. For example, in 1948 Don Castro opened in Columbus the first huge shopping center, in 1950 there were 75 of them, and in 1969 12,500.[23] Clearly, this process of centralization entails enormous savings which are also savings of labor both for internal jobs (offices) as well as for external ones (contacts with the public): if 100 persons go shopping in 10 small shops, 10 clerks will be needed to help them; if they go shopping in a huge shopping center, one could be enough. Countries such as Italy and France have realized the danger that these huge centralized entities in both commerce and services represent for employment, and have passed laws to slow down the development of large scale distribution in 1971 and 1974. These laws have been attacked as reactionary because they defend obsolete forms of commerce. This is true, but it is significant that the Italian and French legislators have sought to defend the employment levels rather than rationalize the distribution network.

As means to defend employment, however, the Royer law or the Italian law 426 have only short range applicability: in the logic of capitalism, a fragmented commercial network is archaic and hardly competitive. It is based on an irrational utilization of the labor force, i.e., hidden unemployment, and is necessarily accompanied by low wages and returns. If 10 clerks in small shops perform the work that could be done by only one clerk in a large shopping center, then they are clearly hidden unemployed with low income. This is not a real solution, and the fact that it is necessary to find recourse to these tricks indicates how nowadays even the tertiary sector has become saturated. The private tertiary sector can no longer perform employment miracles.

This situation can be kept in equilibrium only through a massive state intervention aiming directly or indirectly to create jobs. In the U.S. during the period between 1950 and 1966 the state created 25 percent of the new jobs. On the other extreme, there is Italy, where public sector employees numbered 1,138,000 out of 19,693,000 workers in 1951, and 1,794,000 out of 19,457,000 in 1970. The state's effort to maintain an equilibrium in the labor market is evident. Since monopoly capital creates little employment, the supporting function of government becomes essential to create new jobs — whether in the form of military spending (U.S.) or welfare spending (Sweden). After the 1929 Depression, a large increase in state expenditures became an indispensable means for stabilizing the economy and the labor market.[24]

This state function will become even more significant in the future since

23. Cf. Piettre, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

24. There is a great body of literature on this issue; among others, cf. James O'Connor, *The Corporations and the State*, (New York, 1974) and his *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, (New York, 1973) pp. 227ff; Ian Gough, "State Expenditures in Advanced Capitalism," *New Left Review*, No. 92, July-August 1975.

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other counter tendencies to the employment problem in industry are failing. It is not accidental that in the U.S. the retraining of 5.3 million workers set "free" by automation between 1965 and 1975, aimed at their being re-absorption by the public or semi-public sector. But state intervention in this area runs into major problems: what O'Connor has called the "fiscal crisis of the state." This analysis, however, must be further developed since it is one-sided. In fact, he points out the enormous increase in government expenditures while the complementary phenomenon of the relative contraction of revenues is not fully elaborated.[25] To speak about a fiscal crisis of the state it is necessary to establish a relation between growing expenditures and revenues which hardly keep up with them. O'Connor explains why expenditures must necessarily grow, but does not explain why revenues must be necessarily lower than what is needed.

By and large, the state obtains its revenues from monopoly capital, competitive capital, autonomous workers (craftsmen, professional, small peasant), and service workers. Of course, state employees are left out since, even though they formally pay taxes, they receive their income from the state, i.e., from the taxes paid by the previously mentioned groups, so that they do not add anything to state revenues.

Clearly, from a fiscal viewpoint, the state's main client must be monopoly capital. In the U.S. the 200 largest industrial enterprises controlled over 60 percent of industrial production in 1968,[26] while in Italy, even though there was still much small and medium industry while large enterprises with more than 500 employees are a small minority (about a thousand), in 1972 the latter controlled 53.5 percent of the manufacture and 60 percent of the exports. Furthermore, these enterprises should not be considered by themselves since they are generally part of conglomerates which include dozens of large enterprises. Thus, a small number of power centers dominate the economy.[27] By means of progressive taxation the fiscal system should heavily gauge monopoly capital. Instead, even in the most reformist countries such as Sweden, there is no radical tendency toward redistribution of wealth. In that country the 200 largest enterprises control 60 percent of manufacture

25. For example, O'Connor claims that the increase of fiscal output depends on the growth of the economy's taxable sectors, particularly on the absolute size of the working class and on the income level of wage-earners. In the American economy there is a strong tendency toward an increase of employment in the competitive sectors on account of surplus population growth. It is clear that, to the extent that youths and the unemployed are able to find low-wage jobs in the competitive sector alone (and to the extent that the system will generate total or partial unemployment), wage income will increase in a relatively slow rate (or will remain stagnant) and, consequently, the taxable base will be enlarged slowly (or will stagnate). In any case, in the absence of quantitative studies on the growth of employment in the competitive sector as related to the productive expansion of the monopolistic sector, it is difficult to establish how much weight should be attributed to this process. Cf. *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, *op. cit.* Obviously, this is a very vague account.

26. See Howard Sherman, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

27. Examples of this type are too many to mention. In Japan, for example, after WWII, 56% of the profits were reaped by 0.4% of the firms. Cf. Pierre Jalée, *Imperialism in the Seventies*, (New York, 1972), p. 109.

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and 83 percent of the exports.[28] Occasionally statistics tell us that capital earns little, but statistics do not take into account fiscal evasions. The possibilities for capital to evade taxes are tendentially proportional to the enterprises' size. The more an oligopolistic structure is concentrated, the easier it is to evade taxes. Thus, the development of a monopolistic concentration in these last years is linked to a growing possibility of evading taxes.

In the second half of the 1960s, in the U.S., the upper 1 percent of the population provided 14 percent of taxes while controlling 70 percent of the means of production.[29] As Lundberg points out, that fiscal contribution is not proportionate to its economic weight, and this is because large capital transfers taxes (even direct ones) into prices, as any cost which consequently is ultimately paid by the consumer.

But this ability to determine prices (and, therefore, to transfer taxes into prices) is not the same for all capitalists: "competitive" capitalists are clearly in a disadvantage. As can be seen from the fluctuations of prices from the 1929 crisis to the one of 1973-75, the monopolistic sector can determine prices a lot more than the competitive one. During the period between 1929 and 1932, prices in the monopoly sector decreased 10 percent against 60 percent in the competitive sector; during the 1948 recession the drop was 1.9 percent and 7.8 percent respectively; from 1950 on, monopoly prices no longer dropped even during the crisis phase and during 1973-75 recession, they went up 27 percent against a 1.8 percent increase for competitive prices.[30] This ability to determine prices and to reverse the classical tendencies of old nineteenth century capitalism, grows along with capital centralization: in 1929 the 200 major manufacturing enterprises control "only" 45.8 percent of business, which becomes 47.1 percent twenty years later, 54.8 percent in 1959 and 60.4 percent in 1968.[31]

Clearly, then, the power to determine prices is distributed unequally between industrial sectors in relation to the levels of centralization attained and that the ability to evade taxes is also unequally distributed among capitalists. Furthermore, the growth of monopolistic concentration implies that a growing proportion of the wealth produced goes to the monopoly sector, i.e., that the relative quantity of wealth which can readily evade taxes grows, so that the efficiency of tax evasion in the economy also grows. Thus, the growth of monopolies also means an increase in tax evasion.

It cannot be objected that the state does not care *who* pays, but only about being paid, since such reasoning would overlook several very important things. First of all, if one transfers taxes into prices (even direct ones, since for indirect taxes this is normal) the wage workers will have to pay most of the taxes of monopolies — and so will autonomous workers as well as small and

28. Cf. P. Santi, *Introduzione a Zenit: Critica operaia del modello svedese*, (Bari, 1972), p. 20.
29. See Ferdinand Lundberg, *The Rich and the Super-Rich*, (New york, 1968).
30. For these data, cf. Howard Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-5.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

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medium industries which buy what monopolies produce. Now, citizens' ability to contribute is not unlimited. If they also pay the taxes of the monopolies, their ability to contribute will decrease so that the state's ability to tax them will also necessarily decrease. Furthermore, if fiscal pressures become too heavy, there may result a fall or stagnation of consumption which will effect industrial production and occupation — and therefore even the total contributions of a given society (which are influenced by the employment situation).

The problem is serious and the development of multinationals intensifies it. With the so-called transfer prices it is possible, through clever book-keeping techniques, to make profits appear at the headquarters of the main company controlling a group of multinational enterprises and located in a fiscal paradise.[32] This is a relatively new development since multinational enterprises have become widespread only after WWII. They represent an advanced phase of the development of industrial society and of monopolies, and it is in this relatively new phase that the possibilities for fiscal evasion grow.

Thus, the development of monopolies is extremely dangerous: on the one hand, it demands massive government spending to support the economy, while on the other, monopoly capital, which should be the state's main taxpayer, is in an unprecedented position to evade taxes. Thus, a gap opens between state revenues and expenditures, and this is what is commonly called the fiscal crisis of the state. There are no solutions to this: the contradiction between the multinational character of the economy and the fragmentary nature of national states is not a transitory state of affairs, but an ineliminable predicament of the system. As a result, there are no solutions to the multinationals' book-keeping manipulations.

As for the possibility to determine prices (and to transfer taxes), it could be avoided by a drastic policy of controls over prices. Yet, the history of price controls is full of failures even when these controls have been imposed by authoritarian regimes (e.g., Italian fascism) or by serious reformist ones (Swedish social democracy). The reason is very simple: if the prices established by the state are considered too low by big capital, investments stagnate and nowadays this type of pressure on the state has a lot more weight than ever before.[33] Large monopolies provide sub-contracts to 15 to 30,000 small and medium industries, and they determine the stability of entire sectors so that a slow down in their investments can have disastrous consequences. The multinationalization of the economy adds blackmail to blackmail, since the slow down of investments in a country can be linked to

32. See Charles Levinson, *Capital, Inflation and the Multinationals*, (London, 1971). It is worth noting that the phenomenon of fiscal evasions greatly effects income distribution statistics that indicate an advance of wages over profits — which are instead "hidden" and not taken into account by these statistics.

33. Cf. my *Il Capitalismo Impianificabile* (Roma, 1976), pp. 252-3, n. 97: Note my polemics with Pollock where I stress that the suspension of investments is always a deadly weapon in the hands of the capitalists.

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the threat of transferring certain activities to other countries more receptive to the demand for profits. Not by accident, nowadays price controls are generally considered tools of a limited and transitory value and price control policies practically ratify market tendencies.

Thus, monopoly capital evades taxes and will do so more and more in the future, with developments in monopolization, multinationalization of economics. Furthermore, by emarginating and taking over the competitive sector through unequal exchange between monopoly and competitive prices, the state's ability to tap these taxpayers becomes more and more marginal. Thus, what remains are wage-earners in industry and in the private services. As already indicated, however, the number of taxpayers in this sector stagnates: industry provides few jobs and the private tertiary sphere cannot work miracles. Nor does the spread of highly capital intensive technologies compensate for this stagnation with wage increases: as Pollock already pointed out in the 1950s, the computer does not create a large number of highly paid, extremely skilled workers, but only a small elite, and latter studies have confirmed this state of affairs.[34] Thus, the state faces growing problems in finding the funds necessary to support its policy of upholding employment even by creating fictitious jobs, so that the fiscal crisis of the state and the employment crisis feed on each other. Employment as a whole stagnates even during a phase of recovery (1976-77), and thus the recovery itself tends to be short and prepares a new phase of recession in a vicious circle that seems unending.[35]

In conclusion, in the past the labor market held because, despite the contradictions in agricultural employment and the sluggishness of the industrial sector, the private tertiary and the public sector had a highly dynamic role. Now this role is diminishing and the employment outlook is bleak. Is this an unfounded pessimism? I do not think so: the Common Market middle-term projections for 1985 (when some of us will certainly still be living) indicate that, in order not to increase the present unemployment (6 million plus 3-4 million of so-called "hidden unemployed") 9.7 million jobs

34. Cf. Fredrick Pollock, *op. cit.* Cf. also Joan Greenbaum, "Division of Labor in the Computer Field," in *Monthly Review*, Vol. 28, No. 3, July-August, 1976, pp. 40-55.

35. It might be objected that, faced with the danger of economic disaster, capital decides to pay taxes: this is the eternal dream of reformists who believe they can convince capitalists to make sacrifices for the sake of the system's health. But, as the resurgent phenomenon of crisis shows, this is a utopian dream. For the capitalist the true crisis is the reduction of profits: paying taxes means accepting a reduction in profits which constitutes the crisis *par excellence*. If the system's economic difficulties are actually helpful to the private enterprise there is no crisis for the capitalist who reasons in terms of costs and profits. The case of the Big Seven who, in 1973, did excellent business at the expense of the system's equilibrium, is quite typical. In other words, the capitalist acts toward his personal, not global, ends (profit) — which is normal in a system where single firms or group profits are the only true indicators of success and the economy's fundamental mainsprings. Thus, it is absurd to ask capitalists to accept a sacrifice (reduction of profits) in order to save the system's equilibrium since profit reduction for employers is the real crisis; this idea is as logical as to ask a man to kill himself in order to avoid death. Therefore, I think that there is a fiscal crisis and I do not share the perplexity of Hugh Mosley's theory ("Is there a Fiscal Crisis of the State?" *Monthly Review*, Vo.. 30, No. 1, May 1978, pp. 3à-45.) even though I recognize the many lacunae in O'Connor's analysis.

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would have to be created for the youth entering the labor market.[36] About ten million jobs are thus needed to prevent an increase in unemployment, and about 19 million in order to absorb all unemployment. Given the previous analysis, such an objective is, at best, a dream.

The increasing seriousness of the employment situation in industrialized countries is reflected in the policies of various Western governments. Recently, it has been cleverly pointed out that the 1968 slogan "*l'imagination au pouvoir*" has found unexpected followers among the governments of industrialized countries. They have devised a new language for erasing the term "unemployment" as if, by striking it out, they could actually erase the problem.[37] The absurdity of this state of affairs illustrates the impotence of Western governments. Obviously, there is no shortage of economic policy proposals, but these are mostly extremely vacuous hypotheses revolving around few and confused ideas.

The one idea which seems to be making strong headway today in trade union circles and in the Common Market is that of reducing working hours — "less work, work for all" is a slogan gaining momentum and, looking back through the history of capital, it turns out to have been proposed in the past in similar circumstances.[38] The problem, howeve, is more complex than it seems: employers might accept this if the weight of new employment were to fall on the State, e.g., if it were possible to have subsidized employment. But such a solution would only intensify the deficit in the State budget at a time of acute fiscal crisis. In any case, only the State could take on this burden since, if it were imposed on enterprise by law and without a substantial economic support from the State, it would create a veritable economic Waterloo. From the viewpoint of profit, massive hiring of workers during a crisis, when demand and the market are stagnant and there are large reserves of unutilized capacity, would be economically absurd. The logic of capital is completely the opposite: recovery comes first and then, depending on the market, projections are made.

To force firms to hire during a stagnant phase in the hope that this hiring will stimulate recovery would violate the market and the dynamics of profit. The only possible reaction in this situation would be a stagnation of investments and, consequently, economic collapse.[39] On the other hand, a

36. Cf. V. Vegetti "Proposte CEE per Ridurre l'Orario," in *L'Unità*, March 22, 1978, p. 7, which stressed that 9.7 million new jobs are necessary since those retiring on pensions vacate fewer jobs than are necessary for new arrivals on the labor market; 9.7 million is clearly a significant number. At any rate, the present, unemployment figures are underestimated since, in Italy alone, there is an enormous hidden unemployment, much higher than shown by official data. If we bear in mind that only one-third of the population works, while elsewhere (in Japan) it is 48%, we have a phenomenon of real unemployment affecting about 15% (over 8 million) of the population. These people are generally called non-employed simply because they are not registered on job placement lists. It is presumed that they are not looking for work. The simple truth is that there are no jobs and they are not looking because they know there are none.

37. See N. Vargas, "Chômage: L'imagination au pouvoir!" in *Economia*, No. 36, p. 47.

38. Cf. R. Giannotta, *Lotte e Organizzazione di Classe alla FIAT*, (Bari, 1970), pp. 126ff.

39. Cf. my discussion of similar attempts by the Venezuelan government to force employers

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general and steady increase in employment is not conceivable: in fact, if firms were forced, directly or indirectly, to increase employment by 10 percent they would confront absurd situations since a 10 percent employment increase in the textile branch would not necessarily mean that demand for textiles will also increase by 10 percent since the new demand created by the new employment is not necessarily spread equally among branches and productive sectors. Thus, it is not possible to expect miracles by legislative edicts by reducing the length of the work week — especially since a compulsory reduction of the work week would not necessarily result in stimulating demand for industrial labor.

From the days of the 10-hour work day (1847) to today, the length of the work week has been slowly but continuously decreasing in industrialized countries. As already indicated, however, industrial employment has not been thereby increased. The length of the work week decreases and manpower migrates to the tertiary sector. The cause of this tendency is well-known: large monopolies that utilize labor-saving technologies produce enormous quantities of wealth with a low number of workers (in relation to produced wealth). Thus, a reduction in the length of the work week would intensify monopoly tendencies to utilize even more labor-saving technologies and thus place the small and medium industries (which do not have the financial resources or the adjustment capabilities of monopolies) in an unbearable situation. In such a context, employment could not possibly grow. Clearly, therefore, an increase in employment paralleled by a reduction in the work week can only come about through State intervention which would support the new burden of wages. In view of the enormity of such a burden, however, and during a fiscal crisis of the State, this would have disruptive consequences (e.g., contributing to an already dangerous inflationary spiral). At any rate, few really believe that a reduction of the work week to a 35 or 36-hour length could be imposed on employers during a crisis under the pretext of increasing employment.

Suggestions put forth along these lines at the political and trade union level are generally much more moderate. It is not a question of imposing by legislation a drastic and unprecedented reduction of the work week, but of finding a meeting point between the exigencies of capital (profit-making) and those of the working class (preserving and broadening employment). The proposal put forth by Italian unions, commonly called the 6x6 formula, moves precisely in this direction: workers would work six rather than eight hours per day, but for six rather than five days per week. This would create a need for a new work shift which would increase employment. Usage of existing plants would increase with a result of more employment and higher profits. The circle would have been squared. Yet, the 6x6 formula has met ferocious employer resistance which has prevented its implementation. The entrepreneurial class knows that in a market economy it is almost impossible

to increase employment as a premise for economic recovery, in "The Oil Crisis and the Iron Law of Underdevelopment," *Telos*, No. 31, Spring 1977, p. 28.

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to always use plants at 100 percent of efficiency because of the oscillations of demand. Thus, plants must be built to meet maximum market demand (otherwise the firm would be forced to forfeit a portion of its market to others). Maximum market demand, on the other hand, lasts for a period much shorter than the plant's lifespan. Consequently, it is normal for 10-12 percent of a plant's productive capacity to remain idle even during phases of expansion. This was the limitation of the union proposal. To utilize plant capacity to the maximum would mean production of unsellable goods — which would be disastrous from the viewpoint of profits.

Equally problematic is the attempt to sustain certain types of employment by having the State assume a (modest) share of the costs. The most famous and recent of such cases was the June 1977 Italian law n.285 concerning employment of youth. In other words, it has been recognized that it is generally not possible to force firms to hire and at the same time, the State cannot assume the entire wage burden for new jobs since it does not have the means to do so. It would only create a semblance of employment which would in reality be essentially subsidized unemployment.

Thus, an alternative is chosen: firms are not forced to hire youths joining the labor market but, if they do so, for each person hired the State gives them a wage subsidy which they lose (and they would hate to pay back all sums received) if there are layoffs. As one could have imagined, the law has been a failure. The State assumed only part of the wage burden and the rest fell on the shoulders of the employers who were asked to increase their risks. The law might work when the market is picking up — although in such a situation there is no need for such a law — but when it is stagnant, the law is useless.[40] A rather cynical solution to employment problems in rich countries has been proposed by Lionel Stoleru (an authoritative exponent of the Giscardian brain trust). When asked whether it was possible to resolve the employment problem in France, he answered: "I think that it can be solved completely. We have a million unemployed and two million immigrant workers; these figures prove clearly that a solution is possible.[41] This means keeping immigrant workers from Spain, Turkey, Italy, Yugoslavia or Portugal out of advanced countries like France (or England, West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, etc.). In fact, during the 1966-67 recession, the West German government used this method in an almost painless way: equilibrium was re-established by a slow-down in immigrant entries and some incentive for exits.[42] In 1976, 1.3 million immigrant workers lost their jobs in Europe (600,000 in West Germany and 300,000 in France), but only a fraction of those returned home. This massive immigrant "massacre" did not solve the

40. See interview with Stoleru in *Economia*, No. 30, p. 80.

41. Cf. Antony Ward, "European Capitalism's Reserve Army," in *Monthly Review*, Vol. 27, No. 6, November, 1975, pp. 17-32; P. Cinanni, "L'Imbroglio Svizzero e la 'Svolta' nelle Migrazioni dei Lavoratori in Europa," *Ponte*, No. 6, (1977), pp. 588ff, with data on the sacking of immigrants during the 1966-67 German recession.

42. See H. Friedman, "Employment Perspectives in Industrialized Market Economy Countries," *International Labor Review*, Vol. 117, No. 1, p. 6.

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problems of indigenous workers: French and German workers are just as familiar with unemployment. Neither is it true that illegal immigrants block the flux of emigration from poor countries; just one fact, the U.S. Immigration Service has officially estimated that after 1970 more than 4 million foreigners entered the U.S. each year undetected. On the whole, the service estimaes that 7 to 12 million clandestine immigrants are living today in the U.S.

This becomes all the more striking if one bears in mind that in 1970 the slack in U.S. employment had already reached a clear turn. Thus, the German and the Stoleru recipes (apart from their revolting cynicism) show more than one defect, as has been shown in a study by Anicet Le Pors — apparently written especially to throw cold water on Stoleru's enthusiasm. The study concludes that if 150,000 immigrants were expelled, employment gains for French workers would be only modest, while 88,000 jobs would definitely be destroyed in an absolute sense.[43] The reason for such a strange state of affairs lies in the fact that immigrants accept humble types of work and low wages which the French disdain. It is difficult for a recent graduate accustomed to considering his academic title as a means of social advancement to accept manual labor. He might resign himelf to it if forced by extreme need. Otherwise he will prefer to wait in line 3 or 4 more years (and burden his family) rather than accept a social degradation hard to overcome in the future. Also, the elimination of immigrants could lead to an intensification of productive decentralization — a relatively regressive phenomenon.[44] In fact, in poor French regions where the population's social aspirations are lower, it would become possible to cover part of the jobs abandoned by immigrants only by decentralizing certain low skill or unprofitable activities usually left for immigrants.[45] This is possible only at the price of diffusing among metropolitan workers an economic model based on lower wages, decentralization , backwardness, and labor intensive techniques better suited to decentralization. This so-called "remedy" thus offers meager perspectives.

In the final analysis, drastic reductions in immigration and the closing of the borders (which do not prevent illegal immigration) would only constitute a temporary remedy,[46] considering that in Europe it will become necessary to

43. A. Le Pors, "Immigration et Développement Economique," *La Documentation Française*, (Paris, 1977), p. 184.

44. Obviously, this is a regression from the viewpoint of capital which tends to concentrate in high development zones by constantly marginalizing backward zones — an organic capitalist phenomenon. The decentralization of activities to the poor zones of a country in order to exploit low-wage corresponds to secondary tendencies in the economic process since it stimulates the diffusion of fragmented and low-technology activities.

45. Le Pors, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

46. The solution based on shipping immigrants back can work only in exceptional cases such as the 1966-7 German recession which shifted the weight of unemployment on immigrants. But when the crisis assumes the seriousness of the present one, stop-gap manouvres are not enough: unemployment attacks the entire economic front and hits immigrants as well as metropolitan workers. Nor should this lead us to believe that the crisis could block the migratory flux: we have seen that in the U.S. there is an enormous clandestine immigration phenomenon and that in the

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create 19 million jobs by 1985. Capital creates fewer and fewer jobs, and if these tendencies are not reversed, the system will continue heading toward a structural crisis.

Similarly, one should not be overly optimistic even concerning demographic development. Advanced countries in America and Europe, have a very low rate of demographic increase (0.4 percent). A drastic drop to 0 percent is inconceivable without recourse to repressive methods which are irreconcilable even with German-type democratic-bourgeois regimes. Nor can the end of the democratic-representative system be a solution because, as I have noted elsewhere, both in the medium and the long runs, a solution of this type would create more problems than it would solve.[47]

The previous analysis of the employment situation is a pessimistic one. Yet, is appears positive in comparison to that of underindustrialized Third World countries integrated in the world imperialist system, where in the middle 1970s 40 percent of the working-age population (about 300 millions) were unemployed or underemployed. On the basis of a rather optimistic projection, it has been argued that by the year 2,000 another 700 million persons will flood the labor market so that, between now and then, it will be necessary to create a billion new jobs in order to solve the problem of unemployment. The high rate of demographic increase (from 2 to 3.5 percent per year)[48] renders the economic and employment situation in Third World countries simply explosive: at a 2.5 percent annual rate, the population doubles every 29 years and the demographic increase eats up 10 percent of a scarce GNP.[49]

The demographic boom in the Third World, which can have disruptive effects for the world's equilibria, is a relatively recent event, i.e., following WWII. During the 1930s, underdeveloped zones such as Latin America, which are now at the center of the demographic boom, were by no means the cause of serious preoccupation: at the close of the 1930s, South America, with its 94.5 million people, claimed a density of 5 inhabitants per square kilometer!

Common Market countries part of the immigrants laid off are not returning to their home countries. The explanation of this phenomenon is clear: in the home countries (more so than in the metropolis) there are no jobs and, even among rich countries, there is a large area of illegal and marginal labor which grows with the crisis. Thus, immigrants remain (or arrive illegally) reinforcing further pathological phenomena (e.g., illegal work) in the work market.

47. In *Sociologia dell' Imperialismo* (Milano, 1976), pp. 59ff., I have argued that fascism was a mass reactionary movement which gained popular consensus on the basis of an economic program of stabilization and recovery which no one seems to have today in the West. Moreover, a prefascist solution of the Chilean variety (Pinochet), i.e., founded only on repression and not on consensus or economic modernization (like fascism), would expose the delicate structure of industrial societies to great tensions and costs since they require a minimum of mass consensus (this phenomenon is also present in fascism which was a reactionary movement, though also mass-based). Even when it comes to political alternatives for a representative democracy that does not work any longer, the bourgeoisie finds itself in a genuine *cul-de-sac*.

48. Cf. I.C.C., "Croissance Démographique et Développement Economique dans les Pays peu Développés de 1960," *Population*, 1973, pp. 1010ff.

49. André Piettre, *Lew Grands Problèmes de l'Economie Mondiale*, Tomes Ii & III (Vol. II), p. 221.

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Experts explain this recent demographic boom as a consequence of colonization. During the initial phase, colonial conquests were accompanied by savage massacres of indigenous populations (e.g., Indians in South and North America or the slave trade that opened enormous gaps in the African population), on whose account it took an entire historical epoch to fill the demographic voids caused by conquests.[50] After WWII, however, violent colonization, which had already moved beyond its most ferocious stages, came to an end and a new epoch began: demographic gaps are filled and the importation of Western medical techniques produced significant demographic consequences. For example, Ceylon was able to obtain a 40 percent reduction in mortality with a mere half a dollar expenditure *per capita*, while it took $250 per agricultural worker and $3,000 per industrial worker in order to bring about a substantial increase in productivity.[51]

In other words, fewer die but there are almost as many births as in the past when a high rate of fertility helped to balance a high rate of mortality. In the West, too, before the French Revolution, the situation was as follows: France — among today's most Malthusian nations — claimed a 40 percent fertility and a 33 percent mortality rate.[52] After the Revolution, contraceptive techniques became so widespread that, even though mortality dropped through medical and hygienic programs, fertility also dropped.[53] As a result, in Europe and in the U.S. the rate of demographic increase today is 0.4 percent, i.e., 6 to 8 times less than in the Third World.

Thus, the real problem is to know if, and to what extent, Third World countries can follow the European and U.S. examples. According to geographers and demographers, De Castro's thesis, whereby poverty generates sexual hyper-activity, must be rejected because it does not explain why poverty should have such biological consequences. The thesis merely observes that in poor countries there is much procreation and from there it is argued that the poor are great lovers.[54] Instead, according to Lacoste or Lester Brown, the causes are quite different and can be divided into two groups: cultural and economic.[55] Cultural cause refers to moral or religious prejudices in favor of large families which date back to an era when high fertility was necessary for compensating for high mortality. As often happens, this prejudice was bound to survive beyond its causes. Economic causes refer to the fact that in poor countries child labor is widespread and, as a result, a child is usually considered an exploitable source of wealth — a

50. Cf. Y. Lacoste, *Geografia del Sottosviluppo*, (Milano, 1968), p. 129ff.; Marcel Reinhard, André Armengaud and J. Dupaquiêr, *Storia della Popolazione Mondiale*, (Bari, 1971), p. 670ff.

51. Y. Lacoste, *op. cit.*, p. 131; see also M. Reinhard *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 921ff.

52. Cf. Albert Soboul, *The French Revolution, 1787-1799*, (New York, 1975).

53. Cf. Piettre, *op. cit.*, p. 224; L. Henry and I. Houdialle, "Fécondité des Mariages dan le Quart Nord-ouest de la France de 1670 à 1929," *Population*, 1973, p. 873ff. These authors note that birth control emerged in the wake of the Revolution and, according to Piettre, became widespread in Europe after 1880.

54. For a critique of De Castro, cf. Y. Lacoste, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-5; Lester Brown, *In the Human Interest*, (New York, 1974).

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means for confronting a precarious economic situation.

None of these arguments is convincing: in countries where chronic malnutrition is widespread among the lower strata of the population, the father of 8 to 10 children will probably be the undernourished father of undernourished children. Before someone can be exploited, he must reproduce more than he needs to maintain himself. Third World wages, however, primarily because of child labor, are at the limit of (or just below) the biological minimum. Once the employer finishes his exploitation by means of what are literally, hunger wages, there is nothing left for the father. On the other hand, there is a minimum working-age (physical rather than legal) and this means that until a certain age the child remains a burden for the father. Lester Brown himself provides decisive arguments against the thesis that he himself accepts: "a commission nominated by the Indian government to study this phenomenon has estimated that evey year there are 3.8 million induced abortions of which 180,000 result in the death of the mother. The survival probabilities of an American soldier called to Vietnam in 1970 at the war's peak were much higher than those of an Indian woman planning an abortion. It is evident, therefore, that the decision to confront such a high risk is an indication of the desperation of women seeking to avoid unwanted births."[56]

Things become even more frightening if we consider that for each dead woman there will be (in terms of statistical probabilities) many more that suffer lesions or serious negative consequences due to abortions being performed under unsafe and primitive conditions, as in India. Therefore, as the case of India shows — the country with the largest underdeveloped market economy on earth which is also leading the demographic boom — babies are not considered a source of wealth or help but rather a curse that one tries to avoid at enormous risk. Moreover, worldwide, there are about 40 million abortions annually and, as the Indian case shows, the phenomenon is widespread in the Third World where contraceptive methods function poorly and, in the majority of cases, abortion remains the only recourse.[57]

The Indian example suffices to demonstrate the falsity of the claim that cultural and religious prejudices encourage large families.[58] Furthermore, in Latin America, where the Church carries considerable weight, the progressive position on the demographic problem does not help reduce the birth rate.[59]

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56. See Lester Brown, *op. cit.*

57. For example, the 1972-3 contraception campaign in India must have prevented 3 million births — less of what is obtained each year through abortions. On this, see I.C. Chenais and J. Vallin, "Les Populations au Sud de l'Himalaya," *Population*, 1975, pp. 1082-3.

58. See André Piettre, *op. cit.*, p. 226, which reports that 85% of Indian women are illiterate. Besides, cultural prejudices and customs do not necessarily always favor demographic increase: in India, for example, the breast-feeding period is rather long (up to two years) and implies a reduction in sexual activity. It is also considered inappropriate to have children after one has become a grandparent where, given the low age one can marry, they become grandparents earlier than in the West. On these points, cf.Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Vol. 2, (New York, 1968).

59. See Denis Lambert and Jean-Marie Martin, *L'America Latina*, (Milano, 1973), p. 103.

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On the other hand, before the revolution, France too was a nation characterized by a very high birth rate, an archaic religiosity and a large family cult which no longer exists today. Thus, the point is to identify the mechanisms for transforming a given situation (high birthrate) that worked in 19th century France and which did not work in India or in the Third World. It is well known that in Western countries there has been a need to defend the levels of well-being already attained and that this has helped popularize birth control methods among the people.[60] This is not possible in poor countries. On an individual level, the problem is quite simple: it is one of cost. In Italy, a year's supply of contraceptive pills costs between 12 and 15 dollars and each year the use of pills requires 2 or 3 medical visits and various analyses. The annual cost of this semi-safe system ranges from 60 to 120 dollars per year, and a similar estimate can be reached for the cost of the IUD. Even if it is assumed that in Third World countries the cost remains the same (which is doubtful since the sanitary-pharmaceutical system is enormously more backward so that it is difficult and, therefore, costly to obtain certain goods and services), an untenable situation results since Third World per capita incomes oscillate between $50 and $500 per year. It should also be remembered that these averages conceal huge disproportions since the upper 10 percent of the population normally takes 40 percent of the income. Thus, the situation is even worse for most of the people. As Myrdal points out, the task of attacking this problem can only fall on the State.[61] But can the State succeed where individuals cannot? Here, too the answer must be in the negative. Confronting this problem requires a large social investment: India has committed as much as 1.5 to 2 percent of its budget to contraceptive campaigns[62] and the results were very small — the 3 million births prevented in 1972-73 were almost compensated by the drop in mortality.[63] Moreover, it has been stressed that the modest slow-down in fertility rates seems to be due more to accidental oscillations than to the government's campaign since the birthrate is not at all proportional to the number of couples using contraceptives: in the states of Maharashtra, Tamilnad and Tripura, couples using contraceptives constitute 24.2 percent, 18.8 percent and 6.1 percent respectively, while the rates of fertility are 32 percent, 32.4 percent and 32.9 percent,[64] i.e., similar, despite clear differences in the usage of contraceptives. In the Pubjab, with 25.1 percent of couples using contraceptives, the fertility rate is 34.4 percent; in Manipur the figures are 3.9 percent and 29.3 percent. Other similar examples could follow at random.

It is also worth noting that the Indian government's considerable financial effort has managed on the average to provide necessary contraceptives for only 15 percent of the couples, with no real results. In the end, the problem

60. See André Piettre, *op.cit.*, p. 224; G. Myrdal, *op.cit.*, II, p. 1473.
61. Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 1492ff.
62. André Piettre, *op. cit.*, p. 226.
63. I.C. Chenais and J. Vallin, *op. cit.*
64. *Ibid.*, p. 1084.

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could be clarified by a recent study conducted in Morocco concerning the use of contraceptives.[65] The sample of interviewed women using pills or the IUD for 48 months provided the following data: the number of women using contraceptives decreased continuously during the time segment under consideration (there were intermediate checkups at 6, 12, 24, and 36 month intervals) and, after 48 months, only 28.1 percent of the sample still used contraceptives. The rate of protection (women who did not get pregnant) decreased with time. After 48 months it was only 61.5 percent for IUD users and, for the pill, 37.2 percent at 36 months (there is no figure for the pill after 48 months). Moreover, among women who abandoned contraceptive methods, only 7.1 percent did so because they wanted a child. The rest, as the interviewer points out, did so because they claimed real or supposed discomforts. Evidently, in a poor country, the rate of safety of methods such as the IUD and the pill — which is almost 100 percent — decreases frightfully. Why? The answer lies in the fact that contraceptive usage requires a broad, structured and efficient network of health maintenance. Women need to be helped and counseled, especially in countries where contraceptive devices are a novelty. Otherwise, it is likely that at the first discomfort they will abandon contraceptive use, even if this discomfort is imaginary or has different origins. Yet, these are precisely cases that require an explanation to the patient about the real origin of the trouble, as well as a cure. In poor countries, hospitals and health care systems are primitive,[66] barely adequate for reducing mortality but not sufficient to ensure wide support for a contraceptive campaign. The costs of such a campaign would be very high.

Given the low levels of individual incomes and the poverty of the great majority of the people, an efficient campaign should make the needed contraceptives available free — or almost free — to 90 percent of the population (the privileged 10 percent having large incomes can tend to their own needs). This would multiply many times over the already enormous effort made by the Indian government, which is one of the most heavily committed in this field. What is needed in addition to a massive sanitation network is a modern, strengthened school system capable of dispensing a minimum of education and demographic-sanitary information to all concerned.[67] If one considers that in a country like India 85 percent of the women are illiterate, the length and costliness of the projected course becomes evident. Still, the Indian situation is not the most desperate. In 80 Third World countries, only 5 to 10 percent of the couples on the average — i.e., less than in India — use contraceptives.[68]

65. See, P.P. "Une Enquête au Maroc sur la Continuation des Méthodes Contraceptives," *Population*, 1975, pp. 629ff., with data cited here.

66. Cf. L. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 118 where he notes that in poor countries there are few modern hospitals and they are in urban zones serving the rich. See also, G. Myrdal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III. In other words, it took very little (for example, the wide spread use of quinine against malaria) to reduce mortality drastically, while it would take a lot more to contain fertility.

67. On this issue cf. L. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-116; it is universally admitted that the diffusion of education contributes to containing fertility.

68. See André Piettre, *op. cit.*

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In addition, the problem grows thornier by the fact that a limited effort in the field of social services either becomes neutralized or even becomes counterproductive. Thus, a modest improvement in sanitary conditions may bring about a higher drop in mortality than in birth rates, thus making no change, or even aggravating the demographic problem. Symptomatic of this are the cases of El Salvador and Costa Rica. Both governments have made considerable efforts (in terms of available financial resources) in the field of social and sanitary services in order to prevent fertility. They reaped the following results: in 1950-55 the Costa Rican birth rate was 45.56 percent, mortality was 11.89 percent, and there was a 58.24 percent probability of survival at the time of birth. For the 1970-75 period, we have a 33.40 percent birth rate, a 5.89 percent mortality rate, and a 68.18 life expectancy rate. From a demographic viewpoint, conditions in El Salvador are even worse.[69]

To move to another geographic area and country, the massive efforts of the Sri Lanka government have brought about a significant reduction in fertility which, however, has been almost entirely balanced out by a reduction in mortality. As a result, in the mid-1970s, the annual rate of demographic growth was 2.3 percent against a 2.4 percent in 1871, while 20 percent of the population is unemployed.[70] For Bangladesh, the results were similar.[71] In certain ways, the African situation is more serious since eventual sanitary improvements might have quite dangerous demographic consequences: as of now, average life expectancy in Africa is quite low (46 years, vs. 57 in Asia and 63 in Latin America)[72] and there are vast zones where fertility is lower

69. Cf. G. Gonzales, "Programmes d'Action Sociale et Fécondité: Etude Comparée du Salvador et du Costa Rica," *Problèmes Politiques et Sociaux,* No. 32, p. 25ff.

70. On date about Ceylon (Sri Lanka), cf. J.H. Basse, "La Fécondité à Ceylan," *Population,* 1973, pp. 426ff.; J. Angout, "La Chasse aux Capitaux," in *Economia,* No. 25, pp. 31-2.

71. I. Hd. "Une Enquête Retrospective sur la Population du Bangla-Desh," in *Population,* 1973, pp. 688ff.

72. On the Bucharest conference (August 19-20, 1974) cf. "Plan d'Action Mondiale de la Population," in *Population,* 1975, p. 106. The resolution is limited to suggesting a series of methods, among which are the diffusion of culture and scientific research (pp. 130, 132); but it does not indicate operatively how these means could be concretized given the poverty of backward countries (clearly, these methods are costly). Consider scientific research: Latin America has allocated to this sector (considered as a whole and not just the medico-biological field) 0.2% of its 1963 GNP while rich countries have made a *per capita* effort surpassing that figure by 12 to 134 times (cf. G. Landucci, "Dipendenza Scientifica e Condizionamento Tecnologico in America Latina," in *Terzo Mondo,* No. 26, p. 110). Nevertheless, among underdeveloped countries, Latin America is relatively developed. The fact is that scarcity of resources obstructs high investments in fields where an immediate advantage, in GNP terms, does not follow. Under such conditions, it is clear that a solution to the demographic problem could come from rich countries where there exist enormous multinational firms of the chemico-pharmaceutical sector dealing with the problem. It is unlikely, however, that this solution would be relevant for poor countries: the products of Western technology are extremely expensive for poor countries and, no doubt, present tendencies are not moving in the direction of a reduction of the inflationary spiral — quite the contrary (cf. A. Carlo, "Imperialism, Monopolies, Inflation," in *Telos,* No. 34 [Winter 1977-78], pp. 89ff.). From the scientific viewpoint, demographic growth is already controllable (even though later improvements could be made) so that, the problem is not a scientific but a socio-economic one. Thus, it is not a question of expecting scientific miracles since the real stumbling block is elsewhere. In conclusion, poverty in backward countries prevents them from copying already existing

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than in Asia because some traditional diseases (like syphillis in the Upper Volta, the main cause of the region's low fertility) have not been conquered.[73]

Therefore, limited socio-sanitary actions do not suffice and, indeed, might even produce negative results. Social investments must go well beyond the already considerable efforts made by the Indian government. Is this possible? Third World countries with market economies have entered the orbit of the world capitalist system and obey its laws, which also condition the actions of the regimes governing those countries. In the capitalist system, social investments have developed after the industrial takeoff because their returns are low and belated. Thus, the building of the industrial structure came first and then, on the basis of an enlarged national product, social expenditures followed. Thus, the first phase of the industrial takeoff, the so-called industrial revolution, is notorious for its lack in excess sociality. Third World countries with market economies have a very weak industrial structure and their discrepancy *vis-à-vis* rich countries creates a situation of economic dependence which allows the movement of capital to flow directly from poor to rich countries because capital cannot find profitable investment opportunities locally. Industrial development therefore becomes a priority for those integrated in an area dominated by the logic of profit. It is the only way for a country to become competitive and avoid the evils of an unequal exchange between manufactured and non-manufactured products. Lack of industrial development implies marginality and dependence and, therefore, it is logical that even the small advanced national bourgeoisies of the Third World would seek to increase industrial development. But an economic structure is faced with a drastic choice: it can either favor industrialization or focus on contraception, schools and hospitals. If it focuses excessively on a demographic campaign, industrial investments must lag behind for lack of resources so that the gulf with rich nations grows deeper and dependence increases. If they only focus on industrial development, the demographic spiral is left unchecked and can easily nip in the bud all possibility of development. Thus, a compromise is the best alternative: the goal is to develop social programs without ignoring efforts toward economic development. Funds, however, turn out to be insufficient, and the reduction in fertility is more than compensated by that in mortality, and things are back where they started.[74]

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techniques from rich countries and from obtaining in massive quantity and low prices commodities that Third World economies need in this field. P. George, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

73. See A. Retel Lauretin, "Fécondité et Syphilis dans la Région du Volta Noire," in *Population*, 1973, pp. 79ff.

74. See Dieter Senghaas, *Weltwirtschaftordnung und Entwicklungspolitik: Plädoyer für Dissoziation*, (Frankfurt a.M., 1977, p. 223ff. This is an analysis of the exploitation of poor by rich countries by means of very expensive exports. India, the largest underdeveloped bourgeois democracy, has dedicated considerable resources to military expenditures which serve to reinforce an externally aggressive policy which, in turn, is used by the bourgeoisie to disguise its own internal bankruptcy and drag the masses under its leadership into "national unions" (against the enemy). Cf. Ch. Bettelheim, *India Independent*, (London, 1968). In addition, while in rich countries military expenses help local industries (and, therefore, national development), in poor

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This situation is further complicated for the majority of countries by the reactionary character of their regimes — which is itself not an accident since the living conditions of the masses are frightening and hardly lend themselves to a transplant of Western bourgeois-democratic institutions presupposing a certain degree of mass consensus. Thus, the system requires an expensive military and police apparatus that takes resources away from the country's economic and demographic policies.

The situation is very serious and the degree of hopelessness of Third World countries *vis-à-vis* the demographic problem is well illustrated by the Indian experience following the failure of the 1972-73 demographic campaign: from April to December 1976, over 7 million sterilizations were performed in India, and it was implied that obligatory sterilization might be a possibility. The state of Maharashtra, which has Bombay as its capital, has planned legislation concerning compulsory sterilization which is unlikely to ever become law.[75] The fall of Mrs. Gandhi's regime seems to have put a brake to that policy. Yet, it should be asked whether that policy could have led to serious results had it been continued. Of course, the previously practiced free sterilization helped by incentives (anyone consenting to it received 70 to 150 rupees), meant a considerable cost to the state, but was of little help to the citizen who undergoes severe mutilation (Indian hospitals do not guarantee the consequences of certain operations) for an operation paid for with 2 to 3 weeks of an urban worker's wage.[76]

An incentive of this kind could only attract the most needy of the population, and the Gandhi regime knew as much, since it felt the need to resort to the threat of compulsory sterilization. In order to function, this compulsory measure requires a vast, efficient and therefore costly administrative and repressive apparatus capable of enforcing an unpopular Draconian law.[77] Similarly, it requires a functioning system of hospitals, i.e., one that treats patients without butchering them (not so much for humanitarian reasons extraneous to the logic of Third World elites, but because, in practical terms, an excessive number of physically or psychically impaired subjects is an indication of socio-economic weakness). Thus, if the Gandhi regime had not fallen and had it opted for compulsory sterilization, it would have confronted considerable social and economic costs.

From the viewpoint of existing Third World regimes, the problem is almost

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countries the more sophisticated goods are bought by rich countries, thus removing resources and boosting commercial deficits. Cf. L.C. Landman, "L'Organisation de la Prévention des Naissances en Inde," in *Problèmes politiques et sociaux,* No. 332, p. 41.

countries the more sophisticated goods are bought by rich countries, thus removing resources and boosting commercial deficits.

75. Cf. L.C. Landman, "L'Organisation de la Prévention des Naissances en Inde," in *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, No. 332, p. 41.

76. Landman notes that this sum is nominal because it must also pay doctors' and hospitals' fees. Obviously, this was a laughable countercoup at the individual level but, given the number of cases attended, it was relatively heavy on the state budget.

77. Janata Front has turned Mrs. Gandhi's demographic policy into the cornerstone of his electoral campaign (*Ibid.*, p. 39) which concluded with the clamorous defeat of Gandhi who, in the previous period, had done everything to gag the opposition with measures that could hardly be described as "non-violent."

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insoluble. But would it be such for a socialist regime? Here the structural frame of reference should change: Third World countries do not lack the resources necessary for development and they dispose of enormous, unused surpluses of manpower and considerable quantities of wealth concentrated in a few hands.[78]

This does not contradict what was said earlier concerning the scarcity of resources for the development of Third World countries. Scarcity is real. Yet, it is not absolute but only relative to the underdeveloped capitalist structures of these countries. In other words, low industrial development in the Third World prevents their weak economies from reabsorbing productive forces (manpower and capital) which they create. Consequently, their capital is largely exported while their manpower emigrates or remains unemployed. Economic resources are scarce, not only because they do not exist, but because the mechanisms of the imperialist system work in such a way that these resources are either left unused, or forced to leave the country.[79] Therefore, the picture would change if the ties of dependence with imperialism were severed, thus giving life to a model of autonomous development founded on mass needs — a so-called, self-centered development.

The Chinese case is significant here. Although it is unclear whether the Chinese model of the Maoist era was socialist or collective-bureaucratic, it was a case of non-capitalist or anti-capitalist development, independent of the world market, and capable of significant economic development while containing annual demographic growth at 2 percent and improving enormously the country's sanitary conditions.[80] Thus, the problem is insoluble only within the framework of capitalist underdevelopment.

For poor countries, as well as for the rich, the progressive deterioration of the employment situation has necessitated the development of new economic policies. The most courageous proposals originate from the Geneva IBL (ILO) circles which have developed a series of fairly radical economic measures that can be summarized as follows: (1) an increase in the incomes and buying power of poor sectors of the population to stimulate the economic and employment dynamic; (2) a consistent increase of agriculture and of small artisan production; (3) emphasis on production of necessary rather than luxury goods; (4) radical agrarian reforms to be accompanied by measures that would make agricultural prices renumerative; (5) broader participation of the popular masses in political power, and growth of planning; (6) expansion of international trade in a manner consistent with the needs of imports; (7) development of an intermediate technology capable of reconciling the need for producing goods necessary to the population with

78. For a broader treatment of this point, see Ernest Mandel, *Marxist Economic Theory*, Vol. II, (New York, 1969).

79. Among the latest examples of this, see the case of petrodollars which were rapidly recovered by rich countries, directly or indirectly (investments or demand for always more expensive manufactured goods). Cf. my "The Oil Crisis..." *op. cit.*

80. Cf. M. Reinhard, A. Armengaud, I. Dupaquiêr, *op. cit.*, p. 951.

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a broad use of manpower.[81] Clearly, this involves a complex of daring, radical but, at the same time, ambiguous and contradictory measures because they really do not come to terms with the problem of the continued existence of the imperialist system and of the fetters it places on countries integrated with it.

Let us begin with technology. If these social goals are to be realized, they must come to terms with and overcome capitalist structures. Technologies which privilege productivity at the level of individual projects, i.e., private economic initiatives or enterprises, are typical of capitalism whose logic is to produce more by employing fewer, since this policy is more profitable for private enterprises. Contemporary discourse concerning the global goals of the capitalist system (the so-called global efficiency) is entirely erroneous: the capitalist market recognizes only one real index of success: profit at the level of private enterprise (or group of enterprises) competing with each other.[82] Enterprises which lack capital cannot use highly productive capital-intensive technologies. Thus, they survive at the margins of the market, as is illustrated by the well-known phenomenon of "mortality" of small and medium industries. Therefore, if the objective is realized in the context of capitalism, poorer countries will end up specializing in labor-intensive activities (production of low-technology goods) which rich countries have no interest in producing, due to their low profitability. This phenomenon is already occurring in some sectors (e.g., textiles and footwear) and, although in corresponding sectors of rich countries employers are concerned about the rise of these new competitors, this does not shake the imperialist system in its entirety. In fact, this type of activity is based on extremely low wages, which prevent the growth of consumption and of the domestic market. On the other hand, demand in rich countries (precisely because of the contraction of the domestic market in poor countries) becomes crucial so to further intensify this utter dependence within the imperialist orbit.

In other words, it is a matter of a dependent under-utilization which intensifies an already existing division of labor between rich countries producing high-technology goods and poor countries producing low technology goods.[83] As soon as poor countries seek to move into more

81. In clarifying this last aspect, an expert official connected with the IBL circles emphasized that the technology in question must aim at "greater productivity of manpower by means of a greater volume of jobs, i.e., a maximization of manpower productivity from the viewpoint of the economy in general, instead of the single, particular project." Cf. H. Singer, *Tecnologias para Satisfacer las Necessidades Esenciales,* (Ginebran, 1978), p. 37.

82. Since Third World countries are also dominated by the logic of profit, firms employing less profitable techniques were bound to be marginalized. This explains why, at the BIT conference, an Algerian delegate, commenting critically on the "Genevan" proposals, answered that: "We do not intend to condemn ourselves to technological dependence" (see B.K., "Un Milliard d'Emploi à Gréer," *Economia*, No. 25, p. 32). Besides, the BIT proposals do not seem to have had major consequences so far (though it may be too soon to judge). Yet, Sri Lanka's experience from the application of the Geneva hypothesis is indicative: the results are 38,500 new jobs (direct or indirect) which absorb 0.12% of the GNP — a drop in the ocean! Cf. H.A. de S. Gunasekera and H.M.A. Codippily, "Employment Creation through Regional Development: Recent Experience in Sri Lanka," *International Labor Review*, Vol. 116, No. 1, pp. 4`8.

83. This is why there was considerable reaction by poor countries against the Geneva

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sophisticated production requiring advanced technology, Western cooperation becomes essential.[84] This, however, is paid for in two ways: an increasing deficit in the balance of payments together with the denationalization of top industries acquired or controlled by foreign capital in exchange for their technological cooperation. The Brazilian model is a clear case of this.[85] Thus, in the context of a technology aiming at increasing employment growth instead of productivity, there is no escape. The picture would obviously change if the use of this technology were tied to a radical change in production and in the distribution of wealth (i.e., to the overcoming of capitalism). Whatever its nature, the Chinese model has definitely overturned the typical priorities of capitalism. It is clear, however, that in order to bring about this shift, it is necessary to break with a system that allows profits only at the level of the enterprise and with the dependence on the world market, which obstructs the development of autonomous structures. Clearly, a poor country with a disproportionate distribution of wealth is likely to have a limited domestic market. Hence, the tendency to develop industries focusing on foreign markets and, therefore, outside dependence. In addition, in a country with low technology competitiveness can only be attained through a ferocious control of wages. All of this has to be reversed.

The IBL experts exaggerate when they talk about a broad plan of democratic reforms (agrarian reform, popular participation, planning, income redistribution, etc.) which, if realized, would be incompatible with the survival of capitalism. To propose that the economy must set global social goals (full employment) as opposed to particular ones (productivity and profit at single enterprises) clashes with the continued existence of capitalism. If such a program were realized within standing capitalist structures, it would either go bankrupt or, worse, in the course of its realization it would turn into a boon for tendencies already existing in the world market — i.e., the division of labor between rich, technologically advanced countries, and those marginal countries that produce labor-intensive type goods with all the implied consequences. The IBL experts circle around the obstacle without confronting it.

A similar ambiguity stands out in all talk about agrarian reform and profitability of agricultural prices. In the world capitalist system there is a gap between agricultural and industrial prices (unequal exchange). Agriculture is poor because it accumulates little, thanks to unequal exchange. As a result, it hardly develops, guarantees low incomes, and its sad consequences are poor countries' agricultural deficits and urbanization without development. Unless

proposals which condemn them to produce eternally shoes and shirts, reserving calculators and nuclear energy for the rich.

84. This is so because, by themselves, poor countries do not have the resources to develop scientific research. The picture changes if the poor country breaks with imperialism and recovers control of its own potential sources of surplus. Soviet and Chinese scientific development is indicative. This is not to suggest that the USSR and China are socialist countries, but only that they have broken with imperialism thus opening previously precluded alternatives.

85. Cf. Senghaas, *op. cit.*, p. 118ff.

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the knot is cut (by breaking the unequal exchange between industry and agriculture), nothing will change. The phenomenon in question is typical of the capitalist-imperialist system so that the problem remains one of breaking with capitalism. Similar critiques can be made against the IBL's proposal to increase exchange between poor countries and the world market. In reality, to the extent that these countries are integrated within a system based on unequal exchange, they end up constantly increasing their debts and this blocks the possibility of increasing trade.[86]

It has been said that after 15 years, socio-economic predictions become mere dreams. This is true, of course, for short- or medium-range predictions. Thus, then tracing out the patterns of development of economic systems, predictions should focus on long periods. Already in 1672, W. Petty argued that, under capitalism, the population employed in agriculture decreases to the advantage of those in industry, while the rest are absorbed by the tertiary sector. Three centuries of socio-economic history shows that Petty's prediction was well grounded. The great tendency identified by Petty, however, has run its course and is about to give way to another one: that of increasing unemployment. In the future, there will be more jobs destroyed in agriculture and industry which will be decreasingly absorbed by the tertiary sector. We have reached the limit of this type of development and, in the future, the predominant tendency will be different. Manpower will not go from the primary and secondary sectors to the tertiary, but will rather tend to move from all sectors toward unemployment.

There will be limited pauses and brief slowdowns of this tendency, but the broad outline remains: in rich as well as in poor countries, unemployment can only increase if capitalist relations continue unchanged. In 1985 there will be 19 million unemployed reported or hiding within the Common Market and, in the year 2000, there will be a billion unemployed or underemployed persons in Third World countries with market economies. These are frightening figures and raise the question whether this system can survive under such conditions.[87]

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86. See André Piettre, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

87. This does not mean that the system is necessarily moving toward authoritarian involutions for, as already pointed out, a fascist or Chilean solution is no alternative. For the time being what is more likely is an erosion of democratic liberties (different from country to country) within a formally democratic framework. In any case, even now, there are democratic-bourgeois regimes where only 28-30% of the population works (Venezuela).

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THE SOCIAL REGIME IN RUSSIA*

by Cornelius Castoriadis

1. That Russian society is a divided one, subject to the domination of a particular social group, and with widespread exploitation and oppression, is directly evidenced by the most elementary and best known facts. To present the Russian regime as "socialist" or as a "workers' state," as do both the "left" and the "right" in an almost universal complicity, or even to discuss its nature in reference to socialism to determine at what points and to what degree it deviates from it, represents one of the most horrendous enterprises of mystification known in history. The persistent success of this enterprise obviously poses a crucial question concerning the function and importance of ideology in the contemporary world.

2. Russian society, like Eastern European societies, China, etc., is an asymmetrical and antagonistically divided society — or, in traditional terms, a "class society." It is subject to the domination of a particular social group, the bureaucracy, whose active core is the political bureaucracy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This domination is concretized as economic exploitation, political oppression and mental enslavement of the population by the bureaucracy to its own profit. Yet, the bureaucracy does not exercise an absolute mastery over society — not any more than other dominant strata in other societies. It must face the conflict that opposes it to the population — a conflict whose manifestations the totalitarian regime stifles without successfully suppressing. It is subject to the antinomies and irrationalities connected with the modern bureaucratic regime. Finally, the bureaucracy itself is dominated by its system, by the institution of the society to which it is correlative and by the social imaginary significations (*significations imaginaires sociales*) this institution carries. Russian society too is an alienated or heteronomous society with "all classes confounded."

3. The relations of production in Russia are antagonistic ones. They divided and oppose managers and operatives. They imply the exploitation of producers workers, peasants and "service" employees) and their enslavement in a production process that completely escapes their control. "Nationalization" (state ownership) of the means of production and bureaucratic planning do not entail in the least the abolition of exploitation and have nothing to do with socialism. The elimination of "private property" leaves entirely open the question concerning "*who* effectively controls the means of production and

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production itself." For in Russia (as in Eastern European countries, China, etc.) it is the bureaucracy (in the economy, the state, and especially in the Communist Party) that collectively makes decisions concerning the means of free time and what is produced. Under the pretense of the juridical form of "nationalized (state) property" it has the *right to enjoy, use and abuse* [*jus fruendi, utendi et abutendi*]. State ownership and bureaucratic "planning" are the adequate and necessary means of production and production "statically" at all times. It "does what it wants" with them, physically and economically, as much as and more than a capitalist "does what he wants" with his capital. Above all, it controls them "dynamically." It decides how the surplus extracted from the working population, the rate of that surplus, and its character (the determination of what goes for bureaucratic consumption and what goes for accumulation, as well as the direction of this accumulation). Russian "capital" today is "essentially" the surplus accumulated from the exploitation of the Russian people over the last sixty years. In its physical form, it is the sedimented result of the bureaucracy's decisions and of the functioning of its system during that time.

4. The character of the relations of production and of the social regime is inscribed in the materiality of the means of production and is supported by them. By virtue of the form and content that they impart to the labor process, these instruments of labor seek to guarantee the subjugation of the producers to the labor process, both in terms of the nature of the work they specify as well as the type of organization of labor they entail. Because of the nature of the products they are meant to produce, these instruments of production embody the orientation stamped on social life by the bureaucracy, its specific ends, and both values and meanings to which the bureaucracy itself is subject. The production of armaments, consumer goods for the bureaucracy, and especially the production of machines designed to reproduce the same type of production and the same relations of production illustrate very well how the nature of the social regime corresponds to the productive "means" it develops. The total identity of these means with those invented and implemented by Western capitalism testifies to the deep affinity of the two regimes. It also creates identical political problems. Far from simply inheriting a "development of productive forces" and an allegedly neutral technology to place in the service of socialism, a social revolution in Russia would have to focus on the technical and material conditions of production and transform them as much as in Western countries.

5. For sixty years, the situation of Russian workers within production has been undistinguishable from what it has always been under capitalism. The occlusion of this fact by almost all "schools" of Marxism, including the self-proclaimed defenders of the working class (e.g., the Trotskyists), is highly revealing. The enslavement of the workers at the workplace is not a merely important or secondary "defect" of the system, nor merely a deplorable and inhuman trait. Both on the most concrete as well as on the philosophical level,

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it denounces alienation as the essence of the Russian regime. Strictly in terms of the labor process the Russian working class is just as subject to a "wage" relation as any other working class. The workers have control of neither the means nor the product of their labor, nor of their own activity as workers. They "sell" their time, their vital forces and their life to the bureaucracy, which disposes of them according to its interests. The constant effort of the bureaucracy is to increase as much as possible returns on labor, while at the same time decreasing its remunerations — and this by the same methods used in the West. The increasingly elaborate division of labor meant to render labor more and more controllable and impersonal and workers more interchangeable, the measurement and control of the workers' motions, piecework rates, the "quantification" of all aspects of work and of the workers' very personalities are based, there as here, on a technology which, far from expressing a "neutral" rationality, is meant to subject the worker to a rhythm of production independently set, to break up "informal" groups among the workers, to expropriate all autonomy from living work and to transfer even the most minute type of directing activity to mechanical components and to the bureaucratic apparatus directing the enterprise.

6. This analysis (which would amount to a real Marxian analysis), remains incomplete and inadequate to the extent that it is abstract. To consider production as such, separate from life and social organization, would end up equating the situation of Russian workers with that of the Western workers. But the fate of workers and of the population in general outside of production is not merely an additional trait, but an essential component of the situation. Deprived of political, civil and union rights; forced into "unions" that are mere appendages of the State, the Party, and the KGB; subject to a regime of internal passports and work papers under permanent police control and surveillance in the workplace and outside of it; constantly harassed by omnipresent official propaganda, the Russian working class is subject to totalitarian oppression and control, mental and psychic expropriation that very clearly outdoes fascist and Nazi models and has not been surpassed anywhere except in Maoist China. This situation is without parallel in the "classical" capitalist countries where the working class was readily able to claim civil, political and union rights and openly challenge the existing social order — while at the same time constantly effecting the system's evolution and limiting the latter's irrationality. The difference is crucial, even from a narrow and abstract economic viewpoint. Under the typical capitalist regimes, the working class explicitly negotiates the level of nominal wages and other, even more important, clauses of the work contract (length of the work-day, -week, -year, -life, working conditions, etc.). Of course, the work contract is a juridical form — but it is not an *empty* one, since the working class can, and does, struggle for its modification. Without a working class "free" in both senses of the word, we would have known a "slave-capitalism" or a "serf-capitalism," but not capitalism as it has actually developed. By means of these struggles and this freedom, which it is stupid to simply describe as "formal," the working class was

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able in 175 years to reduce the length of the work-day, to prevent the increase of exploitation, to limit unemployment, etc. But it is precisely the suppression of all freedom in Russia and the impossibility of open conflict that reduces the "work contract" into an empty form so that one cannot speak of "wages" other than in a formal sense. The consequence is not just a much greater exploitation of labor than elsewhere. The suppression of every possibility for the working class and the population in general to openly affect events gives free rein to the deployment of bureaucratic irrationality, and ends in the monstrous waste of human labor and productive resources which characterizes the Russian economy (not to speak of the Gulag, which poses far greater problems).

7. What is even more striking is that totalitarian oppression is unable to stifle the workers' (and peasants') permanent implicit struggle against the system within production. Under the Russian regime, as in the West, the point of departure and the primary object of this struggle is the level of effective rates of remuneration-output (relation between wage received and labor provided). In both cases, far from being merely "economic," this struggle translates the workers' resistance to the oppression and alienation to which the established relations of production subject them. It is expressed in Russia particularly acutely by the permanent crisis of quantitative and qualitative productivity, absenteeism, chronic overruns concerning the planning of "wages" in enterprises, etc.

8. The ultimate condition of this struggle is the fundamental contradiction of bureaucratic capitalism. In production, as in all areas of social life, the regime seeks to prevent individuals and groups from controlling their activities and to assign this function to a bureaucratic apparatus. To the extent that it is external to these activities and it runs into the opposition of the people involved, this apparatus is usually unable to direct or control them — or even to know what is going on. Thus, it is constantly obliged to call for the participation of these same people it wanted to exclude and transform into robots. This contradiction could crystallize in the simple opposition of two groups in a static society. The continual changes of the means and methods of production which the regime itself must introduce, turns this into an unending conflict.

9. This fundamental contradiction and the very nature of the bureaucratic apparatus make bureaucratic "planning" essentially chaotic and irrational, even from the viewpoint of the ends it proposes. Looking at the capitalist society of his epoch, Marx contraposed the despotism in the workshop with the anarchy in society. But bureaucratic capitalism in East and West is *both* despotism and anarchy, *both* in the workshop and in society. The well-known absurdities and enormous waste of bureaucratic "planning" are by no means accidental or eliminable: they are the results of the most important characteristics of bureaucratic organization. The very existence of the bureaucratic apparatus raises social opacity to a previously unknown level so that there is never enough information for planning — in the economy or in major enterprises. The masses of workers hide the truth from the apparatus. The vital

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condition of existence of every sector of the bureaucracy is a falsification of the facts in the eyes of the rest of the bureaucracy. The apparatus tries to resolve the problem by multiplying bureaucratic controls, which merely multiply the factors that engender them. Half blind, the apparatus has also half a brain. The bureaucracy's "expertise," "knowledge," and "competence" are ideological decoys. In the modern hierarchical bureaucratic system (as opposed to a traditional system) there neither is nor can be any "rational" way to nominate and promote bureaucrats. Consequently, most of their activities are spent in solving their personnel problems. The struggle between factions thus becomes an essential sociological factor in the life of the apparatus and radically vitiates its functioning, often transforming objective options into stakes in inter-factional struggles. By creating a radical division in society by virtue of its very existence and by increasingly fragmenting it in order to better control it (but at the same time necessarily internalizing the same fragmentation and division of labor it imposes everywhere), the Apparatus pretends to be the synthesis or the locus of recomposition of social life — but it is only fictitiously so. Particular bureaucratic agencies regularly succumb to their own inertia. Brutal interventions by the Summit of the Apparatus must each time, *in extremis*, slice arbitrarily through problems that can no longer be put off.

10. The industrialization of Russia — and the extension of the bureaucratic regime to over 1.3 billion individuals — has not mitigated the conflicts and antinomies that tear Russian society apart any more than it has reduced the bureaucracy's power. Of course, police terrorism has changed since Stalin's death, when the bureaucracy is trying to embark on a "consumerist" path. Both the nature and the failure of Krushchevism show the limitations of the bureaucracy's attempts at self-reform and the contradictions they generate. Thus, some "democratization" seems to be required to overcome the most irrational features of the system. But even timid attempts in this direction risk explosions (the 1956 events in Eastern Europe), or they open the door to a utilization of "rights" and concessions which rapidly become intolerable to the bureaucracy (the dissident intellectuals of the last 15 years). The problem is that every possibility to challenge the Party's power would be suicide for the bureaucracy, and any Party "democratization," no matter how limited, would be suicide for the authority that embodies, personifies and exercises power, i.e., the Summit of the Apparatus. Likewise, the need to reform economic management at all levels in order to limit its absurdities, runs up against the need to reduce the bureaucracy's role and discretionary powers, which would amount to a self-mutiliation of the dominant stratum. That would be the case if attempts were made to introduce "market mechanisms" into the current system; but also if they wanted a "cybernetic" economy, which — although unrealizable in Russian society — would require the elimination of most of the existing "productive" and economic bureaucracy, the proliferation of new bureaucratic agencies. Thus, the bureaucracy's economic "reforms" ultimately boil down to attempts to increase or decrease centralization. Certainly, a more

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flexible bureaucratic regime is not inconceivable (e.g., Yugoslavia). What makes this extremely improbable is the very nature of Russian society: the risk of shattering the Russian Empire (cf. both the 1956 events and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia) and the virtually explosive situation existing in the country.

11. In effect, the fundamental problems of the Czarist Empire which led to its collapse have not only not been resolved, but they have intensified. The agrarian problem: until recently, peasants were in a state of juridical serfdom, they were attached to the soil by law since they had no domestic passports, and, no doubt, they are still *de facto* in that condition; Russia, the grain basket of Europe even before Herodotus' time, can hardly feed its population, while Western countries subsidize the agricultural sector not to produce; thus the "organization" of agriculture must constantly be reconsidered without any tangible results. The problem of industrial development: the system does not always succeed in meeting the population's solvent demand for consumer goods; the manufacture of products of a constant, satisfactory quality remains an unsolved problem; the military balance with the United States is maintained only by consecrating an exorbitant proportion of productive resources (probably three or four times greater than in the U.S.) to arms production and at the price of a significant underdevelopment of all civilian sectors. After sixty years of "socialism" and of over-exploitation of the population, the *per capita* national product is the same as in Spain, if not in Greece. This "socialist" regime has not yet been able to solve the problems already solved in Neolithic times: how to assure continuity between one crop and the next; nor others, solved at least as far back as the Phoenicians: how to provide commodities to those who are willing to pay the price. The national question: Great-Russian chauvinism and anti-Semitism as strong as ever, still generates the hatred of nationalities locked up by force in modernized peoples' prisons; Russian remains the only important "developed" country where entire nations are kept in servitude. The political question: even apart from the people's total exclusion from control and knowledge of public affairs, the bureaucracy has not, and cannot, find any normal way of functioning to solve the problem of its own management, except through inter-factional struggle and intrigue. To the extent that changes at the Summit ought to be as rare as possible so as not to threaten a fatal collapse of the whole edifice, gerontocracy is the inevitable consequence. The State and the Party, which is its soul, claim to regulate all aspects of social life and to solve all problems for interested parties. Yet, they do nothing but multiply these problems both by their very existence and because of the way they operate. Their monstrous expansion is evidence of the sharpness of the antagonistic schism in society. The persistence and intensification of these problems goes along with a veritable cultural involution. A people which has produced Dostoevsky, Moussorgsky, and Mayakovski must endure the stupidity, pomposity and rightful sterility of "official" culture. At the same time the State ideology is in a process of disintegration. The invocation of "Marxism-Leninism" has deteriorated to a mere ritual. The bureaucracy

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condemns Russian culture to sterility, because it is itself condemned to silence. It is impossible for it to speak truthfully of its original sin, of its bloody birth in and by terrorism under Stalin (whom it dares neither condemn nor rehabilitate fully); and it is impossible for it to erase purely and simply thirty or forty years of Russian history, since this history is continuing essentially unchanged. It is equally unable to allow a truthful, even artistic, depiction of its present, to accept a discussion of the state of Russian society, or even research and initiatives beyond its control. The result of this is the erosion, not to say the total disappearance, of its hold not only on the younger generations, but also on a growing portion of the population. In fact, apart from repression, the only cement of bureaucratic society is cynicism. Russian society is the first cynical society in history. But there are no instances in history of societies able to survive long in pure and simple cynicism; nor is it accidental that Great-Russian chauvinism and nationalism are becoming more and more pronounced. Compressed by bureaucratic terrorism, these conflicts will just explode all the more violently when the occasion presents itself (cf. examples described by Solzhenitsyn and Pliouchtch). Among industrial countries, Russia is the prime candidate for a social revolution.

12. The Russian regime is an integral part of the world system of contemporary domination. With the United States and China, it is one of its three pillars. In collaboration with the others, it controls and guarantees the preservation of the status quo on a global scale. This has been strikingly demonstrated, for example, when the Three intervened together to help the government of Ceylon crush the 1971 uprising; just as it is more than possible that the U.S. and Russia would intervene together to crush a revolution in Europe or elsewhere as soon as they were convinced that they could not control or use it. At the same time, imperialist antagonisms remain sharp and, contrary to what official propaganda claims, a world war is still a possibility not ruled out by the balance of nuclear terror.

13. Let us give the name *social regime* to a given type of institution of society that applies to more than one individual society. The notion of "mode of production" is meaningful if it is used to characterize production as such, not a society or a group of societies. That could only be the case if production and "mode of production" necessarily and sufficiently determined the whole of social organization and life — which is not even false, but nonsense. The very relation between production (and relations of production) and the global organization of society is each time specific to the *social regime* in question, to the given institution of society, and forms a part of that institution. The social regime in Russia (and in the Eastern European countries, China, etc.) is *total bureaucratic capitalism*. The social regime of industrialized countries in the "West" is *fragmented bureaucratic capitalism*.

14. The emergence of modern bureaucracy and bureaucratic capitalism, total or fragmented, raises an immense number of problems, only a few of which can be dealt with here. These problems explode traditional conceptions concerning society and history. The historical arrival of bureaucratic society

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and its functioning remain incomprehensible within the framework of the great traditional theories. The contemporary world is living on representations of society and history which, already formed by 1848, have nothing to say concerning the contemporary world. This is immediately evident of any "liberal" or "neo-liberal" economic and sociological conceptions. What can the bureaucratic regime that constantly violates "economic rationality" be for them but a bad accident contrary to human nature? What can they make of the transformation of citizens into cogs of the state machinery, except an inexplicable resurgence, in the midst of "democracy" and the "dissemination of knowledge," of the transhistorical form of tyranny? The situation is slightly different for what there is of Marx's conception, but only if one breaks its systematic-dogmatic ossification, understands its limitations, and relates it to changes in historical reality. *Capital* must be read in light of Russia, not Russia in the light of *Capital*. By remaining enslaved not even to Marx's thinking, but to elements of that thought transformed into a mechanical scheme, contemporary "Marxists" are unable to say anything relevant concerning the modern world. In particular, bureaucracy and the bureaucratic regime remain absolutely impenetrable as objects of thought.

15. Thus, for almost all Marxist schools and authors (leaving aside, of course, the orthodox Communists), all seems to have been said when the Russian regime is characterized as the result of the degeneration of the October Revolution — itself caused by the "backwardness" of the country and the "isolation" of the new power. That the Russian regime originated in a revolution claiming to be socialism, in which workers and peasants played a decisive role, and to a great extent autonomously, is one thing. But that by evoking this origin one can avoid the question of the present nature of the regime and of the final product of this degeneration is another, completely different matter. The historical conjuncture through which a regime comes about has its importance, but it is absolutely inadequate to characterize it. A capitalism brought about by the fusion of the bourgeoisie with the ancient aristocracy or even the mere transformation of the latter into a capitalist class (Japan) does not differ essentially from a capitalism resulting from a violent elimination of the aristocracy by the bourgeoisie. The very term "degeneration" does not correspond to what is at issue. "The dual power" of the provisonal government and the Soviets between February and October 1917 was succeeded by the "dual power" of the Bolshevik party and the workers' organizations (essentially factory committees) — the second term of which was gradually repressed and definitively eliminated in 1921. The explanation of the rise of the bureaucratic regime by the degeneration of a revolution is disproved by the accession to power of the bureaucracy in China and elsewhere. The interpretation of degeneration as a result of "backwardness" and "isolation" — a ridiculously superficial explanation whose function is to mask the *political* problematic of a socialist revolution and the bureaucratic-totalitarian character of the Bolshevist party from its inception — has become totally anachronistic, since the industrialization of Russia and

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the extension of the bureaucratic Empire did not at all diminish the domination of the bureaucracy. If, after the asserted causes have disappeared, the effect persists, and if the same effect is produced where the causes do not exist, it must be reocgnized that this effect has a different root than originally suspected. Continuing to boast of Marx's claim that feudal society corresponds to the windmill and capitalist society corresponds to the steam engine, these conceptions implicitly claim that the equivalent to the assembly line is, here, capitalism, there "socialism" or the "workers' state." Unable to grasp this new socio-historical reality which is modern bureaucracy, they can speak of Russia, China, etc., only in reference to a socialist society, of which these regimes are deformations. Thus, what they retain of Marx is only his metaphysical and deterministic account of history: there is supposed to be a predetermined stage in the history of mankind, socialism, as the necessary sequel to capitalism. Consequently, whatever is not "capitalism" (superficially conceived in terms of "private property," "commodities," etc.), must be socialism — deformed, degenerate, very degenerate, etc. But socialism is not a necessary stage of history. It is the historical project of a new institution of society, whose content is direct self-government, collective management and direction by all humans of all aspects of their social life, and explicit self-institution of society. By reducing socialism to a purely "economic" matter, economic reality to juridical forms of ownership and in presenting bureaucratic statism and "planning" as socialist, these conceptions have the social function of masking the bureaucracy's domination. They hide its roots in order to justify the existing bureaucracy or to camouflage the aims of "revolutionary" bureaucrats as candidates for power.

16. Up to a point, modern bureaucracy can be comprehended within the Marxian frame of reference. Beyond that point, however, it explodes it. At a certain level of abstraction (as Max Weber had seen, and as Marx had *not*), it is the immanent outcome of the "ideal" evolution of capitalism. From a strictly productive and economic standpoint, technological evolution, the organization of production and the concentration of capital entail the elimination of "independent" individual capitalists and the emergence of a bureaucratic stratum that organizes the labor of thousands of workers in gigantic enterprises, assumes the effective management of these enterprises, and controls the incessant modifications of the means and methods of production. (In this respect, it differs radically from all "traditional" bureaucracies managing a static system). Having reached its full development, this stratum appropriates a part of the produced surplus (in the form of "wages," etc.) and decides on the disposition of the rest of this surplus by mechanisms which displace "private ownership of capital" as either a necessary or a sufficient condition. If they subsist in it, capitalists can play a role in the modern enterprise only by means of the place they occupy in the bureaucratic pyramid. If, as Marx thought, the concentration of capital "does not stop until all social capital is concentrated in the hands of one single capitalist or group of capitalists," this sole capitalist or group of capitalists would be unable to personally dominate hundreds of millions of workers. Such a situation is

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inconceivable without the emergence and proliferation of a controlling, management stratum that effectively controls production and on which this capitalist himself would depend. In the actual history of the classical capitalist countries, concentration does not (and could not) attain its "ideal limit" in this manner (as a function of economic evolution alone). But the tendencies just described are widespread enough to make it possible to define the social regime of Western countries as *fragmented bureaucratic capitalism.* Thus, within the Marxian frame of reference, modern bureaucracy can be interpreted as the organic product of the evolution of capitalist production and of the concentration of capital, as the "personification of capital" at a certain stage in its history, as one of the reference points of capitalist production in the division between "directors" and "workers," and as the active agent of the even more comprehensive realization, diffusion, and penetration of this relation in productive activities (and in all others). The separation of management and production, the transference of the direction of work to an external authority, pseudo-rationalization, and "planning" extended to ever greater sectors of production and of the economy, etc. — it is out of the question that all of these functions can be accomplished by "persons" or merely by means of "capital ownership." It is equally impossible for them to be carried out by the "market," without conceiving the market according to the mythology of political economy (which Marx, indeed, shared). They can be carried out only by the bureaucracy and by the creation of the bureaucratic apparatus. And domination by the bureaucracy appears to be the most adequate form of the domination of the "spirit" of capitalism (here, again, Max Weber had seen things much more clearly than Marx) — or of the magma of social imaginary significations realized by the institution of capitalism.

17. Marx's blindness to the implications of his own correct view of the concentration of capital is not accidental. Ultimately, concentration implies not only the elimination of "individual capitalists" but the abolition of "capital" as such and of the "economy" as a sector separate from the rest of social life. Concentration and monopolization entail the increasing reduction of the "market," the essential alteration of what survives of it, its replacement by the condominium of oligopolists and monopolists, and finally by an "integrated" ("planned") organization of production and of the economy. At the limit of total concentration (and, in fact, long before that point is reached), there is no longer a true "market," "production costs," the "law of value" and, finally, "capital" in the sense Marx gave to this term (which contains as an ineliminable factor the idea of a sum of "values" in a process of self-aggrandizement). At best, the "law of value" is transformed into a rule of "rational" subjective behavior of the sole capitalist or of the bureaucracy, with nothing to guarantee that it is followed and everything assuring that it is not. Under total bureaucratic capitalism one can no longer speak of "economic laws," other than in a trivial sense (psychic and technical constraints are not "economic laws"). That is why analyses of Russia as a "state capitalist" society where the "economic laws of capitalism" remain in effect through a mere

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substitution of the "capitalist class" by the "state" are useless.

18. This interpretation of bureaucracy neglects crucial dimensions, i.e., precisely those which challenge the Marxian conception and ultimately make it untenable. Even in the "classical" capitalist countries, the emergence and growth of the bureaucracy are not reducible to the concentration of "capital" and the corresponding bureaucratization of production and of the whole enterprise. In fact, from the very beginning, Western industrial organizations borrowed their model from the bureaucratic-hierarchical one of states and armies, and transformed it for their purposes — not only by adapting it to the needs of production, but by making it an agency of "change," as opposed to traditional "static" bureaucracies. Consequently, the "industrial" bureaucratic model is in turn re-adopted by the state, the army, and the parties. The bureaucratization of "classical" capitalist societies takes place through the considerable expansion of the role and functions of the state independently of any formal "nationalization" of production (cf. the United States). This entails both the proliferation of the bureaucratic stratum and the broadening of its powers, as well as the multiplication of non-market institutional mechanisms of integration and management of social activities. Finally it finds an important support in the evolution of the labor movement. The constitution of a trade-union and political bureaucracy of "labor" means the adoption of the capitalist model by labor organizations and its acceptance by their members, or the continued domination of the imaginary significations of capitalism and corresponding institutional structures (the division between management and workers, hierarchy, specialization, etc.) over the working class outside production and within the very means it has created to fight capitalism.

19. Thus, even the evolution of "classical" capitalist societies toward fragmented bureaucratic capitalism cannot be interpreted solely in terms of production and economies. Moreover, the emergence and domination of the bureaucracy in Russia is not the result of such an "organic" evolution but of the rupture of the 1917 Revolution and of an essentially political process. The first modern bureaucracy to constitute itself as a dominant stratum — and which served as the catalyst and accelerator of the worldwide bureaucratization process — is not the "standard" bureaucracy which traditional capitalism would have engendered, but is born as a result of the destruction of traditional capitalism. Still more enlightening is the case of "pre-capitalist" countries, especially China. There the bureaucracy, coming to power via a political process and establishing relations of domination to its own advantage, creates "capitalist relations of production" and the corresponding material infrastructure ab ovo. It is not the Chinese bureaucracy that is the product of the industrialization of China, but the industrialization of China that is the work of the Chinese bureaucracy. The real, concrete mediation between the world system of domination and the bureaucratic transformation of China was not provided by "infrastructures" except negatively insofar as capitalism's penetration and impact has dislocated the traditional organization. The same thing also happened elsewhere without, however, the same result. The

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"material" agency which generated conditions of China's bureaucratic transformation were not machines or even guns (Chiang Kai-chek had as many and more), but the "Marxist" catechism and the Bolshevik military-political model. The concrete mediation between world capitalism and the bureaucratic transformation of China is found in the penetration into China of social imaginary significations of capitalism and of corresponding types of institutions ("Marxist" ideology, political party, "progress," "production," etc.). And it is in this sense, and not because of capital's domination, that China, like Russia, belongs ultimately to the same socio-historical universe as "Western" countries: that of bureaucratic capitalism.

20. Total bureaucratic capitalism is thus neither a simple variant of traditional capitalism nor a factor in its "organic" evolution. Belonging to capitalism's socio-historical universe, it also represents a new historical creation. And the relation between what does and what does not change in the transition from traditional to integral bureaucratic capitalism is itself new. This rupture is evident when we consider the concrete social group in power in both cases and the specific institution of the social regime — i.e., formal and informal mechanisms which assure the domination of a particular social group over the whole society. The nuclear institution of capitalism, the *enterprise*, remains the link between the two phases. But "private property" of capital (or rather, its *management*), the market as a mechanism of economic integration, the formal distinction of "state" and "civil society" essential for the existence of traditional capitalism, disappear under total bureaucratic capitalism. The latter is characterized by the universal extension of the modern bureaucratic-hierarchical apparatus, the "plan" as an integration mechanism and the removal of the formal distinction between "civil society" and the "state." The relation of the dominant stratum to these mechanisms is evidently different in the two cases. In fact, in all social regimes the relation of the dominant stratum to instituted mechanisms corresponding to its domination is in each case *sui generis*: its own specific part of the institution of *this* social regime. To a considerable extent, the reason why the Russian regime tends to be incomprehensible stems from the fact that we always want to see the relation between the bureaucracy and its instituted mechanisms in terms of the model of the bourgeoisie's relation to capital ownership and to the market (even if only to claim that the two relations are identical, or to conclude from their difference that there is no exploitation in Russia). But the relation between slave owners and the mechanisms of slavery, the nobility and the mechanisms of the feudal regime, the bourgeoisie and the mechanisms of the capitalist regime, are all different and are part of the mode of institution of the corresponding social regimes.

Still, it is just as false to think of the dominant social group as a mere "personification" of instituted mechanisms and procedures (as Marx does for capitalists and "capital") as to regard these mechanisms as mere "instruments" (as most Marxists do for the State). This relation does not fall under the category of "instrumentality," "personification," or "expression": it is a

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relation without parallel elsewhere, that must be considered by itself. Politically, it is just as false to speak of "power" while abstracting from the fact that it is always also the power of one group over others, as to speak of groups or classes while abstracting from the institutional systems to which they correspond. In total bureaucratic capitalism, the blending of "economic," "political," and "ideological" dimensions acquires a new character relative to the "classical" capitalist societies. Its institution extends beyond the spheres of social activity. It would be absurd to regard it as if the social categories posed and instituted as separate by other types of society, and particularly by "classical" capitalist society (e.g., economy, law, state, "culture," etc.) continued to exist unchanged in it.

21. The advent of total bureaucratic capitalism confirms what the study of pre-capitalist societies already could have shown: it is not through production that "classes" are generally formed. The institution of a social regime of asymmetrical and antagonistic division is equivalent to the establishment of a relation of domination between a social group and the rest of society, and corresponding "secondary" institutions. These are the institutions that embody in the narrowly political and coercive sphere the power of the dominant group, especially of the State; those that make possible the creation of an economic surplus and its appropriation by the dominant group, those that guarantee the domination of myths, religious beliefs and ideas — in short, social representations and significations corresponding to the given institution of society, their internalization by individuals, and the indefinite fabrication of individuals in conformity with this institution. Thus, for example, antagonistic relations of production cannot exist except as part of relations of domination. They *are* intrinsically relations of domination in the specific sphere of production and work: they are external to the work process in a slave or feudal regime, while they increasingly penetrate it under the capitalist regime. They imply the constitution of a power over society and its appropriation by a particular social group. The origin and unity of this group are not necessarily found in the identical position of the individuals that comprise it relative to production, but in their participation in this power over the rest of society — a power which must also be translated as "economic power," or the disposition of people's time and allocation of part of this time to activities that serve the dominant group. Such a power can be already historically constituted in the society in question and a social category formed on the basis of production and the economy (or even otherwise) appropriates it to attain complete domination by transforming it either a little or a lot. Such was the case with the bourgeoisie — wrongly extrapolated by Marx to all of history. Even in this case, however, it would be wrong to regard power and the State as something external to and superimposed on a productive-economic structure, or a mere tool of the social stratum to achieve domination. A new social group (a conquering ethnic group or a "political" group) could also create and impose relations of production corresponding to its domination and permitting its social reproduction through the direct establishment of new relations of domination and of new

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forms of power. Such was probably the origin of slave societies and certainly, the most frequent origin of contemporary bureaucratic regimes in Russia, China, or Eastern Europe.

22. Under total bureaucratic capitalism, the abolition of the "economy" as a separate and relatively autonomous sphere is part of an essential change in the relation between "civil society" and the State. Actually, this very distinction — which is loaded with important ideological elements typical of the bourgeoisie's perception of society — ought to be re-examined. The relations between "civil society" and the State have never been the way they were presented in theoretical constructions (including in Hegel and Marx). At any rate, bourgeois society thrives in the distinction between a private sphere, a public "civil" sphere, and a public governmental sphere. This distinction is already shaken by the evolution leading to fragmented bureaucratic capitalism: the extension to the State's activities increasingly restricts the public "civil" domain and even the private "sphere" tends to become in many ways "public." A qualitative leap is brought about by total bureaucratic capitalism. The distinction between the public "civil" sphere and the public governmental sphere is obliterated while the "private" sphere is reduced to a minimum (in the most extreme cases, to the individual's biological functioning). But there is still no domination of the State *as such* over society — nor the "absorption of civil society by the State." The State itself is dominated by a separate "political" organism — in the typical and prevalent case: the Party as the ultimate authority and, within the Party itself, the Summit of the Apparatus. As the organization and unifying locus of the dominant group, the Party can only rhetorically identify itself to society as long as the terror that it exercises over society, reduces it to silence and proclaims this identification. It cannot "absorb" society without ceasing to be what it is and what is clearly indicated in its name: a *part* of society or a particular body within it. On the other hand, the formal erasure of the distinction between civil society and the State signifies neither the "absorption" of the former by the latter nor a "unification" of society. The claim to unify and homogenize society (as formulated in the Party's ideology) is true only in one respect: the undifferentiated submission of all to the unlimited and arbitrary power of the Summit of the Apparatus. Beyond that, it cannot conceal (1) the persistence of a social and not merely "occupational" differentiation as strong as under traditional capitalism (city dwellers vs. country dwellers, manual workers vs. intellectual workers, men vs. women, etc.); (2) the asymmetrical and antagonistic division of society between managers and operatives (increasingly complicated by the reciprocal interpenetration of different bureaucratic-hierarchical pyramids); and finally (3) cleavages and conflicts within the very bureaucracy. Moreover, this claim gives rise to a new opposition between the formal existence of a State encompassing the totality of the social and the reality of the social, which constantly escapes this State and differs from it — both by excess (doing more and different things than it is allegedly doing) and by defect (not doing, by far, all that it is supposed to do). A corollary to this opposition is a new split between

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its appearance and its reality. "Public civil" life has become nationalized. But national life is no longer public at all: its unfolding must be hidden in the slightest details, and what is otherwise "public" becomes a State secret (from the most banal economic statistics down to the telephone books and the Moscow subway schedule).

23. The Russian regime is part of the socio-historical universe of capitalism because the magma of social imaginary significations that animate its institutions and are realized through it is the very thing that is brought about in history by capitalism. The core of this magma can be described as the unlimited expansion of "rational" mastery. It is, of course, a question of a mastery that is mostly illusory, and of an abstract pseudo-"rationality." This imaginary signification constitutes the central juncture of ideas that become effective forces and processes dominating the functioning and development of capitalism: the unlimited expansion of the productive forces; the obsessive preoccupation with "development," pseudo-rational "technical progress," production and the "economy"; "rationalization" and control of all activities; the increasingly elaborate division of labor, universal quantification, calculation and "planning"; organization as an end in itself, etc. Its correlatives are the institutional forms of the enterprise, the bureaucratic-hierarchical Apparatus, the modern State and Party, etc. Many of these elements — institutional significations and forms — are created in the course of historical periods that antedate capitalism. But it is the bourgeoisie that, during its transformation into a capitalist bourgeoisie, changes their function and reunites them to the signification of the unlimited expansion of "rational" mastery (explicitly formulated since Descartes, and always central to Marx, so that his thinking always remains anchored in the capitalist universe). And this signification, mediated by the transformation of Marxism into an ideology and by the political organization of the Party, assembles, unifies, animates, and guides the bureaucracy in its rise to the domination of society and in the specific institution of its regime and administration.

24. The "realization" of this social imaginary signification is deeply antinomic. This is a decisive trait of modern societies and contraposes them to traditional "archaic" or "historical" societies where no antinomy of this type is found. Modern society seeks only "rationality" but produces only "irrationality" (from the viewpoint of this very rationality). Or better: in any other known society, the system of representations which the society generates is not in flagrant opposition to its reality, as is the case under the regime of bureaucratic capitalism. It is perfectly logical that this antinomy reaches a delirious paroxism under the extreme forms of "Marxist" totalitarianism, under the regimes of Stalin and Mao.

25. In modern societies, this system of representations tends increasingly to be reduced to ideology. Ideology is the "rationalized and systematized" elaboration of the emerged and explicit part of the imaginary social significations corresponding to a given institution of society (or in place of and for the aims of a particular social stratum within this institution). Thus it can

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appear neither in "mythical" nor in "merely" religious societies. Understandably, it begins its real development only with the institution of capitalism. It acquires an increasing importance by the very fact that the central imaginary signification of capitalism is its presumed rationality, and that its very content requires this form of "rational" expression which is the ideology. The ideology is thus supposed to make everything explicit, transparent, explicable and rationalizable — at the same time as its function is to hide everything. Subject to this intrinsic contradiction and diametrically opposed to all social reality, the ideology is forced to make everything shallow and flat, including itself. It becomes an empty form, condemned to progressive internal erosion. The current fate of "Marxism-Leninism" in Russia and China provides an extremely striking illustration of this.

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THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE*

by György Konrad and Ivan Szelény

1. When Is the Concept of Class Applicable?

Every more or less complex society has its intellectuals — people whose knowledge is accepted by society as intellectual knowledge, who are monopolistic possessors of knowledge having cross-contextual validity, and who regard that as their sufficient warrant for receiving social authority and reward. Their position varies, however, from one society to the next, just as power itself is legitimated in different ways in different societies. The relationship of the type of power legitimated by intellectual knowledge to other kinds of power also varies. The study of social structures demands that we look into the following questions: What factors legitimate authority in different societies? And what relationship do these variously legitimated forms of authority bear to one another?

Every society can be characterized by the dominant principle of legitimation which prevails in it. It is this basic legitimating principle which defines the social structure and marks out the places in it of those who justify their power on other principles. We accept the fundamental premise of Marxian sociology that the basic structure of society is determined by the way that society reproduces itself, and more particularly by the disposition made of the social surplus product, who controls it, and on what principles. On this thesis we must conclude that in every society a legitimated right to dispose over the surplus product is elevated to the general and dominant principle of legitimacy, subsuming within itself other principles of legitimation.

This fundamental structure ranges the members of society into subordinate and superordinate positions, along a hierarchical scale — the producers of the social product and its expropriators, hence oppressed and oppressors. It also indicates the conditions on which members of society come to occupy these positions or exchange them for others. Finally, it is this basic structure that creates the coherence of the groups that form around identical positions, enabling them to recognize their identity and through that recognition to construct their own culture and ethos. Thus it is that we can characterize aggregates of individuals in identical situations in different ways, and so we

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*Translated by Andrew Arato and Richard Allen. This is a chapter from a forthcoming book by the authors tentatively titled *The Road of the Intellectuals to Class Power*, printed here by permission of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. The Hungarian original was written in 1974, and was published in the West in 1978. The first chapter of the book amounts to an extensive definition of intellectuals that rejects classical Marxist, Mannheimian, and statistical definitions in favor of a model that stresses the possession of transcontextual knowledge acquired through various historical forms of higher education. This knowledge is further specified in terms of two fundamental *a priori*s, or interest structures: *telos* and *techne*, and in terms of a historical tendency of the possessors of teleological and technical knowledge to raise their historical interests to the levels of transcendent values. The authors see the culmination of this development in contemporary Eastern Europe where the intellectuals are on the road to their own class power. — *Editors' note.*

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think it likely that the intelligentsia, for example, can be described differently in different periods of its social history when it occupied different places in the social structure, sometimes as a social order or estate, sometimes as a stratum, and sometimes as a class.

a] *Some notes on the Marxian concept of class.* In attempting to define the basic structure of capitalist society Marx set out from the relations of property ownership. He described the structure of capitalist society as a class structure in which the basic classes are, on the one hand, the owners of the means of production (or capital) and, on the other, those who do not own their own means of production and who merely supply the property owners with their labor power. Bourgeoisie and proletariat occupy the two fundamental positions in this dichotomous structure. On the basis of what has already been said we can assume Marx recognized that in capitalist society it is property ownership that legitimates control over the surplus product. Thus he was correct in declaring the ownership of capital to be the fundamental factor determining the structure of this type of society.

aa] *Difficulties involved in the historical and sociological use of Marx's concept of class. The problem of the Asiatic mode of production.* Marx believed that in the relations of production he had found the key to a description of all societies past, present and future as class structures (or, as the case might be, classless). Nevertheless, it was only capitalist society that Marx subjected to concrete and detailed analysis, and even though he emphasized that from his standpoint the entire history of mankind was a history of class struggles he used the category of class very cautiously in analyzing precapitalist societies (which he nonetheless still generally termed class societies). During the 1920s Marxist and especially Soviet scholars found themselves in great difficulty when they were obliged to apply a concept of class derived from property relations to the great mass of historical and economic data which had been accumulated on Asiatic societies. The mode of ownership characteristic of Asiatic societies was prebendal property — a non-inheritable estate conferred upon an official in exchange for service to the state, whose revenue the holder could enjoy but which he could not sell or otherwise transfer, nor could he even make changes in the mode of cultivation practiced on it. The Asiatic mode of production seemed to suggest unmistakably that the feudal lord partook of social authority and a disproportionate share of the surplus product not in the capacity of a property owner but in that of an official. Thus it became a matter of debate whether the social position of such landlord officials as, for example, the mandarins of China, could be described using a concept derived from ownership of the means of production.

This question arose not only in connection with the Asiatic mode of production but also in the study of Eastern European history, particularly Russian history of the 16th and 17th century — for there, too, the landholding service nobility were really officials and soldiers who were given the use of various lands by the czar in exchange for services rendered him, but provisionally and subject to revocation at any time. And so those historians who

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were prepared to be more flexible in the face of the empirical data proposed that these "Asiatic" social formations should not be treated as feudal and recommended the term "Asiatic mode of production" to indicate their distinctiveness. Behind this suggestion, however, more orthodox scholars saw a theoretical abyss yawning — if only because its acceptance might supply a precedent for removing other types of societies from the scope of the universally valid blueprint which the Marxist philosophy of history offered. It would, moreover, have given others the right to deal with the various kinds of feudal or slave societies not on the basis of property relations, but in terms of concrete relationships of power and authority. Even in the case of the Western European societies which Marx knew so well it became doubtful whether precapitalist social structures could be analyzed at all on the basis of property relations (even though those societies appeared most susceptible to a Marxist analysis, for private property in one form or another can be found over the whole length of Western history). Perhaps the more acute of the orthodox theorists also sensed that such a relativization of the role of property relations might also come to influence the way Soviet society viewed itself. In that event the fundamental tenet that the basic classes of Soviety society evolve in conjunction with its two forms of property (collective and state property) would have been called into question. In other words, it would no longer have been possible to derive the structure of Soviet society with any assurance simply from the negative observation that in the Soviet Union there were no means of production in private hands. In the light of these considerations it is perhaps easier to understand why the study of medieval Chinese economic history became a political crime in the Russia of the early 1930s, to such a degree that many of the practitioners of that discipline were obliged to bid farewell not only to their scholarly research but often to their very lives as well.

ab] Difficulties in applying the Marxian concept of class to the analysis of the social structures of socialist Eastern Europe. Even the sharpest of the orthodox theorists could not, for all the grisliness of their methods of disputation, bury the problem itself; they merely succeeded in putting it off for three decades. It was hardly a coincidence that just at that point — when the Asiatic mode of production had to come to be tolerated again as a seemingly harmless notion and was being used by historians and philosophers in some of the Eastern European countries as an accepted analytical category — sociologists should have begun to justify the old suspicions by calling into question the relevance of property relations to any analysis of the structure of socialist societies. Having arrived at a recognition of the irrelevance of property ownership as an analytical category the sociologists went on to attempt a positive, substantive analysis of socialist society. Their work took three different directions.

Those whose approach was more empirical soon found themselves obliged by their concrete researches to discard the traditional type of class analysis based on property relations, for the classification of the population into a working class based on state property and a peasantry based on cooperative property soon proved incapable of explaining a whole range of empirical phenomena,

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from the distribution of income to the diversity of life styles. In its place they substituted a statistical method of analyzing social stratification. But in doing so they neglected to ask: What criteria do define the structure of socialist societies, if not property relations? The possibility that the concept of class might be applicable was simply left aside, even though it was obvious that the concept was accepted as an ideological premise, since historical materialism defines only communist society as classless, but presents socialist society as the collectivity of the working class, peasantry and intellegentsia. Thus they do not even seek the real dimensions determining classes. This circumstance pushed East European empirical sociology into theoretical eclecticism, which both its Eastern and Western critics recognized. The latter could justly demand a more coherent structural analysis of East European societies than those empirical-stratification categorizations that lumped together a mass of indicators, in no substantive relation to one another i.e., the character of work, its qualificational level, the degree of complexity of knowledge required for work, the possibility of supervising one's work, the number of subordinates, etc.

A neo-Marxist attempt emerged from the critique of the above that sought to modify the concept of property so as to achieve a substantive class concept applicable to socialist societies. Thus the theory of the new class or the collective owner class was born. This politically radical analysis is characterized by an unchanged theoretical conservatism. Its representatives continue to insist that the content of class relations is to be given by property relations, but in order to hold onto this presupposition they must completely empty the concept of property. On the contrary we would argue that if even prebendal property contains property rights so barely that the actual social power and consequent social condition of the possessor of prebendal right cannot on its basis be explained (although this right and the prebend itself relate to a person and is used by and for a person since the prebendal owner divides the income of his holding with the actual owner, the ruler), then the category of property seems even less useful in a socialist economy, where the firm manager indeed performs certain ownership functions, but from the income of the firm participates on the bases of the same legitimation — even if in a greater measure — as the most simple unskilled worker. Even if we called the company manager an owner, this would still not be adequate for the determination of his social situation. The argument in any case narrows the concept of ownership to the impersonal, functional right of disposing over the surplus product, and expels all elements that might indicate the separate use of the two concepts. If we need the concept of property to explain, under certain circumstances, who disposes over the surplus product and under what condition, merely formal logic requires that property be a richer and more specific concept than the exercise of the mere right of disposition. Simplifying the logical circle of the concept of the new class we confront the following question: Who disposes over the surplus product in socialist society? Answer: the collective owners, the new owners. And who are these new collective owners? Answer: those who dispose over the surplus product.

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There was only one way out of this tautology, and it began to be taken in Eastern Europe in the latter half of the 1960s, in the form of research into the mechanics and legitimation of the right to dispose over the social surplus. By examining the nature of bureaucratic rule these theorists sought to arrive at a structural analysis that would be new in content. As soon as we turn to the analysis of bureaucratic rule, however, we overstep the limits of the concept of property relationships and find ourselves dealing with a more general notion that lies behind it: the relations of authority and rule in society, and the question of how rule is legitimated. We feel obliged to assume in advance that property is only one possible way of legitimating rule, and that other bases of legitimation are conceivable as well.

b] *Some remarks on Max Weber's concept of class.* In his analysis of social structures Marx committed the same error with which Karl Polanyi reproached those economists who in analyzing non-market economies thought in terms of market categories and market rationality. Marx, that is, projected the notion of class, which was relevant in societies where ownership of capital really did give a legitimate right to dispose over the surplus, back onto societies in which the principles of legitimation were different and where for that reason property relations in themselves were not decisive in defining the social structure. For that reason Weber's attempt to pin down the range of legitimate validity of Marx's concept of class appears all the more justified. It was no accident that Max Weber, who had devoted a great deal of study to the economic history of Asia and the special conditions in which European capitalism developed, was the first writer who thought it necessary to render more precise Marx's categories for analyzing social structure. Weber employed the concept of class to describe social structures based on a free-market economy. In his analysis class relations always emerge from a market situation. Under free-market capitalism the labor market gives rise to the most fundamental class relations. There the owners of capital and the owners of labor power meet and enter into transactions with one another, and that is what delineates the two basic classes of capitalist society, capitalists and workers. Up to that point Weber really did no more than apply his own terminology to the interpretation of Marx's theory of classes. But Weber went further than that, for in holding that the notion of class was applicable only in market economies and under market conditions he also asserted that it was not valid for precapitalist societies. Indeed, a considerable part of Weber's work was devoted precisely to discovering what other means of legitimating authority exist in precapitalist societies, and what structures of social domination are built upon them. But if we accept Weber's proposition that it is proper to speak of classes only where market conditions exist, then we must abandon the use of the concept of class in dealing with socialist societies, which are fundamentally redistributive in character.

Nevertheless we will continue to use the notion of class in discussing modern societies with redistributive economies, to that extent lending the concept a more general meaning. Like market economies, modern redistributive economies may be regarded as rational economies in which the power to

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dispose over the social product is legitimated on rational principles. In capitalist societies the power of disposition over the surplus product is likewise legitimated through a rational criterion, ownership of capital; in order for someone to have a portion of the surplus product at his disposition he must be a capitalist. In modern redistributive systems it is the teleological redistributors who dispose over the surplus product; in order to become one of them an individual must possess specialized knowledge, or in other words must be an intellectual. It is our contention, then, that in modern redistributive economies the teleological redistributors occupy a structural position around which a social class may form.

It is not the purpose of this study to provide a description of the class structure of socialist societies in general. For the time being, we do not even wish to take a position on the question of whether the social structure of early socialism can best be described as a dichotomous class structure, or whether it is more useful to work out for it a multidimensional class structure like Weber's. The aim of this essay is simply to examine whether it is appropriate to describe the new social position which the intelligentsia occupies in modern redistributive economies as a class position. Indeed, neither Weber's nor Marx's concept of class is apt for that purpose, for it was not the purpose of their conceptualizations to present a complete descriptive cross-section of society, and when they attempted it they generally overstepped the bounds of their own class concepts strictly defined to characterize society as a complex system of classes, strata, and status groups.

2. *Models of Economic Integration and the Social Structure*

a) Model of economic integration or mode of production? We propose to analyze the position of the intellectuals in various societies in terms of the models of economic integration which those societies display. We understand by model of integration a concept analogous to mode of production, but substantively superior in that it also takes in the systems of authority and rule in various societies and not just their relations of production. In analyzing various models of integration, emphasis will be placed on the legitimation of social authority. Of course these models of economic integration can also be taken as models of reproduction, but coupling together the institutions of social reproduction and social authority anchors economic concepts in a sociological framework and does away with the rather sterile problem which appears in formal sociology as a dualism crying out for concretization: What deterministic relations exist between the technical aspects of production, and authority or culture (described as a superstructure in Marxist sociology)? Something of this sort is all the more necessary because every concrete social analysis is bound to come to the conclusion that base and superstructure stand in an interdependent, mutually determining relationship, and singling out the criteria of primacy within this mutual dependence has importance only for the history of philosophical thought since Hegel.

Earlier we asserted that property relations play a decisive role only in certain

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historical contexts, which gives them only a relative importance. Although we consider justified the exceptional significance which Marx attached to property relations in capitalist society, we believe that the elevation of this contextual category into a supra-historical absolute is a very dubious procedure. To the category of mode of production we attribute a purely formal economic value, since we do not regard property relations, independent of their conditioning circumstances, as affording any universal principles for explaining the process of social reproduction. Indeed, their too frequent use only leads, in our judgment, to bypassing precisely those problems that belong at the center of sociological research: What is the meaning of property, or any other social institution, in the concrete system of institutions of any society? A great mass of research in sociology, economic history, and anthropology, from Weber to Malinowski and Polanyi, proves that there is hardly a single precapitalist society in which property relations can offer an adequate explanation of social authority. Those societies can best be analyzed in terms of traditional, political, legal, and cultural factors as principles of legitimation, even though in them property has a greater or lesser importance as one institution among many.

That is why, in seeking the place of intellectuals in the social structure, we set out not from the category of mode of production but from Polanyi's models of economic integration. We said before that, with the emergence of the teleological redistributors, there appears in the social structure a point around which a class may coalesce. That assertion implies another — namely, that, extending Weber's interpretation, we will speak of class not only amid free-market conditions but will assume the existence of a historically new model of economic integration in which we consider the formation of the intelligentsia into a class to be a possibility: the redistributive economy of early socialism.

b) *Economic integration and social authority. ba*) *Growth or stagnation?* The type of economic integration which offers a basis for the formation of the intelligentsia into a class — rational redistribution — differs from the sort of redistribution ideally typified in the Asiatic mode of production (which we will henceforth call traditional redistribution), and also from the self-regulating market ideally typified by 19th-century Western European capitalism. We see the distinction between these three integrational models in the way each interprets the overall challenge to which it must respond in its own way. Systems of traditional redistribution are not called upon to respond to the demands of growth; a dynamic economy is not one of their goals or values. Such a system works satisfactorily even when it assures no more than the simple reproduction of society. Typically, traditional redistributive systems are powerfully conditioned by their ecology; the simple reproduction of society depends heavily on chance environmental and topographical factors, and therefore social survival demands that these natural conditions be brought under control (in particular through irrigation works, justifying their designation as hydraulic societies).

Under the Asiatic mode of production the members of society accept as

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legitimate the authority of the central redistributive apparatus to appropriate a part of their production as social surplus because the central authorities, by maintaining the system of dams and irrigation canals, guarantee the society's continued survival. The common feature of free-market and rational-redistributive economies, on the other hand, is that both assure an expansion of production, orienting the members and institutions of society toward economic growth. The difference between the last two appears in the way the challenge of growth is met: The free market builds the imperative to expand into the market mechanism itself, and the goal of growth, internalized in this way, is then controlled through an impersonal profit mechanism. Rational-redistributive societies treat economic growth as an external challenge, a politically defined goal dictated by the desire to catch up with the developed Western economies. In this externality of the goal of growth, rational redistribution resembles the more traditional variety, for whom the challenge of nature appears as an external menace, and it is for this reason that institutions of authority which are similar in many ways arise in both.

bb) *Independent economy or coordinated economy?* All redistributive systems are characterized by the coordination of economic and political power, by contrast with free-market economies, where for the first time in history political and economic institutions are separated. It is this coordination of political and economic institutions that lends a certain limited sense to the superficial comparison of rational-redistributive with precapitalist systems in such phrases as "feudal socialism." For purposes of analyzing the concept of class, however, the most important difference between those two models of integration is to be found in the way the organs of combined political and economic authority are legitimized. In older redistributive societies tradition legitimates the appropriation of the surplus product, and so the rule of traditional authority is the prime structural feature of this type of economy.

bc) *Legitimating control over the surplus product.* Under the Asiatic mode of production the power to redistribute is founded upon traditional status; its legitimacy cannot be called into question on the grounds that it is not exercised rationally enough or sufficiently enough. Modern redistributive economies, on the other hand, like free-market economies, are rational and geared to dynamic growth. They are based on the performance principle and accept the criterion of maximum return at minimum cost; they strive for the most efficient use of capital, create comparable institutions to assure the organization of technical and industrial labor, and make achievement, not ascribed status, the criterion of class membership. The Asiatic mode of production is also characterized by a centralized state bureaucracy, a pyramidal conduit serving the whole redistributive system. In a somewhat similar way modern redistribution substitutes governmental administrative decisions for the decisions of the market, creating through the sum of those decisions a bureaucratic network which tends to become centralized and to encompass the whole society. Since no one owns any appreciable amount of property, everyone in rational-redistributive society, from top to bottom of the

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pyramid, is an office holder. Nevertheless, the features that Weber discerned in analyzing the workings of the rational bureaucracy of modern capitalism are also to be found, in many respects, in this organization of office holders, and they distinguish it from traditional bureaucracy with its non-rational recruitment procedures and operational principles. This modern bureaucracy, in which interest relationships are impersonal, has to show effective results, and accordingly its various rungs are occupied by people possessing various degrees of bureaucratic knowledge.

Historically and technologically, market economy and rational-redistributive economy are contemporaries. Thus their common feature is the rationality of power. In the latter system authority to redistribute the surplus product from a central point is not granted according to inherited status, much less by tradition or charisma, but by a purposive rationality — an ideology which has grown into a common consensus that the organs of central planning and redistribution are capable of redistributing the surplus product in the most rational manner. In market economies, too, the right to dispose over the social surplus is legitimated according to a rational criterion, except that there it is the ownership of capital that bestows legitimacy.

bd) Differences in the way the surplus product is determined. Our three models of economic integration not only legitimate the right of disposition over the surplus product differently, they also determine the surplus product itself in different ways. In market economies it is determined by economic criteria alone. The surplus product is equivalent to the difference between production costs and market prices; its size is regulated by the market mechanism itself. All redistributive systems, on the other hand, have in common the fact that the surplus product is not determined by economic means alone; its magnitude is the result of political decisions. In these societies the surplus product is as much as the central authorities can extract without provoking uprisings against themselves. In traditional redistributive economies, however, the size of the surplus is relatively limited. Rational-redistributive systems, on the other hand, are the most effective of all at maximizing the amount of surplus product withheld from the personal consumption of society's members and mobilized for purposes of expanding production. From that it does not follow, of course, that in the rational-redistributive systems the social capital retained is allocated more efficiently than it would be if a market mechanism were making the decisions about its use. On the contrary, every economist knows that while the proportion of national income devoted to investment in the socialist countries is substantially larger than in market societies on a comparable level of development, the efficiency of the capital invested is lower. It is no less a commonplace that market economies display their efficiency above all in the way they satisfy consumer needs and the infrastructural requirements of consumption, while at the same time they generally devote a smaller share of their resources to such ultimately extra-economic purposes as armaments. That is the reason relatively developed socialist societies can create military establishments on a par with, or even larger than, those of more developed market societies.

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Expansion of the size of the surplus product is not an essential feature of traditional redistribution. If it happens, nonetheless, the increase goes not to expanding production but toward swelling the mandarin bureaucracy. We might add that in such systems only a few goods become saleable commodities, for in the redistributive process most goods circulate in kind, which further limits the amount of goods that can go to make up the surplus product. Thus for the most part traditional redistribution goes together with a subsistence economy. The necessities of life are consumed in their immediate natural form within the communal organizations of production, so that often it is only luxuries which enter the redistributive stream. Then there is the fact that societies characterized by traditional redistribution are not great centralized empires, and even when they are forcibly organized into empires they frequently fall apart again into regional satrapies constantly at war with one another. If any one region succeeds in imposing its rule on the others, it is still incapable of integrating them economically, and attempts only to hold the various regions together as long as possible by means of ideology and sheer military power. Sooner or later, however, anarchy and corruption dissolve the imperial structure, a process whose ultimate economic cause is to be found in the fact that the redistributive mechanism itself limits the kind and amount of surplus product available for redistribution.

be) *Commodity relations under rational redistribution.* Rational redistribution, in contrast, by rationalizing the tools of power, is able to increase the size of the surplus product considerably. In this process an important part is played by the fact that although the price-regulating function of the market is eliminated, commodity relations are not; in fact, they are made universal. We know of no other model of economic integration that converts so large a proportion of all products into commodities. The entire labor supply becomes a commodity, for the political machinery of rational redistribution destroys all traditional productive units, replacing them with a vast bureaucratic apparatus. This universalization of commodity relations does not take place according to the logic of the market, however. It is the rationality of the planning process, not the decisions of owners of capital, which redistributes the retained surplus product, whose size cannot be effectively regulated by the market. The extension of commodity relations does not weaken the redistributive system. On the contrary, it strengthens it, for the prices of the increased quantity of goods brought into circulation by minimizing how much of his own production the peasant consumes — and by minimizing, in a particularly thorough and inflexible fashion, the price of labor — are basically determined not by the market but by the decisions of the authorities. This key structural feature is motivated primarily by the desire to put a relatively large percentage of the national income to use through the channels of the state budget, and to make even consumption dependent, in large measure, on allocations from a central source rather than on wages arrived at through transactions on a labor market.

Although the first great spurt of economic growth in the rational-redistri-

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butive societies coincided everywhere with the transfer (by means of collectivization) of a large quantity of peasant labor from small-scale agriculture to industry, and thus with the rapid conversion of the independent small producers who made up the bulk of the population into wage workers, the "sale" of labor in the redistributive economy still cannot be regarded as "market commerce" in Polanyi's sense. A worker who is forced to sell his labor, sometimes by police measures, cannot enter into transactive relations in any kind of "labor commerce" with the organizations that offer employment; he is more or less at their disposition. In these circumstances there is no connection between the worker's wage and the size of the surplus product he turns out, nor theoretically can there be any. Just as prices are not economic but political prices, so too wages are not economic but political. Consequently, only the patience of the population determines their lower limit. In the light of all this it can be understood why wage differentials are governed not by the actual demand for various kinds of labor, but by an abstract hierarchy of qualifications.

bf) The universalization of commodity relations: Stalin's revolution. Today both Chinese ideologists and the Western New Left consider Eastern European economic policy since Stalin's death as revisionist because a few pieces of market machinery have been fitted into the overall redistributive mechanism, and an ever-growing number of consumer goods have been defined as commodities, removing them from the sphere of direct allocation. But in fact it would be more correct to say that the great turning point in the history of the Eastern European economy was the introduction of Stalinist economic policy, which found a country where three-quarters of the population were small peasant producers and in a few years' time transferred nearly all available labor to the "socialist labor market." Stalin and his entourage realized that neither extorting capital from individual peasant holdings through a system of forced deliveries of crops, nor giving free rein to the open marketing of peasant production, as recommended by Bukharin, could greatly increase the surplus product available for rational redistribution. That objective would be served only by curtailing the peasant's self-sufficiency, treating all labor as a commodity, and extending the range of consumer articles that could only be obtained with money as rapidly as possible.

Thus, far from abolishing commodity relations, Stalin universalized them. Henceforth, the size of the surplus product which the central authorities could skim off the economy was limited only by political factors. That enabled the planners to take into account only political and power considerations (rather than economic ones) in deciding what would be a requisite or sometimes just barely tolerable standard of living. Over the years, experience yielded the elementary political insight that living standards had to be raised in some modest degree (but enough for the population to notice it) if the state apparatus wanted to avoid such outbreaks of discontent as occurred in Hungary in 1956 or Poland in 1970.

bg) The recent economic reforms do not limit redistribution; they only make

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it more rational. By comparison with the Stalinist revolution, the economic reforms adopted in some of the Eastern European countries during the 1960s, which introduced monetary indicators in place of administrative directives in the management of the enterprise, were only of secondary significance. Since these reforms never disturbed the redistributive interpretation of labor as a commodity and did not attempt to replace the worker's dispositive situation with new, transactive relations, they did not bring the rational-redistributive system a single step closer to a market economy.

Western leftist critics of early socialism almost without exception misunderstand this extension of commodity relations in the Eastern European societies. The gradual disappearance there of utopian-socialist illusions about the possibility of direct, moneyless redistribution leads them to think that Eastern Europe must be headed, as a result, toward a market model of economic integration, and that the institutional conditions for a restoration of capitalism have been created inside the socialist system. They should bear in mind, however, that the universalization of commodity relations takes place strictly according to the logic of redistribution, not just in the sense that the price of every key commodity (including labor) is regulated by central decision, but also in that the apparent market elements in fact only increase the proportion of the surplus product which can be diverted into the stream of central redistribution. The alternatives of plan versus market, natural indicators versus monetary indicators, represent in fact only structural options within the framework of redistribution. Even the most radical proponents of market devices in Eastern Europe have only designed measures to increase, by monetary means, the size of the surplus product available for central redistribution, to a degree that was not possible for the socialist system in its first period, when some limitations on commodity relations still survived.

In sum, all these reformers recommend is that products on whose redistribution only formal administrative decisions can be made should not be introduced into the central redistributive process. They deem illusory the appropriation of such components of the surplus product as are destined to be re-allocated to the producers anyway; subsidizing the price of milk or meat, for example, and balancing that section of the state budget by taxing other articles in trade, has in this view only the appearance of being a redistributive decision. What all these reforms strive for is precisely to make rational redistribution more rational, by purging it of traditional elements.

An economy by no means approaches the free market model merely because it expands the range of products which are treated as commodities. The decisive question is still how the surplus product is determined, and here rational redistribution is still unalterably characterized by the integration of political and economic power and, as a result, by administrative decision-making uncontrolled by economic processes. And so we must defend the Eastern European economic reformers of the 1960s against the charge of revisionism; indeed, we see in them the direct heirs of the rationalizing tendencies of Stalinist economic policy. Their reforms have not in the least

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questioned redistribution's basic principle of legitimacy — the principle that it is the teleological redistributors who should decide over the social surplus product, not owners of capital or self-managing owners of labor power. They only want to be rid of bungling, untutored party bureaucrats who run the economy with arbitrary, haphazard directives, and put in their places "computerized" planners with a high level of econometric knowledge, who can govern economy and society more effectively.

bh) Special characteristics of the Chinese social and economic structure. Western European New Left writers customarily cite as an alternative to the Eastern European model of development the economy of China, in which market relations and distribution of product other than in kind play a rather modest part. Because of that they tend to see the Chinese model as a more likely point of departure for a genuinely socialist economy. In our opinion Chinese socialism differs from the Soviet model primarily in resembling traditional redistribution more closely than it does the typical rational-redistributive system. Central redistribution of the Chinese type draws only a relatively small fraction of the social product into the state budget. In China the Stalinist revolution has never taken place; the central government has converted into commodities neither labor nor consumer articles, nor even the bulk of the agricultural means of production. The Chinese state has not become the kind of regime required for modern rational redistribution, in that the individual members of society — particularly the villagers, who make up 85 percent of the population — are not brought constantly and immediately face to face with the central authorities.

China may still be termed a "segmented" state in the sense that redistribution does not take place through a rational bureaucratic apparatus working from the top down, nor does it encompass the whole of social and economic activity. But that does not at all mean that the Chinese organizational model is any less bureaucratic than the Soviet one, or that it really affords greater scope for self-management. The lowliest official in the technical bureaucracy stands high above the locally organized communal units, ostensibly autonomous and basically self-sufficient economically. The technical bureaucracy is in fact smaller than in the Soviet Union, but on the other hand the range of products regulated by it is larger, for in China officials must supervise the actual physical distribution of goods in kind, which in the Soviet system is merely regulated in broad outline by the bureaucracy.

The surplus product which flows from the Chinese communes into the hands of the central distributive apparatus is relatively smaller, but that does not at all mean that the producers have any greater voice in determining the size of the surplus product taken from them than do the producers under the Soviet model. In fact, the Soviet citizen still has greater autonomy in his choice of consumer products, for he can spend his wages as he likes on the (admittedly narrow) consumer-goods market. The fact that his labor has been made a commodity subjects him all the more to the professional bureaucracy, of course, but it also makes him freer of them to the degree that the control

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exercised over him is more impersonal and does not extend to every moment of his life, his leisure time as well as his working hours. In China, on the other hand, an enormous unpaid bureaucracy is ranged alongside the paid professional bureaucracy, and extends its watchfulness over the individual into every aspect of life.

Since Chinese society is not integrated through a central rational-redistributive system, ideological and political controls even stricter than those found in the Soviet model are required in order to assure the integration of state and society. The latter can only be achieved if everything that happens in society is imbued with ideological significance and the most banal acts are given symbolic meaning, so that every manifestation of the individual's life can be weighted in the scales of loyalty or treason. That is what makes the life of the Communist movement seem more spirited in contemporary China, even if the parades and slogans of the organizationally mobilized masses never represent the articulation of a particular interest in society. The purpose of these rituals is to compel the masses to express their dedication to the organization of Chinese society, in which the people under one leader advance toward a single goal, and usually the masses need to be mobilized whenever the leader identifies his next rival in the Politburo and undertakes to oust him and his supporters from the upper levels of power.

For all that, the organizational forms of traditional redistribution survive relatively intact in China, Chinese society itself is no less bureaucratic than Soviet society; it is only so in a different way. Since a relatively smaller fraction of the social product is made available for central redistribution, fewer redistributors are needed, hence fewer intellectuals. But since contemporary Chinese redistribution, in contrast to the traditional form, is already rational in its essential structural components, class positions for the intelligentsia already exist in theory under Chinese socialism, and the formation of the intellectuals into a class is now possible within the foreseeable future. Today, however, the appropriated surplus product still goes primarily to meet military needs; only a small fraction of it is returned to the civilian economy in the form of production subsidies. Thus it is that in contemporary China the teleological redistributors are themselves, first and foremost, soldiers. So too the power struggles in the Chinese leadership are restricted to groups within the elite; they reflect the rivalries between the party bureaucracy, the state bureaucracy, and the military, and do not involve intellectual groups outside their ranks.

Thus when Liu Shao-chi advocated an extension of rational redistribution on the Stalinist model, which would have resulted in a rapid growth of the Chinese working class and urban population, he was in fact advancing a class program for the intelligentsia, even though on the ideological plane he and his supporters had to come forward as spokesmen for industrialization and the working class. It was no accident that after the collapse of his reform efforts, reprisals were directed in the main against intellectual groups outside the inner circles of the central bureaucracy. In banishing university professors, scientists, and artists to village re-education camps the authorities settled accounts with

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those elements of the intellectual class which sought, under the guise of rationalizing the redistributive system, to expand the class power of the intellectuals at the expense of the central bureaucracy.

In that respect the Cultural Revolution was no more than a struggle of intellectuals belonging to the ruling elite against the coalescence of the intellectuals outside it into a class. It was accompanied by a struggle against the state bureaucracy, which, although it has a stake in the prevailing order, is more interested by reason of its technocratic tendencies in broadening the intelligentsia's power base. Maoist ideology's *bête noire* was the technical expert whose social status made him relatively independent of the political hierarchy. Therein lies a certain resemblance between the principles of Maoism and Stalinism, however much the basic differences in their social and economic policies may seem to go against it. Stalin made a worker out of the peasant, kept agriculture as a separate branch of the economy while appropriating its entire surplus product, subordinated its development ruthlessly to that of industry, and in the pursuit of all these policies crowded the villagers pell-mell into the cities. Mao did the exact opposite of all these things. Yet they had in common the power monopoly of the part, and they defended it by the most brutal means in order to prevent the evolution of the intelligentsia into a class. The purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were bloodier than the Cultural Revolution in China because (among other things) the danger of the intelligentsia's coming to form a class was more immediate. With regard to the economic structure it was Stalin himself who, in forcing the pace of social development in the direction of a rational-redistributive system, created at the same time the conditions for the formation of the intelligentsia into a class. To the degree that the rulers of China will have to abandon the structural principles of traditional redistribution in favor of further elements of rational redistribution, struggles within the intellectual class will come to replace political conflicts within the governmental elite in China as well.

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THE BIOGRAPHICAL SOURCES OF WITTGENSTEIN'S ETHICS

by Albert W. Levi

Two discrepancies haunt the philosophy of Wittgenstein. One is that between the last few pages of the *Tractatus* and all that has gone before. The other is the rather strange stylistic diversity between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. I shall try in this paper to put forward hypotheses or semi-causal explanations which may cast some light on at least one of these prior problems. To those who believe that philosophical changes are exclusively the product of logical considerations my ruminations will be both uninteresting and irrelevant. But to those who are more sympathetic to considerations of time and circumstance, who believe in an intimate relationship between the form and content of philosophy and the *conditions* of philosophizing, who find neither biography nor social milieu unimportant for an understanding of philosophical "meaning," there may be something here which if not demonstrably true, may yet be moderately suggestive and worthy of attention.

Wittgenstein scholarship up to now has, of course, been largely of the former kind. Ryle and Anscombe, Black and Maslow, Pole and Stenius, Pitcher and Hacker all attempt explication of Wittgenstein's "earlier" or his "later" philosophy in terms which presuppose the strict autonomy of mathematical logic and linguistic theory. Yet strangely enough in Wittgenstein's case it is just his most profound philosophical admirers who have emphasized his personal magnetism, his unforgettable charisma, and this comes through admirably in the *Memoir* of Malcolm and the Biographical Sketch of Von Wright. Yet, the net result of these biographical efforts is to drive an even deeper wedge between Wittgenstein's life and his philosophy.

Von Wright while candidly admitting "it is probably true that he lived on the border of mental illness," yet adds a moment later: "In general, there is a striking constrast between the restlessness, the continual searching and changing, in Wittgenstein's life and personality, and the perfection and elegance of his finished work."[1] But this is queer indeed! Where, except possibly in the *Tractatus*, is this "perfection" and "elegance" to be found? Where else is there ever "finished work?" For the numbered symmetry of the *Tractatus* soon gives way to the tortured ruminations, the scattered jottings in notebooks and intellectual diaries and *Zettel*, and there are no more treatises—only *Bemerkungen* and *Untersuchungen*—and a certain poignant despair at the fragmented, the disjointed, the non-unified which dogs the philosopher to the end. All of this is clearly registered in the Preface to the

1. Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, Biographical Sketch by Georg Henrik von Wright (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962) p. 11.

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Philosophical Investigations:[2] "It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I pictured differently at different times. But the essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks. After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks..."

By Wittgenstein's own acknowledgement the *Philosophical Investigations* are merely "a number of sketches" made in the course of "long and involved journeyings." Many are "marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman." And of the final product he says: "So ist also dieses Buch eigentlich nur ein Album!" Thus Von Wright's "restlessness" and "continual searching and changing" of the life and personality is not so much belied as mirrored and exemplified in the philosophic work. And the question is: Are there not other aspects of the life and personality in addition to the restlessness and searching which are also mirrored in Wittgenstein's philosophical endeavor?

This question has been given added urgency and relevance by the publication in 1973 of two books which have rent the polite veil of logical criticism to raise serious and even indiscreet questions about the sociological and particularly the psychological context which produced the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. One is *Wittgenstein's Vienna* by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin (New York: Simon and Schuster). The other is *Wittgenstein* by William Warren Bartley III (Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott). They differ partly in comprehensiveness (the Janik and Toulmin book is a full scale cultural history, while Bartley in much shorter compass surveys Wittgenstein's personal life), but chiefly in a difference between a primarily sociological as opposed to a primarily biographical focus.

Janik and Toulmin do begin with a recognition of "the need to look afresh at the relation between Wittgenstein the man and Wittgenstein the philosopher," and they have one long chapter entitled "Wittgenstein the Man, and His Second Thoughts," but it trails off into cultural history as if their courage had suddenly failed them—as if the tight and genteel web of philosophic respectability had been too much for them after all. After having briefly touched upon Wittgenstein's privately expressed feelings of personal guilt they back discreetly away.[3] "Still, to grope after the ultimate source of Wittgenstein's deepest intellectual attitudes in his personal temperment and makeup would, very likely, betray us into unprofitable and irrelevant speculations.... Instead, we shall do better to recall the social and cultural parallels that we came across in earlier chapters—that is, at those respects in which Wittgenstein's life and background make him so representative a figure of the last days of Austria-Hungary."

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2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953), p. ix.
3. Janik and Toulmin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 236-7.

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George Steiner, reviewing *Wittgenstein's Vienna* for *The New Yorker* (July 23, 1973), and coming fresh from a reading of Bartley chides Janik and Toulmin for their faint-heartedness and says, I think rightly: Sooner or later, however, the relevance of Wittgenstein's private life will become inescapable. Unless one faces the issue frankly — are the main facts of Wittgenstein's homosexuality still a "secret" to anyone seriously interested?—it will become more and more difficult to view in a rational light many aspects of Wittgenstein's biography.... What matters more, the 'personal temperament' may indeed be relevant to Wittgenstein's philosophy and especially to his treatment of human speech. When one is dealing with someone of his stature, candor can only clarify." The philosophical relevance of Wittgenstein's private life is, indeed, becoming inescapable. His personal temperament has important bearings on how we interpret his philosophy. And candor in this regard can only point in the direction of the illumination of our perplexities.

II.

In 1911 as a youth of 22 Wittgenstein came to Cambridge to study the foundations of mathematics with Bertrand Russell. He remained there for two years before going to live briefly in Norway where he worked at logic and began the *Tractatus*. In 1914 he volunteered for the Austrian Army, completing the *Tractatus* between 1914-18, and after the war remained in Austria. Ten years later in 1929 as a man of 40 he returned to Cambridge, was awarded the Ph.D. for the *Tractatus*, elected a Fellow of Trinity, and began teaching a small select group of devoted disciples. Ten years after this (1939), he succeeded G.E. Moore as Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge — a post he finally resigned in 1947. Four years later he died of cancer in Cambridge at the age of 62. These are the bare facts.

It is perhaps not unnatural that Wittgenstein's British and American disciples, holding his mentality to be the product of Frege, Russell and the exigencies of modern relational logic and linguistic theory, should have dwelt upon their experiences with him at Cambridge. Neither Malcolm nor Von Wright consider the *fin de siècle* Vienna in which Wittgenstein's mentality and character was formed or that crucial period (1918-1929) between the end of the war and his Cambridge return. It is the great merit of Janik and Toulmin that they attempt to supply the Viennese cultural context which formed Wittgenstein even before he first came to England. It is the striking originality of Bartley's work that he should have traced the "lost" years of Wittgenstein's life — those "mystery" years of 1918-1928 before his return to Cambridge. For these latter are tortured years indeed, and attention to them clearly suggests the multiple ways in which Wittgenstein's life interpenetrates with his philosophy. To one strand of this interpenetration I should now like to turn.

In 1967 Basil Blackwell published (with a Memoir by Paul Engelmann) 53 brief letters and postcards which Wittgenstein had sent to Engelmann

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between December 1916 and September 1925.[4] The letters are both highly personal and enigmatic. But one thing runs through them like a trail of blood — a deep consciousness of personal guilt. For over and over the letters betray a pitiful sense of his *Unanständigkeit* (indecency), his *Schlechtigkeit* (badness), even his *Schweinerei* (rottenness). On January 16, 1918, he writes: "It is true that there is a difference between myself as I am now and as I was when we met in Olmütz. And, as far as I know, the difference is that I am now *slightly* more decent. By this I only mean that I am slightly clearer in my own mind about my lack of decency.... But what am I to do? *I am clear about one thing*: I am far too bad to be able to theorize about myself; in fact I shall either remain a swine or else I shall improve....

And on November 16, 1918: "Just how far I have gone downhill you can see from the fact that I have on several occasions contemplated taking my own life. Not from my despair about my own badness but for purely external reasons."

On May 30, 1920 from the Rasumofskygasse: "I have had a most miserable time lately. Of course only as a result of my own baseness and rottenness (*Niedrigkeit und Gemeinheit*). I have continually thought of taking my own life, and the idea still haunts me sometimes. *I have sunk to the lowest point.* May you never be in that position! Shall I ever be able to raise myself up again?"

Three weeks later the despair is terrible: "As far as the merits of my case are concerned I am beyond any outside help. — In fact, I am in a state of mind that is terrible to me. I have been through it several times before: it is the state of *not being able to get over a particular fact.* It is a pitiable state, I know. But there is only one remedy that I can see, and that is of course to come to terms with that fact. But this is just like what happens when a man who can't swim has fallen into the water and flails about with his hands and feet and feels that he *cannot* keep his head above water. That is the position I am in now. I know that to kill oneself is always a dirty thing to do. Surely one *cannot* will one's own destruction, and anybody who has visualized what is in practice involved in the act of suicide knows that suicide is always a *rushing of one's own defenses.* But nothing is worse than to be forced to take oneself by surprise."

And even as late as February 24, 1925: "It is true that you are not decent, still you are *vastly more* decent than I. I don't want to speak about myself. — Anyway I am not happy, and not because my rottenness troubles me, but within my rottenness."

Prior to the publication of Bartley's *Wittgenstein* in 1973 (except perhaps in the case of Wittgenstein's most intimate friends), it would not have been possible to understand these utterances with any certainty. Wittgenstein's guilt about his "indecency," "badness," and "rottenness," his constant

4. Paul Engelmann, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein*, With a Memoire (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) pp. 11, 21, 33, 55.

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contemplation of suicide, his *not being able to get over a particular fact,* while clear as an indicator of deep pathology were obscure as to their ultimate meaning and their cause. It was Bartley's not entirely sympathetic function to ground this unmistakably in Wittgenstein's role as guilty homosexual.

So far as I know no psycho-biography of Wittgenstein exists. The materials for a psychoanalytic treatment in terms of the family situation and in particular of Wittgenstein's early relationship to his mother and father do not seem to have been assembled. Yet while Bartley suggests that all was not precisely normal in the Wittgenstein family, Wittgenstein himself might well have been sympathetic to a Freudian interpretaiton of his own "tragedy." Rush Rhees reports a 1946 conversation of Wittgenstein about Freud as follows:[5] "The fact is that whenever you are preoccupied with something, with some trouble or with some problem which is a big thing in your life — as sex is, for instance — then no matter what you start from, the association will lead finally and inevitably back to that same theme. . . . Much the same could be said of the notion of an 'Urszene'. This often has the attractiveness of giving a sort of tragic pattern to one's life. It is all the repetition of the same pattern which was settled long ago. Like a tragic figure carrying out the decrees under which the fates had placed him at birth. Many people have, at some period, serious trouble in their lives — so serious as to lead to thoughts of suicide. This is likely to appear to one as something nasty, as a situation which is too foul to be a subject of a tragedy. And it may then be an immense relief if it can be shown that one's life has the pattern rather of a tragedy — the tragic working out and repetition of a pattern which was determined by the primal scene."

It almost seems as if Wittgenstein's life is expressive of a tragedy of this sort — "the tragic working out and repetition of a pattern." Of Wittgenstein's four brothers three committed suicide. Bartley reports that "The eldest brother, Hans, a musical genius, who had begun composing when four years old, had taken his life in Havana, Cuba, in April 1902, in his twenty-fourth year. The third son, Rudolph, killed himself in Vienna on May 2, 1904. Hans was known by the family to have been homosexual; Rudolph is thought to have been so."[6]

Whatever the exact nature of the family constellation which produced these devastating effects, it is clear that Wittgenstein was no less a victim than his brothers. Bartley only states forthrightly what from the letters to Engelmann can be surmised. "Throughout his life, but especially during and following the First World War, Wittgenstein was tormented by intense guilt and suffering over his sexual desires and activities."[7] The details, many of which Bartley supplies, need not detain us. What we rather more

5. *L. Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970) pp. 50-1.
6. Bartley, *Op. cit.*, p. 43.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

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immediately need to ask is: What was the effect (if any) of Wittgenstein's guilty homosexuality upon the content of his philosophy?

The operant word here is "guilty." It is probable that Plato, whom Wittgenstein resembles in so many ways,[8] was also homosexual, and certainly, if one inquired what effect this had upon his philosophy, clear answers could be given by referring to the doctrine of love in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium,* the opening of the *Charmides* and the *Euthydemus*, the sexual regulations of the *Republic* and the *Laws*. Yet if "Platonic love" means the love of man for man, and ideally the love of a man for a beautiful youth or boy, this is hardly reprehensible or guilty.[9] This is more or less precluded by the social context. In the higher and polite society of fifth-century Athens, which furnishes the setting for Plato's dialogues, boy-love was a recognized institution and Plato would have us know (from the *Symposium* and the *Laws*) that within the Greek cities generally it was associated both with a love of sport and a taste for philosophy. But the social context within which Wittgenstein's philosophy was produced — the ambience of Freud's Vienna and Havelock Ellis's England — was diametrically opposed. The Athenian attachment to homosexuality was open, confident, and assured — a possible subject for a philosophic dialogue or an essay in *belles-lettres*. The early twentieth century commitment or addiction to homosexuality in Austria or England is furtive and ashamed — fit only for the confessional or an essay in abnormal psychology. How does this affect Wittgenstein's philosophy? George Steiner thinks it has something to do with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. I on the contrary think it has something to do with his quixotic theory of ethics (although perhaps in the end it comes to the same thing). Let us approach this in one of its more comprehensive treatments.

III.

The only popular lecture ever composed or delivered by Wittgenstein was a lecture on ethics.[10] It was probably read to a small society ("The Heretics") in Cambridge sometime between September 1929 and December 1930 — that is to say, not long after his return. He begins by affirming that the subject of ethics seems to him of general importance and defines the subject by an appeal to Moore's *Principia Ethica*: "Ethics is the general inquiry into what is good." But he at once broadens his topic by making it convertible with "the enquiry into what is valuable" or "the enquiry into the meaning of life" or "the enquiry into the right way of living." It is immediately clear that Wittgenstein wants to do two things: he wishes to restrict ethics to the realm of intrinsic or absolute value and eliminate instrumental values or means. And he wants, also like Moore, to show that values are not facts or "natural" entities, but are somehow transcendent or "supernatural." But what is

8. See my article "Wittgenstein as Dialectician" *Jl. of Philosophy*, (Feb. 13, 1964).
9. See, for example, Warner Fite, *The Platonic Legend* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934) Chapter VIII "Platonic Love."
10. Published for the first time in *The Philosophical Review*, January 1965.

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striking is the way that Wittgenstein personalizes the experience of moral value — to indicate what that "idea" is in his own mind; to show how psychologically "the ethical" appears in his own moral experience.[11] "I want to fix my mind on what I mean by absolute or ethical value. And there, in my case, it always happens that the idea of one particular experience presents itself to me which therefore is, in a sense, my experience *par excellence* and this is the reason why, in talking to you now, I will use this experience as my first and foremost example. (As I have said before, this is an entirely personal matter and others would find other examples more striking.) ...I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have it *I wonder at the existence of the world*.... I will mention another experience straight away which I also know and which others of you might be acquainted with; it is, what one might call, the experience of feeling *absolutely* safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined to say 'I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens.' ...A third experience of the same kind is that of feeling guilty and again this was described by the phrase that God disapproves of our conduct... Now the three experiences which I have mentioned to you... seem to those who have mentioned them, for instance to me, to have in some sense an intrinsic, absolute value."

"Systems of morals," said Nietzsche, "are only a sign language of the emotions" (Die Moralen sind auch nur eine Zeichensprache der Affekte"). When in the last chapter of *Principia Ethica* G.E. Moore stated that the highest of all absolute or intrinsic values were "the pleasures of human intercourse" and "the enjoyment of beautiful objects," he was but codifying the beliefs of that little band of *fin-de-siècle* Cambridge which was soon to flower in the drawing rooms of Bloomsbury. And when this only public lecture of the master personally fixes the idea of absolute or ethical value in the three dimensions of (1) wonder at the existence of the world, (2) the feeling of absolute safety, and (3) the consciousness of guilt so great as to suggest "that God disapproves of our conduct," we are in the very center of the moral nightmare of Wittgenstein's homosexual universe.

At first glance Wittgenstein's "wonder at the existence of the world" seems a little like Heidegger's problem as to why anything should exist rather than not. But Heidegger's question is put in the context of a consideration of Being, as a problem of ontology, while for Wittgenstein the wonder of existence is probably as much horror as wonder, and by his own admission is of moral rather than metaphysical relevance. I suggest that it is illuminated by his conversation about Freud where "the big thing in your life — as sex is, for instance" leads back with metaphysical inevitability to a tragic pattern fixed long ago. It is the "not being able to get over a particular fact" of the letter of Engelmann which in its absoluteness seems grounded in the structure of the universe — in the decrees under which the fates have placed one at birth. So Oedipus himself might have felt. And at this point the ontological

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

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and the moral attitudes coalesce. Wittgenstein is here referring not merely to the brute "givenness" of the world, but more transparently (and perhaps unconsciously) to the brute "givenness" of what he thought of as his moral deformity. It is completely understandable then that this should be a basic presupposition of his personal approach to ethics, an elemental structure in the composition of Wittgenstein's moral world.

What of the second point — that astonishing identification of intrinsic value with the experience of absolute safety, with the feeling "I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens?" This, too, I think, is intimately tied up with the ramifications of Wittgenstein's sexual nature. It is a psychological commonplace repeated over and over in Plato's dialogues that every rational man is constantly threatened by a brood of lawless desires within, ready at any moment to break out like a swarm of wild beasts. This Platonic metaphor is a literal transcription of Wittgenstein's intimate life. Bartley notes the paradox.[12] "He was, so his teacher and friend Bertrand Russell wrote, 'perhaps the most perfect example I have ever known of a genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating. He had a kind of purity which I have never known equalled except by G.E. Moore.' Yet this pure and intense genius who himself wrote that he would like to die in a moment of abrilliance was also a homosexual given to bourts of extravagant and almost uncontrollable promiscuity."

And some pages later as illustrative of this fact he describes Wittgenstein's life when he was living in rooms on Untere Viaduktgasse in Vienna's third district just after the war in 1919.[13] "By walking for ten minutes to the east, down Marxergasse and over the Sophienbrücke (now called the Rotundenbrücke), he could quickly reach the parkland meadows of the Prater, where rough young men were ready to cater to him sexually. Once he had discovered this place, Wittgenstein found to his horror that he could scarcely keep away from it. Several nights each week he would break away from his rooms and make the quick walk to the Prater, possessed, as he put it to friends, by a demon he could barely control. Wittgenstein found he much preferred the sort of rough blunt homosexual youth that he could find strolling in the paths and alleys of the Prater to those ostensibly more refined young men who frequented the Sirk Ecke in the Kärnterstrasse and the neighboring bars at the edge of the inner city. And it was to this particular spot — still used for the same purpose at night, and still about as dangerous — that Wittgenstein was to hie almost as long as he lived in or visited Vienna. Similarly, in later years in England he was from time to time to flee the fashionable and intellectual young men who were ready to place themselves at his disposal in Cambridge, in favor of the company of tough boys in London pubs."

The life to which Wittgenstein's nature condemned him was *dangerous* in at least three senses. It posed the constant threat of the outbreak of wild desire

12. Bartley, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

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Paradoxical as this seems, it follows logically. Every two-world theory suffers the enigma of their interaction. Plato's value transcendence was only indifferently breached by his doctrine of eros. And that disturbing footnote in Kant's First Critique outlawing valid moral judgment has been all too often ignored by his moralistic followers. Having distinguished between the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds, he was forced to concede the subject to feelings of intense mental suffering and guilt. It also posed the threat of blackmail, publicity, and the loss of reputation. And finally, the "rough young men" and "tough boys" may even have posed the threat of actual bodily harm. In such a situation it becomes understandable how much of Wittgenstein's moral energy should have been absorbed by the effort to construct an environment that would protect him from his own nature. And, indeed, during much of his life, I think, Wittgenstein was working out a self-protective pattern of behavior to shield himself from his most extreme tendencies toward promiscuously homosexual inclinations. Under these circumstances Wittgenstein's identification of intrinsic value with absolute *safety* in the lecture on ethics takes on new meaning, and we may perceive with greater clarity how the feeling: "I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens" becomes for him a paradigm of moral value.

The third experience which Wittgenstein associates with the ethical — the sense of guilt — is so obviously a consequence of his life situation that little more need be said about it here. And it is equally obvious that it is deeply associated with the intermittent episodes of pessimism and depression which dogged his lifetime and upon which all who knew him intimately have remarked. Under normal circumstances the notions of responsibility and moral culpability are naturally associated with the objects of moral judgment, but to relate the ethical sense to a guilt so great that it implies all the sternness of divine disapproval is noteworthy for its excess. But just this preoccupation with "divine judgment" and "the last judgment" is, as we shall soon see, one of Wittgenstein's most curious and idiosyncratic obsessions. Yet I think the sense of guilt in Wittgenstein, however obvious, leads to a really important point; to a new understanding of the significance of those enigmatic moral pronouncements of the last three pages of Wittgenstein's great first work — to what I should like to call the latent (and probably unconscious) moral strategy of the *Tractatus*.

IV.

Almost from the moment of its publication the *Tractatus* has been regarded as a puzzling and a paradoxical book. After about seventy dense pages devoted to the strictest consideration of logic, the theory of language, mathematics, and the philosophy of natural science (and in which as if by magic "the world" has been transformed into the aggregate of truth functions of elementary propositions) we are in conclusion presented with slightly over three pages of curious and recondite obiter dicta about values, ethics, death, eternity, God, and the mysticism of silence. And we should note that it is

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either minimized, ridiculed, or ignored. And this despite the fact that in a well-known letter to Ludwig von Ficker[14] (dating from the early fall of 1919 and therefore very close to the actual completion of the *Tractatus*) Wittgenstein himself stressed their supreme value: that in their cryptic references is contained the entire intention of the *Tractatus*. "Der Sinn des Buches ist ein Ethischer," he said — the real point of the book is ethical. And further, its chief function, he says, has been "to set limits to the domain of the ethical from the inside — which is *the only way* it can be *rigorously* done." ("Es wird nämlich das Ethische durch mein Buch gleichsam von Innen begrenzt; und ich bin überzeugt, dass es, *streng*, nur so zo begrenzen ist.") And our question must be: Why was Wittgenstein so compulsively anxious "to set limits" to the domain of the ethical?

Only now is the question beginning to seem relevant and significant. The general interpretive line has long been to ignore the last few pages of the *Tractatus* and to discredit the evidence provided by the letter to von Ficker. Even as late as 1972 Hacker could conclude: "In short, Wittgenstein's letter to von Ficker is either self-deluding or disingenuous."[15] But is it? I do not think so and I believe that what Hacker has blindly failed to take into account is the function which Wittgenstein's theory of ethics plays in relation to the peculiar moral ambiguity of Wittgenstein's own life situation. Let us then turn to the moral theory which the end of the *Tractatus* projects with such aphoristic curtness.

The simplest characterization of the moral stance of the last few pages of the *Tractatus* is that it asserts the "two world theory" with a vengeance — that it cursorily recapitulates Plato's distinction between a sensible and an intelligible world, Kant's opposition beltween a noumenal and a phenomenal universe, and therefore the relentless and intransigent ethical non-naturalism of G.E. Moore. "Der Sinn der Welt musst ausserhalb ihrer liegen. In der Welt ist alles wie es ist und geschieht alles wie es geschieht; es gibt in ihr keinen Wert — und wenn es ihn gäbe, so hätte er keinen Wert." (The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value — and if there were, it would be of no value.) There is the contingent world of fact which is valueless, and there is the sense of value which lies outside the actual world and they are rationally incommensurate. The consequence follows as in a demonstration of Euclid — the abolition of any ethics at the human level. "Darum kann es auch keine Sätze der Ethik geben." (Hence also there can be no ethical propositions.) And "Die Ethik ist transzendental." (Ethics is transcendental.) And these simple pronouncements give ample aid and comfort to Wittgenstein's profound sense of guilt. For, translated into the language of his need, they read: "Hence there can be no moral judgment, *no ethical condemnation* within the competence of men."

14. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker* (Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1969) p. 35.
15. P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, (Oxford Univ. Press, 1972) p. 83.

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precisely ethics which takes first place and is, as if by design, internally related to the mysticism of silence. The basic incongruity between the first seventy and the last three pages of the *Tractatus* is breathtaking. What does it mean?

These last three pages are not by any means incoherent, and they have, I think, a purpose which only the general pattern of Wittgenstein's life discloses. Yet for almost half a century it has been their fate to have been unknowability of the former (since "knowledge" always has its empirical vectors) — with devastating consequences for "moral knowledge."[16] "The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of our own conduct, thus remains entirely hidden from us. Our imputations can refer only to the empirical character. How much of this character is ascribably to the pure effect of freedom, how much to mere nature, that is, to faults of temperament for which there is no responsibility, or to its happy constitution, can never be determined; and upon it therefore no perfectly just judgments can be passed."

The moral implications of axiological dualism are clear. To distinguish between an imminent universe of fact and a higher world of value is precisely to place the domain of the intrinsically moral beyond the scope of human judgment. But in Wittgenstein this strategy is clothed in characteristically linguistic garments. The underlying purpose of the first seventy pages of the *Tractatus* has been to transform the world of actual fact into a world of significant speech, and this displacement of ontology by semantics has its ethical correlate. The denial of moral "being" is accompanied by a vehement denial of the possibility of moral "saying" — by the assertion of a doctrine of moral inexpressibility. The last few pages of the *Tractatus* are dominated by this strategy. "Es ist klar, dass sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen lässt." (It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.) And, "Vom Willen als dem Träger des Ethischen kann nicht gesprochen werden." (Of the will as the subject of the ethical we cannot speak.) And the final imperative of all: "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen." (Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.)

It seems clear that what we have here is exactly what Wittgenstein asserted to von Ficker at the beginning as the chief purpose of the *Tractatus* — "to set limits to the domain of the ethical from the inside." But it also seems clear that what is here at work is a protective device of incontestable power — the paralysis of a threatening moral expressiveness. The concern with absolute safety in the lecture on ethics was no trivial preoccupation. As much of Wittgenstein's life activity was absorbed by the effort to construct an environment that would protect him from his threatening homosexual inclinations, so his moral philosophy was unconsciously constructed to protect himself against the moral condemnation which those inclinations might be expected to call out. The permanence of this need is attested by the history of his philosophical development. In later years Wittgenstein drastically

16. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1953) p. 475 (Footnote a).

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reversed the logical foundations of the first seventy pages of the *Tractatus*, but the moral stance of the last three pages remained with him until the day of his death. His logic of language could be shifting as the winds of his philosophical perspective, but his ethical theory was anchored in the unchanging necessities of his life.

We are now, I think, in a better position to understand the meaning of those last cryptic pages of the *Tractatus* — the two-world axiology, the ineffability of ethics, the mysticism of silence. It is the protective pattern in high gear. It is the subtle strategy of a proud but guilty homosexual who has with great perspicuity and care placed himself beyond the condemnation of rational speech — that is to say — beyond the moral judgment of his fellow men.

V.

Beyond the moral judgment of his fellow men. Perhaps not beyond the moral judgment of God. If the unconscious motivation of those last pages of the *Tractatus* is the avoidance of moral rebuke at the human level, the question of its transcendental operation is more problematic. It hinges upon an inference as to Wittgenstein's theology — his deepest religious beliefs. And here the evidence is more than a little obscure. There are lectures and conversations of Wittgenstein which are relevant, but their interpretation is far from certain. There is surely no dogmatic assertion of belief in the existence of God — quite the contrary. But there is equally no dogmatic assertion of atheism. Wittgenstein seems to have held these ultimate beliefs in suspense. But what one needs to attend to is the phraseology and the descriptive language of his meditations on religion. And here there is, I think, abundant evidence for the centrality of those moral conceptions which are naturally associated with guilt: "retribution," "punishment," and their theological analogue "the Last Judgment." With this last idea Wittgenstein seems to have been obsessed.

Von Wright in his "Biographical Sketch" finds Wittgenstein's seriousness of character to be of the religious kind. "Yet I do not know," he said,[17] "whether he can be said to have been 'religious' in any but a trivial sense of the word. Certainly he did not have a Christian faith. But neither was his view of life un-Christian, pagan, as was Goethe's. To say that Wittgenstein was not a pantheist is to say something important. 'God does not reveal himself *in* the world,' he wrote in the *Tractatus*. The thought of God, he said, was above all for him *the thought of the fearful judge*."

That Wittgenstein's guilt, his continuous inner self-accusation may have turned his consciousness toward the idea of a final judgment is also echoed by Engelmann:[18] "The idea of a God in the sense of the Bible, the image of God as the creator of the world, hardly ever engaged Wittgenstein's attention, . . . but the notion of a last judgment was of profound concern to him. 'When we

17. Von Wright, *Op. cit.*, pp. 19-20. Italics mine.
18. Engelmann, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 77-8.

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meet again at the last judgment' was a recurrent phrase with him, which he used in many a conversation at a particularly momentous point. He would pronounce the words with an indescribably inward-gazing look in his eyes, his head bowed, the pciture of a man stirred to his depths."

Our final evidence comes from Malcolm:[19] "Wittgenstein did once say that he thought that he could understand the conception of God, in so far as it is involved in one's awareness of one's own sin and guilt. He added that he could *not* understand the conception of a *Creator*. I think that the ideas of Divine judgment, forgiveness, and redemption had some intelligibility for him, as being related in his mind to feelings of disgust with himself, an intense desire for purity, and a sense of the helplessness of human beings to make themselves better.... I believe that Wittgenstein was prepared by his own character and experience to comprehend the idea of a judging and redeeming God. But any cosmological conception of a Deity, derived from the notions of cause or of infinity, would be repugnant to him."

It is clear that Wittgenstein's "religion" is motivated by ethics, not metaphysics, and in this sense it is Judaic. His God is "the fearful judge." The guilt which constitutes the foundation of moral intuition to which he alludes in the "Lecture on Ethics" is described by the phrase "that God disapproves of our conduct." And the "Lecture on Religious Belief" which he delivered privately in Cambridge in the summer of 1938 is replete with references to retribution, punishment, and the concept of a last judgment.[20] "If you ask me whether or not I believe in a Judgment Day, in the sense in which religious people have belief in it, I wouldn't say: 'No. I don't believe there will be such a thing.' It would seem to me utterly crazy to say this."

But perhaps the most convincing demonstration of Wittgenstein's belief that a moral prescription has the coercive form of an absolute judge occurs in the conversation on Schlick's *Ethics* of December 17, 1930, reported by Waismann. Schlick has again raised a moral-theological issue first posed in Plato's *Euthyphro*: Is the Good good because God wills it, or does God will the Good because it is good? And Wittgenstein answers:[21] "I think that the first conception is the deeper one: Good is what God orders. For this cuts off the path to any and every explanation "why" it is good, while the second conception is precisely the superficial, the rationalistic one, which proceeds as if what is good could still be given some foundation.... If any proposition expresses just what I mean, it is: Good is what God orders."

Wittgenstein holds not to the teleological but to the deontological theory of moral value precisely because the latter is tinged with an irrationalist strain. And this fits perfectly with his life-long admiration of existentialist religious thinkers with a strong sense of emotional decisiveness: Tolstoy, Kierkegaard, and above all, St. Augustine. This seems highly incongruous in an exact logician in the tradition of Frege and Russell, but it is a consequence not of

19. Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, pp. 70-1.
20. *Lectures and Conversations*, p. 55.
21. *The Philosophical Review* (January 1965), p. 15.

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intellectual judgment but of biographical necessity. Wittgenstein's profound sense of personal guilt colored almost every aspect of his most intimate convictions. And what we know of it enables us to infer some of the answers to what are admittedly perplexing question such as: Did Wittgenstein really believe in God? As a creator of the universe, certainly not. But as the stern final judge of men's moral transgressions, very probably. In fact, empathetically one can even present a hypothesis as to Wittgenstein's reasoning in this matter. It would not be an ontological or a cosmological or a teleological, but a moral argument for the existence of God; not unlike that argued by Kant. I should call it Wittgenstein's *culpalogical* argument, and it would go something like this. "I am so tainted by moral corruption that I feel overwhelmingly that I shall be judged at a final Last Judgment. And since there must then be a supreme power to judge me at that time, God may well exist." It is this overwhelming and life-long sense of guilt which made him such a paradoxical but permanent admirer of St. Augustine.

Throughout his lifetime Wittgenstein read and re-read Augustine's *Confessions.* Among the few books in his possession at his death was not one but *two* copies of this work — a Latin edition of Teubner dated 1898 and a German translation by Lachmann in a Reklam edition of 1888.[22] And in fact I think the resonance which Wittgenstein found in Augustine was the abysmal sense of sin and something very closely approximating the penitential mood. "I will now call to mind my past foulness, and the carnal corruptions of my soul,...reviewing my most wicked ways in the very bitterness of my remembrance.... Where was I, and how far was I exiled...in that sixteenth year of the age of my flesh, when the madness of lust...took the rule over me and I resigned myself wholly to it? The briars of unclean desires grew rank over my head, and there was no hand to root them out...."[23]

These are the dread sentiments which in secular prose find their veiled expression in Wittgenstein's letters to Engelmann. And they are, I think, the clue to a true understanding and an adequate interpretation of Wittgenstein's ethical doctrines and his philosophy of religion.

22. Garth Hallett, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations"* (Cornell Univ. Press, 1977) pp. 25, 761.
23. *The Confessions of St. Augustine,* (Everyman Edition, 1932) Book II.

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THE METACRITIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGY*

by Theodor W. Adorno

θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν.

Epicharmos, Fragm. 20

The attempt to discuss Husserl's pure phenomenology in a dialectical spirit is particularly open to a suspicion of arbitrariness. Husserl's program aims at an "ontic sphere of absolute origins," [1] fully in view of that "organized spirit of contradiction" (*organisierten Widerspruchsgeist*), which Hegel once characterized as his procedure in a conversation with Goethe.[2] The dialectic, as conceived by Hegel and subsequently turned against him, despite any similarities, is qualitatively different from the positive philosophies among which Hegel, as a system maker, is included. Even if Hegelian logic, like Kantian logic, may be "tied" to a transcendental subject, even if it may be an absolute idealism, it nevertheless points beyond itself as, according to Goethe's dialectical dictum, everything absolute (*alles Vollkommene*) does. The power of the uncontestable radiated from Hegel as from no other, and was only tentatively and fragmentedly rediscovered by later bourgeois philosophy, the philosophy of Husserl included; this power is the power of contradiction, which turns against itself and against the idea of absolute knowledge. Thinking, whose active insight rediscovers itself in every existing thing (*in allem Seienden*) and tolerates no limits, breaks through the barrier of compulsion (*Nötigung*) to set a fixed limit to all its determinations, and thereby even rocks the primacy of system, of its own content. The Hegelian system, of course, must presuppose the identity of subject and object, and therby that primacy of Spirit which it seeks to demonstrate; but in its concrete unfolding it negates the identity that it ascribes to its sum total. Nevertheless, what unfolds antithetically is not, as many now think, the structure of Being-in-itself, but rather a society full of antagonisms, to whose stages the Phenomenology of Spirit relates and with good reason, as being the self-movement of the Notion (*Begriff*). The compulsory character that the dialectic shares with the system, and which is inseparable from its character of immanence—its "logicity"—is drawn close, by means of its own principle of identity, to the real compulsion—the compulsion of the social nexus of guilt (*Schuldzusammenhangs*)—to which thought submits and which it blindly

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1. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas,* trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York, 1962), pp. 153—54 (sec. 55).

2. *Goethe: Conversations and Encounters,* ed. and trans. David Luke and Robert Pick (London, 1966), p. 170 (Eckermann).

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assumes to be its own. Its closed circle generates a flawless illusion of naturalness, and ultimately a metaphysical illusion of Being. The dialectic, however, always destroys this illusion.

Over against this, an elderly Husserl, in the title of his concise exposition of phenomenology, has evoked the Cartesian title that serves as an absolute foundation for philosophy. He would like to restore *prima philosophia* on the basis of a reflection on a Spirit cleansed of every trace of mere existing things. The metaphysical conception that marked the beginning of the epoch emerges naked and exposed at the end of it, in an utterly sublimated and sharpened form but nonetheless only the more inescapable and consistent for it: the conception that seeks to develop ontology nominalistically, i.e., in terms of a reduction of concepts to the thinking subject. This phenomonological conception, however, rejects dialectical analysis—Hegel's Negativity—as a mere temptation. The doctrine of the mediate character of all immediacy is incompatible with the impulse towards "reduction"[3] and is denounced as a logical absurdity. Hegel's scepticism regarding any choice of something absolutely First (*eines absolut Ersten*) as an indubitably secure starting point in philosophy is alleged to amount to a plunge into a sheer abyss —a motive that, among Husserl's disciples, quickly turns against all conceptual labor and effort and tries to arrest thought in the midst of thinking. Whoever is not alarmed by this scepticism would seem wholly to have lost his standard of measurement and to have bowed to the fruitless transcendent critique that pays with a lack of cogency for the empty claim to be a superior "standpoint," in order to avoid engaging in the controversy and rather, as Husserl would have said, deciding it in advance and "from above."

The methodological objection against the dialectic is too formal, however; the dialectic gives no support whatever to the distinction between method and thing. Its own procedure is immanent critique. The dialectic does not so much oppose phenomenology by means of an external and foreign approach or "plan" but, rather, it uses the power of phenomenology itself to drive the latter in a direction it would not consider at any price and exhorts the true confession of phenomenology's own untruth. "The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent's stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not."[4]

For a consciousness wary of academic convention, the contradiction in the idea of an ontology derived from an historically irrevocable nominalism is illuminating—that is, the idea that an ontology placed above all subjectivity and also above its own critique is, openly or secretly, to be discovered by returning to the very subjectivity that the ontology dismissed as being dogmatic. Dialectical thought, however, does not permit this contradiction to remain abstract but uses it to drive conceptual movement towards a binding decision about phenomenological contentions. There is no layer molded from

3. *Ideas,* passim, especially pp. 96 and 155f (secs. 31 and 56f).
4. *Hegel's Science of Logic,* trans. A. V. Miller (New York, 1969), p. 581.

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primordial (*ursprünglichen*) Being that lies beneath the constituents of pure phenomenology, nothing actually First that might outbid the phenomenological claim. Rather, the supposedly original concepts—especially the concepts of epistemology, as they appear in Husserl—are necessarily all mediated together, or, in conventional scientific language, "loaded" (*vorassetzungsvoll*). The very concept of something absolutely First lies open to criticism. Should it come to light that the givenness discussed by epistemology postulates the mechanism of reification (*Verdinglichung*) while, in a philosophy of immanence, to which the term "reification" belongs, the thinglike character of Dasein (*dinghaftes Dasein*) refers back to the context of the given, that does not, on the other hand, imply the primacy of things over givenness. It does follow, however, that the hierarchical scheme of something fundamentally First and of what is first derived from it has no claim to validity. Every attempt to pass on such a claim to a privileged category gets trapped in antinomies. In the immanent method, this is expressed by the fact that the analysis of things runs into the given in the same way that the analysis of the given runs into something thinglike. This is no objection, however, to a procedure that does not adopt a norm of reducibility but, rather, only to a method that does obey such a canon. If a critique does not want to join the hunt for something absolutely First, then it must not advocate against phenomenology what phenomenology itself and many of its successors have in mind, namely, to ground transcendent Being by means of a philosophy of immanence. Such an ultimate ground is determined precisely by its concept and its legitimation and not by any concrete thesis, however variable in content. The compulsory character of philosophy can be broken by calling it strictly by name, not by erecting another, and still older, power in its place.

The content of what is claimed to be First is less essential than the question of something First as such. For example, the argument over a dialectical versus an ontological beginning is irrelevant given a critique of the notion that it is always necessary to begin with either an ontological or a spiritual original principle. This implies an emphatic use of the concept of something First itself—that is, of the positing of identity. Absolutely everything is to be incorporated into the principle that is asserted to be philosophically First, regardless of whether this principle is called Being or thinking, subject or object, essence or facticity. The philosopher's First makes a total claim; it claims to be unmediated, and immediate. In order for it to fulfill its own concept, mediations first would have to be explained away as so-called ornaments of thought, and what is First would have to be exposed as something irreducible In-itself. Any first principle of philosophical reflection, however, must be universal if it is not to be found guilty of contingency. And any universal principle of something First, even the principle of facticity in radical empiricism, contains abstraction. Not even radical empiricism could claim an individual thing existing here-and-now—a fact—as what is First but only the principle of the factual (*Faktischem*) in general. As a concept, something First and immediate is always mediated and thus is not first. There

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is no immediacy and nothing factual, in which philosophical thought hopes to escape mediation through its own efforts, that comes to reflective thinking except through thought.

This is something that the pre-Socratic metaphysics of Being also noted and which it illuminated in Parmenides' phrase that thinking and Being are the same; thereby, of course, it contradicted its own Eleatic doctrine of Being as an absolute. With the principle of νοεῖν the reflection, which must destroy the pure identity of the εἶναι and which yet remains bound to it as to the most abstract concept, the inextinguishable opposite of the most abstract thought is thrown violently into process. "The criteria which have been bestowed on the 'true being' of things are the criteria of not-being, of naught; the 'true world' has been constructed out of a contradiction to the actual world: indeed an apparent world, insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion."[5] Since then, all ontology has been idealistic[6]—first without knowing it, then by its own admission, and finally against the desperate desire of theoretical reflection to emerge from the self-enclosed region in which Spirit is In-itself into its own In-itself. By comparison, the differences stressed by the official history of philosophy, even the difference between the psychological and the transcendental, fade into irrelevance.

Husserl candidly conceded this in the *Cartesian Meditations*. He does not give up his contention, of course, that even pure descriptive psychology is by no means transcendental phenomenology, despite the strict parallelism between both disciplines: "To be sure, pure psychology of consciousness is a *precise parallel* to transcendental phenomenology of consciousness. Nevertheless, the two must at first be kept strictly separate, since failure to distinguish them, which is characteristic of *transcendental psychologism*, makes a genuine philosophy impossible."[7] However, it may be a question of nuances here. This concession carries all the more weight in that Husserl himself still lacks the criterion that would have allowed the pure Ego ultimately stressed by him, the residence of the transcendental, to separate itself from the immanence in consciousness characteristic of the traditionally scientific style. For the latter, data of consciousness are a piece of the "world," Dasein; not so for Husserl. In response to the question as to what else they might be, however, he answers, "actuality-phenomena" (*Wirklichkeitsphänomene*).[8] Nevertheless, there surely can be no talk of phenomena without Dasein.

Because something First in philosophy is already supposed to contain everything, Spirit takes possession of whatever is unlike itself and assimilates it. It inventories what it seizes, allowing nothing to slip through its net; the principle must guarantee completeness. The enumerability of what is

5. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York, 1968), p. 484.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 483.

7. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague, 1977), p. 32 (German edition, p. 70).

8. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

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included becomes an axiom. Availability creates an alliance of philosophy and mathematics, which has endured since Plato fused the Eleatic and the Heraclitean heritage with the Pythagorean. Plato's later doctrine, according to which ideas are numbers, is no mere indulgence in exotic speculation. From the eccentricities of thought, it is almost always possible to infer what is central. By means of a number metaphysics, the hypostasis of ordering is achieved in an exemplary way; it is an ordering with which Spirit spins so complete a web over the things it masters that it seems as if the web itself were what is hidden. The Socrates of Plato's middle period finds it "necessary to seek (his) refuge among concepts and through them to inquire into the true essence of things."[9] The veil before Spirit becomes still thicker, however, as Spirit itself becomes more thinglike in its mastery, as it does in the process of enumeration.

In the concept of something First, which dominates the original texts of western philosophy and which becomes thematic in the concept of Being found in Aristotelian metaphysics, number and enumerability are co-conceived. What is First already belongs per se to the number series. Where a πρωτον is spoken of, a δευτερον must be declared and counted. Even the supposedly singular Eleatic concept of the One becomes comprehensible only in relation to the Many it denies. We run into the second part of Parmenides' poem due to its incompatibility with the thesis of the One. Yet without the idea of the Many, it would be impossible to define the idea of the One. The opposition between the ordering, arresting Spirit and that which it finds opposed to itself is reflected in numbers. In order to make it like itself, Spirit first reduced to indeterminancy what is opposed to it, which it then defines as the Many. To be sure, it does not yet call it identical or reducible to itself, but it already has become similar. As an aggregate of unities, what has been reduced to indeterminacy forfeits its particular qualities, until it reveals itself as an abstract repetition of an abstract center. The problem in defining the concept of number stems from the fact that its own essence is the same mechanism of concept formation with whose help it is to be defined. The concept itself is subsumption and thereby contains a numerical relation. Numbers are arrangements for making the non-identical, under the name of the many, commensurate with the subject, the model of unity. They lead the manifold of experience to its abstraction. The Many mediates between logical consciousness as a Unity and the chaos that the world becomes as soon as the the latter contrasts itself to the former. If, however, unity is already contained in the many as the element without which the latter is unthinkable, on the other hand, the one demands the idea of enumeration and multiplicity. Naturally, the thought of multiplicity, in turn, has not yet synthesized into a unity what lies over against the subject. The idea of the Unity of the world belongs to a late stage, to the philosophy of identity.

Nevertheless, the continuity of the number series has remained, since

9. Plato, *Phaedo*, Stephanus p. 99, especially p. 100.

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Plato, the model of all continuity of systems and of their claim to completeness. From it derives the Cartesian rule, respected by all philosophy claiming to be scientific, that no middle term may be missing. In dogmatic anticipation of the later philosophical claim of identity, this rule already stamps a closure (*Geschlossenheit*) upon what can be thought a character that may not be appropriate. The self-identity of Spirit and the subsequent synthetic unity of apperception are projected upon things by a mere method, and indeed more recklessly, the tidier and stricter the method tries to be. That is the original sin of *prima philosophia*. Merely in order to gain continuity and completeness, it must cut out of its sphere of judgment whatever does not fit. The poverty of philosophical systems, which ultimately reduces them to mumbo-jumbo, is not only a symptom of the decline of systems. Teleologically, it is a decline of the same procedure that already demands uncontested, in Plato, that virtue be demonstrable, like a geometrical figure, through a reduction to its schema.[10]

The authority of Plato, as well as the cutting edge (*das Eingeschliffensein*) and unique cogency of mathematical thought, give almost no validity to the consciousness of the monstrous notion that a concrete social and specifically located category like virtue—a category which Gorgias located in the social context of domination[11]—should be reduced to its skeleton as if that were its essence. In the triumph of mathematics, and in any triumph, an element of mythical scorn, there echoes as in the pronouncement of an oracle; whoever listens to it has already forgotten the best part. Mathematics also is a tautology, in that it ultimately has supremacy only over what it already has prepared and molded. In the *Meno,* perhaps it is not without reason — namely, in order to avoid the monstrous notion mentioned above — that Socrates' desideratum is voiced without opposition, as self-evident and thus dogmatic and unfounded. This desideratum, still noticeable behind every analysis of meaning in pure phenomenology, is that of a method, in the pregnant sense of a mode of procedure for Spirit that can be reliably applied always and everywhere because it rids itself of the connection to things and this is a connection that Plato still sought with respect to the object of knowledge.[12]

Such a concept of method is the forerunner of epistemology; it is not yet conscious of its implicit recourse to an autocratic subject. And epistemology was hardly ever anything but reflection upon method. The cut which it makes, however, it part of the concept of a πρώτη φιλοσοφία. Just as this concept cannot be presented except as a method, so too is method, the ordered "path," always the valid conclusion of what follows from what comes earlier; methodological thought always demands something First, so that the path will not fail its purpose by breaking off and ending with the accidental. The procedure is planned in advance so that nothing outside the order of its

10. Plato, *Meno*, Stephanus p. 86.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
12. Plato, *Phaedrus*, Stephanus pp. 265-266.

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progression is allowed to disturb it. Hence, the harmlessness of all methodology, from the doubt of Descartes to Heidegger's respectful destruction of the traditional. Only determinate doubt, never absolute, has ever endangered ideologies; absolute doubt upsets its own plans through the mehodological goal of giving birth to what already exists on its own. This corresponds in Husserl's epistemology to the definition of the ἐποχή by sophists and sceptics.[13] Doubt merely shifts judgment to the preparation for a scientific vindication of the assumptions of pre-critical consciousness, in hidden sympathy with conventional human understanding.

At the same time, however, the method always must do violence to the unknown thing, whose knowledge it seeks as the sole reason for its existence. The method must model the other after itself; this is the prime contradiction in the construction of non-contradiction by philosophies of origins. Knowledge as methodological, protected from aberration, autarchical, and fancying itself to be unconditioned, has a τέλος of pure logical identity. Thereby, however, it substitutes itself, as an absolute, for things. Without the act of violence on the part of method, society and Spirit, substructure and superstructure hardly would have been possible; and that further lends it the irresistibility reflected by metaphysics as transsubjective Being. Philosophy of origins (*Ursprungsphilosophie*), which was the very first to bring the idea of truth as a method to maturity, is nevertheless a ψεῦδος in origin. Only in instants of an historical hiatus, such as that between the slackening of scholastic compulsion and the beginning of the modern bourgeois-scientific, has thought drawn a breath. In Montaigne, for example, the diffident freedom of the thinking subject is linked to a scepticism of the omnipotence of method, namely, of science.[14] In a social context, however, the separation of intellectual (*geistiger*) and physical labor appears in the constitution of method as its separation from things. In the labor process, the universality of methodological procedure was the fruit of specialization. Precisely when Spirit is limited to a particular function, it exercises its privilege and mistakes itself for an absolute.

The break in Parmenides' poem already points to a discrepancy between method and thing, even if it still may be lacking a conception of method. The absurdity of two different sorts of truth suddenly appearing next to one another, even if one is supposed to be mere illusion, blatantly expresses the absurdity of the earliest form of "rationalization." Truth, Being, and Unity—the highest Eleatic words—are pure determinations of thought, as Parmenides recognizes; thereby, however, although he and his followers keep it secret, they are also directions how to think — that is, "method." Natorp's ahistorical neo-Kantianism has hit upon this aspect of the old philosophy better than those who give the latter too much respect. Just as with methodological procedure, only things are still a troublesome content for

13. *Ideas*, p. 100 (sec. 32).

14. See perhaps *The Essays of Montaigne*, trans. George B. Ives (Cambridge, 1925), v. 2, chap. 12, pp. 170ff.

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Parmenides' original words, a mere deception he rejects. Parmenides' δόξα is the world of the senses overshooting thought thinking of its true Being. The pre-Socratics asked truly awestruck questions about origin; it was not so much that the concept of origin later became mundane but rather that the pre-Socratics, and even Plato, expressed the break, the alienation, purely and completely. That is their dignity, the dignity of thought that does not yet veil the evil to which it testifies. Nevertheless, the onward march of the *ratio* as progressive mediation, has ever more artfully hidden that break without ever being able to master it. Thereby, it has steadily increased the untruth of the origin.

In contrast to the gaping contradiction of the Eleatics, which was not yet captured conceptually, Plato's doctrine of χωρισμός already thought of both spheres as being together, even if only in their stark opposition—a first mediation prior to all μέθεξις; and his later work, like the whole of Aristotle's, makes every effort to fill the gap. Although this gap is earmarked as the very condition for a philosophy of origins, it is at the same time positively unbearable for the latter. It warns it of its impossibility by pointing out that it has its objectivity at the subject's discretion (*Willkur*). The closure of philosophy of origins is the very break itself. Hence method's fanatical intolerance of all arbitrariness (*Willkur*) as deviation—precisely because method itself is wholly arbitrary. Its subjectivity gives rise to the law of objectivity. Spirit believes only its own domination to be unlimited. As a unity regained, however, it merely stamps its approval on the division; it is truly an absolute, an appearance of reconciliation freed from what was to be reconciled, and, as such, all the more a picture of the inescapable nexus of guilt. Precisely the indispensable unbroken connectedness inflicts its evil upon philosophies of origins by creating the condition for the freedom from them. The demythologizing the process which Spirit undergoes in joining itself to a second mythology, uncovers the untruth of the very idea of something First. What is First must become more and more abstract for a philosophy of origins; the more abstract it becomes, however, the less it continues to explain and the less it serves as a foundation. Totally in consequence of this, what is First serves as a foundation. Totally in consequence of this, what is First directly approaches an analytical judgment, into which it wants to change the world—approaches a tautology and ultimately nothing at all. The idea of something First consumes itself in its process of development. That is its truth, which could not have been gained without a philosophy of what is First.

Because the subject states the principle from which all Being arises, it elevates itself. There is little in this that is different from the blatant self-praise of those pre-Socratics who wandered about like unemployed medicine men and whose dishonesty echoes down to Husserl in the Platonic rage at the sophists. Husserl's writings are full of admiration for the "extensive fields" (*ungeheuren Felder*) opened up by

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him.[15] In the *Cartesian Meditations* one reads, "A science whose peculiar *nature is unprecedented* comes into our field of vision":[16] or, "Once we have laid hold of the phenomenological task of describing consciousness concretely, veritable infinities of facts — never explored prior to phenomenology — become disclosed."[17] Heidegger strikes the same tone in his pronouncement that Being is the "most unique thing there is."[18] From days of old, the spokesperson for *prima philosophia* has asserted himself to be the one who knows everything and has it all "in the bag." He claims sovereignty over the many individuals he scornfully ties to himself, a claim still acknowledged by Plato's philosopher-kings. Even at its highest stage, the Hegelian doctrine of absolute knowledge, *prima philosophia* is not cured of this boasting. Hegel is only telling tales that poor wisemen otherwise keep to themselves when he says that philosophy itself is true Being; in contrast, Plato, save in the Utopia, was content to reserve favorable positions in the hereafter for the philosophers.[19]

The pompousness, overt or hidden, and the hardly self-evident need for the absolute security—of Spirit—for how in the world can the gambler's lack of Spirit be lessened by the risk of error — are the reflex reaction to real powerlessness and insecurity. They are a lament that drowns itself out through positivity, a lament of one who neither can contribute to life's actual reproduction nor participate in its control but who, as a third person, only sells and promotes the means of domination—Spirit objectified into method—to those who dominate. What they do not have they at least want in the Fata Morgana of their own province of Spirit. Irrefutability replaces domination for them and merges with the service they actually do perform in their contribution to control over nature. Their subjectivism, blind from the start, is met at once, however, by the penalty for its limitations. For the sake of domination, their subjectivism must control and negate itself. Only to prevent error, for the sake of their own elevation, they humble themselves and would especially like to cancel themselves out. They use their subjectivity to subtract the subject from the truth, and present objectivity as the remainder. All *prima philosophia* down to Heidegger's claim of "destruction"[20] has essentially been a theory of the residual. Truth is supposed to be the leftover remnant, the most vapid thing of all. Even the content of Husserl's phenomenological residue is completely inadequate and empty, and it is so judged as soon as philosophy takes even the smallest step to return to freedom from the prison of the residue, as it does in the sociological excurses of the

15. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague, 1969), pp. 250-255f (German edition pp. 221 and 225f).
16. *Cartesian Meditations*, pp. 29-30 (German edition, p. 68).
17. *Ibid.*, p. 41 (German edition, p. 79).
18. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1959), p. 79 (German edition p. 60).
19. *Phaedo*, p. 82.
20. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, 1962), pp. 41ff (1927 German edition pp. 19ff).

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Cartesian Meditations.[21] *Philosophie perennis* relates to unreduced experience as does Unitarianism to religion and as does culture to what falls under its neutralized concept. Huxley is ironically correct when he picks out his *philosophia perennis* as the common element in the thinkers he examines; the narrow selection brings to light what was already implied where true Being was pathetically assigned to a universal concept for the first time.

Only in freedom can Spirit fulfill and reconcile itself with that from which it tore itself away. And unless this freedom degenerates into mere assertion, there is an element of insecurity associated with it. Freedom itself is never given, but it is always threatened. The absolutely certain as such, however, is always un-freedom. The compulsion to indulge in absolute certainty, like all compulsion, works at its own destruction; by the device of indubitable certainty, the scientific spirit annuls all indubitable certainty. This does not disturb the guiding idea of the remainder, however. The absolutist Husserl, who would like methodologically to distinguish the "phenomenological residuum"[22] shares that idea, right down to the terminology, with raving nominalists and relativists like Pareto, who contrasts residues and derivations.[23] The most divergent traditional theory[24] agrees with scientific custom, that the "troublesome factors that hide pure things should be eliminated; such factors are always subjective additions. Yet, the more thoroughly the operation is carried out, the more compellingly it leads to pure thought and thereby precisely to the human being it tried to get rid of. The path to freedom from anthropomorphism, which First Philosophy treads under the banner of demythologization, ends in the apotheosis of the ἄνθρωπος as a second mythology.

Quite mindful of this, philosophy has proudly boycotted psychology since the time of Husserl. It is out of fear of psychology that philosophy, in the search for the residue, sacrifices everything for which it exists. All *prima philosophia*—and not least of all that of Max Scheler, who so readily scorned the average citizen—has something of what simple-minded pastors in remote villages still like to preach, i.e., that eternal values are there for a rainy day. If, however, as since the Platonic hypostasis of eternal ideas, the temporal is juggled away by metaphysics and its residues are reified, this is ultimately because metaphysics thrives on want and on the constant fear of losing what little it has. It self-consciously makes its eternity in the likeness of something temporal—in the likeness of property relations, which are made by humans and rule them in alienation. Husserl's program of philosophy as a rigorous science, the idea of absolute security (*Sekurität*), bears this stamp. Because his Cartesianism builds fences around what *prima philosophia* lays claim to, as being invariant and a priori—around what, in the French version of the

21. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 131ff (German edition pp. 159ff).
22. *Ideas*, pp. 140f (sec. 50).
23. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology*, trans. Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston (New York, 1935), v. 1 and 2, pp. 64, 508.
24. Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," trans. Matthew J. O'Connell, in *Critical Theory* (New York, 1972), pp. 188-243.

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Cartesian Meditations, " 'est specifiquement apropre, à moi ego"[25]—*prima philosophia* itself comes into ownership. It ignores, moreover, the function of invariants in knowledge, namely, to see whether they concern what is essential or what is unimportant. Thus, Husserl expects a beneficial reform of psychology through his cultivation of an intentional—i.e., purely a priori—psychology; he fails to consider that empirical psychology, which is not at all invariant, might offer far more richness of insight than the former, which has nothing to fear because it takes no risks.

With the substitution of what is constant for what is true, the source of truth becomes the source of deception. It is a mistake to conclude that what endures is truer than what passes away. A system that deforms the world into an available possession is presented as the world itself. The invariability of concepts, which would not exist without disregarding the temporal determinacy of what a concept encompasses, is confused with the immutability of Being-in-itself. This is the grotesque maneuver of the adept of phenomenology, who copes quite well with what, in his jargon, is called the problem of immortality. To be sure, he staunchly confirms the demise of each individual soul, but he also reassures himself that the pure concept of any such soul, its individual εἶδος, is surely incorruptible. Through its clumsiness, this impotent trick brings uniquely to light what is hidden in the depths of great speculation. Heraclitus, however, to whom Hegel and Nietzsche bowed,[26] still equated essence with transiency; but since the first authentic formulation of the doctrine of ideas,[27] transitoriness of appearance has been attributed to the realm of δόξα, to illusion, and essence has been reserved for eternity.

Only Nietzsche has protested against this: "The other idiosyncracy of the philosophers is no less dangerous; it consists in confusing the past and the first. They place that which comes at the end—unfortunately! for it ought not to come at all!—namely, the 'highest concepts,' which means the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last smoke of evaporating reality in the beginning *as* the beginning. This again is nothing but their way of showing reverence: the higher *may* not grow out of the lower, *may* not have grown at all. Moral: whatever is of the first rank must be *causa sui*. Origin out of something else is considered an objection, a questioning of value. All the highest values are of the first rank; all the highest concepts, that which has being, the unconditional, the good, the true, the perfect—all these cannot have become and must therefore be *causa sui*. All these, moreover, cannot be unlike each other or in contradiction to each other.... That which is last, thinnest, and emptiest is put first, as *the* cause, as *ens realissimus*..."[28] Yet, what Nietzsche considers to be the outrage of "sick webspinners,"[29] which in

25. Husserl, *Meditations Cartésiennes* (Paris, 1931), p. 78.
26. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson (London, 1892), v. 1, pp. 278ff.
27. Plato, *Symposium*, Stephanus p. 210e ff.
28. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, pp. 481-482.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 482.

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the interest of life, "should not have come at all," was committed with the violence of life itself. And the evil in that πρῶτον ψεῦδος, which he explains as an evil of Spirit, comes from real (*reale*) domination. The victory is codified because the victor installs himself as the better. Due to a lucky act of violence, the vanquished is made to believe that what survives is of a higher right than what perished.

The price the survivor must pay for being transfigured into truth by thought is his very life. He must be dead to be consecrated into eternity. "You ask me which of the philosophers' traits are really idiosyncracies? For example, their lack of historical sense, their hatred of the very idea of becoming, their Egypticism. They think that they show their *respect* for a subject when they de-historicize it, *sub specie aeterni* — when they turn it into a mummy. All that philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been concept-mummies; nothing real escaped their grasp alive. When these honorable idolators of concepts worship something, they kill it and stuff it; they threaten the life of everything they worship. Death, change, old age, as well as procreation and growth, are to their minds objections—even refutations. Whatever has being does not become; whatever becomes does not have being. Now they all believe, desperately in what has being. But since they never grasp it, they seek for reasons why it is kept from them."[30]

What Nietzsche saw through, he also underrated. Thus he remained stuck in a contradiction from which the self-reflection of thought soon would have to emerge. "Formerly, alteration, change, and any becoming at all were taken as proof of mere appearance, as an indication that there must be something which led us astray. Today, conversely, precisely insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we see ourselves somehow caught in error, compelled into error. So certain are we, on the basis of rigorous examination, that this is where the error lies."[31] The metaphysics of what is constant took its ground for knowledge from the constancy of things in contrast to their appearances; and the enlightened critique summed up by Nietzsche—which was ultimately Humean—dissolved the hypostasis of things thus effected. Even that, however, cannot succeed uninterrupted. To oppose the fixed and the chaotic and to control nature never would have worked without a moment of fixity in what is controlled, in what otherwise denounced the subject continually. For the sceptical subject to deny that moment completely and to locate it only in itself is no less hybris than when it makes the schemata of conceptual order absolute. In both cases, subject and object, as already congealed, are made into the ὑποκείμενον. For the sake of omnipotence, a reflecting Spirit strips the world of its qualities to create naked chaos, just as it creates the cosmos for the sake of worship.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 479-480.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 482.

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The philosophical concept presents what is fixed and fundamental (*das Tragende*) as elementary. It should be simpler than what is derived (*das Getragene*), something Descartes also did not doubt since the ὑποκείμενον may be truer than what is elevated above it, however primitiveness and truth are juxtaposed. That is perhaps the most fateful consequence of the supposition of immediacy, which leads the subject, as mediation, to painful self-deception. A regressive tendency to hate what is complex always governs a theory of origins, as a guarantee of its affinity for domination. Progress and demythologization have neither clarified nor extinguished this tendency; rather, wherever possible, they have let it emerge even more crassly. The enemy, the other, the non-identical, is likewise always what is different, and differentiated, from its universality. It has been constantly slandered from Plato's curse on the allegedly effeminate musical tones to radical reflection's pithy invectives against "prattle," in Heidegger. As soon as one asks what was at the beginning, the cutting of the Gordion knot lies on his lips; even Hegel obeyed that tendency of traditional philosophy, in the theme of the nothingness of the individuated. In the interest of its own greater glory, the pure concept accuses the more highly developed individual of being impure and degenerate; there can be no progress of scientific and philosophical rationality without such reactionary dimension (*Rückschritt*).

Totalitarian systems have not contrived this reactionaryism out of the never-never land of history but, rather, have brutally carried out what ideology, as the domination of Spirit, cleverly prepared over the millenia. The word, "elemental," however, covers the scientifically simple, as well as the mythically primordial (*Ursprüngliches*). The equivocation is as little an accident as most equivocations. Fascism sought to make a theory of origins a reality. The oldest, that which has existed the longest, was directly and literally to prevail (*herrschen*). Thereby, the usurpatory charactor of what is first came glaringly to light. Blood and soil, the original forces that are concretized in fascism and completely chimerical in modern industrial society, became the butt of children's jokes, even in Hitler's Germany. The identity of primordiality and domination results in the notion that whoever has the power is not only supposed to be Number One but also The Original. As a political program, absolute identity passes over into the absolute ideology that no one any longer believes.

First Philosophy has by no means been mere domination. It aims, first of all, at a liberation from the nexus of nature; rationality has never fully rid itself of the memory and actualization of autonomy. However, as soon as rationality made itself absolute, it almost always approached its dreaded dissolution. A philosophy of origins which turns to the subject, to pure identity, out of its inherent flight from the contigent, also fears losing itself in the contingency of the merely subjective; as an isolated moment, the merely subjective never really achieves pure identity and retains its stigma as much as its opposite does. Grand philosophy has never escaped this antinomy.

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Thinking, which claims to be the ground of Being, is always ready to ban itself as an obstruction to the latter; even idealist speculation, in its de-subjectification, as it were, of the subject, has only apparently broken this ban. The mechanism of abstraction hides from itself and immanently tends toward the same ontology it opposes.

By virtue of this tendency, the hard-pressed philosophy of origins fled from subjective reflection back into Platonism and, at the same time, had to strive desperately to bring such a retreat into harmony with an irrevocable subjective-critical motive. This dates back to Kant. He refuted the conclusion about the immediacy of what is first and yet wanted to preserve something first in the form of a constituent; he liquidated the question of Being and yet taught *prima philosophia*, "foundation" (*Grundlegung*), on any account. Even Hegel's heroic effort could do nothing against this. The subject-object is still a distinguished subject. Over against such transcendental subjectivism, however, the question of Being does not, as its apologists would have it, stand as something actual before our eyes today, free from thousands of years of debris. Rather, its absolute In-itself is only absolute blindness toward its own immanent subjective and mediate character. By a dogmatic and likewise empty assumption of Being, that movement of thought which aims at the knowledge of origins declares its own bankruptcy. It celebrates origin at the price of knowledge.

The irrationality, to which the philosophically absolutized *ratio* succumbs, admits the arbitrariness of whatever tries to free itself from all arbitrariness. This is the case, not only in talk about outlines (*Entwürfe*), but even in Husserl, who decrees the phenomenological reductions to be the creation of his "ontic sphere (*Seinssphäre*) of absolute origins." For Husserl, this is something one can do or not do, and it stands in extreme contrast, for example, to the concept of "compulsion" (*Nötigung*) in the Kantian ethics or to Kant's derivation of the Copernican turn as wholly necessary if reason is to master those contradictions in which it no less necessarily gets entangled. The more total is the contemporary ontological claim, which reaches out beyond all reflecting thought toward myth, the more dependent it becomes upon the mere "attitude" (*Einstellung*) that, in Husserl, functions as an existential of knowledge, as it were. While such philosophizing, precisely in its treatment of the so-called problem of constitution, emulates mathematics, which in the name of the most rigorous strigency can proceed at will, can posit multiplicities, and can vary, the arbitrariness of the absolute soon fulfills its political function. The form of totalitarian philosophy is suited to the totalitarian state, insofar as it combines the arbitrariness of its orders, in which their necessity dissolves, with a dictatorial demand for unopposed recognition. Once again, authority and usurpation immediately become one.

The scientific form of philosophy of origins was epistemology. It wanted to elevate what is absolutely first to the absolutely certain through reflection upon the subject, a subject it claimed could not be drawn from any concept of

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something first. In the course of such reflection, however, the compulsion toward identity grows stronger. Thought, which is no longer carried out "directly" (*geradehin*), as Husserl puts it, but is turned back upon itself instead, is isolated more and more from whatever it and its sphere of influence, the immanence of the subject, might not completely absorb. The notion that the world could emerge from that immanence, or even that judgments about the world could be verified through it, is no less problematic at the outset than a judgment unconcerned with mediation. Consequently, this notion has only very gradually established itself as a principle, in the course of reflection. Arbitrariness, the complement of compulsion, already lies hidden in the intimation that the recourse in question, even if motivated at each step by a scientific consciousness, is the sufficient condition of truth. Epistemology convicts itself of this arbitrariness. The determination of what is absolutely First runs aground in subjective immanence because the latter can never completely absorb the non-identical moment into itself and also because subjectivity, the organ of reflection, contradicts the idea of the pure immediacy of something absolutely First. Although the idea of a philosophy of origins aims monistically at pure identity, subjective immanence, in which what is absolutely First seeks to be alone and undisturbed, cannot be brought to that pure identity with itself. What Husserl calls the "original institution" (*Urstiftung*) of transcendental subjectivity is at the same time an original *pseudos*. For this reason, immanence itself is repeatedly polarized toward the subjective and objective moments in epistemological analysis; Emil Lask has demonstrated this with particular force. Husserl's noetic-noematic structure is likewise one of dualistic immanence, although Husserl was not aware of the contradiction he thus perpetuated.

The return of a subject and object in the midst of subjectivity, the duality of what is one, comes about in two types of epistemological theory, each of which feeds on the unworkability of the other. These two types are roughly the theories of rationalism and empiricism. Antagonistically completing each other, they do not differ in their inner construction or in their conclusions as radically as traditional philosophical historicism suggests. A metacritique of epistemology should deal with both. Empiricism never advocated the idea of something absolutely First and the idea of absolute identity as convincingly as did rationalism and its idealist heirs. And if, therefore, empiricism seems less entangled than the latter, it thus succumbed much more easily to the process that leads out of entanglement to the very boundary of the determinations of immanence. In empiricism, thought gives in too early and with too little resistance. Because it humbly bows before mere *Dasein*, it forsakes the chance to see through the latter and gives up the moment of freedom and spontaneity. Even in the sphere of immanence, consistent, critical, and self-reflective thinking grasps incomparably more of the essence, of the life process of society, than does a procedure that is resigned to the registering of facts and that gives in before it really begins. While empiricism, as a theory of knowledge, traces the condition for all knowledge to the factical-(*faktisch*)

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psychological consciousness and declares that condition to be a basic principle, this consciousness, as well as what is given for it, also could always be different, according to the rules of empiricism. This contradicts the idea of something First, however, which alone motivates the analysis of consciousness as a philosophical method, even the empiricist analysis of "human understanding."

Yet, the isolated subjective pole in the midst of consciousness, "Spirit," avoids the isolated objective manifestation (*Vorfindlichkeit*) of Being—"the given"—and, precisely thereby, avoids determination no more than does the latter. Its "achievement," like itself, defies analysis. It does not allow itself to be determined, as epistemology requires in the name of scientific method, whereas the determinable itself is already modelled after that facticity (*Faktizität*) to which Spirit is the counter-pole. Spirit can as little be divorced from the given, however, as the latter can from it. Neither is something First. The fact that both are essentially mediated by one another makes both equally unfit to be original principles. If, meanwhile, someone should want to discover the original principle in such a state of mediation itself, he would confuse a concept of relation with a concept of substance and would claim a *flatus vocis* as the origin. The character of mediation is not a positive statement about Being but, rather, an instruction for knowledge not to rest content with such positivity—actually, a demand to carry out the dialectic concretely. Proclaimed as a universal principle, it would repeatedly tend toward Spirit, just as in Hegel; with its passage into positivity, it becomes untrue. Theories of knowledge strive perennially to master such aporiae, and none succeeds. Every one of them is under the curse of Anaximander, whose philosophy of Being—one of the earliest—prophesied, as it were, the eventual fate of them all.

A metacritique of epistemology demands constructive reflection upon epistemology's internal structure as one of guilt and punishment, of necessary error and futile correction. With growing demythologization, the philosophical concept simultaneously becomes increasingly more spiritual and more mythical. Something of this necessity is anticipated in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, still today an unaccomplished program. Certainly, an immanent critique of epistemology is not itself exempt from the dialectic. Because the philosophy of immanence (the equivocation of logical and epistemological immanence warns of a central interconnection) could be burst open only immanently—that is, through a confrontation with its own untruth—its very immanence is the untruth. An immanent critique must know of this untruth merely in order to begin. Hegelian phenomenology conforms to this insofar as it passively succumbs to the movement of the Notion (*Begriff*) and, at the same time, actively carries this movement out and thereby changes the object. The concept of immanence sets limits to an immanent critique. When one measures an assertion by its presuppositions, he is proceeding immanently, namely, according to the rules of formal logic, and thinking becomes its own criterion.

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The fact that not all Being is consciousness, however, is not a necessity of thought contained in the analysis of the concept of Being but, rather, puts an end to the closed character (*Geschlossenheit*) of such an analysis. To think of not thinking is no uninterrupted (*bruchlos*) consequence of thought; rather, it suspends thought's claim to totality. Immanence, however, in the sense of the equivocation of immanence of consciousness and logical immanence, is nothing other than such totality. The dialectic negates both in one. Epistemology is true insofar as it makes allowance for impossibility of its self-movement and lets itself be driven at every step by the insufficiency of things themselves. It is untrue, however, in its claim that it has succeeded and that simple states of affairs always correspond to its constructions and aporetic concepts. In other words, it is untrue according to its own measure of scientificity. There is the possibility that the critique of such untruth, itself caught in the abstractions it dismantles, may be needless scholarly worry. This is unlikely, however, given that the materialist dialectic has degenerated into the same dogmatism as the philosophy of consciousness it seeks to unseat and has dispatched the latter by mere decree, without ever having confronted the logic of things. Before that succeeds, idealism will be voluntarily resurrected.

Despite its static-descriptive tenor, which seems to shun speculation, Husserl's epistemology is also linked to a context of guilt. Its system, as well, resembles, in more modern terms, a credit system. Its concepts form a constellation in which each is to meet its debt to the other, although the presentation hides the litigation pending between them. Expressions of Husserl's, such as fulfillment (*Erfüllung*)—that of a contract; evidence (*Evidenz*)—an exhibit; and judgment (*Urteil*)—that of a trial, unintentionally construe epistemology as analogous to a universal legal relationship. In the end, the likeness is even strengthened, if possible, by such antiquating additions from legal language as "domain" (*Domäne*) and "institution" (*Stiftung*). In the image of an irrevocable, self-renewing contract, never fulfilled and thus inherently interminable, even the most enlightened theory of knowledge participates in the myth of something First. Its metacritique presents it with a due bill and wrests the insight from it, gained externally from society, that equivalence is not truth and that fair exchange is not justice. The real life process of society is not smuggled into philosophy through a sociological correlation but is the very core of logical content.

Epistemology, the effort to carry out the principle of identity completely by a total reduction to subjective immanence, unintentionally becomes a medium of non-identity. As progressive demythologization, it not only strengthens the spell (*Bann*) of concepts cleansed of everything heterogeneous, but it also works to break that spell. To carry itself further (*nachvollziehen*) and write its inner history is actually already to have epistemology awaken. The individual epistemological determinations are thus as little absolutely false—they become so only when they seek to be absolutely true—as they are concerned with states of affairs; each one is

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necessitated by the demand for a lack of contradiction. What must be destroyed is not the self-reflection of knowledge, but the delusion that this lack of contradiction, the totality of cousciousness, is the world. Finally, it is the duty of a critique of epistemology, which has the mediation of concepts as a canon, to proclaim unmediated objectivism; otherwise, this would be left to contemporary ontologies or to the ideologues (*Denkfunctionäre*) of the Eastern bloc. To criticize epistemology is also to hold fast to it. It must be confronted with its own claim to absoluteness, with the Kantian question how metaphysics as a science could be possible and with the Husserlian ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science. Its usurpation of universality also obliges it to satisfy the universality of thought, which implies the dissolution of the vital privilege of the philosophical spirit to attribute universality to itself. Knowledge, which measures itself against the ideal of universality, can no longer be monopolized by the medecine men and wisemen who practice it; to use Valéry's insight, wisdom is as anachronistic as virtue. The more consistently epistemology proceeds, the less it comes undone; thus it prepares an end to the fetishism of knowledge. The fetishized Spirit becomes its own enemy, though seldom so emphatically and prototypically as in Husserl.

When the philosophy of immanence codifies the ὕβρις of Spirit, which wants to be everything, it has also precisely discovered a moment of reflection and of mediation, and has thereby determined knowledge to be work just as it has determined its bearer, the logical-universal subject, to be society. Without a moment of subjective reflection, any notion of dialectic would be nugatory. What is not reflected in itself does not know contradiction, and the perversion of dialectical materialism into the state of religion of Russia and into positive ideology rests on the theoretical condemnation of that element as idealist. If the philosophy of immanence tends, with reason, to revert to dogma, ontology, or copy-realism (*Abbildrealismus*) it also develops the antidote at the same time. It is idealism that first allowed actuality to become transparent as something neither independent of humanity, who lives in it, nor invariant. Its form is human, and even nature, which is positively extra-human, is mediated through consciousness. Humanity cannot grasp the fact that it lives in social Being, and not in nature. Idealism is ideology, however, in that it simply humanizes actuality in agreement with naive realism and becomes the latter's reflective justification. Precisely thereby, it takes whatever exists back into "nature," even if "nature" is transcendental.

The structure of immanence, as absolutely self-contained and complete, is necessarily already a system, regardless of whether or not it expressly deduces itself from the unity of cousciousness. Thus, Nietzsche's mistrust of *prima philosophia* is also essentially directed against the systematizers: "I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity." [32] If, as with more recent authors, one derives the idea of a legal system from a didactic need for a self-contained and convincing

32. *Ibid.*, p. 470.

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presentation,[33] then one might well reduce philosophical systems to a related need. The first two systematizers in the grand manner were the first headmasters of organized schools. Just as a system omits nothing, so the teacher, orator, and demagogue relates to his students. His irrational authority is mediated by the *ratio*, his claim to leadership by logical-argumentative compulsion. Plato's Socrates already dispatches his interlocuters by means of the proof, hardly elegant by Attic standards, of their own ignorance; an uneasiness about it softly echoes in Alcibiades' panegyric at the end of the banquet. The more problematic the wisdom, the more tirelessly it must underscore its stringency. For that, the logic of consistency (*Konsequenzlogik*) recommends itself; disregarding the experience of the object, it allows thought to exercise a "formal," and thus irresistible, compulsion. While Plato's philosophy denounces the rhetoricians, who deal with formal objects completely opaque to them, he himself, in his method of concept determination, is immersed in a formalism of debate that surpasses that of the Sophists only in consistency. In a contest, Socrates almost always must maintain his rightness against those he designates as opponents, although and because he "knows nothing." It is not by chance that it remains up in the air in Agathon's speech, or occasionally in the Phaedrus, whether Plato parodies a rhetorical showpiece, presents a stage of truth, or ultimately both. The bombastic nature of many pre-Socratic pronouncements probably rests on the fact that the total knowledge they attribute to themselves, the inclusivity of the system, at the same time always excludes something. That is perhaps the darkest secret of First Philosophy. The emphatic difference between essence and appearance, First Philosophy's great discovery, also has the aspect of "I know and you don't," however much life, hardened and alienated from itself, requires that differentiation as its corrective.

Yet, precisely the excessive zeal with which First Philosophy offers its wisdom to fools testifies to its insecurity. The claim to absoluteness that First Philosophy puts forward is the medium of its own downfall. The system, which formulates that claim in the name of closure and completeness runs into the impossibility of satisfying it. Idealism, which became capable of a universally well-developed systematic only through its reduction to the absolute unity of the I think, has revealed, in proportion to its own radicalism, the questionability of what has definitively come out of it. In the doctrine of antinomies in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, *prima philosophia* became conscious of this. The search for something purely First, for the absolute cause, results in an infinite regress: it cannot be assumed that the infinite is given as something closed (*abschlusshaft*), although this assumption nevertheless seems unavoidable to the total Spirit. The notion of the given, the last refuge of the irreducible in idealism, clashes with the notion of Spirit, as one of complete reducibility—clashes, that is, with idealism itself. The

33. See Helmut Coing, *Geschichte und Bedeutung des Systemgedankens in der Rechtswissenschaft*, in *Frankfurter Universitätsreden*, 1956, No. 17, p. 36.

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antinomy bursts open the system, whose own idea is the idea of that identity which becomes disunited with itself, as something anticipated and as the finitude of the infinite. The recourse to subjective immanence occurred only in order to clear away what might not be contained already in something First; otherwise, the philosophy of immanence forfeits its *raison d'être*. Its own task, however, tha analysis of consciousness, brings to light the fact that consciousness does not contain anything absolutely First that is independent of its material, that is independent of what "is due" to consciousness. What is ontologically First is ontologically not First, and thus its idea totters.

Kant helps himself out of this predicament quite ingeniously, with the distinction between form and content. In the determination of contradiction and of its necessity, which actually forbids the reconciliation that Kant attempted, the more stubborn truth is on his side, later idealism. As an apologist for *prima philosophia*, however, he continued to defend the primacy of form. The reciprocal dependence of form and matter, which he himself achieved, was not allowed to touch the formation of the system. The forms become what is absolutely First as something given *sui generis* for which, according to the second version of the Transcendental Deduction, "a further reason" cannot be named.[34] This is the model of Husserl's later procedure for describing transcendental structures. Kant tries, of course, to find the secret and to trace the origin of the rather paradoxical givenness of forms. He thus arrives at pure identity, at pure thinking itself—at the subject, which, as "pure" and divorced from all content, is made into an absolute non-existent and yet hypostatized. The Transcendental Deduction ends with reason as absolute Being; and Transcendental Dialectic criticizes the absoluteness of Being as well as of reason. Thus, in a certain way, the Deduction lags behind the doctrine of antinomies. Nevertheless, the latter presupposes the Deduction, as the proof of the subjective character of the categories, in order to guard against a "naive" and unreflective positing of the infinite. By the retreat to formalism, for which first Hegel and then the phenomenologists reproached him, Kant honored the non-identical and refused to draw it remainderless into the identity of the subject. Thereby, however, he restricted the very idea of truth, which now, as the heterogeneous, did not trust itself to classify things through concepts of order.

Husserl's restorative phenomenology anxiously guarded itself against this. That is its truly pre-critical element, which qualified it as the pace-setter for ontology but is also its legitimate protest against formalism. Nothing distinguishes phenomenology and what came out of it so emphatically from neo-Kantianism, which otherwise is very closely related, as the fact that Husserl, at least in the writings that are decisive, either hardly allows the question of infinitesimals to be raised or else neutralizes them to the possibility of wholly arbitrary variability and "unbounded horizons." The infinite was

34. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York, 1968), p. 161.

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the paradoxical form in which thinking, as absolute and open in its sovereignty, gains control of what is not exhausted in it and of what blocks its absoluteness. Ever since humanity really became absorbed with closed administrative systems, the concept of infinity has atrophied, and the thesis, in physics, of the finitude of space has become fitting.

According to Kant, antinomies appear where thinking exceeds the possibility of experience. For *prima philosophia*, however, the system is endangered by experience. The Kantian critique of reason thought itself to death about this. In no way, however, does the question of *prima philosophia* thus coincide with the alternative of realism and nominalism. All modern philosophies of origins arose under nominalistic auspices. Indeed, Aristotelian metaphysics, with the double meaning of its concept of οὐσία, already stands on the threshold; and it might be asked whether such a philosophy of something First, in that it strives to determine its substratum out of thinking, out of a procedure of concept-formation, does not thereby comply with the nominalism it opposes. The turn toward the subject makes concepts a product of it thinking; the insistence on a pure In-itself (*An sich*), *quod nulla re indiget ad existendum* transforms it into a For-another (*Für anderes*). Nominalism, like realism, stands under a primacy of something First. In both, a coin is flipped for *ante* or *post*, and each mention of a *post* implies and *ante*; this is so in the *res*, as the principle of existence, no less than in the universal. Certainly, nominalism once meant something else; the sophistry of Gorgias and the cynicism of Antisthenes quite contradicted the philosophy of Being, as well as fetishized culture in general. Ever since the fusion with science and the victory of the great schools, however—and even of those less reliable—the impulse of nominalism has been diverted. Having once been bound to the given by oath and thereby, just as much as its counterpart, to subjective immanence, nominalism lands in the position of having to say B because it has said A no matter how unwilling it is to do so. As a theory of the grounding of science, it unavoidably becomes an "extreme empiricism."[35]

As Husserl clearly perceived, however, extreme empiricism contradicts its own concept. In its concern over a criterion for absolute certainty and thus over fundamentality, post-Humean empiricism, to say nothing of logical positivism, has outdone absolutist metaphysics, if possible. On the other hand, the resignation from the absolute announced by nominalist and empiricist tendencies was secretly never wholly foreign to absolutist metaphysics; for Husserl, it was almost self-evident. The very question of something First is retrospective; thinking, which, as in Plato, has its absolute in memory, really expects nothing more from itself. The praise for the immutable suggests that nothing should be different than it already always was. A taboo is placed on the future, and it is rationalized in the desire of all "method" to explain the unknown from the known. This is already at work in

35. Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay (London, 1970), v. 1 (*Prolegomena to Pure Logic*), p. 115.

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Plato, who thereby tacitly makes convenience, agreement with established language, a norm. With axioms like completeness and continuity, to think in terms of identity really already presupposes total intuitability (*Ueberschaubarkeit*) and knowledge (*Bekanntheit*). What is new is filtered out; it is regarded merely as "material," as contingent—as a mischief-maker, as it were. Whatever might help the subject out of its self-captivity is negatively stressed, as something dangerous and to be overcome, something to be brought right back into the enclosure of the known. In this, empiricism agrees with its opponents, and that links it to the philosophy of origins.

The turn to ontology, which Husserl began hesitantly and quickly enough revoked, was conditioned by the rupture in the great systems, which plows so sharply and thus so magnificently through the Kantian critique of reason. Ontologies want to be a First Philosophy, but one free from the compulsion and impossibility of deducing itself and what exists from a First Principle. They would like to have the advantage of a system without paying the price; they want to restore the cogency of order out of Spirit without grounding it in thinking and in the unity of the subject. The double claim is wholly arbitrary, and that is why the progress of ontology over the system is as ambivalent as late bourgeois progress in general. The resurrected ontology regresses. It shakes off the compulsion of the system in order suddenly to seize control of what is First, which became completely questionable through its universal mediation. The escape of ontology from immanence sacrifices rationality and criticism, in objective agreement with a society that is moving toward the gloominess of direct domination. The subjective arbitrariness of the escape is avenged; however, it fails. The tautological emptiness of the sacrosanct highest determinations is kept hidden, to no avail, by underhandedly obtaining them from psychology and anthropology, which have their subjective origin stamped on their foreheads. What ultimately fancies itself to be an origin merely dates itself by its allergy to the nineteenth century that was cultivated in the youth movements, an allergy that testifies not so much to conquest as to what is not conquered and to the treachery of freedom.

Because the question of something immediately First is inappropriate to the state of Spirit today and must firmly close its eyes to mediation, it evokes an outmoded historical state. In the question which timelessly precedes the ontic there is change, and the past is made unrecognizable. Even Brentano's pupil, Husserl, whom many contemporaries thought a scholastic and whose positive-descriptive stance lacks almost any trace of the critical, unwillingly leaned towards the antiquated. For him, critical reflection is completely and paradoxically halted for the sake of the postulate of cogency inherited from the Critique. The categories become states of affairs dispensed by reflection that have only to be registered, or, in the language invented for this, only to be expressed (*zu sagen*). The abdication of concepts and the desperate need for something absent and therefore negative is chosen a priori to be positive. Of course, the decree of a positivity that exists in-itself, which goes contrary to

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reason's ostensibly destructive exercise, is as old as urban bourgeois philosophy.

The difference between the tradition and the resurrected metaphysics, however, is still a total one. Kant thinks himself assured of the reconstruction of truth from the immanence of consciousness; the "How is it possible?" constitutes the decisive pattern for all his questions because he regards possibility itself as beyond question. Thus, like Hegel after him, he takes it upon himself to carry out that universal reconstruction. Husserl despairs of this.[36] In the transcendental investigations that replace a system for him, thought stops. He keeps to singular determinations, and the concreteness happily regained is owed, not to more philosophy, but to less. Husserl's followers still think only in order to weaken thought and to canonize a nonetheless binding and thus abstract dogma. With the critical completion of its motives, phenomenology uncovers its holes, which it futilely tries to fill by a transition from one concept to another. Yet, in a certain sense, phenomenology wants those very holes in its ontological end-phase; its secret desire for irrationalism profits from its involuntary irrationality. Thus, it talks the jargon of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*), which has meanwhile debased the whole German language of moral development (*Bildungssprache*) to holy gibberish—a theological tone minus any theological content save that of idolatry. It gives the appearance of the bodily presence of something First, which is not bodily and not present. The authority of what is First resembles that of an administrated world; it cannot support itself by anything but the fact of administration itself. Socially, the enthronement of the entirely abstract is that of a mere form of organization whose social content is ignored for good reason. Compared to the systems of Aristotle and Thomas, which still hoped to accomodate all of creation, today's ontology behaves as if it were enclosed in a glass house looking at truth outside like the ungraspable fixed stars, holy words approached too closely if one merely asks what they mean. Everything factual, however—the life of concepts—is scornfully thrown to individual disciplines like history, sociology, and psychology, whose emancipation from philosophy has also been unfortunate. Philosophy, then, is to be only what is still concerned with the absolutely indifferent, and its worth increases with the indifference of the highest word, which includes everything and thus nothing. The new ontology returns contritely to the beginning of the Hegelian logic and is quenched in the abstract identity with which the whole game began.

Since Scheler's book on Kantian ethics, epistemological and systematic formalism has been defamed. Material philosophizing was promised in contrast to this formalism, though it was immediately burdened, of course, with an extremely questionable concept of value drawn from the exchange relationship. No longer were instruments to be honed; they were to prove their mettle, as Hegel intended. The phenomenological movement, however,

36. Herbert Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence," in *Negations*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston. 1968), pp. 55f.

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which began as epistemology, later distanced itself, step by step, from all existing things and even from the highest concept of existence, *Dasein*, which Husserl wanted to eliminate from the start. The necessarily formal character of πρώτη φιλοσοφία itself is thereby ratified, and not only in the form of reflection characteristic of the philosophy of immanence. Whoever wants to name what is absolutely First must eliminate whatever it does not require. Yet, once the ontological difference, as a defense against the accidental, is claimed to be unmediated, fixed and immovable, then the purifying process encroaches upon existing things. As Husserl bluntly put it, measured against the pure concept of Being, it also could just as well not be. What is ignored is that, conversely, the idea of Being (*Sein*) can be thought only in relation to some existing thing (*Seienden*). That becomes the fate of the resurrected ontology; in vain, albeit necessarily, it projects that fate onto the structure of Being itself. What has today become popular as a question of Being reveals, not the apologetically cited primordiality, but rather the poverty of a philosophy of origins, which lets indispensable ontic elements slip through its net. Hating mediation, the concept of Being in a philosophy of origins must also ontologize existing things. In the end, however, it resolves the ontic-ontological difference, amid pompous claims about being beyond it, toward the side of mere concepts. Anti-idealism arrives at itself in the mere idea, just as Husserl's phenomenology regressed to transcendental idealism. The necessarily false consciousness of this movement of thought is the prototype of ideology, for which doctrine tends, by nature, to be suited. If existing things merge without distinction into Being in its broadest extension, then they can be made absolute at will in accordance with historical opportunity. That is the plan of the ontological conquest of formalism. Against it, Husserl's old-fashioned persistence in formalism proves to have the higher right, and ontology has finally returned to formalism, contritely but ashamed, by working out a ritual in which pure concepts deny that they are such.

The appearance of concreteness was the *Fascinosum* of the School. What is intellectual (*Geistiges*) is to be intuitive and immediately certain; concepts are given a sensuous tinge. The metaphorical, art nouvesque, and merely ornamental nature of such language, however, becomes evident in Husserl by the very fact that the pretended sensuousness of thought is of no consequence in a philosophical framework. The use of such terms from the *Logic*, clearly published after *Being and Time*, as "verification" (*Bewährung*),[37] "rules throughout" (*durchherrscht*),[38] and "awakening" (*Weckung*),[39] shows an elegance and distance that are vaguely reminiscent of the school of George; the ἐποχή changes into the esoteric. Husserl associated the means with an ideology that the scientific character of his epistemology wanted nothing to do with. Nevertheless, his epistemology did add precisely a claim of cogency to

37. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 65 (German edition p. 57).
38. *Ibid.*, p. 128 (German edition p. 114).
39. *Ibid.*, p. 209 (German edition p. 186).

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what he expressed under the guise of scientific genuineness. Thus, the critique of Husserl's specialized epistemology substantially transcends it. An aura of concreteness accrues to concepts that arise in consciousness, in accordance with the theories of the ideal unity of the species and of ideation untainted by abstraction. Subjectively mediated determinations are credited, as qualities of Being-in-itself, to what contains nothing subjective, and the authority of the latter is strengthened. The reverse question—From where do those determinations come?—is barred. Because of the taboo against facticity, however, those concrete concepts are also quite lean. They feed on ontic elements, which then, by mere labelling, become "pure"—pure consciousness or purely ontological. The appearance of concreteness rests on the reification of results, not unlike positivistic social science, which lists products of social processes as the ultimate acceptable facts.

The illusory concreteness gets its metaphysical pathos, however, precisely from its emphatic distance from facts, from that spiritual element which precedes facticity in ontological as in all German, idealism. Whoever subscribes to this cannot dirty his hands with those mere existing things from which the characteristic concepts nevertheless get their substantial clout. In this mode of prodecure, the belated πρώτη φιλοσοφία eagerly forgets the critique of the crude thesis that the logically higher is also metaphysically higher. It forgets no less, however, the logical process itself. Such forgetfulness creates the absolute In-itself. Having become wise, the old wisdom understands how to present all the scars of its failures ultimately as badges of honor; everything turns out in its favor. Because mediations were chased into darkness, determinations that had to be renounced in the construction of universal concepts are once again, out of philosophical need, added to the result without furor. It is not necessary to notice what was left out in order to arrive at "Being in general." Since, however, this Being includes everything thinkable, it can be filled without contradiction. it is circumscribed in the most sensuous metaphors with a preference for those from early history, because every criterion for distinguishing metaphor from what was intended has disappeared from concepts. The innocently scientific maxim of Husserlian phenomenology, that the essence of concepts is to be seen in descriptively faithful analyses of meaning, as if each individual concept had an unshakeably fixed essence without regard for the constellation of other concepts, still aroused an illusory concreteness.

Over against this, the obsolete notion of a system still has its corrective truth in a knowledge that isolating praxis of Spirit is impossible. Such praxis became a prerogative for concepts to acquire those tones they had lost historically in the process of alienation. The tones are fleeting phantasmagoria, however, as long as concepts, which evokes essence, disown their own essence. Husserl endorsed his reflections as radical, and, since then, fictitious radical questions have sprung up everywhere. They become their own answer and let everything stay the way that is supposed to be true for it. The concept of radical was castrated with the help of theology. If this concept

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sought the root of evil in the theses against Feuerbach, now it only should emphasize the question to end all questions, the anticipation of the answer that does not exist. No information remains for thinking, which excludes the manifold of facts in its determination of something First because they are conditioned and mediated, except for the paradox, suppressed by contemporary ontology, that Leibniz imparted to Lockean empiricism: *intellectus ipse*. This paradox, like its abstract opposite, the doctrine of *tabula rasa*, expresses the impossibility of the polarization of knowledge, and thereby the very impossibility of the question of something First.

Along with the concept of something First is also thrown in that of the absolutely new, in which phenomenology participated phantasmagorically without really bringing a new motive. What is First and what is absolutely new are complementary, and dialectical thought would have to divest itself of both. Whoever, since the Preface to the Hegelian *Phenomenology*, refuses obedience to a philosophy of origins has recognized the mediate character of the new along with that of the old and has found the new to be contained in the older form as the non-identity of its identity. The dialectic is the attempt to see the new element of the old instead of just the old element of the new. Just as it mediates the new, it also preserves the old as mediated; if it were to proceed by the schema of a mere flowing and of an undifferentiated vitality, it would degrade itself to an image of the amorphous structure of nature, which it ought not to sanction by repeating but ought knowingly to transcend. The dialectic gives the old its due as something thinglike, but it can move it only by freeing the power of the latter's own weight. It achieves the insight that the closed process also includes what is not included and thereby reaches a limit of knowledge itself. The dialectic itself is transcended only by a changing praxis. Beforehand, however, the new is as much in power as the old; if the latter wants to date the domination of the autochthons back to the divine, then the former makes an idol of the priority of production, in which the principle of domination is no less hidden. This is just as in the marketplace of Spirit, where the attempt is made to raise the question — What is new? — synonymously with the question of primordiality.

The malice of this question and thereby, of course, the devaluation of the new in general is fundamentally bourgeois. Nothing unknown, nothing different, can arise from the known. All pieces of the game have been played. So speaks the self-contempt of a mutilated father, condemned to unfreedom; he will not grant that his son might overcome his inherited shame, while, in contrast, to the son, a woman cannot even fully participate in a patriarchal society. One moment in the nexus of guilt constitutes the consciousness that the nexus cannot be broken. To see through the law of identity, however, means not to be dissuaded from the belief that what is derived can break the power of the origin. All music once served to ease the boredom of the gentry, but the most recent quartets are not dinner music. According to psychoanalysis, tenderness is created by the reaction to barbaric sadism, but it became the model of humanity. Even the frail concepts of epistemology point

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beyond themselves. In their very highest formalisms, and especially in their failure, they are to be saved as a piece of unconscious history writing by helping them to self-consciousness against their own intention. This rescue, mindful of the suffering embedded in concepts, waits for the instant of their collapse. This instant is the ideal of a philosophical critique, which has no measure other than the collapse of illusion. If the age of interpretation is over, and if it is time to change the world, instead, then philosophy takes its leave, and the concepts cease and become images. If philosophy, as scientific semantics, would like to translate language into logic, it still faces the speculative task of bringing logic to the point of speech. It is not time for a First Philosophy, but for a last.

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LUKÁCS' AND HUSSERL'S CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE*

by Mihaly Vajda

Marxism and phenomenology show striking parallels in their relation to science. But since there are many phenomenologies and Marxisms, this problem cannot be analyzed in the abstract. Thus, the following analysis will focus on two fundamental works: Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* and Husserl's *The Crisis of European Science*. This selection is not arbitrary. The two books are representative of their respective schools and decisively influenced further developments. Furthermore, both books are products of the decades between the two world wars, and can be considered as typical expressions of the crisis of bourgeois culture.

Philosophy's relation to science is not determined exclusively by its character and development but primarily by the intellectual climate in which it is continually reformulated. Marx's relation to science was necessarily much more positive than that of his 20th-century followers. "The exclusiveness with which the total world view of modern man, in the second half of the 19th century, let itself be determined by the positive sciences and be blinded by the 'prosperity' they produced" [1] — to use Husserl's own phrase — also played a decisive role in Marx's thinking. Though he vehemently criticized both the findings and the procedures of bourgeois social science, especially economics, from a different concept of scientificity, he had no doubts about the value of science as such.

In the 20th century the sciences and their function have lost this sanctity. Modern phenomenology itself was the product of an age whose unconditional faith in science played a conservative rather than a critical role. This explains phenomenology's unambiguous relation to science. Marxism's relation to science is more complicated. One important factor here is the tension between its 19th-century origins and its permanent radicalism. Precisely to preserve its radicalism, the so-called philosophy of praxis, or "Western Marxism," whose main work was Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness*, had to take a very militant stand against the scientism of conservative Marxist schools. This was not only the expression of its political conservatism, but an attachment to orthodoxy in the narrow sense of the word. Lukács, who defined orthodox Marxism as methodology, had to extract the latent critique of science from Marx's own method.

The following will attempt to outline briefly where the two critiques converge. Neither critique attacks science's claim to be scientific. What phenomenology and Marxism criticize in the exact sciences is their claim to

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*Translated by David Parent.

1. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, 1970), pp. 5-6.

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exclusiveness, which does not and cannot meet scientific requirements. Today's sciences fail to justify their existence: they have nothing to do with the meaning of human existence. Husserl formulates the question very sharply from the beginning: "Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.... In our vital need — so we are told — this science has nothing to say to us. It excludes in principle precisely the questions which man, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentious upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence.... Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the world, the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact. But can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the sciences recognize as true only what is objectively established in this fashion, and if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn into nonsense, and well-being into misery?"[2]

Lukács emphasized this just as strongly: a science that merely discovers "facts" and seeks to determine the laws and structures of our world from these facts cannot guide our activities and actions. "A situation in which the 'facts' speak out unmistakably for or against a definite course of action has never existed, and neither can or will exist. The more conscientiously the facts are explored — in their isolation, i.e., in their unmediate relations — the less compellingly will they point in any one direction. It is self-evident that a merely subjective decision will be shattered by the pressure of uncomprehended facts acting automatically 'according to laws'."[3]

Science can do no more than predict events to which we must adapt. In this sense, they are not a means to self-realization; they make us part of the "objective" world governed by the natural laws they have discovered: they make us objects of transcendence.

This failure of science to carry out the task of human knowledge, i.e., to give meaning to our existence, stems, according to both Husserl and Lukács, from the fact that science is unable to assume the *standpoint of the totality*. Science has been reduced to technique (*technê*), an art of manipulation that rules out meaningful and really human action in favor of limited calculation, since it does not approach human reality as a totality, but only as the sum of "particular facts" governed by "objective" laws. The loss of the totality means at the same time *the abolition of historicity*. "The unscientific nature of this seemingly so scientific method consists," says Lukács, "in its failure to see and take account of the *historical character* of the facts on which it is based."[4]

Husserl formulates the same idea in positive terms. "This we seek to discern

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
3. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1971), p. 23.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

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not from the outside, from facts, as if the temporal becoming in which we ourselves have evolved were merely an external causal series. Rather we seek to discern it from the inside. Only in this way can we, who not only have a spiritual heritage but have become what we are thoroughly and exclusively in a historical-spiritual manner, have a task which is truly our own. We obtain it . . . only through a critical understanding of the total unity of history — *our* history."[5] What science lacks is precisely this critical understanding of the total unity of our history.

The next common point of criticism is the *critique of total quantification.* The sciences have reduced our qualitative world, the world we live in — the *Lebenswelt* in Husserlian terminology — to mere quantitative relations. The loss of a sense of quality is tied to the loss of meaning for the particular time. For modern science time has lost its quality: it has become just another dimension on the same level as space.

There are numerous other points in common between the Husserlian and Lukácsian critiques of science. In fact, it would be difficult to distinguish the two standpoints since the critique of science in the two works is identical. Not only do they criticize the sciences for not accomplishing the real tasks of human knowledge and for their methodology, but both blame a bad attitude, a *bad rationalism*, for the failure. This crisis of the sciences is also a crisis of man (in Husserl the crisis of European man, the surrender of true teleology; in Lukács the crisis of capitalism — but the two views amount to the same thing: the total reification of man), and has its roots in naturalistic objectivism. "The 'crisis' could then become distinguishable as the *apparent failure of rationalism.* The reason for the failure of a rational culture, however, . . . lies not in the essence of rationalism itself but solely in its being rendered superficial, in its entanglement in 'naturalism' and 'objectivism'."[6] And for Lukács, "the salient characteristic of the whole epoch is the equation which appears naive and dogmatic in the most 'critical' philosophers, of formal, mathematical, rational knowledge both with knowledge in general and also with 'our' knowledge."[7] The corollary of this one-sided, formal, objectivistic and naturalistic rationalism is necessarily an irrationalism: the irrationality of the whole. The rationally knowable partial systems, "the principle of rationalisation based on what is and *can be calculated,*"[8] and the world of first and "second" nature obtains within the irrationality of the whole world — a world where man walks as a stranger, homeless and exposed to irrational forces.

This rationalistic objectivism, combined with an ultimately irrational world view, characterizes the whole attitude of modern science and is the distinctive mark of our era. Yet, this dismal failure of the sciences is only a *sign of mankind's vital crisis*, whose causes and practical solutions both

5. Husserl, *op.cit.*, p. 71.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
7. Lukács, *op.cit.*, p. 112.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

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Husserl and Lukács seek to discover. In attempting to do so, both trace the history of modern European philosophy; both show how the objectivism of early modern thinking necessarily ended in skepticism; both regard the attempt of classical German idealism to restore the identity of subject and object in transcendentalism as having only half succeeded; and then both show that the solution must be sought in a transcendentalism carried to its logical conclusion.

Yet, the conditions under which this goal is attainable seem at first glance to be diametrically different. The holistic standpoint, which could lead to the recovery of the sciences and of human existence, is seen by Husserl as the true philosophical perspective, and by Lukács as that of the proletariat. In Husserl, the restoration of true humanity is an individual and purely intellectual project, while in Lukács it is the practical achievement of a class. For Lukács the mental reorientation, the recovery of the total standpoint through knowledge, seems to be only a subordinate partial factor of the practical upheaval that is shaking the bourgeois world. One could even say that the following statement by Lukács also characterizes Husserl's position: "The specialization of skills leads to the destruction of every image of the whole. And as, despite this, the need to grasp the whole — at least cognitively — cannot die out, we find that science, which is likewise based on specialization and thus caught up in the same immediacy, is criticized for having torn the real world into shreds and having lost its vision of the whole."[9] In description and goals, Lukács' radical brand of Marxism and phenomenology agree. For Lukács, however, the Husserlian approach is only a partial aspect of what they both criticize and seek to transcend. For Lukács, the Husserlian solution would be only a pseudo-solution since progress in knowledge can occur only as part of progress in social relations. The history of ideas and historical materialism cannot and must not be reconciled. In Husserl it is the mind itself that by itself must rediscover its original path, which emerged in European history, so to eliminate false objectivity, while in Lukács the revolutionary transformation of the bourgeois mode of production is necessary to restructure the human mind.

This simple contraposition of the two conceptions, however, is an unfortunate simplification. The coincidence of critique and goal is unthinkable if the Husserlian conception is reduced to the history of ideas, and Lukács' to historical materialism. No doubt, in Husserl the determining factor of human history is spirit (*Geist*). But if this was nothing more than the attitude of a wide variety of men, which in every concrete historical situation determines their respective activities, then his entire phenomenology would be meaningless and internally contradictory. The psychologistic attitude of the so-called history of ideas was the main object of Husserl's critique in his very first works, and even in the *Crisis* it was still considered the other side of objectivistic science. "Historicism assumes its position in the factual realm

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

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and by absolutizing this realm without quite neutralizing it (since the specific meaning is by nature alien to historical thinking or at least does not influence its general determinations), what follows is a relativism closely related to naturalistic psychologism and entangled in similar skeptical difficulties," he writes as early as 1911 in his famous *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*.[10] The history-of-ideas standpoint was and remained as alien to Husserl as the naturalistic one.

Could the Husserlian "spirit" be the same as Hegel's absolute "Spriti?" An Hegelian interpretation of phenomenology is not at all absurd. Since Husserl never found the final solution to his transcendental phenomenology, the door was left open even for this interpretation. The solution Husserl sought, however, was altogether different. Hegel's absolute spirit, whose development is the totality of human history, reduces every concrete person to a means for the totality. Hegelian philosophy remained the philosophy of human alienation. The Husserlian spirit, on the other hand, is a unity of thought and action whose true development is the real becoming not only of mankind, but of every single human personality. For Husserl, the realization of the attitude of transcendental phenomenology is "the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy."[11] It is not just a new conceptual attitude, but also a new practical one: a genuinely new spiritual form of life. Of course, he does not explore material preconditions of this new life. Yet, his philosophy does not turn out to be merely a new contemplative attitude. That the unity of theory and practice can and ought to be realized is as much an integral part of Husserlian phenomenology as of Marxism. "For yet a third form of universal attitude is possible (as opposed to both the religious-mythical attitude), namely, the synthesis of the two interests accomplished in the transition from the theoretical to the practical attitude, such that the *theoria* (universal science), arising within a closed unity and under the *epoche* of all praxis, is called (and in theoretical insight itself exhibits its calling) to serve mankind in a new way, mankind which, in its concrete existence, lives first and always in the natural sphere. This occurs in the form of a new sort of praxis, that of the universal critique of all life and all life-goals, all cultural products and systems that have already arisen out of the life of man; and thus it also becomes a critique of mankind itself and of the values which guide it explicitly or implicitly. Further, it is a praxis whose aim is to elevate mankind through universal scientific reason, according to norms of truth of all forms, to transform it from the bottom up into a new humanity made capable of an absolute self-responsibility on the basis of absolute theoretical insights."[12]

Similarly, Lukács' position differs sharply from shallow historical materialism. The standpoint of the identity of subject and object is not merely an advance in thought, but also the total transformation of earlier forms of

10. Edmund Husserl, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," *Logos*, Vol. 1 (Tübingen, 1910-11), p. 323.
11. Husserl, *The Crisis, op.cit.*, p. 299.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

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association and behavior. It is not at all a matter of a mindless, quasi-automatic upheaval of social relations (and ultimately of relations of production) brought about by natural laws (i.e., arbitrarily) precipitating the attainment of the real standpoint. The social upheaval and the discovery of the true viewpoint are not only inseparable: they are ultimately identical processes. The revolutionary transformation of the world of reification, i.e., of the bourgeois, capitalist mode of production, corresponds with the development of the proletarian class consciousness ascribed to the proletariat (the standpoint of the identical subject-object). This had already been formulated by Lukács in 1919 as follows: "The development of society is a unified process. This means that a certain phase of development cannot take place in any area of social life without exerting an impact on all other areas. Through this unity and coherence of social development it is possible to grasp and achieve an understanding of the same process from the standpoint of one social phenomenon or another. Thus, one can speak of culture in its apparent isolation from other social phenomena, for when we correctly grasp the culture of any period, we grasp with it the root of the whole development of the period, just as we do when we begin with an analysis of economic relations."[13]

If we consider Husserl's and Lukács' critiques of science in these terms, then the fact that Husserl focuses only on the philosophical aspect of the process and concentrates exclusively on the change of spiritual attitude does not affect the similarity of the two conceptions. For the one, the standpoint of the identical subject-object is that of the true philosopher. For the other, it is that of the proletariat. But what prevents the true philosopher's standpoint from also being that of the proletariat, since each standpoint is ultimately formulated as "the philosopher's"?

The true difference between the two standpoints thus does not reduce to that between the history of ideas and historical materialism. Yet, even if, following Lukács' argument, we accept the premise that the essence of a historical period can just as well be understood by its culture as by its forms of production because every age constitutes a historical whole, it remains to be seen whether in Husserl the total lack of analysis of social relations, understood in the broadest possible way, indicates that he cannot explain the sequence of various attitudes, or even that he regards this sequence as needing explanation. It may be useful here to turn to the individual passages in Husserl's book where he speaks outright of the "factual" causes of a change in attitude. For instance, in discussing the formation of the Greeks' original theoretical attitude, he writes that: "Naturally the outbreak of the theoretical attitude, like everything that develops historically, has its factual motivation in the concrete framework of historical occurrence. In this respect one must clarify, then, how *thaumazein* could arise and become habitual." "We shall not go into this in detail," he adds. Thus, for Husserl, the "factual

13. Georg Lukács, "The Old Culture and the New Culture," in *Towards a New Marxism*, edited by Bart Grahl and Paul Piccone (St. Louis, 1973), p. 21.

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motivation" of "historical developments" is secondary,[14] as it is for every historical view that does not see the history of mankind objectivistically as a natural event and attempts to grasp every detail of this history. If men have made their own history, i.e., if it was not determined by transcendental powers, then the factual motivations should not be conceived as the causes of the change of attitude. According to Lukács: "The idea that we have made reality loses its more or less fictitious character: we have —in the prophetic words of Vico... — made our own history and if we are able to regard the whole of reality as history (i.e., as *our* history, for there is no other), we shall have raised ourself in fact to the position from which reality can be understood as our 'action'."[15]

Unless one wants to explain human history objectivistically in terms of transcendental causes, one need only follow the inner connection of successive attitudes. If this is the case, the true history of mankind can also be grasped by examining the sequence of changes of attitude. Shallow historical materialism saw history as the evolution of forms of physical activity — first as the result of relations of production, then as the development of the means of production (in both cases, transcendentalism). This evolution includes the sequence of mental attitudes as well.

In this regard there is an important difference between the two conceptions. Both Lukács and Husserl stress the element of consciousness in human development; both analyze the development of philosophical conceptions as expressing the spiritual essence of European history. Both seek a solution to the crisis inherent in the domination of positive science, characterized as objectivistic, naturalistic, and rationalistic in a bad sense. Husserl calls this age of *reification* a false turn of European teleology. But has this era taken a false turn for Lukács as well? Lukács also ascribes a negative value to reification, even when he casts aside the utopian standpoint of a moral imperative. "Whenever the refusal of the subject simply to accept his empirically given existence takes the form of an 'ought,' this means that the immediately given empirical reality receives affirmation and consecration at the hands of philosophy: it is philosophically immortalized."[16] For Lukacs, the question is only whether reification is a necessary precondition for the unreified, unalienated conditions of subject-object identity, or whether it is just a stage of European history which mankind could avoid. While for Lukács the holistic standpoint can be attained only by abolishing the world of fragmentation, Husserl seems to regard the age of the naturalistic attitude as an accidental, intermediary stage.

Although Husserl and Lukács both depict the course of European history from Descartes to classical German idealism in terms of reification, Husserl attributes the entire false development to a single mental step, namely that of Descartes. Here the difference between the two is obvious. Lukács

14. Husserl, *The Crisis, op.cit.*, p. 285.
15. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness, op.cit.*, p. 145.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

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concentrates on modern social science. When he criticizes science, he usually means economics, law, etc.; the natural sciences play no specific role in his analysis, although his critique applies to them, too. Husserl likewise condemns the objectivistic, naturalistic attitude of every science. For him, however, this attitude is not a necessary consequence of the scientific method, which he considers one of mankind's most valuable achievements. What is problematic is only the false discussion of the method's meaning. The appropriation of this method by the social sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) is a typical example of this aberration. Efforts to construct a world of the mind analogous to the world of nature created by the natural sciences could only take place if the natural sciences falsely interpret the world of nature. They regard the mind as objective nature and as a technical procedure for objective description. This false attitude emerges as early as Galileo. "Galileo, the discoverer...of physics, or physical nature, is at once a discovering and a concealing genius."[17] And further: "I am of course quite serious in placing and continuing to place Galileo at the top of the list of the greatest discoverers of modern times. Naturally I also admire quite seriously the great discoverers of classical and post-classical physics and their intellectual accomplishment, which, far from being merely mechanical, was in fact astounding in the highest sense. This accomplishment is not at all disparaged by the above elucidation of it as *techne* or by the critique in terms of principle, which shows that the true meaning of these theories — the meaning which is genuine in terms of their origins — remained and had to remain hidden from the physicists, including the great and the greatest."[18] This "having to remain hidden" does not point to historical limitations — which would follow from Lukács' theory — but to the impossibility of devoting oneself completely to this method and at the same time maintaining a critical distance from it. "But the mathematician, the natural scientist, at best a highly brilliant technician of the method — to which he owes the discoveries which are his only aim — is normally not at all able to carry out such reflections. In his actual sphere of inquiry and discovery he does not know at all that everything these reflections must clarify is even in *need* of clarification, and this for the sake of that interest which is decisive for a philosophy or a science, i.e., the interest in true knowledge of the *world itself, nature itself.* And this is precisely what has been lost through a science which is given as a tradition and which has become a *technē*, insofar as this interest played a determining role at all in its primal establishment. Every attempt to lead the scientist to such reflections, if it comes from a nonmathematical, nonscientific circle of scholars, is rejected as 'metaphysical'."[19]

The birth of the natural sciences as such did not necessitate the development of naturalistic objectivism. Yet the successes of the natural sciences blinded modern European man: "The world must, in itself, be a

17. Husserl, *The Crisis, op.cit.*, p. 52.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

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rational world, in the new sense of rationality taken from mathematics, or mathematized nature; correspondingly, philosophy, the universal science of the world, must be built up as a unified rational theory *more geometrico*."[20] And, of course, if scientifically rational nature is a world of bodies existing in itself — which was taken for granted in the given historical situation — then the world-in-itself must, in a sense unknown before, be a peculiarly *split* world, split into nature-in-itself and a mode of being which is different from this: that which exists psychically."[21]

Thus we have the world view of exact science, of bad rationality and objectivism: the standpoint which has lost the world as a totality. Lukács could also agree with this description of the development of contemporary thought. This world of rational theory *in the geometric manner* is nothing but capitalism's world of "second" nature, whose essence combines the ever increasing domination of nature with the loss of the totality. The splitting of the world into nature-as-such and the psychic nature of isolated individuals (understood as second nature) corresponds to the world of capitalist reification as described by Lukács. Here "a man's own activity, his own labor, becomes something objective and independent of him, something that controls him by virtue of an autonomy alien to man. *Objectively* a world of objects and relations between things springs into being (the world of commodities and their movements on the market). The laws governing these objects are indeed gradually discovered by man, but even so they confront him as invisible forces that generate their own power.... *Subjectively* — where the economy has been fully developed — a man's activity becomes estranged from himself, it turns into a commodity which, subject to the non-human objectivity of the natural laws of society, must go its own way independently of man just like any consumer article."[22]

For Lukács, the failure to reflect on the true meaning of scientific method is a necessary consequence of those relations of production that are the other side of the totality, including domination by method. Reification, furthermore, cannot be philosophically transcended until it has been overcome in practice. Lukács must be close to Husserl in thinking that Descartes "accomplished the primal establishment of ideas which were destined, through their own historical effects (as if following a hidden teleology of history), to explode this very rationalism by uncovering its hidden absurdity. Precisely those ideas which were supposed to ground this rationalism as *aeterna veritas* bear within themselves a *deeply hidden sense*, which, once brought to the surface, completely uproots it."[23] Bourgeois thought cannot overcome itself. The holistic perspective can be attained only by the proletariat.

Husserl merely explains what happened with Descartes. "For Descartes, the

20. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness, op.cit.*, p. 87.
23. Husserl, *The Crisis, op.cit.*, p. 74.

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Meditations work themselves out in the portentous form of a substitution of one's own psychic ego for the [absolute] ego, of psychological immanence for egological immanence, of the evidence of psychic, 'inner,' or 'self-perception' for egological self-perception; and this is also their continuing historical effect up to the present day."[24] Once this psychological mis-interpretation was anchored in European thought, total objectification of the subject was necessary to attain subject-object identity. Husserl leaves the question unanswered as to whether this misunderstanding could have been avoided.

Husserl believes that transcendental phenomenology is possible only from the vantage point which the modern, exact science and rationalistic philosophy have surrendered for their rationalistic attitude. In Lukács, the standpoint of the identical subject-object is not at all that of the uninvolveld observer. On the contrary, Lukács stresses that only the class which has been most deeply affected by the social conditions of reification and whose fate clearly depends on overcoming the bourgeois attitude can, by a practical and theoretical act, do away with this reification.

To anticipate the result of our analysis: the real difference between Lukács and Husserl lies in their approach to the question of *false consciousness*. For Lukács the holistic perspective is the standpoint of the proletariat, while for Husserl it is that of the true philosopher. This difference has been described here as inconsequential since the proletariat's standpoint is also formulated theoretically in a philosophy and since Husserl does not discuss the sociological relevance of the philosopher's standpoint. The dissemination of knowledge, however, is for Husserl a political struggle, a question of power: "Clearly this leads not simply to a homogeneous transformation of the generally satisfactory life of the national state but probably to great internal schisms in which this life and the whole national culture must suffer an upheaval. Those conservatives who are satisfied with the tradition and the philosophical men will fight each other, and the struggle will surely occur in the sphere of political power."[25] Unlike Lukács, Husserl does not specify the sociological composition of this circle of philosophers.

In light of this discussion, the most important questions of our time seem to be whether we need a total reorientation to overcome the crisis of our era; and whether such a reorientation — be it total or partial — must represent the standpoint of *one* sociologically and concretely delimitable social group (or whether it is attainable independent of such particularity).

Let us return to Husserl's conception of the development from the natural attitude to transcendental phenomenology. "Extrascientific culture, culture not yet touched by science, consists in tasks and accomplishments of man in finitude. The openly endless horizon in which he lives is not disclosed; his ends, his activity, his trade and traffic, his personal, social, national, and mythical motivation — all this moves within the sphere of his finitely surveyable surrounding world. Here there are no infinite tasks, no ideal

24. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 288.

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acquisitions."[26] "Now natural life can be characterized as a life naively, straightforwardly directed at the world, the world being always in a certain sense consciously present as a universal horizon, without, however, being thematic as such."[27] This natural attitude, this unity with the socio-cultural world, is the normal mode of human existence. "All other attitudes are accordingly related back to this natural attitude as reorientations [of it]."[28] On the one hand they have emerged historically from the first, primal attitude; on the other, they remain anchored in the original attitude even after other historically determined generations have forged higher and different attitudes. "The individual men who reorient themselves, as men within their universal life-community (their nation), continue to have their natural interests, each his individual interests; through no reorientation can they simply lose them; this would mean that each would cease to be what he has become from birth onward. In any circumstances, then, the reorientation can only be a periodical one."[29]

The original attitude is practical in its connection with its socio-cultural environment. There are two different possible reorientations toward universality: practical and theoretical. Husserl labels the higher-level practical attitude a religious and mythical one, characterized as consisting in this: "that the world as a totality becomes thematic, but in a practical way." "But all this speculative knowledge is meant to serve man in his human purposes so that he may order his worldly life in the happiest possible way and shield it from disease, from every sort of evil fate, from disaster and death."[30] "But in addition to the higher-level practical attitude...there exists yet another essential possibility for altering the general natural attitude, namely, the *theoretical attitude*."[31] "Man becomes gripped by the passion of a world view and world knowledge that turns away from all practical interests and, within the closed sphere of its cognitive activity, in the times devoted to it, strives for and achieves nothing but pure *theoria*. In other words, man becomes a non-participating spectator, surveyor of the world; he becomes a philosopher..."[32] This is "the peculiar universality of his critical stance, his resolve not to accept unquestioningly any pregiven opinion or tradition so that he can inquire, in respect to the whole traditionally pregiven universe, after what is true in itself, an ideality. But this is not only a new cognitive stance. Because of the requirement to subject all empirical matters to ideal norms, i.e., those of unconditioned truth, there soon results a far-reaching transformation of the whole praxis of human existence, i.e., the whole of cultural life: henceforth it must receive its norms not from the naive experience and tradition of everyday life but from objective truth."[33] As

26. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 283, 294.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 286-287.

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already indicated, this teleology has gone astray in modern objectivism by regarding technique (*technè*) as an art and as truth.

Thus, both critiques of science have no other goal than to rediscover *truth*. Both maintain that the meaning of our history can be grasped only from a holistic perspective. A mankind that seeks to adapt to its own world as something alien surrenders its human essence and fails to realize its teleology. In Lukács' opinion, this teleology consists, ultimately, in achieving a mankind which does not let its norms be dictated by *objective truth*, i.e., which is capable of absolute self-responsibility by virtue of absolute theoretical insights. It is a question of objective knowledge. Lukács says: "the proletariat is...the first subject in history that is (objectively) capable of an adequate social consciousness."[34] "It was necessary for the proletariat to be born for social reality to become fully conscious."[35] Both Lukács and Husserl posit the necessity of total reorientation, the nature of which consists in grasping the totality. This knowledge of the totality is self-knowledge.

Such a radical reorientation means the abolition of the duality of philosophy and science. Lukács: "only by overcoming the — theoretical — duality of philosophy and special discipline, of methodology and factual knowledge can the way be found by which to annul the duality of thought and existence."[36] Husserl: "A definite ideal of a universal philosophy and its method forms the beginning; this is, so to speak, the primal establishment of the philosophical modern age and all its lines of development. But instead of being able to work itself out in fact, this ideal suffers an inner dissolution." "Along with this falls the faith in 'absolute' reason, through which the world has its meaning, the faith in the meaning of history, of humanity, the faith in man's freedom, that is, his capacity to secure rational meaning for his individual and common human existence."[37]

Both thinkers seek the Archimedean point from which the disintegration of human knowledge and life can be reversed and a unified *teleology* of human existence be established, one marked by self-determination. The critique of fragmentation and false objectivism implies the *emancipation* from external determination. This critique of science owes its vehemence to the disenchantment caused by the failure of science and scientific objectivity's promise of freedom. The bourgeois era replaced tradition preserved by God with a new, possibly much more abject servitude to "factual" objectivity, to faceless, crude, merciless "facts." Man was alone, powerless to control a godless world. Exact science promises to guarantee survival, contingent on understanding and adapting to the discovered facts and their laws. Yet a world ruled by anthropomorphic albeit unknowable forces is preferable to this. All radical critiques of science, including phenomenology and Marxism, seek to reveal this scientistic world view as false consciousness.

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34. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness, op.cit.*, p. 199.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
37. Husserl, *The Crisis, op.cit.*, pp. 12 and 13.

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Does the denial of this world view necessarily result in a holistic perspective? Is it *either* total exposure to *or* total power over our destiny? Is the assumption that man must be either master or slave justified? To answer these questions we must raise another: How is it at all possible to grasp historical reality as a totality? What does that mean? The holistic standpoint cannot reside in the totality of the object alone, but presupposes that of the subject as well. Otherwise, the objectivistic world view remains intact. The totality is *ab ovo* the unity of *object and subject*. This is for Lukács and Husserl the unified process of human history. Mankind, the subject of knowledge, is also its object since man has created the objective world he knows, including nature. To conclude from this that man makes solely his own history is to be confined to the Hegelian standpoint. Man remains an *abstract* concept, easily replaceable by the absolute mind. For the flesh-and-blood individual only the knowledge of reality as *his own power* is significant. Prerequisite to this power is the individual's participation in the formation of that reality. *That is what rules out the holistic standpoint*. Both philosophers realize this. Husserl was preoccupied with this problem all his life. He accepted neither the Hegelian solution, in which the individual is sacrificed, nor a solipsistic, and ultimately relativistic, one. He tried to show that the intersubjectivity of the transcendental ego satisfies the requirements of a holistic conception.

Lukács, on the other hand, simply casts aside the standpoint of the individual. "The individual can never become the measure of all things. For when the individual confronts objective reality he is faced by a complex of ready-made and unalterable objects which allow him only the subjective responses of recognition or rejection."[38] "For the individual, reification and hence determinism are irremovable."[39] Lukács finds the subject capable of grasping the totality in the proletariat as a class: "Only the class can relate to the whole of reality in a practical revolutionary way. (The 'species' cannot do this as it is no more than an individual that has been mythologized and stylized in a spirit of contemplation.)"[40] Does this description of an individual having "been mythologized and stylized in a spirit of contemplation" apply only to the species and not to the class? Lukács' answer is clear. In contrast to mankind, hitherto unable to realize its real historical unity, the proletariat is forced to do so. The individual proletarian is the first individual in history who can identify unconditionally with his class, though not with the whole of mankind. Since the self-knowledge of the proletariat entails the self-knowledge of all of society and history, the class-conscious proletarian, as a representative of his class, becomes the real subject of history. To the extent that the class-conscious proletariat ceases to articulate society in terms of classes, Lukács posits, ultimately, *the total absorption of the individual into the species.*

Either total submission or total control? The critique of naturalistic

38. Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness, op.cit.*, p. 193.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*

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objectivism, the critique of a relentless factual world (the scientism of total bureaucratization) is justified: Man is not subject to rule by persistent, objective facts. The world view of objectivistic science and of bad rationalistic and irrationalistic philosophies must be transcended, but not from the standpoint of the totality. For that would mean not only the identity of subject and object, but also that of the subject as it understands itself in the object: the identity of the individual and the species. That identity signifies the total repression — annihilation is impossible — of individuality.

Philosophy's belief in its ability to suppress its own particularity, and thus every other particularity as well, is a new false consciousness, the attainment of which would result in just as much cruelty and inhumanity as that caused by false objectivism. The real and practical unmasking of the false consciousness of objectivism must also show that the subject never completely becomes an object, that the reification of human relations and human consciousness is only a tendency, which, though dominant in the bourgeois era, never successfully eliminated counter-tendencies.

In the essay "Phenomenology and Bourgeois Society,"[41] I have attempted to outline the possibility of a phenomenological reorientation since the complete isolation of the bourgeois individual as dictated by objectivism is only apparent. This individual never ceased to be a social being. The reorientation, then, must not and cannot be a total one. A total reorientation, replacing objectivism with holism and effecting the repression of individuality, would not solve the crisis of mankind. The crisis can be overcome only *by developing the social character of the individual.*

For it is false that "For the individual, the reification and hence determinism are irremovable."[42] *History and Class Consciousness* is based on the assumption that objectivism is true. Because of this assumption, Lukács can exercise his critique only from the standpoint of a total reorientation. Husserl's ambiguities, however, leave room for a different solution. The standpoint of the totality here is that of the philosopher, whose reorientation is only temporary. "It can have habitually enduring validity for one's whole remaining life only in the form of an unconditional resolve of the will to take up, at periodic but internally unified points of time, the same attitude and, through this continuity that intentionally bridges the gaps, to sustain its new sort of interests as valid and as ongoing projects and to realize them through corresponding cultural structures."[43]

Philosophy represents the standpoint of the totality, or, as Habermas would say, the emancipation interests of mankind. If it subordinates its own standpoint to that of scientificity as in the case of positivistic determinism, then it does indeed abandon its true mission. This holds true not only when it represents the standpoint of the isolated individual, the private man, the

41. See *Phänomenologie und Marxismus*, Vol. 3, *Sozialphilosophie*, edited by B. Waldenfels, J.M. Broekman, A. Pazanin (Frankfurt, 1978), pp. 115-143.
42. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness, op.cit.*, p. 193.
43. Husserl, *The Crisis,, op.cit.*, pp. 281-282.

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bourgeois, but also when it represents another particularity, i.e., the proletariat. The elitism of *History and Class Consciousness* reveals the false consciousness of Bolshevism, its belief that a self-conscious elite can and should represent a class and, through it, all mankind.

Liberation from every particularity can end only in the terror of the general. The standpoint of a specific particularity amounts to the same thing. If there is a solution, it lies only in the mutual recognition of the most different particularities. The holistic standpoint cannot and does not want to be achieved. It does not belong to *one* class or to one specific oppressed particularity, but to all of mankind. Inasmuch as the unity of mankind is a value only to the extent that the different particularities seek mutual recognition instead of annihilation, the standpoint of the totality, philosophy, should not be realized. If the unity of mankind is a value at all, it is so only in the regulative and not in the constitutive sense. What follows from this for science?

If the holistic standpoint is only a point of departure for critique, and not an attainable or desirable reality, we need reject only the universalization of science and not science itself. Habermas writes correctly, but not logically, that "it constitutes the honor of the sciences to apply their method relentlessly without reflecting on the knower's interest. The sciences are all the more certain of their discipline because they methodologically do not know what they do, i.e., methodological progress within an unproblematized framework. False consciousness has a supportive function."[44] Habermas is not logical here, for the consciousness of science is *false only in the sense* that it — inevitably — seeks to universalize its world view. Yet, we cannot subordinate the technical interest attached to it (and the practical one of hermeneutic science, which is always linked with concrete mankind) to the emancipatory one. Such subordination would mean the totalitarian world order we have just rejected. Thus, the consciousness of "objective science" is not, in and of itself, false. "Objective science" represents part of our reality: the impossibility of overcoming all objectivity. Science, moreover, does not have the function of creating meaning. Under no circumstances can the meaning of life stem from knowledge. Any meaning that stems from knowledge is, for us, transcendent.

44. Jürgen Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'* (Frankfurt, 1968), p. 165.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

EUROCOMMUNISM AND-OR EUROSOCIALISM: AN INTERVIEW WITH MASSIMO L. SALVADORI[1]

Q: Recently there has been some talk of Eurosocialism. What do you think is the difference between Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism?

A: I don't think that one can talk about a contrast between Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism. There are no qualitative differences at the level of political strategy, but only at the level of political theory. Eurocommunism follows a strategy very close to the one adopted by the socialist and social democratic movements. In this sense, it is significant that European communists, and in particular Italian communists, speak of the need to overcome the traditional division in the labor movement. Yet, Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism differ significantly with regard to the theoretical justifications given for present positions. The European socialist movement includes a broad spectrum of people. There are a number of important principles to which they all subscribe, but many diverse positions. Swedish social democracy, for example, is very different than French socialism. When one thinks of German socialism, Austrian socialism and English Labourism, the differences are simply enormous. German socialism is decidedly statist, while French socialism is *auto-gestionaire*. Still another difference among socialist and social democratic parties is the degree to which they still subscribe to Marxist ideas. Even within the same party, e.g., the French Socialist Party, there are Marxist as well as non-Marxist currents. Despite these differences, however, there are certain fundamental principles which all socialist parties share: reformism and a liberal-democratic conception of the State. These principles do not conflict with the Eurocommunist position. Where there is a divergence is in the way the two parties see the relation between past and present. Communist Parties consider themselves fundamentally Marxist, claim that their present position is continuous with their past traditions, and say that they, accordingly, provide a global alternative to social democracy. I disagree with this. Initially, Communist Parties were anti-parliamentarian and advocated a dictatorship of the proletariat; today, they are parliamentary parties, they no longer advocate the dictatorship of the proletariat and they seek alliances with all progressive political parties—even the Catholics. Thus, qualitative change has taken place. For reasons relating to internal party life and their traditional working class constituency, they nevertheless claim an essential continuity with the past and think that in some sense this adds clarity to their position. I, on the contrary, feel that such a claim only confuses the situation.

Q: Does this hold true even for the Italian communists?

A: I think so, although I may be completely wrong. Through their most authoritative spokesmen, Italian communists claim that the *compromesso storico* strategy is an extreme application of Gramsci's views. From a historical point of view, this is nonsense. One must remember that Gramsci was a Leninist, certainly not in the orthodox and restricted sense, but in so far as he remained within the historical and strategic problematic of Leninism. He believed in a revolution guided by one major force and having one predominant conception of the world.

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1. This interview was conducted by Frank Adler and Paul Piccone in Rochester, New York, October 21, 1978.

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Q: Yes, but was it not Gramsci's most important concern to raise the masses to the level of civil and political life so that they could make their own choices rather than simply follow the Party's mandate?

A: As I said, Gramsci was not a *crude* Leninist, but he nevertheless accepted the objective of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This conception was certainly more developed in Gramsci and markedly different from Stalin's essentially bureaucratic conception. Clearly, one cannot view Gramsci simply as a minor student of Lenin, but one should not forget that he remained within Lenin's overall problematic. When, for example, he develops his theory of hegemony in the *Prison Notebooks*, he claims that it derives from Lenin.

Q: On the other hand, there is a good deal of historical and textual ambiguity regarding what works of Lenin Gramsci read as well as how he interpreted them. One could certainly argue that Gramsci's conception of hegemony was different and much more fully developed than that of Lenin. In any case, it seems that, for you, what distinguishes Eurocommunism from Eurosocialism are essentially historical or archaeological considerations.

A: Yes. As I said, in terms of actual political practice, there are no qualitative differences between Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism.

Q: Given this state of affairs, as well as your argument that differences between communist and socialist parties boil down to how they interpret the past, what do you then make of the contemporary conflicts between them, e.g., Craxi's recent polemic against the PCI?

A: Your question is very important. The problem, however, is in seeing what lies behind these conflicts. As I said earlier, on matters of fundamental strategy there are no significant differences. Yet, the way one understands the past is not purely an academic matter but can have important political implications. I am not trying to pass a judgement as to whether Eurocommunism is a positive or negative phenomenon: that type of judgement must be made on a different level. I am only trying to outline a factual analysis. Here we see that one characteristic of Eurocommunists, or at least of party spokesmen, is the contradiction between their actual programs and their ideological claim of continuity with the past—i.e., a contradiction between what they are and how they would like to appear. Their programs, particularly those of the Italian communists, are very moderate (e.g., the *compromesso storico*, the austerity program, etc.). I would say that they are ultra-moderate, even more so, perhaps, than typical social democratic programs. At the same time, however, they must appear revolutionary. Given the limited success of government programs, the severity of the Italian crisis, and the critical attitude of the masses in the face of the present political situation, Italian communists find themselves in a situation where they must ride two separate horses: one is their actual moderate politics, the other is to give the masses some sense of ideological and psychological satisfaction. Berlinguer proposes very moderate policies, but promises that the communists are for the liquidation of capitalism. He never says, however, how the PCI intends to achieve the latter in terms of the former. The liquidation of capitalism is held out as a goal, but no program is in fact laid out to indicate the means by which this goal might be reached. Thus, there is a characteristic schism between means and ends which, I would say, is profoundly anti-Marxist.

Socialists are now in the process of conducting a rather harsh and aggressive polemic against the communists. Here I think we must make a distinction between the rather important questions that the socialists are putting before the communists, as opposed

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to the rather superficial manner in which they are doing so. The communists want to be part of the government, but what kind of country are we talking about? Italy is a small and dependent country with no real autonomy. This is an inevitable fact which no potential governing party can ignore. Therefore, it is obvious that any party which seeks to govern must make clear its international alliances. Here we confront another oscillation of the part of the PCI: on the one hand, Berlinguer claims to accept NATO; on the other, he professes profound solidarity with the Russian Communist Party and the international communist movement. I am not prepared to say which alternative is the true or the right one, I only want to point out that these are alternative and incompatible choices, since, for example, NATO is a military alliance meant to contain Soviet military power.

The Italian socialists want some clarifications from the communists. But one must bear in mind that they have a great inferiority complex with respect to the Communist Party and, thus, through a lively debate with the communists they hope to alter the balance of forces on the Italian Left. The socialists raise some important questions, but in an over-emphasized and superficial manner. Let me give an example. The socialists ask the Communist Party to clarify its relation to Leninism—not as an abstract historical question, but rather in terms of the practical implications that this relation might have upon contemporary politics. Posed thusly, it is a meaningful question. Yet, the socialists have posed it in such a manner as to premise the question with the presumption that Leninism was necessarily a historical error as was its historical lineage (which would include Marx, Lenin, Gramsci, and Togliatti), compared to a qualitatively better socialist tradition (which would include Proudhon and others). It is obvious that such an operation on the part of the socialists contributes little to friendly internal relations within the Left. The socialists' superficial and aggressive attack has only forced the communists to turn inward and defend their traditions. In no way has anything been clarified.

Another example: When Berlinguer says that the communists will make no disavowals and will defend their traditions, particularly the historical importance of the October Revolution, they, in turn, give an equally superficial answer. The problem is not one of whether to defend the October Revolution, but rather one of explaining the present political implications that a judgement concerning the October Revolution might now have on how they view the Soviet model, as well as their relations with the Soviet Union. The evaluation of the Soviet Union is not a purely academic question, but one of immediate political significance since such a judgement must have consequences for domestic and international politics. In any case, I am only trying to explain why I claim that there are no qualitative differences between the parties on profound political issues. I believe that the Italian Communist Party is fundamentally democratic and reformist.

Q: This ambiguity within the Italian Communist Party that you speak of is not altogether new. Both before fascism and during the Cold War there was also an internal contradiction between reformist politics and Leninist ideology. At the time of the "Salerno turn," when Togliatti immediately after WWII charted the parliamentary path to be followed by the Italian Communist Party, he held out the possibility of breaking with this ambiguity, but the Cold War made such a move impossible. Ideologically, a choice had to be made between the U.S. and capitalism, or Russia and Leninism. Understandably, they chose Russia and Leninism, while their politics continued to be moderate and reformist. Was this not so?

A: I see the political thrust of your question. I would say, however, that the source

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of the present Communist Party line should not be located in Togliatti's "Salerno turn," its origin must be traced to 1956 and not 1944. The politics of the Italian Communist Party, whether during the popular front or during the national alliance against fascism which continued through the immediate post-war years until 1947, was conducted within the framework of the Communist International and looked to the Soviet Union as a model. Within this framework, the historical problem of the Italian Communist Party was to find a national path, perhaps different from the one the Russians had taken, but one which would nevertheless arrive at the same point. A qualitative break took place only in 1956 after Khruschev's secret speech and the Hungarian episode. From that date onwards it became increasingly clear that the Soviet model was not one the Italian Communist Party could follow.

Q: Yes, but before 1956 what the Italian Communist Party took as the Soviet model was an ideal, an ideal-type which had little to do with empirical Russian reality. Could it be that what really changed was the Italian Communist Party's point of reference rather than their vision?

A: Why do I locate 1956 as the beginning of a new ambiguity in the Italian Communist Party line? Because there was a *prise de conscience* with regard to the Soviet Union. One should remember, however, that, when Togliatti gave his famous interview to the journal *Nuovi Argomenti*, he pointed out that the Soviet reality had shown serious defect. Yet, he maintained that the Soviet Union remained more democratic than any other existing society. Here, the adjective "democratic" is very important. Togliatti did not just say that the Soviet Union was a socialist system in the sense that it had nationalized the means of production. He called it *democratic*. At the same time, Togliatti embarked upon another path. This was the idea of a *via nazionale* understood not only as a strategic move but also as a recognition that a country like Italy could not undertake a socialist transformation in isolation. Italy was not a sovereign country with the necessary independence and its own economic resources so that it could attempt a socialist transformation by itself. This position prefigured what Berlinguer would later say after the fall of Chile. In my opinion, socialist transformation can only take place within the context of a unified Europe. At any rate, if this concept of a *via nazionale* has anything more than narrow strategic significance, it indicates the search for an autonomous ideological identity *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

Q: Does this mean a search for another model?

A: Yes. It was a way of saying that the time had passed when individual European countries could aspire to become like the Soviet Union. In this sense, the *via nazionale* articulated by Togliatti in 1956 is one of the important roots of Eurocommunism.

Q: Then, you claim that 1956 represented the qualitative break which eventually lead to Eurocommunism and not before. Furthermore, the key factor was the rejection of the Soviet model?

A: Yes, I think that this is the fundamental point. Permit me to return to a previous question because something else just came to mind. For both Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism to be successful, no simple choice can be made between the United States or the Soviet Union as national reference points. What the European Left must do, united and working together, is to build a force sufficient to promote a type of neutralism for Europe which is neither anti-Soviet, nor anti-American, but truly autonomous from the two super-powers.

Q: But is such autonomy really possible?

A: I am not sure. But if such autonomy is not possible, the European Left will never

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achieve any major strategic successes.

Q: Along these lines, what do you consider the possibility that the West German model might be followed or imposed? A model, that is, which is internally repressive, overly bureaucratic and certainly not socialist.

A: Here one would have to undertake a rather careful historical analysis. I was talking about general strategy. Only a united European Left could be strong enough to keep Europe on a democratic and reformist track, and to attain sufficient autonomy so as to end this constant choice of becoming a satellite of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Naturally, this autonomy would have to be based on a number of necessary prerequisites which may or may not be possible. However, it is obvious that no fundamental change will occur if Eurocommunists and Eurosocialists maintain an essentially conflictual relation. The two may survive as separate forces, but separately they stand no chance of bringing about fundamental change.

Q: Why is it that no one poses the question in this way?

A: From your question, I take it that you think that I am being overly optimistic.

Q: Exactly.

A: In my opinion, there are currents within both the communist and socialist parties seeking such a solution. Despite all existing difficulties and conflicts (for example, between French Communists and Socialists), no point of rupture has been reached. At a recent meeting of the socialist international, Willy Brandt emphasized the need for a profound dialogue between the social democratic and communist movements. This will certainly not be an easy linear process. It is hindered, among other things, by electoral competition between the socialist and communist parties. This is very important because elections are a type of political market place and competition may very well exaggerate differences. If Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism cannot overcome these obstacles, then neither should be taken very seriously.

Q: If, however, European autonomy with respect both to the United States and the Soviet Union is impossible, is it then your opinion that Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism are largely irrelevant?

A: I posed European autonomy as just a possibility, knowing that even a united Europe would probably remain in a position of economic and technological inferiority. For now, we must continue with European integration within the framework of international capitalism and under the hegemony of the United States. Communist and socialist parties which aim to eventually transform society do not propose immediately to place the great centers of the economy under public control. Yet, they could use public power to reduce the economic and technological subordination of Europe.

Q: You keep talking of European integration and autonomy. Given the present economic predominance of Germany, would this not simply mean a Europe dominated by West Germany and all the problems that this would raise?

A: This is an important problem, given West German economic superiority—whose role has already been questioned by the French and the English. But allow me to return to our previous discussion. If European political unity cannot be attained, economic integration will never lift Europe beyond the level of relative underdevelopment. The political unification of Europe is a historically necessary objective. I do not know, however, when it will happen or *if* it will happen. If we end up with a conservative Europe, guided by conservative forces, then the domination of West Germany is inevitable. The great problem which confronts European

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Communist and Socialist parties today is one of uniting so that they can jointly contribute to the democratization of Europe. This would also affect West Germany in so far as a strong labor movement which has overcome its divisions would be a strong factor in promoting democratization within West Germany.

Q: All things considered, would you not agree that German hegemony is a more probable outcome?

A: I can only say the following. First of all, the conservative European tendency that one sees is not limited to Germany; the problem of the Right affects all of Europe and has international dimensions. Right-wing tendencies exist in all European countries, especially in Germany and Italy. The problem, however, is to see if the situation can be changed. It cannot change unless there is a united Left. If the Left remains divided and conflictual relations persist, the possibilities for change are very low. The only realistic course of action is an alliance between Communist and Socialist parties which should proceed with the political unification of Europe, maintain democracy and struggle against authoritarian tendencies. Toward this end, a realistic debate ought to begin within the Left concerning the nature of a potential model of transformation. As I said, there is no existing valid model. The problem is: what would the contents of such a model be? The Left must use the State as an instrument to maintain public control over investments and the economy. This is an intermediate or short-term objective. This, too, however, creates problems, for if the State is so used, it gives rise to the problem of bureaucratic development. When there is a crisis of political perspectives, one must keep open the possibility for experimentation so that a better vision might be gained along the way.

THEORY AND POLITICS: A DISCUSSION WITH HERBERT MARCUSE, JUERGEN HABERMAS, HEINZ LUBASZ AND TELMAN SPENGLER*

I.

HABERMAS: Herbert, for your 70th birthday nine years ago, we compiled a small anti-*Festschrift*, with your supporters and your critics. That was in a much more political context than the one today. For that reason there were also sharp tones as in every political debate. I think, in general, that today's context is regrettable in comparison with the one back then. But for the purpose of our conversation it's not all that unpleasant: we can relax in the summer weather, take a step back, and...

MARCUSE: I'd like to protest there.

HABERMAS: Good, good.

MARCUSE: I think we shouldn't talk ourselves into thinking we can ignore politics today or put politics on ice until we're in the mood again or happen to find time for a political discussion.

HABERMAS: It is my understanding that we shall have a political discussion today.

MARCUSE: Yes.

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HABERMAS: But one that need not be determined by any clearly sectarian disputes.
MARCUSE: Certainly not.
HABERMAS: That has its advantage. For example, we have time to start with a brief biographical retrospective. Then I would like to pose two, three philosophical-theoretical questions, and then finish up by having a more specifically political discussion. You know that I have always been interested (even because of biographical similarities) in your transition from Heidegger to Horkheimer, if I may put it that way. Let me begin with a few questions about the time you spent in Freiburg, the years after 1918 in general. First of all, your inaugural dissertation on Hegel's ontology appeared in 1932, a study the very title of which is characterized by a Heideggerian posture. In the same year the journal *Die Gesellschaft* published your commentary on Marx's rediscovered texts on national economy and philosophy. A year later the essay on the "philosophical foundations of the economic concept of labor" appeared in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*. We would probably consider both works Marxist even today. How were they reconciled, the Heideggerian conceptual world and Marxism?
MARCUSE: I believe the transition from what you call the Heideggerian conceptual world to Marxism was not a personal problem, but a generational one. The failure of the German revolution — which my friends and I actually experienced in 1921, if not earlier, with Karl's and Rosa's murder — was decisive. There didn't seem to be anything with which we could identity. Then Heidegger came along, *Sein und Zeit* appeared in 1927. At the time I had just completed my first degree, the doctorate in 1922, had worked for a while in a second-hand bookstore and publishing company in Berlin, but I was still looking. What happens after the revolution fails? A decisive question for us. Philosophy was certainly taught at the time, the academic scene was dominated by neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism, and then suddenly *Sein und Zeit* appeared as a really concrete philosophy. One spoke of "life" (*Dasein*), "existence" (*Existenz*), "one" (*Man*), "death" (*Tod*), "anxiety" (*Sorge*). That seemed to speak to us. That lasted until approximately 1932. Gradually we noticed — and I say "we," because it really wasn't just a personal development — that this concretization was quite false. What Heidegger had done essentially was to replace Husserl's transcendental categories with his own; such apparently concrete concepts as existence and anxiety, he evaporated into bad abstract concepts. I had read Marx and was continuing to do so. Then the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* appeared. That was probably the turning point. This was, in a certain sense, a new Marx, who was really concrete and at the same time went beyond the parties' petrified practical and theoretical Marxism. After that, Heidegger versus Marx was no longer a problem for me.
HABERMAS: You say Heidegger, when he came out with *Sein und Zeit*, appeared like someone offering a concrete philosophy?
MARCUSE: Yes.
HABERMAS: Precisely if one looks at Heidegger from a Marxist point of view, one sees not concreteness but a quasi-transcendental, fundamental ontological conceptual system being developed for the terms of history, for historicity, but not for grasping a material process of history.
MARCUSE: Yes. In Heidegger history evaporates in the concern for historicity.
HABERMAS: You nevertheless latched on to this fundamental ontology. In these early writings, in the *Philosophische Hefte* and then in the two essays I mentioned, you also tried to activate the ontological framework by formulating the concepts in terms of alienated labor versus unalienated labor.

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MARCUSE: Yes, but that wasn't Heidegger any more. That was an ontology which I believed I could locate in Marx himself.
HABERMAS: Is it true that your political convictions had been firm since 1918, and the philosophical impulses were only gradually integrated with political beliefs, or was it a dialectical process? You were even active in the council movement, weren't you?
MARCUSE: I was involved briefly, as a member of the soldiers' council in Berlin in Reineckendorf in 1918. I left that soldiers' council very, very quickly when they began electing former officers to it. Then I belonged to the SPD for a short time, but I left that too after January, 1919. I believe my political stance was fixed at that time, in the sense that I was uncompromisingly against SPD policy. In this sense I was revolutionary.
HABERMAS: What role did Lukács of *History and Class Consciousness* and Korsch of *Marxism and Philosophy* play? You must have been familiar with them before Heidegger.
MARCUSE: I read Lukács before Heidegger, Korsch, too, I think. Both are examples of how to see more in Marxism than a political strategy and a fixed political orientation (*Zielsetzung*). There is in both what you called ontology; it refers to a more or less implicit ontological foundation in Marx.
HABERMAS: How did you get to the Institute?
MARCUSE: Chance. Through Kurt Riezler, who was then curator of the University of Frankfurt and a friend of Horkheimer. I don't remember how I met Riezler, in any case he arranged the contact between the Institute and me. That was at the end of 1932. He was a Heidegger fan himself.
HABERMAS: Oh, I didn't know that.
MARCUSE: Yes, he wrote a very Heideggerian book on Parmenides. In his person and his work he connected the Institute on the one hand and Heidegger on the other. Otherwise there was no connection.
HABERMAS: Were you familiar with the Institute, what did you know about it in 1932?
MARCUSE: It 1932 only the first volume of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* had appeared. That was all I knew. Because of the political situation I desperately wanted to join the Institute. At the end of 1932 it was perfectly clear that I would never be able to qualify for professorship (*mich habilitieren können*) under the Nazi regime. The Institute had already begun making plans to emigrate, with the library, etc.
HABERMAS: You met Horkheimer then?
MARCUSE: I was in Frankfurt at the end of 1932, but I met only Leo Löwenthal, not Horkheimer. Löwenthal was the arbiter between me and Horkheimer.
HABERMAS: Then there wasn't any collective work before New York?
MARCUSE: There wasn't any *real* collective work before New York.
HABERMAS: Can you say what the strongest impulse was for an intellectual reorientation and continued theoretical development in those new surroundings?
MARCUSE: Yes. First: The largely independent discussion of Marxism, of Marxist theory. Second: the excellent analysis of the political situation. For example, no one at the Institute doubted that Hitler would come to power and that, once he was in power, he would stay there for an unforeseeable amount of time. And third: psychoanalysis. I had read Freud before, but I didn't approach him systematically until I was at the Institute.
HABERMAS: What role did Fromm play in this context?
MARCUSE: You probably know from personal experience that the Institute's

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organization was rather hierarchic and authoritarian.
HABERMAS: I can attest to that.
MARCUSE: At that time I was a marginal figure in the Institute, and since I wasn't included in important consultations, I could deduce internal developments only indirectly. The real reason for Fromm's departure from the Institute was his castration of Freudian theory, especially the revision of the Freudian concept of instinctual drives (*Triebstruktur*). I can only conjecture as to whether personal matters played a role, I don't know.
HABERMAS: Then, it wasn't until then that Freud played a role for you, in the sense that the possibility of a Marxist social psychology...
MARCUSE: The necessity was felt, the necessity. What was behind all these works was the reality of fascism. And the reality of fascism had to be explained in Marxist terms, not pieced together ad hoc, but developed from Marxist theory itself. In addition, psychoanalysis seemed to uncover an entire substructure of human behavior that I thought could perhaps be the key to why things had gone wrong in 1918-1919. Why was that historically extraordinary potential for revolution not only untapped, but spoiled, even destroyed for decades? Psychoanalysis, especially Freud's metapsychology, seemed to help explain the causes.
LUBASZ: Why was the Institute actually so averse to Fromm's revisionism? That is, why did it assume that psychoanalysis would lose something by abandoning strict instinctual interpretation?
MARCUSE: The crucial point was and is the explosive content of Freudian instinct theory — not the reconversion (*Rückverwandlung*), but the confinement of psychoanalysis to a praxis devoid of decisive theoretical impulses. In my opinion Fromm was one of the first to eliminate the explosive elements from Freudian theory.
HABERMAS: I would like to know if, retrospectively, you're not doing a disservice to the contribution Fromm made to the rise of Critical Theory as it developed in New York.
MARCUSE: I am afraid you're right — as far as the "early" Fromm is concerned.
HABERMAS: Wasn't Fromm the first to introduce the program of a Marxist social psychology to the Institute, at the end of the twenties? You weren't in Frankfurt at the time, so I can only ask about your first impressions in New York. Wasn't it Fromm, certainly urged on by Horkheimer, who tried to reconcile Marx and Freud in his own fashion, a fashion decisive for Critical Theory? Wasn't it Fromm who made it clear that some trivial psychological assumptions cannot determine the subjective factor, but that the latter, how shall I put it, must integrate basic conceptualizations of psychoanalysis and Marxism? Isn't the image of Fromm that you're painting now heavily colored by the later dispute with Fromm the revisionist, and isn't his contribution to Critical Theory's formative period underestimated?
MARCUSE: Yes, I concede that without reservation. And the description I gave was, as you said, colored by the position of the late Fromm. The early Fromm, let's say until — when did the book *Flucht vor der Freiheit* appear?
LUBASZ: 1940.
MARCUSE: When? No, we have already criticized the book very severely. But Fromm's early works, especially those on Christian dogma, and then the first essays in the *Zeitschrift*, they were received as radical Marxist social psychology. That is correct.
HABERMAS: Since the topic seems to be gaining importance today, could we talk a little more about the Institute's mode of work in New York? There is a group here in Munich around Mr. Dubiel that is studying this phase of the Institute's work from the

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point of view of academic organization. Perhaps I should read a few sentences aloud. In Mr. Dubiel's work *Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung. Fallstudien zur Struktur und Geschichte der frühen kritischen Theorie* his hypothesis is briefly this: "The distinction between research and representation" — Dubiel is referring to comments made by Marx on the structure of *Capital* and incorporated into Horkheimer's inaugural address when he took over the Institute from Grünberg in 1930 — "which Horkheimer identified with the distinction between discipline-specific analysis and philosophical construction formed the basis for research among Horkheimer's colleagues. This substructure rested on the distinction between cognitive roles in relation to the function of research and representation and a specific linkage of these functions in the research process itself. This research structure is easily recognizable in the structure of the Institute. Horkheimer systematically claimed the function of representation, while his colleagues were relegated to related discipline-specific services."

MARCUSE: No, that's an unthinkable split, a completely undialectical split between research and representation. It really wasn't practiced at the Institute. It is not at all the case that Horkheimer was responsible for philosophical stimulation and integration and his colleagues represented his thoughts. Not at all. Every one of the colleagues shared the area here reserved for Horkheimer.

HABERMAS: Dubiel says Horkheimer made use of the director's dictatorial powers, which he valued explicitly, in the following manner. He allegedly formulated the questions arising from reflections on the historical situation and determined which topics were to be pursued according to which interpretative perspective. The second step...

MARCUSE: He suggested them, he didn't determine them.

HABERMAS: Even that is an important modification.

MARCUSE: Naturally he had a certain advantage because of his position. But of course things were discussed before work was begun. Let's see if I can think of an example.

HABERMAS: Your essay on...

MARCUSE: ...the liberal and totalitarian state...

HABERMAS: ...yes, there was...

MARCUSE: ...a speech by Hitler, the speech at the industrial club in Düsseldorf, it became known, and Horkheimer called the colleagues together, pointed to newspaper articles and asked what was so significant about this speech that we should make it the object of a more or less independent study. We discussed it and made the decision. Horkheimer did not dictate: Now you will work on this.

HABERMAS: One could consider Pollock and Grossman economists, Fromm a psychologist, Löwenthal a literary theoretician, Adorno and Marcuse ideology critics, etc. Did a division of labor exist between these specialists and Horkheimer, who formulated the general philosophical perspective? Dubiel says one need only look at the individual issues of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, all of them are introduced by Horkheimer, and Horkheimer even wrote commentaries, for example on Pollock's essays...

MARCUSE: Pollock wrote the essay on state capitalism, in my opinion one of the very first attempts to show that late capitalism would not collapse because of internal, purely economic problems. But the Marxist critique of political economy is not a single discipline, one cannot set it up as a single discipline in contrast to philosophical integration, whatever that is.

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HABERMAS: That holds true...
MARCUSE: ...likewise later for Neumann and Kirchheimer. What they did was not specialized in the sense of empirical research divided up into disciplines.
HABERMAS: It seems to me too that Dubiel and his colleagues place too much distance between Horkheimer's integrative, philosophical perspectives and the so-called specialists. In your opinion then, even the so-called specialists pursued a Marxist-inspired social science...
MARCUSE: Yes...
HABERMAS: ...which was itself oriented toward integrating various aspects, social psychology, economics, and theory of the state.
MARCUSE: Precisely, I believe that up until the end Marxist theory itself was the integrating force that prevented, for example, economic problems from being treated solely as discipline-specific problems.
HABERMAS: Perhaps we could now take a quick look at how you all worked together at the Institute. What does "Institute" even refer to, was it two rooms at Columbia University?
MARCUSE: It was an entire house on 117th Street. The house belonged to Columbia University and was placed at the Institute's disposal.
HABERMAS: And how did you work together? How should we picture it?
MARCUSE: The problems and the selection of articles were discussed more or less in Horkheimer's office. Anyone who happened to be there participated, Pollock, Löwenthal, they were always there, Adorno came later, I too. Yes, the hierarchy made itself felt even there. There was definitely a chasm — Neumann, Kirchheimer, Grossmann on one side and the others whom I just named on the other. This discrimination was due more to personal factors than anything else.
HABERMAS: Could one say that the closer circle was composed of those persons closest to Horkheimer's intentions, his theoretical intentions?
MARCUSE: Yes, one could say that.
HABERMAS: How did that happen? The *Zeitschrift* was the organizational center?
MARCUSE: Definitely, yes.
HABERMAS: Such that everything actually took place in the form of editorial meetings?
MARCUSE: To be sure. The manuscripts were presented, first to Löwenthal, then they went to Horkheimer and were discussed again.
HABERMAS: Were there seminars?
MARCUSE: Regularly? No. There were seminars, but they weren't confined to the internal Institute. They took place in the context of evening lectures, held at Columbia University.
HABERMAS: And guests came as well?
MARCUSE: Students from Columbia University also came.
HABERMAS: The lecturers were always members of the Institute?
MARCUSE: Yes, I think so.
HABERMAS: And that served public relations, I mean the public image, to show that you were there.
MARCUSE: Yes.
HABERMAS: Did the Institute ever establish, shall we say, relationships with local, more strictly political groups in emigration?
MARCUSE: That was strictly forbidden. From the very beginning Horkheimer had insisted that we were guests of Columbia University, philosophers and scholars. Any

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organizational ties could have shaken the Institute's precarious administrative foundation. Such ties were out of the question.

HABERMAS: What goals did you work toward in the second half of the thirties? The *Zeitschrift* was published in German until 1940, I think. Apparently you did not intend for your theory to take effect in America. Were you already oriented toward a Germany after the collapse of fascism?

MARCUSE: I never asked myself that question. I would like to answer: no, that orientation did not exist. The orientation was that, if we would be staying in American for a foreseeable amount of time, as was hoped, then we must plan accordingly. The thought that a return to a non-fascist Germany was just around the corner, so to speak, was not entertained.

LUBASZ: How did you picture the link between the theory then in the process of being created and a conceivable praxis, or was that excluded?

MARCUSE: Again the same answer: if by praxis you mean political activity in an organization or for one: no, we didn't speak of identifying with politically active groups. For example, no one at the Institute ever assumed that things would be essentially different after fascism if the SPD or another bourgeois party came to power, or that a revolutionary situation would then arise. The problem "philosophy and praxis," as it erupted in 1968, was suspended at the time.

HABERMAS: Can you say why the Institute dissolved, why Horkheimer and Adorno went to California? Were there also internal reasons, were there reasons in the theoretical development, had you reached an end?

MARCUSE: In a certain sense we had reached an end, and at the same time we had arrived at a beginning. It's a very interesting phenomenon. The end was that neither Horkheimer nor Adorno, to name the main figures, had ever really been able to adjust to American academia. For them everything was more or less positivism, psychologism, etc. On the other hand, it is interesting that Horkheimer and Adorno left America just when the Institute, its theory, and its work were being appreciated and having success in America, that is, after the appearance of the *Authoritarian Personality*. All of a sudden, overnight, the Institute's work was an indispensable part of American academia. And then they left.

HABERMAS: To be sure, the discussion on the A-scale and the F-scale was not exactly a discussion on Critical Theory.

MARCUSE: No, but the book does have, if I remember correctly, a long introduction by Adorno.

HABERMAS: Back to 1940-41 again. Why did things stop at Columbia? Why did the two of them go to California? That meant a discontinuation of the *Zeitschrift*, didn't it? Why?

MARCUSE: If I'm not mistaken, Horkheimer had political fears that, even in America, the fascist trend would gain such momentum that the Institute would be endangered.

HABERMAS: In the years after 1968 there were rumors about your activity immediately after the end of WWII. Could you talk about that, your return to Germany as an officer of the US army?

MARCUSE: At first I was in the political division of the OSS and then in the Division of Research and Intelligence of the State Department. My main task was to identify groups in Germany with which one could work toward reconstruction after the war; and to identify groups which were to be taken to task as Nazis. There was a major de-Nazification program at the time. Based on exact research, reports, newspaper

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reading, and whatever, lists were made up of those Nazis who were supposed to assume responsibility for their activity. Later it was said that I was a CIA agent.
HABERMAS: Yes, yes.
MARCUES: Which is ridiculous, since the OSS wasn't even allowed near the CIA. They fought each other like enemies.
HABERMAS: My question is aimed, not only at disposing of this absurdity, but also at clarifying, politically, what actually came of your suggestions. Are you of the impression that what you did then was of any consequence?
MARCUSE: On the contrary. Those whom we had listed first as "economic war criminals" were very quickly back in the decisive positions of responsibility in the German economy. It would be very easy to name names here.
HABERMAS: Perhaps we should conclude this part of our discussion. Just one more question: I have wondered who, outside Frankfurt, could have stimulated you to intellectual debate. I came up with Sartre.
MARCUSE: Correct.
HABERMAS: What significance did Sartre have for you? One can see traces in your work up to *One-Dimensional Man.*
MARCUSE: That is a late or belated concern with a genuinely, not only apparently concrete ontology. I can show that very specifically. In Heidegger life (*Dasein*) is neutral, i.e., an abstract concept. In Sartre life is divided into two genders — a consideration that doesn't even appear in Heidegger. In *L'Etre et le Néant* there is, for example, a really charming phenomenology of the behind. I liked that.
HABERMAS: Yes, even people who can see must at least have eyes.
MARCUSE: Sartre really presents a concrete philosophy. That was verified too, for the path from *L'Etre et le Néant* to the "political" Sartre is a very short one.
HABERMAS: You stress the fact that what you learned from Freud found a place via a different route, in a left-Heideggerian tradition, say with Sartre. I have always viewed this somewhat differently. I think that in the early thirites you really anticipated Sartre, the Sartre of *Marxismus und Existentialismus,* in decisive respects. Your attempt at a Marxist application of Heideggerian fundamental ontology resembles, in its premises, what Sartre had done in the transition from *L'Etre et le Néant* to Marxist positions in the fifties, certainly without knowing your works.
MARCUSE: Yes, certainly.
HABERMAS: Do you think it's wrong to see it that way? Of course in the fifties you didn't take it all that seriously any more.
MARCUSE: That isn't true.
HABERMAS: Yes, it is. Only then did the Marxist reception of the late Husserl and even Heidegger begin in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
MARCUSE: That shows that maybe there is after all an internal, conceptual relationship between what is really good in Husserl and perhaps even in Heidegger. Husserl's essay on the crisis of European science, in comparison with the earlier transcendental works, is really a new beginning.

II.

HABERMAS: I would like to discuss a few theoretical questions with you, Herbert. First, about anthropological foundations for your social theory, then about the importance of aesthetic theory, the relationship between philosophy and science, your theoretical assessment of political democracy, liberalism in general, and finally the relationship between theory and praxis. That will bring us directly to political

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questions. Perhaps I should add something about the viewpoint from which I ask these questions. Next to Adorno, you and your works have had the greatest, direct influence on me. We agree to such an extent that I notice only those difficulties that perhaps lie in the theory itself and which one comes across if one is interested in pursuing these things further. That's the spirit in which I would like to ask a few questions. I think I'll just read a few passages from your work now and then so that we'll know exactly what we're discussing. First, from *Foundations of Historical Materialism* (*Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des historischen Materialismus*). There's a section there that, I think, clarifies a motif in your thought, one that has remained constant till today, up to the book *The Aesthetic Dimension* (*Die Permanenz der Kunst*). It is by the way a motif that separates you from Horkheimer and Adorno. In this early essay from 1932 it says: "It is precisely the unerring contemplation of the essence of man that becomes the inexorable impulse for the initiation of radical revolution. The factual situation of capitalism is characterized not merely by economic or political crisis but by a catastrophe affecting the human essence; this insight condemns any mere economic or political *reform* to failure from the outset, and unconditionally requires the cataclysmic transcendence of the actual situation through *total revolution*. Only after the basis has been established in this way, so firmly that it cannot be shaken by any merely economic or political arguments, does the question of the *historical conditions and the bearers* of the revolution arise: the question of the theory of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Any critique which only pays attention to this theory, without coming to grips with its real foundation, misses the point."

MARCUSE: That's from the *Essays on a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism* (*Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des Historischen Materialismus*)?

HABERMAS: No, from *Foundations of Historical Materialism* (*Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen Materialismus*), the commentary on the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (*Oekonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte*). That was 1932.

MARCUSE: Yes.

HABERMAS: Even if I peel away a skin of expressionist terms (such as "total revolution"), there remains a theme which is constant throughout. At the time you still had an ontological approach. When you say "foundation," "essence of man," then you're still trying to adapt fundamental-ontological perspectives in a Marxist fashion. You distanced yourself from this conceptual framework. On the other hand, the impression arises that Freudian metapsychology later assumed the role of Heideggerian existential ontology. Even today your Marxism has a strongly anthropological flavor, if I may put it that loosely.

MARCUSE: You're using "anthropological" in the sense of philosophical anthropology, not ethnology?

HABERMAS: Yes. In order to clarify my intention, let me cite from *An Essay on Liberation*, (p. 10) (*Versuch über die Befreiung*, p. 25): "We would then have, this side of all 'values,' an instinctual foundation for solidarity among human beings — a solidarity which has been effectively repressed in line with the requirements of class society but which now appears as a precondition for liberation."

MARCUSE: Yes.

HABERMAS: In this sense you even speak of the "biological foundations" of socialism, even if you put a question mark after it. You say very clearly in your last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension* p. 24 (*Permanenz der Kunst*): "Eros and Thanatos assert their own power in and against the class struggle. Clearly, the class struggle is not always 'responsible' for the fact that the 'lovers do not remain

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together.' The convergence of fulfillment and death preserves its real power despite all romantic glorification and sociological explanation. The inexorable human entanglement in nature sustains its own dynamic in the given social relations and creates its own metasocial dimension." — That's what I mean by anthropology. "The emergence of human beings as 'species beings' — men and women capable of living in that community of freedom which is the potential of the species — this is the subjective basis of a classless society. Its realization presupposes a radical transformation of the drives and needs of the individuals: an organic development within the socio-historical." (*The Aesthetic Dimension*, pp. 16-17). You conceive this organic development from the point of view of a return to a natural basis — in any case to an anthropologically oriented potential.

MARCUSE: But not a return. I would uncompromisingly reject any explanation in terms of "Return to Nature." Here too nature is something that must first be created.

HABERMAS: You speak of a natural basis. You also speak of instinctual drives with a foundation for the free association of laborers in a future society. I ask myself how such strongly anthropological assumptions are to be reconciled with historical materialism, with the hypothesis that human nature can change.

MARCUSE: To say that human beings have primary drives does not mean that they cannot change. When I speak of human nature, I mean a nature that can change human beings as whole persons. If the instinctual drives are fixed in the sense that Eros and Thanatos are in conflict, this does not mean that the forms this conflict assumes are not changeable, both historically and socially. Freud even said there are moments when destructive energy is subordinate to erotic energy. This is in fact a change in instinctual drives, not something I just tacked on. It is therefore not correct to say Freud posits an unchanging human nature. At least, it is correct only in a very limited sense.

HABERMAS: As we can see in the quoted passages, what I tentatively called anthropological foundations of social theory has two sides. On the one hand, they help justify a radical version of the concept of revolution. You say that the destruction of capitalism is not at all solely the question of overcoming a certain social structure. Rather, the changes brought about by such a destruction would have a revolutionary effect on the deep vital structure of the individual personality, on its relationship to nature, on the relationship between the sexes. Then it's not merely a question of, shall we say, exchanging one set of principles of social organization for another.

MARCUSE: Put another way — and to give Hegel his due —: it is a question of radical change in the structure of needs.

HABERMAS: But the structure of needs was simply a word for bourgeois society and a form of social relations, whereas you're using psychoanalysis as an anthropological theory here. Isn't there a trace of the pathos of the new human being that in the '20s...

MARCUSE: Well, what do we need a revolution for if we're not going to get a new human being? I never saw it like that. Why should I? Of course a new human being. That's the point of revolution as Marx saw it; it's not the point of the bourgeois revolution. The bourgeois revolution was really designed to establish the domination of one class on the way out by another. For that, to be sure, one needs a new structure of needs, but not really a radically new human being. Only in the historical phase of late capitalism has this cry for a new human being become so acutely vital to revolution. Because — and this is something the correctness of which we should discuss — the potential is there, the social, natural, and technical potential, that would allow this new human being to step forth and be realized.

SPENGLER: The Chinese wouldn't like to hear that. The problem of the new human

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being is the only common link between Marcuse and Mao.
MARCUSE: All the worse for Mao. It is a dangerous concept, and I don't use it, I don't talk about the new human being.
LUBASZ: What does that mean: a new human being? What is meant by that?
MARCUSE: In Freudian terms: a change of instinctual drives, such that destructive energy is increasingly transformed into erotic energy, until quantity changes to quality and human relations (among themselves and to nature) become peaceful and open to happiness.
HABERMAS: Why do you find it necessary to articulate the innovations to be achieved by revolutionizing capitalist society in terms of psychoanalysis?
MARCUSE: Why?
HABERMAS: The Marxist approach is more inclined to understand new or changed personality structures in terms of the effects of outside changes on the inside, that is, in terms of new forms of social relations.
MARCUSE: Forms arranged by human beings, as you just said. A new personality structure is a prerequisite for radical change, for a qualitative leap.
HABERMAS: But one would argue, if a form of social relations is possible in which the split between privatized existence is eliminated in work as well as politics, if it succeeds...
MARCUSE: Explain that: What is eliminated?
HABERMAS: ...if production and the articulation of political will can be so successfully organized that what is necessary can be made independent of decisions based on a common and freely articulated will, that is, if a society is radically democratized, then superfluous social pressures disappear. With that, the malformation of personality structures becomes superfluous. At any rate, that is the standard Marxist viewpoint concerning transformations of personality structures. But in *Eros and Civilization* you take the opposite route.
MARCUSE: Opposite in what way?
HABERMAS: First of all, you choose basic psychological concepts and say, now we shall explain what personality structures under the performance principle look like, and then you refer to a psychological device and base your argument on a prehistoric dynamic, which is of course historically mediated...
MARCUSE: No, I ask: How is it that the psychic structure of human beings has always prevented or else botched possible revolution. And that is a historical question, how society, class society, manipulates instinctual drives — incidentally, first indirectly and then more and more directly and effectively with progress in technology and psychology.
HABERMAS: Then you believe that this psycho-anthropological approach does not become historically necessary until the conflict potentials in late capitalists societies demand analysis in terms of social psychology, rather than, strictly speaking, political economy.
MARCUSE: Because the manipulation of instinctual drives is one of the most important tools for exploitation and oppression in late capitalism.
HABERMAS: The socialization process has become so pervasive in late capitalism that it infects, so to speak, natural substrata which were protected by the bourgeois family in liberal capitalism.
MARCUSE: For example, the systematic overactivation of the destructive drive, the systematic indoctrination of violence, the systematic destruction of the private sphere, new forms, much more effective forms of social control.

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SPENGLER: If that is all so explicitly linked to late capitalism, then how does it differ, for example, from the forms of social control practiced in the Soviet Union?
MARCUSE: They are not yet necessary there. As far as I can tell, the power of the ruling bureaucracy does not yet experience such a general problem of legitimation. There it is still a question of improving the living standard, at which the bureaucracy still succeeds.
HABERMAS: To get back to the anthropological element. You say you wrote *Eros and Civilization* in response to a historical situation in which the conflicts could not be fully analyzed without dealing with psychic mechanisms.
MARCUSE: That is a historical phenomenon itself.
HABERMAS: All right. But I surmise that you have other reasons as well for using Freudian theory. I think you use Freudian instinct theory in *Eros and Civlization* in order to come up with a materialist version of the concept of reason. If that is the case, then I ask: Is it really possible to ground reason naturalistically in this fashion? If I may, I'll use another quoatation to elaborate briefly on this. In *Eros and Civilization* you oppose the logic of domination and the logic of alienation, what Horkheimer calls instrumental reason.
MARCUSE: Max Weber.
HABERMAS: Does that go back to Max Weber?
MARCUSE: I think so.
HABERMAS: I don't think so, but I won't exclude the possibility. It says on page 205: "To the degree to which the struggle for existence becomes co-operation for the free development and fulfillment of individual needs, repressive reason gives way to a new *rationality of gratification* in which reason and happiness converge." Then, further down on the same page: "Once privacy must no longer be maintained apart from and against the public existence, the liberty of the individual and that of the whole may perhaps be reconciled by a 'general will' taking shape in institutions which are directed toward the individual needs. The renunciations and delays demanded by the general will must not be opaque and inhuman; nor must their reason be authoritarian. However, the question remains: how can civilization freely generate freedom when unfreedom has become part and parcel of the mental apparatus? And if not, who is entitled to establish and enforce the objective standards?" This question would imply the answer that human beings can articulate a general will if and only if they come together as free and equal partners in a free articulation of will — and only if they do it themselves.
MARCUSE: Yes.
HABERMAS: Then the principle inherent in this concept of free communication, shall we say, the principle of peaceful intersubjectivity of communication, the principle of language, is the one to which we must take recourse if we are to ascertain what is reasonable in such a new social context. You, however, refer, not to the principle of rational agreement — in its political form, simply the democratic principle — but you refer to the principle of educational dictatorship. You say here: "From Plato to Rousseau, the only honest answer is the idea of an educational dictatorship, exercised by those who are supposed to have acquired knowledge of the real Good." I wonder if you refer to educational dictatorship only because you consider the *telos* of free agreement, inherent in reason as language, as something as yet devoid of historical articulation, and as long as that is the case, one must resort to means of educational dictatorship. Or is there another reason? Do you perhaps locate reason not in language or rational agreement at all, not in a general, free articulation of will,

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but much, much deeper — in an instinctual nature somehow external to reason? You see that I have difficulty accepting your attempt to use instinct theory to establish a foundation for rationality as something that opposes instrumentally aborted reason. And I suspect that you resort to educational dictatorship because you are seeking a naturalistic foundation for reason.

MARCUSE: Today I wouldn't talk about educational dictatorship. The passage you cited was intentionally written for purposes of provocation. Perhaps educational dictatorship within democracy, but not simply educational dictatorship period. But that's not the main issue. Regarding the naturalistic foundation for reason I would indeed dare to say: yes, that is precisely what I consider necessary. Whenever I spoke about these things in lectures, I almost always made clear that what I say is based on two irreducible value judgments. 1) It is better to live than not to live. 2) It is better to have a good life than a bad one. Those are two irreducible value judgments. If someone does not accept them, then there is no room for discussion. On the basis of these two value judgments, I believe, it is possible to determine a concept of reason according to which repression that demonstrably improves chances of a better life in a better society is rational (there is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that the concept of reason is a repressive concept).

HABERMAS: Who determines what the better life is?

MARCUSE: That's the one question I refuse to answer. Whoever still doesn't know what a better life is, is hopeless.

HABERMAS: No, the problem is that everyone knows very well what a better life is, but that, at least here and now, these conceptions don't coincide. I wouldn't like to share Mr. Dregger's version of the good life.

MARCUSE: Whose?

HABERMAS: Mr. Dregger. He's a, well...

SPENGLER: ...politically displeasing phenomenon...

HABERMAS: ...a DCU functionary who supports a national conservative policy à la Strauss, "law and order" values, characteristic of, so to speak, clean life in the community. In other words, he represents values which, according to psychoanalysis, reflect repression of instinctual drives.

MARCUSE: One can demonstrate that what the man says is false. It does not lead to a better society, but instead to the stabilization of the existing one.

HABERMAS: No. You do not obtain the value standards you mention in the passage from the two fundamental value judgments which you just cited. Those are empty formulae that people can apply at will. Value standards do not fall abstractly, naturally from heaven, once and for all. As soon as value standards have a material content, they are dependent on the problems to be solved in a concrete historical situation. One determines which values are to be rationally accepted and pursued only...

MARCUSE: ...by analyzing the conditions for change...

HABERMAS: ...by making what everyone could want in this situation plausible.

MARCUSE: Yes, preciesly.

HABERMAS: But then reason is not something rooted in instinct, but in language. It is rooted in the conditions for a free articulation of will.

MARCUSE: We can articulate a general will only on the basis of reason and never the other way around. And reason or rationality is indeed rooted in instinct, in the impulse of erotic energy to slow down destruction. That is what I would define as reason: protection of life, enrichment of life, beautification of life. And according to

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Freud that is laid out in the instinctual drives themselves.
HABERMAS: What is laid out in the instinctual drives is whatever we finally recognize as our real needs. The difficulty lies in the fact that these real needs are always articulated in a historical medium, that is, in light of concrete problems. Of course, there is also something general that is accomplished, and we can call that eros. But there are conflicts only in certain historical situations where we have to say just what makes us happier, our environment more beautiful, our life worth living.
MARCUSE: But we all know that.
HABERMAS: You're speaking like the old philosopher: "We all know that."
MARCUSE: Of course every human being knows that nature looks more beautiful if I don't put up a sixty-story building on the shores of a lake. You don't need any philosophy to know that. It is a call to instinct. It undoubtedly looks more beautiful, it is more satisfying, it is more calming. The same holds true for these damn atomic energy plants.
HABERMAS: If it were that simple, we wouldn't be sitting in all this shit.
MARCUSE: Yes, we would. It's forced on us.
SPENGLER: What do you do in the event that people can envision a better life in a better society only in a fascist society?
MARCUSE: A fascist society, that is, a society based on mobilization and supermobilization of aggressive and destructive energy cannot be a better society.
HABERMAS: You anchor your definition of rationality in two points. On the one hand you say it is intuitively accessible, it just takes healthy human intelligence to know what one really wants.
MARCUSE: Human intelligence and human instinct.
HABERMAS: Human instinct. That is one anchor. The other anchor is theory. You say: if what goes without saying is clouded to such an extent — by societal pressures that can be analyzed — that human beings can no longer recognize the obvious, then we need a theoretical study of how this denial, this self-deception has come about, and only a few are privy to this theoretical insight. I object to the fact that, on the one hand, you base your definition of reason and what is rational on Hegel. You develop that in all your books, even in *Eros and Civilization* in a peripheral chapter on the *Phenomenology of the Mind*. On the other hand, knowing full well that Hegelian logic is no longer so readily acceptable, you push Hegel aside. The concept of reason becomes ananymous, so to speak, denies its idealist origins, and is transplanted into the context of Freudian instinct theory. You revealed the difficulty when you said: What is rational is inherent in the instincts or in eros to the extent that everyone can grasp with his hands what is better for him and for everyone else.
MARCUSE: No, that's too slick. The concept of reason is inherent in the instinctual drives to the extent that eros is identical to the efforts to contain destructive energy.
HABERMAS: In every concrete situation there are different definitions of our common interest or even of an interest capable of generalization.
MARCUSE: That is the most important point. Frankly, I don't think it is impossible to determine, generally, what the general interest is in a given situation. I consider that a problem created by the ideology of the ruling class. It seems to me to be very possible to determine what the general interests are.
HABERMAS: We have general elections, and the parties and platforms which are generally agreed upon are apparently not the parties and platforms in which you would expect the general interest to be...
MARCUSE: ...Just a minute. We have general elections which, everyone knows, are

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false. We need the exertion of theory, the evidence of vitality to make the general interest clear to everyone. It is a form of repression itself to insist that the general interest is not generally ascertainable. I think it gets easier and easier to ascertain it.
HABERMAS: You say it must be theoretically determined.
MARCUSE: It must be theoretically demonstrated.
HABERMAS: What makes that so easy, if precisely this theory is not generally accepted but marginal instead, as for example in academia? And what gives you the authority to say: I, Herbert Marcuse, can easily demonstrate what serves the general interest today?
MARCUSE: I don't say that. I say that it can be demonstrated to me and to every other person capable of language what the general interest is today. And that it undoubtedly cannot be determined by the Pentagon.
HABERMAS: There is historical evidence that contradicts this claim.
MARCUSE: And that would be?
HABERMAS: The fact that in industrial countries today there aren't even any organized political groups whose self-concept would grant this social theory working credibility. The fact that it had lost its addressees, its historical addressees, first of all in the 30s and 40s, was after all constitutive for Critical Theory. In the classical period of what is today known as Critical Theory, it is held that only isolated individuals are in any position to recognize the calamity. You are now contradicting that.
MARCUSE: I no longer hold that position. Today I would say that, in effect, everyone knows what is necessary, that the general interest in a better society and the possibilities for its realization are demonstrable, and that this certainty is repressed. And that is what Critical Theory always said or meant: not only lone individuals — perhaps only they can articulate it as such, but in truth: everyone. Moreover, radical changes in history have never begun with mass movements.
HABERMAS: Allow me to read a few passages from *One-Dimensional Man*. These passages clarify your use of the concepts with which the rational can be recognized. These are general concepts, universals, the type of concepts in which critical potential is inherent. On page 211 it says: "[. . .] Universals are primary elements of experience — universals not as philosophic concepts but as the very qualities of the world with which one is daily confronted." That is approximately what you have just said. Everyone can know what is beautiful and good. Here you speak of the "substantive universals of duty, justice, happiness and their contraries." "It seems that the persistence of these untranslatable universals as nodal points of thought reflects the unhappy consciousness of a divided world in which that which is falls short of, and even denies that which can be. The irreducible difference between the universal and its particulars seems to be rooted in the primary experience of the inconquerable difference between potentiality and actuality, between two dimensions of the one experienced world. The universal comprehends in one idea the possibilities which are realized and at the same time arrested in reality."
MARCUSE: That's orthodox Aristoteles.
HABERMAS: Yes, that's Aristoteles revived from a slightly Hegelian vantagepoint, but in almost phenomenological language. You say here that we find the concepts with which we articulate our value judgments in "everyday life," in the life-world. Hegel analyzed the nature of these judgments as self-critically surpassing that which is and confronting it with how things could and should be. Philosophically, that is disquieting because you systematically decline to defend the philosophical theories from which this conceptualization derived. You are neither a systematic Aristotelian

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nor a systematic Hegelian. But if that is the case, then to put it quite simplistically, we must explain philosophically how we arrive at the normative foundations of our theory. You try it with Freud. You say: reality principle and pleasure principle.
MARCUSE: Yes.
HABERMAS: You characterize the principles according to which instinctual drives are articulated and say: That which is rational is that which united these two principles.
MARCUSE: Not only unites.
HABERMAS: Or reconciles?
MARCUSE: If the dynamic of both principles strives toward liberation of erotic energy.
HABERMAS: All right, but then on the level of this theory's application it can be shown that that's really too general to ever be able to identify what is good or better or desirable, or even an interest capable of generalization. Look, you have these two poles. On the one hand you say the everyday world is so conceptualized as to function in a fashion similar to the one Hegel attributed to the concept. For this reason, our last resort (and I agree with this) is the self-image of those involved.
MARCUSE: As they are.
HABERMAS: But, if we wish to use the language of bourgeois philosophy, those involved must *be able to* participate in a free articulation of will as free and equal, as autonomous individuals. Then they could incorporate their experience potential.
MARCUSE: Yes, there I agree with you.
HABERMAS: OK, but then the rational is not located so much in this type of everyday conceptualization as it is in the organization of a free, general articulation of will. That is, in the *telos* of a nonviolent intersubjectivity of communication. The rational is not located in, shall we say, an interest structure, per se, which is oppressed, deformed, or set free in certain social relations.
MARCUSE: Rationality cannot consist of organization as such. It can consist only of organization that has been or will be created by human beings who adhere to that rationality. You are distorting the issue.
HABERMAS: No, it consists of how we conceive it, and how everyone who has ever exchanged a word with another person for purposes of communication conceives it.
MARCUSE: Yes.
HABERMAS: Our intuitive concept of rationality, so to speak, is located in this dimension, not in our interest structures. The material content, and what is at stake in the concrete situation, is in fact located in the instinctual drives.
MARCUSE: But that is also the locus for how this "what" is possible, for the foundation which makes your domination-free organization possible. And in this context I would like to discuss the concept of solidarity. Solidarity is in itself of no value at all. Under the Nazi regime there was real solidarity up to the bitter end. Solidarity in itself is of no use. There is solidarity in the Mafia, there are all possible kinds of solidarity. Solidarity must be grounded in a structure capable of binding human beings erotically, i.e., in a classless society. It must be rooted in instinctual drives. Fascist solidarity is apparently grounded in instinctual drives. Fascist solidarity is appraently grounded in solidarity in aggression and not in eros, not in the protection of the other, cultivation of the other, love for the other, whatever that may be. In short, I think we need the concept of solidarity. Your general articulation of will presupposes solidarity. A general articulation of will by human beings whose vital interests are diametrically opposed will not function.

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HABERMAS: We can certainly presume that contradictory interests will continue to exist even in all future societies. The important thing is that what is generally regulated in every society is regulated such that all these rules coincide.
MARCUSE: The prerequisite has to be a correspondence, a feasible correspondence of interests that allows for a peaceful resolution of conflicts of interest in a socialist society.
HABERMAS: Perhaps we should set aside the topic of reason for a while...
SPENGLER: It came to a rather inconclusive end.
HABERMAS: Yes, we'll get back to it when we discuss aesthetic theory.
LUBASZ: Before we abandon the topic, I'd like to say I have the feeling we didn't get past Rousseau. On the one hand we can say that the socially rational consists of the possibility for domination-free articulation of will. On the other hand there is the question as to how the individual participants in this process select the good, the common good. There are of course the two great Rousseauian tricks. First, there's the "educational dictatorship," more or less, then there's the "trick to be forced to be free," since whoever doesn't see the light has erred and must be forced to perceive the good. We didn't get past that.
MARCUSE: But my dear Heinz, we did get beyond that, first of all because Rousseau lacks the dimension introduced by Freud. Second of all, it's entirely possible for Rousseau to have said something sensible.
LUBASZ: To be sure.
MARCUSE: Beyond which one need not go.
LUBASZ: If we say that, we must also share Rousseau's decisive self-judgment: This is what freedom looks like. If the facts do not correspond to these conditions, it is not a free society.
MARCUSE: Rousseau doesn't actually address the problem of the general *articulation* of will. On the basis of his reason, his instinctual drive, the *citoyen* is already a human being capable, not only of distinguishing between common interest and immediate, private interest, but if necessary also of acting against private interest. The *citoyens* are not just anybody, *citoyens* are those human beings who have already become qualitatively different.
LUBASZ: They have to be in the majority.
HABERMAS: In principle everyone.
LUBASZ: Yes.
MARCUSE: No, not everyone.
LUBASZ: Yes, in principle everyone.
SPENGLER: We're going in circles.
HABERMAS: We're going in circles. I think we should move on to aesthetic theory...
SPENGLER: I suggest we have something to eat.
HABERMAS: Yes.
MARCUSE: That's also part of aesthetics.
LUBASZ: First food, then morality.
SPENGLER: And then aesthetics. That's a completely new definition of history.

III

HABERMAS: Well, now that we're refreshed, let us move on to aesthetics.
MARCUSE: With pleasure.
HABERMAS: Why do you and Adorno hold aesthetics in such high esteem? Is it

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because the relationship between art and philosophy, as determined by Hegel, has in certain respects been inverted by the two of you? It is no longer philosophy that effectively conceptualizes the idea as sensual appearance, but rather art now provides the concept of a better life. Does the cognitive function of art surpass that of philosophy in certain respects, specifically as concerns the discovery of that which should be?

MARCUSE: If I have to use Hegel's terminology, I prefer to say: Art allows for the sensual appearance of the concept. Reality, as what is to be changed, is sensually experienced, suffered, and dreamed. This happens quite concretely in the representation of individuals, things, and nature. They are portrayed with their own particular truth and reality, which do not coincide with given truth and reality — and which cannot be adequately portrayed by any other medium.

Art has this privilege, since its language already signifies a break with everyday reality. The language of art subverts everyday experience: an alienation from "normality" — a subversion of consciousness and the subconscious. This breaks through a dimension of reality, which has been hitherto taboo. In this dimension people and things are emancipated from the existing reality principle, the norms of which are called into question. Paradoxically, art comprises desublimation processes — in a fictitious area, which, however, is saturated with reality.

HABERMAS: Then you have changed your aesthetic concepts, if I understand you correctly. In your first major essay...

MARCUSE: ..."On the Affirmative Character of Culture"?

HABERMAS: ... Yes. In that essay you very cautiously contemplate the possible elimination of art. At the time you took a much more positive stance on the fundamental, surrealist conception, according to which art must step back into life, or at least be integrated into the material life-process if art is to lose its affirmative appearance. Perhaps I should cite the pertinent lines from the early essay: "Beauty will find a new embodiment when it no longer is represented as real illusion but, instead, expresses reality and joy in reality. A foretaste of such potentialities can be had in the unassuming display of Greek statues or the music of Mozart or the later Beethoven. Perhaps, however, beauty and its enjoyment will not even devolve upon art. Perhaps art as such will have no objects." That was 1935-36.

MARCUSE: Yes.

HABERMAS: And in *An Essay on Liberation*, where you write about the grafitti of the Paris May, you held firmly to this conception. On the other hand, in your last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension*...

MARCUSE: Yes, I modified it considerably.

HABERMAS: There, you say: "The talk of the end of art belongs today to the ideological arsenal and to the possibilities of counter-revolution. It might be possible for such talk to cause humanity to forget the difference between good and evil, war and peace, and beauty and ugliness by means of the scientization of control. The end of art would be then the end of the artist and of the consumers of art, resulting from an increasingly efficient administration of needs and satisfactions, enjoyment and aggression."

Which experiences moved you to revise your earlier thesis?

MARCUSE: For instance, the experience that late capitalist culture strives specifically to integrate art into life or at least reconcile art and life by attempting to destroy aesthetic form and the great works (catch-phrases, which come close to those of book-burning). This made me think that, even in a free society, art will continue to

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exist, though we do not know in what form, because it belongs to the historical invariables. The conflicts which are expressed, resolved, or repressed in art lie beneath the foundation of any specific social order.

SPENGLER: Can you cite examples? Whenever the word art is used, usually a totality of art is invoked. It can refer to painting, music, theater, sculpture.

MARCUSE: I restricted the book to literature for the simple reason that I do not feel qualified to speak about the other arts. To what extent it is applicable for the other arts is something I cannot judge.

HABERMAS: Is your thesis plausible, given the fact that a sphere of autonomous art did not develop until the advent of bourgeois society? That would prove that art is not eternal.

MARCUSE: Autonomy of art — not only bourgeois art, but every art, even Greek art, — signifies the break with everyday reality which I mentioned before. And that is the point: the work of art does not obey the norms of the existing reality principle, but has instead its own set of rules. This autonomy of art comes long before bourgeois society. Medieval cathedrals, for example, represent such a break with the everyday world. Whoever enters it enters a sphere which is not that of the everyday world.

HABERMAS: But the threshold between sacred and profane was different, it wasn't profanely defined.

MARCUSE: Correct. To paraphrase Karl Kraus: Art would come to an end if people could no longer distinguish between a chamberpot and an urn. Then of course one could speak of the end of art.

SPENGLER: I have the feeling that when you equate iconoclastic riots with modern art production, you are getting at a phenomenon that can also be interpreted differently. In music and the plastic and graphic arts, at least in the last 20 years, art has meant a more serious confrontation with the medium itself, i.e., the medium is called into question. But — you mentioned Warhol — why should art's self-thematization in any way signify the end of art?

MARCUSE: Because that is not a self-thematization of art. Art thematizes itself only in the work of art and in no other way.

SPENGLER: According to this definition, the chamberpot has the same legitimacy as the urn.

MARCUSE: No, for the chamberpot represents the everyday, or better, the everynight reality which the urn does not represent. That holds true for Duchamp's chamberpot as well, which he signed and put in the museum. This changes absolutely nothing in the character of the device, except that it becomes a privileged commodity.

SPENGLER: Would your concept allow for the prescription of aesthetic content in art?

MARCUSE: According to my concept, art is only the aesthetization of content. To abandon aesthetic form is to abandon art itself. The change of location alone from Duchamp's atelier to the museum changes nothing in the object.

HABERMAS: How is it, Herbert, that your aesthetic writings never address avant-garde art, the beginnings of which one could perhaps locate in symbolism, with Baudelaire and Mallarmé, as such? The historical frame of reference from which you draw your aesthetic theses extends, even in literature, from Classicism to Romanticism to Realism up to, let us say, Kafka and Brecht.

MARCUSE: And Beckett.

HABERMAS: I do not recall any place where you discuss Beckett specifically. Besides, you emphasize the continuities, whereas Benjamin's and, above all, Adorno's theory of

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art essentially seeks to comprehend the peculiar reflection process which characterizes modern art. As Spengler just said, modern art thematizes its own production process, its media as such. This process, which began in painting approximately with Kandinsky and which [MARCUSE: has led...] practically to the dissolution of the category of the work of art; this process was at the heart of Adorno's theory. You do not analyze it. You maintain the general category developed in the early essay from which we cited. That is, the general category of art as the representational form for that which has been split from everyday life, that other which cannot be realized in the life-process. This concept results from a strict application of the Marxist concept of ideology to art. It works well for the classical works of bourgeois art. But does it work with Kafka's *The Trial* or for a painting by Pollock or for Schönberg, about whose music I know nothing?

MARCUSE: What doesn't work?

HABERMAS: The concept wrought from the example of bourgeois art and which you called the affirmative character of art. That is a thoroughly dialectical category. You use it to express the belief that the emancipatory experience potential is neutralized and severed as well as preserved and capable of memory.

MARCUSE: That is certainly the case with Kafka's *The Trial.* It is weaker, more desperate, but the image is still there. A remnant of affirmation.

HABERMAS: There is actually nothing that is still affirmative about it.

MARCUSE: If I were to write the essay from the 1930s today, I would modify the affirmative character of art and emphasize more its critical-communicative character. That is precisely what, in my opinion, was destroyed in the so-called avant garde.

LUBASZ: You speak of communication through art and truth contained in a wake of art. To what extent does the truth of theoretical expressions differ from the truth of aesthetic expressions?

MARCUSE: Theoretical and aesthetic truth cannot be made to correspond, just as it is not possible for theory to give itself aesthetic form. According to my thesis, the truth of art lies neither in form as such, nor in content as such, but rather in content which becomes form: i.e., in the aesthetic form. Theory conceptualizes reality; art consists in the sensual representation of theory, that is, it changes and invalidates the given reality. Each art work in relation to reality is poetry, imagination and discovery. The sensual representation of Theory through art (as a function of the productive power of imagination), does not culminate in "normal" sense-perception, but rather in its very transformation: in new modes of seeing, hearing, etc., which in turn lead to a new mode of cognition. Furthermore, "recollection" is a creative power in art: remembering past happiness and sorrow — not simply as retrospective lamenting, but also as a stimulus toward the realization of Bloch's idea of the "concrete Utopia," as the regulative norm for a future praxis.

LUBASZ: You mentioned among the great works of art Beethoven's later Quartets. For that matter, let us consider the Great Fugue. What is its truth content? I have a specific reason for asking this, as I suspect that, in further developing this concept, you will correlate aesthetic truth with erotic drives.

MARCUSE: The Great Fugue is one of infinite forms which expresses just that: emancipation from the existing reality principle through the expression of the dynamic struggle between Eros and Thanatos, in which Eros ultimately triumphs. Certainly, aesthetic truth is related to the erotic elements: it is sustained by erotic energy manifest in our instincts. It expresses this energy in word, image, and sound. This occurs through the medium of beauty. (I still believe in beauty as an aesthetic

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category.) It is irrelevant that Schiller and Hegel have already said this. Aesthetic truth originates in this intrinsic connection between Eros and beauty in the work of art, as does the imperative that it be harmonious, fulfilling, and bring happiness. The normative "should" is not imposed externally or from above, but rather is sublimated instinctive necessity and the "natural" object of Eros. Beauty is not a quality of the aesthetic object, but rather of the aesthetic form, in which the object is represented. Of course, the hideous (or ugly) is also an object of art (Goya's "Caprichos," Daumier's bourgeois, Picasso's women; in literature the countless alleged and real villains, wrongdoers, immoral persons), but is suspended in aesthetic representation; it partially comprises beauty in the aesthetic form.

HABERMAS: Does the priority given to aesthetic theory in Marcuse's works signify a naturalization of the concept of reason, of which we spoke previously?

MARCUSE: Yes.

HABERMAS: Because reason can no longer justify its own normative concepts, such as justice, beauty, and humanity, it relies on evidence derived from a medium such as art, which is rooted not in theory but rather in the erotic or instinctive nature.

MARCUSE: You say that reason can no longer justify concepts such as justice, beauty, etc.

HABERMAS: Not theoretically in a Platonic or Hegelian fashion — with recourse to the constitution of being or conceptual structures — but rather reason must draw its normative content from experience. I mean a type of experience, which (as with Schelling around 1800) enables the work of art to be a medium for intellectual perception.

MARCUSE: Indeed, one should seriously consider Schelling's aesthetic philosophy. It approximates my position in the matter. I do not believe that reason cannot justify concepts. What does that mean? Concepts such as harmony, for example, can provide a relatively adequate analysis of justice, beauty; I know this has happened, that it can be done. Hence, conceptual definitions are possible.

HABERMAS: Yes, conceptual definitions, but certainly no foundation for normative content?

MARCUSE: Foundation for normative content?

HABERMAS: Yes.

MARCUSE: The normative content would be grounded in erotic nature, in the actuality of instincts, in their dynamics. On the other hand, I do not by any means envision art replacing an abdicated reason, serving as the protector of norms. Reason will outlive its bourgeois manifestation. Theory still pursues its task. Inasmuch as theory and art are directed at the same truth, they are both bound to reason — a reason that is not identical with bourgeois rationality.

SPENGLER: Perhaps I've misunderstood...

MARCUSE: I don't know how to explain that more clearly, as something fundamental seems lacking. Let's consider the concept of justice. Michael Kohlhaas expresses the essence of justice, portrays the truth about justice. I can recognize beauty not through conceptual definitions, but rather by reading one of the authentically great novels or a poem by Baudelaire or Mallarmé. It is equally a dimension of cognition, though it is different from that of theoretical conceptualization.

HABERMAS: Fine, but our problem is to establish whether your grounding of reason in instinctive human nature requires aesthetics as that discipline which reveals the truth, namely, that we can make normative standards plausible only by means of authentic works of art.

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MARCUSE: Not normative standards in general, but rather norms of freedom contingent on a different reality principle. Indeed, Marxist theory can achieve the same. The question presents itself to me as such: what constitutes the difference between truth in the authentic work of art and truth in Marxist theory? What, if anything, leads art to the latter, or what is lacking here which can be found in art? In art a dimension of depth has been achieved which would have to lead to a re-evaluation of Marxist concepts. Otherwise, everything is too simple, too one-dimensional.

HABERMAS: I view things differently. Marxist theory also has a normative foundation. Previously, it could remain extraordinarily simple. If the capitalist economy does not fulfill the functions it should, an immanent critique would suffice to prove the inadequacy of capitalism. Today, things are different. We have realized through history that no other economic system has developed the forces of production as tremendously as capitalism, and furthermore that the malfunctioning of this social system can no longer be explained trivially, e.g., in terms of increasing impoverishment. Certainly poverty is and remains a global and perhaps even critical problem. If one directs one's attention momentarily to developed societies only, then it becomes clear why a critique of this social form requires a highly differentiated normative foundation. That is one side. On the other hand, the bourgeois ideals according to which Marx could evaluate the bourgeois state have been incorporated into a cynical common consciousness.

MARCUSE: To summarize things briefly, I would express the relationship of aesthetics to Marxist theory as such: art preserves that which was not elaborated in the idea of socialism.

HABERMAS: Was it always so?

MARCUSE: In the development of Marxism, both positively and negatively. The positive aspects: liberation of subjectivity, which is identical to the emancipation of sensuality, and invariables which cannot be eliminated even in the best of socialist systems; the invariables are remnants of tragic elements and of necessary hope, which persist even after class society has been abolished.

LUBASZ: Isn't an important dimension excluded if one concentrates solely on aesthetics?

MARCUSE: No, both are contingent upon each other; theory demonstrates the historical and social possibilities for and limitations to liberation. Art cannot do the same.

LUBASZ: No, but I'm thinking of another aspect. That which we can no longer ground theoretically may be demonstrated aesthetically. In a certain sense the predominant preoccupation with the authenticity of works of art means forfeiting social communication.

MARCUSE: Why? It is not just a question of "empathy," but also a question of cognition. And that which has been realized can be communicated.

HABERMAS: That is a grounding of reason in an extrinsic medium. Could one express it as such?

LUBASZ: Yes, fine, but this grounding can only be an individual act.

MARCUSE: Is it possible to discuss the authenticity of works of art and can such a discussion decide the question of authenticity?

MARCUSE: Yes, certainly such a discussion is possible. Indeed, I even attempted in a book to provide a definition of authenticity in terms of the effective departure from the existing reality principle, in terms of the perfection of aesthetic form, in terms of the presence of images of liberation, etc.

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SPENGLER: That is a limited concept of art, a literary concept of art.
MARCUSE: I presume that much of this can be applied to the fine arts and music.
HABERMAS: If you would do so, however, wouldn't you necessarily arrive at an assessment of contemporary art that corresponds to the conservative edict concerning the end of avant-garde? From this perspective the vision emerges that precisely the constitutive categories of modern art, e.g., the new, experimental, constructive principles have led to a self-destructive process of the accelerated aging of modernity, a process which has now broken down and percolated. In the *Feuilleton* of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and elsewhere, this trend is formulated as the end of the avant-garde. Would you agree with this?
MARCUSE: I would concur only insofar as what *this* avant-garde does no longer has the slightest connection to art.
HABERMAS: You are cornered into the same camp as Gehlen.
MARCUSE: That doesn't bother me.

IV

HABERMAS: Can we begin to talk about the relationship of philosophy to science? It seems that Horkheimer and the whole Institute evaluated the role of the individual sciences more positively in the 1930s than they have since the 1940s. In their essay "Philosophie und kritische Theorie" they already put strong limitations on the function of knowledge in the individual sciences. On page 124 they wrote: "Critical social theory believed that the working out of the most general results of science was the only task left for philosophy. It also assumed that the sciences would have to show, to the best of their ability, new possibilities for a richer existence in order to serve the development of productive forces." But then: "Scientific rigor as such is never a guarantee for truth, especially not in the situation where the truth both speaks against the facts and lies behind the facts as today." That already sounds like, how should I put it, a re-evaluation of the philosophical form of knowledge as opposed to the individual sciences. What do you think?
MARCUSE: What is meant here is that a perfect scientific method in and of itself is no guarantee of truth.
HABERMAS: Do you believe that a distinction between philosophy and science is useful or meaningful? And if you do, what is it that you do? Is it more philosophy or science?
MARCUSE: Critical social theory never claimed that the criteria for truth and science are valid for philosophy and the social sciences the way they are for the natural sciences.
HABERMAS: Then let's stick to the social sciences.
MARCUSE: Agreed.
HABERMAS: With linguistics, psychology, and political science.
MARCUSE: The reasoning which is usual and necessary in physics and mathematics is not possible here.
HABERMAS: Herbert, I don't believe that's our problem. I haven't explained the problem clearly enough. In the early 1930s you steeped yourself in psychoanalysis. At the time that was, above all, a special area cut off from physicians and centered on the theory of neurosis. Without doubt, you learned quite a lot from this theory; you still feed off it today. Do you think it is possible that there are social sciences today like economic theory or Piaget's developmental psychology from which you could also learn in much the same way as you learned from psychoanalysis? I see a reciprocal

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effect between a theory of society and the individual sciences.
MARCUSE: The invention of the neutron bomb does not bring anything qualitatively new to the field in which I do theoretical work.
HABERMAS: But I'm speaking of the social sciences.
MARCUSE: OK. The neutron bomb does not contribute to a better understanding of the existing society.
HABERMAS: Well, that is a rather ironic illustration of the difference between violence against people and violence against things.
MARCUSE: This difference is certainly not new.
SPENGLER: But the question has not yet been asked, for example, in reference to psychoanalysis. To what extent will developments in psychoanalysis be incorporated into a theory of society?
MARCUSE: Without understanding Freud's metapsychology, I cannot understand what is happening today — if I did not have Freud's concept of the destructive instinct as a basis, as an explanation, as a hypothesis. Today the intensification of this instinct is a political necessity for those in power. Without this hypothesis I must believe that the world has become crazy and that we are being ruled by madmen, or by criminals or by idiots, and that we have let ourselves go to pieces.
HABERMAS: Let's try to get at this point another way. You keep evading the issue.
MARCUSE: Naturally, that is my life instinct (*Lebenstrieb*).
HABERMAS: If one questions scientists, then one would more or less find the following ideas widespread: that with this science, based on organized discussion and methodically prepared discovery, a "self-propelling mechanism" is found which guarantees, at least "in the long run," growth in theoretical knowledge.
MARCUSE: Who says that?
HABERMAS: That is the ruling conception of science. This conception includes, among other things, a faith that science can always assume ideological functions, that it is consistently able to correct itself as long as it is assured in the long run that the totality does not end in the production of ideology alone. In accordance with these principles, systematic science organizes learning processes which lead us closer and closer to the truth. Sharing this perspective makes it difficult to claim the autonomy of philosophical thought as opposed to scientific thought. Like the Horkheimer of 1930, we must then assume that the development of a theory of society is bound up with the progress of the individual sciences.
MARCUSE: Not in any very deep or thorough manner. Philosophy, for example, relies and depends on the individual sciences. Today it would be impossible to write the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas or to portray the world as God's creation, etc., etc. In this sense, science does set up definite, inviolable boundaries for philosophy.

V

HABERMAS: Let's turn to the issue of theory and praxis, revolution and reformism. In the *Deutsch-französische Jahrbücher*, Marx still used the ideals of bourgeois revolution as a norm for his immanent critique of the Hegelian philosophy of government and of the states existing then. Later he was concerned with the state as a phenomenon within the superstructure, i.e., in connection with the functional necessities of the accumulation process. He no longer analyzes the bourgeois state immanently, does not criticize it according to its own ideals. This may be explained by the fact that the legacy of bourgeois emancipation, as embodied in the constitutional principles of non-fascist bourgeois states, was not appropriated univocally by workers'

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movements, and not at all by bureaucratic socialist nations. Otherwise, Carter, irrespective of his motivations, would not be able to make human rights an issue by means of which to criticize established socialist countries. It is my impression that a tendency to underestimate certain functions of bourgeois or formal law (devised to guarantee liberties) was present in Marx and perpetuated by the earlier Frankfurt theory. To a certain extent this was understandable because the latter's theory of the state developed in the confrontation with Weimar democracy from the perspective of fascism, which had struggled to and had attained power. The fundamental thesis then was that fascism was ultimately the form of bourgeois government corresponding to monopoly capitalism.

MARCUSE: Though with many substantial reservations. For example, we have monopoly capitalism, but not fascism in the United States. One cannot maintain that the United States represents an underdeveloped stage in the development toward monopoly capitalism. The thesis as it was then advocated by the Institute pertained essentially to specific conditions in the Weimar Republic.

HABERMAS: Didn't you then, in the wake of Pollock's article on state capitalism, believe that fascism simply changes the bourgeois era in the sense that after fascism all bourgeois states would become more or less fascistic?

MARCUSE: Yes. But to be more precise, I thought that post-fascist bourgeois states would be forced to eliminate gradually the achievements of bourgeois democracy. That was my concept of preventive counter-revolution.

HABERMAS: In the past three post-war decades we have witnessed the development in Western societies, even in West Germany and Japan, of political systems founded on competition among parties. Within these systems, basic civil rights are guaranteed to a greater extent than in fascist or bureaucratic socialist states (without necessarily drawing parallels between these). Isn't one forced to view this as the essence of reformism, so to speak?

MARCUSE: The truth about reformism is that bourgeois democracy is still infinitely better than fascism. This does not change the fact that reformist parties vouchsafe for the stabilization of the existing system.

Both aspects are true. Bourgeois democracy, insofar as it is at all possible after fascism, is worth striving for in the face of fascism as an existing danger. But it seems that precisely this bourgeois democracy has been dismantled and maimed continuously by the bourgeoisie itself and by big capital. When I look around not just in West Germany, I realize that even in democracies based on competitive political parties, no particularly great efforts are made, for example, to constrain the arbitrary power exercised by the police. As for the human rights campaign, it seems to me that Mr. Carter's concept of human rights is clearly defined by geographic and strategic considerations.

HABERMAS: Still, he's making some efforts in South America.

MARCUSE: What about Iran? Brazil? And especially South Africa and Rhodesia? His is a strange concept indeed. To formulate this somewhat extremely, I think what's needed is a second bourgeois revolution because the bourgeoisie, as a result of big capital, has begun to abandon its own achievements, and because the working class has become increasingly embourgeoisified. Thus, the preliminary stage to change may well appear as a new bourgeois revolution.

HABERMAS: Dubiel, whom I mentioned before, gave the second half of his book on the Frankfurt Institute the title "Die Integration des Proletariats und die Einsamkeit der Intelligenz."

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MARCUSE: God, am I lonely.
HABERMAS: That is conditioned by the fact that critical theory has lost its original audience with the integration of the proletariat. This empirical hypothesis is one which you have advocated even up to the present.
MARCUSE: What?
HABERMAS: The integration of the proletariat into the capitalist system. That is an empirical proces...
MARCUSE: ...but not the fault of critical theory.
HABERMAS: No, but an empirical thesis that you have advocated and which presents a problem for every Marxist theory. The relationship between theory and praxis has been stylized by the early Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* in the following manner: theory is merely the reflection of class consciousness which must be identifiable empirically in its preliminary or final stages. Neither you nor Horkheimer has ever accepted this version. If I interpret things correctly, the Frankfurt theorists have always maintained two positions. They have defined themselves in opposition to traditional theory, i.e., traditional philosophy, and to philosophically "subconscious" isolated disciplines of science. They have also pointed out that a self-critical theory must emerge from a reflection of the historical context in which critical theory itself resides. In his famous essay "Traditional and Critical Theory" Horkheimer interprets this context as one of scientific activity and the social work process.
MARCUSE: Yes.
HABERMAS: That is one position. The other one addresses certain distortions of Marxist theory, whether these be a result of the dogmatism of *Diamat* or of the revisionism ensuing from the Second and Third Internationals. Critical Theory wanted to remain true to the intentions of Marxist theory even in the context of a fundamentally changed historical reality.
MARCUSE: Hm.
HABERMAS: Didn't it actually strive to establish itself as the continuation of Marxist theory into the 20th century, that is, as the true Marxist theory?
MARCUSE: Yes, that is correct.
HABERMAS: Then the accurately diagnosed integration of the proletariat into the bourgeois system presents a real problem. I want to summarize this in Dubiel's words, which appear to be essentially correct. He states: "Within the political and analytical framework of the Frankfurt School during the 1940s, the issues of proletarian class consciousness could not be meaningfully combined with scientific work toward developing a critical social theory. The internal social relations of power in Nazi Germany and on a European continent under fascist domination forced one to doubt whether the proletariat, given the existing political and historical conditions, could even be considered as a receptive audience for revolutionary theory. Then, in 1944, in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* Horkheimer and Adorno concede that their theory, which had originally defined itself programmatically as the theoretical grounding of the proletarian struggle, had lost its audience entirely."

To quote directly now from *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: "When the talk of the end of art can direct itself toward anyone, it is neither the so-called masses, nor the individual, which is powerless, but rather an imaginary witness to whom we bequeath it, so that it might not be completely lost with us."

You recognize this statement. How do you view things today? Or did the issue present itself differently to you during the 1940s than it did to Horkheimer and Adorno?

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MARCUSE: I cannot agree with that statement. As for the issue of our audience, it seems that there is an agent, class or group somewhere in the world (or not in the world) to whom one can turn. This would result precisely in a reification of the concept of classes. To say that the proletariat is integrated no longer does justice to the existing state of affairs. Instead, one must go further in one's formulations. In present-day late capitalism, the Marxist proletariat, in so far as it still exists at all, only represents a minority within the working class. The working class, in terms of its consciousness and praxis, has been embourgeoisified to a great extent. Therefore, we cannot apply reified fixed Marxist concepts directly and rigidly to the present situation. The expanded working class, which today makes up 90 percent of the population and which includes the great majority of white-collar workers, service workers — in short, everything Marx ever designated under the term productive worker — this working class remains a potential agent or subject of revolution; but the revolution itself will be an entirely different project than it was for Marx. One will have to contend with groups which were of no significance whatsoever to original Marxist theory; for example, the renowned marginal groups organized by students, oppressed racial and national minorities, women (who comprise no minority but rather the majority), citizens' initiatives, etc. These are not substitute groups who are to become the new revolutionary subjects. They are, as I call them, anticipatory groups that may function as catalysts, and no more than that.

SPENGLER: How do these groups affect the development of theory?

MARCUSE: Theory must be formulated anew, not only because these groups have emerged as relevant components, but rather because of the radically new composition and changing consciousness of the working class, and because capitalism has succeeded in stabilizing itself. This would mean ultimately, in my opinion, that we have to look for a model for revision according to which revolution will occur not because of progressive economic deterioration, etc., but rather on the existing basis of the so-called consumer society. The problem today is that of revolution in the context of consumer society.

SPENGLER: That statement seems self-contradictory. Marginal groups, such as you have mentioned, are defined by their economic standing. To get back to my question: how can theory be developed both to address the existing social inequalities of the classical sort — e.g., economic scarcity — and to respond to totally different phenomena such as the oppression of women?

MARCUSE: The criterion is oppression. Whether oppression is necessarily associated with the earlier concept of oppression, as in the situation of the petty bourgeoisie or proletariat, remains another question. As I have stated already, approximately 90 percent of the population today are dependent on capital and sell their labor power because they have nothing else to sell and no responsibility or participation in contolling the production process. All these criteria correspond to the Marxist concept of the working class. Women are in a special position because the oppression they share with men as workers in an office or factory recurs in the private sphere. This double oppression has a long history which bears not just psychological, economic and political implications, but also cultural ones.

HABERMAS: You've brushed aside somewhat the issue of a lost audience. A critical social theory that defines itself as an agent of self-enlightenment in the historical process must look for indications that within this process a consciousness emerges which can be articulated by that theory. According to your own diagnosis, we find such indicators no longer in the central core of the proletariat, but rather where (a)

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Marx would not have suspected them and (b) the agents of the revolutionary process are not located centrally, e.g., namely, in peripheral groups or in women. I wonder if this insight might not lead to a greater revision of the theory than you suggest for the moment.

MARCUSE: It becomes increasingly questionable to me whether one can speak of students today as being a peripheral group. In the United States there are more than 10 million students. Students become more and more important as agents within the production process, which itself has become "intellectualized." Thus, even the term "peripheral group" seems too ideological. To judge from their activity, students are situated at the forefront of emancipatory struggle, and not in the ghetto of a peripheral group.

HABERMAS: Is that really so?

MARCUSE: It is the case everywhere. In Latin America, Asia and even Africa.

LUBASZ: But not in Europe.

MARCUSE: Yes, also in Europe, and even in the most highly developed country in the world, in the United States.

HABERMAS: Now we come to an evaluation of the student movement. To what extent can one maintain expectations of students being capable of organizing themselves politically, similar to the expectations we had in 1967-69? Are such expectations empirically tenable?

MARCUSE: Did we all have these expectations? Did you and did I assume that this was the revolution?

HABERMAS: No, of course not.

MARCUSE: Well, then.

HABERMAS: But we did say — and you mentioned this first — that a critical potential develops in these sectors, experience is gained (you mentioned the key word, the "new sensibility") which is critical of the system, which certainly will not have immediate revolutionary consequences, but which nevertheless serves as an indicator for a spontaneously engendered consciousness-raising.

MARCUSE: I would still maintain the same even today. The student movement brought to the surface those images of the real possibilities which had been prohibited or suppressed in traditional Marxism. It was the first movement which also conceived of socialist revolution as qualitative change and the construction of socialism as a qualitatively different society, without falling prey to the fetishism of productive forces. The forces of production have long since been adequately developed, if not overdeveloped, in capitalist countries. The crucial issue then and still now is to define a new principle of reality. This issue is not thematically treated by Marx; there are traces, particularly in writings of his youth, but these then disappear.

HABERMAS: What can we say realistically about the political relevance of progressive groups within the student body? The student movement has disintegrated as a real movement.

MARCUSE: That's right, and this fact is a logical result of the counter-offensive which was in effect after 1968. As always, the ruling class has had a much better and clearer consciousness of the significance of this oppositional movement than the movement itself; the ruling class realized that there was an imminent danger and it then quickly poured on more explosives. Under the pressure of increasing repression in the United States, France, and West Germany, the movement collapsed, but during its decomposition, the ideas of the movement became widely known and were adopted by other sectors of the population. I have pointed out on numerous occasions and repeat

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briefly: we attest to the collapse of the so-called work ethic. "With the sweat of your brow you should have your daily bread." — Who proclaims this norm?
HABERMAS: Our cultural ministries are attempting to re-establish the Protestant work ethic through administrative channels.
MARCUSE: That doesn't change the fact that the quality of commodities continuously declines, that acts of anonymous sabotage become more numerous in the United States, that absenteeism is much greater today than ever before. How many million cars did the American car industry have to recall in the last few years because of serious defects? At the same time, however, we observe the successful integration, repressive integration of unions into the system. The alliance between capital and labor functions because persistent unemployment forces the workers to adapt if they wish to live and survive.
HABERMAS: As of 1973, it has been recognized as a mass phenomenon that unemployment as such acts as a disciplinary mechanism.
MARCUSE: Hasn't that always been the case?
SPENGLER: That is an old, well-known tale, and can be proved to have held true in the middle of the 19th century.
MARCUSE: I think it has always been so. I mean not just disciplining through the work ethic, but also political disciplining.
LUBASZ: No, one could inversely maintain that if a crisis becomes so great as to generate mass unemployment and thus indirectly strengthen radicalism, one can demand from politicians and industry that jobs be created. In such a situation, phenomena such as mass strikes appear, for example, the general strike of 1926 in England. However, as long as there is a chance that most people will continue working and unemployment remains marginal, then adaptation to the system will prevail because each worker will cherish the hope of finding a job.
MARCUSE: The question remains, and in my opinion points to the real proof of Marxist theory: how long will the stabilization of late capitalism last? Will the internal contradictions, irrespective of their nature — and I don't believe there are only those which Marx formulated — really become intensified or will capitalism succeed in cementing its position for a measurable space of time on the basis of an escalated economic and political imperialism, with China and the USSR even as its markets? If this should occur, then those in power will be able to sleep in peace for a few centuries yet. Then there will be no revolution.
SPENGLER: That is a justification for hitting the bottle....
HABERMAS: Is Eurocommunism the new model you referred to earlier?
MARCUSE: Eurocommunism is no model for revolution. It is, as far as we can judge today, a faithful reflection of existing power relations on the one hand, and of the internal and external embourgeoisification of the working class on the other.
HABERMAS: Does it represent second generation social-democratic trends?
MARCUSE: It is too early to say that with certainty; it may very well be that in France, for example, the coalition of the left may dissolve prior to elections. Then, of course, the politics of the Communist Party would change. It is difficult to make prognoses.
HABERMAS: Which model for revolutionary change is then realistically conceivable in the present day?
MARCUSE: What I envision is an upsurge of protest organized locally and regionally, the outbreak of isolated businesses out of the system, radicalization of self-administration — a diffuse disintegration which becomes contagious, so to speak. The

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specific, immediate cause cannot be foreseen.
HABERMAS: So within late capitalism as an indeterminate system, conflicts endangering the very system itself could accidentally erupt everywhere? Another question: what do the new populist trends mean? An alliance of a conservatively inclined middle class, radical students, other factions of the intelligentsia who all join together, for example, in opposition to atomic energy. These are developments we observe in West Germany and France for some time now.
SPENGLER: Would you explain first why you use the expression "populist"?
HABERMAS: Populist because...
MARCUSE: ...in America it is called that...
HABERMAS: In the first place, because it is impossible to clearly correlate populist trends to specific social groups, and second, because the political orientation is essentially defined negatively as the defense against anonymous bureaucratic structures, as the defense against that which subjectively appears to present a danger to technological progress, as the defense against vaguely analyzed threats in general. Such groups are not held together by a common political perspective or goal. Isn't that characteristic of traditional populism?
MARCUSE; Yes, indeed.
LUBASZ: If I may add something: in Marxist theory there is the basic assumption that the development of the forces of production represent something good, or desirable. Marx does not foresee the point at which this development could have negative consequences. This cooperation among radical students, farmers, citizens, etc., is interesting for the fact that they oppose precisely that development of productive forces. The paradox, in terms of Marxist theory, can be seen in the fact that, for example, unions themselves strongly support the construction of atomic energy plants.
MARCUSE: That has less to do with theory than with keeping one's job.
LUBASZ: Yes, but that contradicts the theoretical assumption, if I'm not mistaken.
MARCUSE: The theory itself recognizes this constradiction — in the diagnosis that, with the evolution of capitalism, the production of waste and luxury and destruction itself would increase. This insight is one of its fundamental tenets.
HABERMAS: Herbert, thank you so much for your patience.

MARXIST ETHICS AND THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE: AN INTERVIEW WITH AGNES HELLER*

Question: 1956 was a year of drastic change in the history of socialist countries, and for you and other people around Lukacs, it was a decisive year. You participated in a conference on freedom at the beginning of 1956. Bloch had organized it and Kolakowski read a paper. The conference had a clear political impact and provided an excellent opportunity to meet the young generation educated in countries of "realized socialism." In reference to this and other events of that year, would you clarify the importance of 1956 for your formation and, in general, for Eastern European countries?

*Translated by David J. Parent. This is an edited version of a longer manuscript dealing with questions raised by Laura Boella, Guido Neri and Amedeo Vigorelli.

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Heller: 1956 was both the end and the beginning of something. At that time definite consequences were drawn from all the problems, uncertainties and questions that had been accumulating, and confronted us with new problems, which we tried to deal with in the following years. This was the first time we felt we were making our own history, and this feeling did not turn out to be a mere illusion.

Two events that year should be singled out, for they played a significant role in transforming our way of thinking: the 20th Party Congress and the revolts in Poland and Hungary. During the six months separating these two events, we changed radically. To mention a personal example, in our private conversations in Berlin in March 1956 with Kolakowski, Harich and Kronski — the young Polish philosopher who, unfortunately, died very young — the main topic was inner-party democracy: we compared Stalin with Lenin. In August of the same year I gave a lecture at the Kossuth Club in Budapest. In quoting Rosa Luxemburg that "there are no civil liberties, only liberties as such," I spoke out for political pluralism and the right to strike. That democracy was no longer an "inner-party" matter became clear to me and to a rapidly radicalizing Polish public opinion, reflected in articles appearing at the time in *Pro Prostu*.

I will speak only of Hungary, both because my personal experiences are linked with that country and because between 1953 and 1956, Hungary was the "model country" of Europe. It was the model country for a possible transformation precisely because it was the model country of Stalinst terror. The government justified its extreme terrorism by narrowing the alternatives open to Hungary, Hitler's last ally: "Red terrorism" or fascism. That this "choice" completely contradicted the facts was disregarded by the government ideologists. Few people know that in the free elections of 1945 and 1947 left parties in Hungary won almost as great a voter percentage as in France or Italy today. At the same time, farmers and workers organized on the basis of local and factory self-management. In factories, the system of workers' participation was completely developed *before* the nationalization of Hungarian industry. Thus, Hungary was not a fascist country at the time of the ruthless takeover in 1948 and 1949, but a country that was already developing democratic institutions. Of course, even then democracy was limited by Russian intervention, as in the case of the leader of the Liberal-Conservative Party, who was without much ado dragged off to a Siberian concentration camp. Yet, this democracy had already shown itself viable.

In four years of compulsory collectivization in the countryside and forced labor in the factories, the country came close to *starvation* due to irrational industrialization. At the same time, more than 300,000 people in a population of ten million were sent to internment camps; the same number, if not more, were exiled to the countryside; tens of thousands went to prison; thousands were executed. Fear prevailed. No "private" sphere was tolerated. Controls extended to what one taught, whom one could love and marry, what was to be despised and what was to be believed under the threat of death. To believe in God or to go to bed with a "deviationist" could result in the loss of one's job, arrest, or deportation. This explains the rage with which Hungarians in 1956 attacked the red stars — the symbols of this government.

Total fear went hand in hand with total indoctrination. *Credo quia absurdum est* was the real standard of this regime. The party did our thinking for us and we were supposed to believe everything it taught us. Stalinism is based not only on fear, but also on faith.

What our generation asked itself from 1953 on was: how could we believe at all? I also asked myself this question, despite the fact that I was never accepted as a

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"believer." But, in my opinion, I had been mistakenly criticized as a "deviationist." Allegedly, I was a good Communist because I identified totally with a system which suffered only for improper execution. Had it been properly implemented, it would have been the best system in the world. Still, I often asked myself whether my dissatisfaction was the result of my shortsightedness as a "bourgeois individualist." Instead of thinking things out, I ignored my conscience and relativized my indignation. Thus, the period between 1953 and 1956 was a period of enlightenment — a process of "emancipation from self-incurred tutelage."

This process ended in March 1956. Thereafter we still chased after illusions, but had come of age — no one told us what to think anymore. Privately we took an oath for *reason* and cast aside blind faith once and for all. We swore that from then on we would no longer *be afraid* and that neither fear nor opportunism would prevent us from acting according to our reason and our conscience. This oath was forgotten by some, but many remained faithful to it despite all vacillations. Our friends in the West, who often criticized our emphasis on "ethics" as petty-bourgeois, should realize that this oath is the *precondition* for any democratic politics and action. This oath caused many, including leading politicians and "simple" men, to choose suicide as an alternative.

By March 1956 we had gained freedom of thought, but exercised it in daily practical politics more than in theory. None of Lukács' students had produced anything theoretically original before 1956, nor did anyone else in Eastern Europe. Lukács began his work on the *Aesthetics* that year. The program was there: in the Petöfi Circle discussions we sought to put "fundamental philosophical problems" on the agenda. The realization of this program, however, came only after 1957.

In this context, the Berlin Conference on freedom was very significant. First, it enabled philosophers of Eastern countries simply to *meet* and *talk*. Up to that point there was an iron curtain even among Eastern European countries, and only "official" philosophers could communicate. It was a revelation for me to learn of common concerns in other countries. I also gained some "factual" information there since contemporary philosophical literature was unavailable in Hungary. Feuerbach was the most recent "Western" thinker we could find in the libraries. Second, the theme of the conference, "Freedom," put our central problem on the agenda. The various proposed solutions to this vital question revealed that there were a number of possible Marxisms. Third, it was a promise for the possibility of a tolerant dialogue in the future — a promise which, however, remained unfulfilled until much later.

In October 1956 we were confronted with totally unforeseen events. At that time we were unaware that the implications of the revelations of the 20th Party Congress meant the end of an era: a government's loss of legitimacy. The system was grasped as an alienated totality and was totally rejected. The Hungarian populace did not do this from a socialist standpoint. They did not and could not advocate a democratic, pluralistic socialism. There were workers' councils, and a program of self-management was formulated. Yet, the majority of the population did not want to hear a word about socialism. "Out with the Communists and the Russians!" was the most popular slogan.

It could not have been otherwise. For a populace which voted overwhelmingly for socialism in 1947, socialism had become synonymous with bloody despotism, hunger and national degradation. At that time these were identical. No existing Communist movement or party opposed the Russian intervention. The European Communist Left and the socialist Left identified completely with the executioners of a nation. Today's

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Eurocommunist parties bear great responsibility for those events. Despite the prevailing circumstances and historical background, many socialist themes were present in the actions of this revolution, if not in its ideology. The same workers' councils which demanded that Imre Nagy reinstitute mandatory religious instruction in schools were determined *not* to return factories to private ownership. The workers did not want to restore private property, but rather wanted to free themselves from state exploitation. This could not be expressed adequately in a theoretical program because no such theory was available.

I accepted the fact that the revolution in its dynamics did not correspond to my "ideas" and regarded this as an autonomous expression of the real will of the people. The Bolshevik tradition in which the elite was to shape the will of the working class became unacceptable to me and many others, who likewise acknowledged the popular will. The struggle for socialism had to begin anew and prove in practice that socialism is not identical with Bolshevism. Our task became the founding of a new and qualitatively different socialism.

In spite of my reservations, the 1956 revolution was the greatest event of my life. The lessons of those ten days were reflected positively and negatively in my subsequent theoretical and political considerations.

The intervention of the Soviet army had catastrophic consequences — it caused us to doubt the possibility of a new democratic beginning in Hungary in the near future. Despite this despair, some of us — myself included — managed to salvage some hope which, though not totally unfounded, again proved to be illusory. The 20th Party Congress marked a historical turning point. For many Hungarian Communists and functionaries, the revelations of this congress were cathartic in their effect. We had good reason to expect that a similar process would occur in the Soviet Union. However, their reaction was rather a negative one. As one Soviet official expressed it: "If the revelations of the 20th Party Congress are true, we are all fascists. But we are not fascists, therefore they are not true."

Our hopes, later to be reinforced by the 22nd Party Congress, could be best described as Khrushchevism. We regarded Khrushchev as a possible reformer. Although we knew of his consent to the intervention in Hungary, we suspected that he had at least hesitated and done so only out of the need to strengthen his position. When the resolutions of the 22nd Party Congress were not implemented, we realized all reform efforts had to fail due to resistance from the power apparatus.

Q: At the Berlin Conference, Kolakowski emphasized the need to differentiate between the collective interest represented by the socialist state and individual interests. This distinction bears similarities to your philosophical position as expressed in the theory of needs. What do you think of Kolakowski's thinking in those years and now?

A: Kolakowski's ideas and personality deeply influenced my position aflter 1957, but not specifically on the issue you addressed. The problem of interests assumed central importance in my first book on Chernyshevsky written in 1953 and 1954 as a philosophical reflection on Imre Nagy's new social program of 1953. My main theses were that no social program can be realized without the participants' interest and that only consensus among individuals can lead to a collective solution. Thus, the issue of individual rights in civil society was paramount even prior to Kolakowski's statement at the Berlin Conference.

Kolakowski's decisive influence on my philosophical position dates from the post-revolutionary period. The attempt to salvage a positive philosophy despite the negative

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outcomes of the revolution led me to adopt a Hegelian view of history. Kolakowski's skepticism toward my Hegelianism and his ironic counter-arguments to my position ultimately revealed the inconsistencies and logical contradictions inherent in my Hegelian framework. Consequently, I rejected the deterministic notion of historical necessity asserting itself through chance occurrences, and struck a path to the young Marx. My theoretical development was paradigmatic for an intellectual trend of the time.

Kolakowski personified the self-awareness of oppositional socialism in my generation. He had an unsurpassable eloquence in articulating problems and questions tormenting our generation, and exemplified a "civil courage" in his opposition not only of the government, but of dubious phenomena within the political opposition. His writings on the redefinition of the Left, on history and on anti-Semitism are unforgettable. Certainly we did not agree entirely with each other's philosophy, but our efforts to develop a Marxist pluralism were unified.

It is difficult for me to speak of the present-day Kolakowski, as we have developed in different directions. My persistent advocacy of leftist radicalism and radical Marxist philosophy necessitated a relativization of Eastern Europe, insofar as I identify more with the concerns and endeavors of leftist radicals of the Western world. For them, Eastern Europe is an inevitable warning. Leszek Kolakowski has made a different choice; he remains deeply committed to Eastern Europe.

Q: Your absence from the university after 1956 coincides with your first extensive studies on Aristotelian ethics and the writing of Renaissance Man. *These works address some fundamental philosopical themes: on the one hand, the question of ethics as a specific form of social praxis, on the other, the issue of everyday life and the idea of the subject able to reconcile happiness and value, need and meaning. Would you briefly explain the origin of these ideas?*

A: I recall the post-revolutionary years with extreme bitterness. Those were times of bloody retaliation in which victims of the reaction by far outnumbered those of the revolt; executions, imprisonment or release were decided arbitrarily. The number of trials held in Hungary after 1956 would be comparable to the Nürnberg trials, although no one would compare the ten-day revolution with the ten years of mass murder under Nazism. The number of death sentences in Hungary since 1957 are equalled only by those in Greece and the Soviet Union.

We felt trapped. Although I not only was dismissed from the university and expelled from the Party but also forbidden to publish and subsequently had to teach in a grammar school, I was nevertheless one of the few lucky ones, for whom active participation in the revolts had not meant imprisonment. Two years after the revolution Imre Nagy was executed. Although politically rather naive, this man saved the dignity and honor of Eastern European socialism. Once again, most of the Left remained silent.

My first work after 1956 was published ten years after its completion. It provided an outline of general ethics and attempted to resolve Weber's antinomy between an attitudinal ethic and an ethic of responsibility. For this task it was necessary to assert the primacy of collective ethos (*Sittlichkeit*) over subjective morality (*Moralität*). Because of the gradual dissolution of collective morality, the world of norms divided into the concrete and the abstract, whereby the latter represented an "abstract morality" contraposed to the former. Moral autonomy consisted in the conscious choice of abstract, ideal norms over the existing concrete norms in conflict situations. Class morality has to be taken as an expression of alienation of moral conduct.

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My subsequent writings were motivated by the pursuit of a moral tradition on which to ground a socialist Utopia of a new collective ethos. The Renaissance tradition, characterized by the harmony between concrete, everyday thinking and abstract political, scientific and philosophical thought, could not serve as a model for the present but may have validity as prehistory for a possible future.

As in the Renaissance period, morality should signify a form of life founded upon ethical purality, leading thus to plurality in life. Our goal is not a society tailored to moral or intellectual perfection, but rather one in which *all* people with moral *common sense* can exist in freedom, brotherhood and social equality. *Democracy* is one precondition, the other is community. Communities freely chosen by individuals can be the bearers of a new morality. Most men act morally out of a need for recognition by others; when we can attain recognition only through multiple mediations, our needs necessarily become quantified. The pursuit of mutual recognition within the community of fellow citizens allows for the development of meaningful relationships in social life.

In my later career, a decisive turning point was marked by my new philosophical orientation to problems of the contemporary Western world. This began with the detailed study of critics of American culture, including Riesmann, Whyte, Fromm, and especially C. Wright Mills. *The Authoritarian Personality* aroused my interest in Adorno. The confrontation with questions and dilemmas of a world previously unknown to me remained of a theoretical nature since personal contact or concrete experiences were impossible. Except for a brief journey to Vienna in 1956, I was more than 30 years old at the time of my first extended visit to the West. Such possibilities became even more limited later on. My changing perspective led to what I call the relativizing of Eastern Europe. The greatest concern of Eastern Europe was and remains the liberation of civil society and the guaranteeing of civil liberties. I never intended to cast doubt on the justification of these goals, although they had already been superceded by new theoretical considerations. To identify with Eastern Europe would have meant either the acceptance of a liberal or even conservative way of thought, or the complete renunciation of philosophy. Both theoretical self-reflection and personal experience underlie my allegiance to the Western world.

Q: For intellectuals in socialist countries, the 1960s were a phase of reflection. During that period, the Korcula Summer School in Yugoslavia provided the politically important oportunity to meet and discuss critical issues. The Praxis *group seemed to stimulate discussions between Eastern European intellectuals and leading exponents of critical theory in Germany, Italy and France who were undergoing a political and philosophical radicalization in conjunction with youth protest movements. Those meetings of intellectuals and critics from East and West bear witness to the influence of Lukács and Bloch. How do you assess the role played by these intellectuals within the Communist movement during the 1920s and the articulation of a philosophical critique of "realized socialism"? What is your opinion of the* Praxis *group?*

A: Until the end of 1964, we were living in despair, when a discussion dealing with alienation addressed this problem in Hungary. Because of our participation in this discussion my husband, Ferenc Feher, and I were investigated by the secret police. It was allegedly not in connection with the discussion that investigations were carried out (since "in our country there are no discussions of scientific matters"), but rather to treasonous agitation "committed elsewhere." The atmosphere improved significantly in 1965, in connection with preparations for an economic reform. That reform was officially introduced in January 1968, only to end in August of the same year.

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At the beginning of the 1960s we formed a circle known as the "Budapest School." The relationship among group members was both personal and theoretical in nature. We critically evaluated and discussed each other's manuscripts. The fact that we were all theoretically very different proved very productive and enabled us to counterbalance our respective weaknesses.

The years between 1965 and 1968 were marked by increasing philosophical depth. During this time we endeavored to found a "positive" philosophy based on a new reading of Marx and in so doing, we participated in an international renaissance of Marxism as a pluralistic theory. This period was also a time of new illusions engendered by our active but at the same time critical participation in the reform movement. Our goal was to transform economic reforms into social reforms. In order to support this social movement and not withdraw skeptically into the private sphere, we necessarily shared the hope that, with the participation of the whole population, social transformation was actually possible through reforms. The doctrine of 1956 faded, and we misjudged the end of the cold war as the advent of a new world situation.

The meetings with Yugoslav philosophers at the Korcula Summer School took place during this reform period. I participated three times: in 1965, 1967 and 1968. Both the Korcula Summer School and the journal *Praxis* were institutions of the renaissance of Marxism. Korcula and *Praxis* created a public forum in which discussions took place and different tendencies within the new Marxism confronted and interacted with one another critically. The new Marxism became *international* through these institutions.

Within this common purpose, there were differences among the three summer school sessions. The 1965 session was not influenced by the radical youth movement, since it did not exist yet. Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, however, this movement dominated our discussions. The impact of the revolt of the youth becomes immediately evident if we compare Marcuse's discussion with Serge Mallet in 1965 and his compassionate speech in 1968.

Korcula allowed us to meet with significant figures of both the old and the new Marxism. Of course, not all of these people were equally to my liking. The two individuals who impressed me most were Ernst Bloch and Lucien Goldmann. I knew both of them from their writings, and had already met Bloch in Berlin. After August 1968, when we were all in despair, Bloch alone maintained his optimism. When I expressed my distress, he slapped the table with annoyance: "Even this table can become a crocodile! Believe it, believe me, an old man!" I didn't believe it, but was very moved.

Meeting Goldmann was theoretically very important to me. I saw him first in Korcula, and then in Royaumont in January 1968, where I first met Adorno. Our heated discussions on the aesthetics of the young Lukács ended in the same way as my conversations with Kolakowski. I defended my position to the end, but later realized it was weak and that Goldmann had been right on essential issues. Through him I rediscovered Lukacs' *The Soul and the Forms* and *The Theory of the Novel.*

The *Praxis* group was crucial for one major theoretical contribution, namely, the reintroduction of *History and Class Consciousness* into contemporary Marxism. Although Lukács' philosophical masterpiece was one of the most significant works of the 20th century, because of my "Eastern European experiences," I found this work altogether too Leninist for me.

Q: During 1968 you lived in Hungary, the United States (where you attended the

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World Sociology Congress) and Germany (where you taught for one semester). For Hungary it was a year of economic reforms and intense involvement in the events of the Czech spring, whereas the West experienced the anti-authoritarian revolt within the university and lifestyles (the American and German communes) initiated by the youth. What effects did these experiences have on your philosophy?

A: In 1968 I did not go to the U.S. and did not teach at any German university. I knew Rudi Dutschke from his previous visit with Lukács in Budapest. I cannot recall any other contact with leaders of the student and youth movements.

I sympathized with the American and French student and youth movements as well as the general strike in France, for these confirmed my theoretical ideals, as expressed in my book *The Everyday Life*. Having reached the conclusion that change of lifestyles through the formation of new communities was the precondition for a real socialist society, I saw this worldwide movement as an embodiment of these very principles. These young people were attempting to achieve new lifestyles. They did not merely reject the existing world, but articulated new ideals: they strove to realize a future worthy of human beings. I did not agree with everything happening in or through these youth movements, and had serious reservations, particularly about the German student revolt. Nevertheless, the sequence of events indicated that a new revolutionary concept and praxis had taken shape and that revolution was no longer identical with Jacobinism, but that what was being sought was a revolution of *civil society* and of lifestyles.

The decline of these movements does not mean that all their efforts would have been in vain. After all, the world cannot be changed from one moment to the next. Reforms can be initiated from one day to the next and political revolutions may even erupt from one day to the next, but the total revolutionary transformation of lifestyles constitutes a slow process with occasional setbacks. The conflicts within the protest movements cannot be described as mere conflicts of interest. Through them I reached the distinction between interests and needs, and my subsequent theory of needs was shaped significantly by the 1968 events.

1968 was a year of optimism. The prospect of Europe unified under democratic socialism seemed a real possibility at the time. We anticipated that within such an international context, the economic reforms then being launched in Hungary would initiate a social transformation of the system. However, as I have already said, our optimism proved to be based on illusions, as the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia finally showed.

August 1968 marked the end of our reformist illusions and aspirations. But in Hungary there were no abrupt reactions to the event since, at the time, the press was not immediately intimidated and statements were allowed which, even after 1975, would never again be permitted. Official retaliation against those who protested against the invasion was relatively mild, as only our passports were revoked for one, or, as in my case, for two years. In Hungary a return to the iron fist came only in 1972.

We had astonishingly little contact with Czech philosophers. We knew of Kosik, even before we read *The Dialectics of the Concrete*, which was the most significant attempt to develop a phenomenological Marxism while giving new meaning to the dialectic. It was hard for us to meet him, as he was a very withdrawn man. The possibilities for traveling to conferences were also very limited at this time. The Czech theorists whom I nevertheless met were either totally hostile to Marxism and socialism or involved in dogmatic Marxism, which we rejected. In retrospect, I believe that we — meaning Eastern European theorists — were mistaken not to have struggled more

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energetically for mutual contacts. Since the 1960s, we had had our first opportunity to expand contacts with Western European socialists and Marxists. We were so involved in these new dialogues that we almost forgot one another, and when we realized our mistake after January 1968, it was already too late.

The years 1969 and 1970 were not comparable with the period immediately after 1956, partly because Hungary was not suffering as much then. The reaction of the majority of the Western Left to the Czech events and to the subsequent Soviet intervention was altogether different from their reaction to the Hungarian revolution and the ensuing Soviet response. Although a few Communist parties and some anti-democratic New Left groups still identified with the oppressors, the major European parties sided with the oppressed, though with varying decisiveness and consistency. At that time a parody of the *Communist Manifesto* was formulated as follows: "A spectre is haunting Communism: the spectre of Europe." Others contended that the Soviet Union had regained Prague, but had lost Rome and Paris.

From then on, a coherent international opposition became organized in Eastern Europe. Although several members have been victimized by confinement in prisons or psychiatric clinics, the opposition can never be fully exterminated, for when one person is eliminated another takes his place. Governments have completely lost their legitimation, and the "liberator of nations" has been unmasked as an imperialist power.

Q: In connection with post-1968 ideological and political changes, there has been a biased interpretation of your thought concerning radical needs and the revolution of everyday life, which sometimes reverses the deeply ethical thrust of your discourse. This is particularly true of Italy. What do you think of such an interpretation and what can you add to what you have already written concerning the relation of values and needs?

A: I am not familiar with all interpretations of my works and therefore I can answer only in general terms. The transformation of lifestyles and radical needs are central to my work and not identical with one another.

The revolution of lifestyles takes place on the level of *civil society,* but even civil society cannot consist only of communal institutions. A modern society cannot function without intermediary relations or without representative institutions. The precondition of a community is that its members know and interact with each other in more than one relation, e.g., economic, political, artistic or religious. The wider the scope of integration, the less society can and should become a community. However, units of self-administration, such as production or housing collectives, may be organized as communities. Within these communities persons are trained to participate in social discourse. A pluralistic democracy, with all its institutions, can to a certain extent be protected against bureaucratization and alienation only if the entire population has been educated in communal discussions and decisions.

In this connection, Habermas discusses "communication free of domination." He distinguishes between two types of consensus: one freely attained and the other extorted by domination. There is, however, a third type of consensus, which results from weariness. In discussions between private individuals, some are motivated completely by private interests and, while some have developed the ability to discuss, others have not. It often happens that discussions of this type end with some surrendering not because they agree with the arguments of others nor because they succumb to domination, but simply because they have grown weary and cannot withstand the stress and strain intrinsic to democratic processes. The more

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individualistic people are, the quicker they give up and leave the task to other, more determined individuals. Thus, Habermas speaks of the communicative community. There exists indeed a communicative community of scientists, but not of socialized people. Discourse is always embedded in social life and that's why rational discourse cannot be separated from social coexistence. This is true of the family, where the ability to discuss rationally is learned along with the ability to live with and for one another. If we do not learn the second, we will not learn the first.

In contrast with the revolution of lifestyles, radical needs are not specifically related to communities. The satisfaction of radical needs means the abolition of exploitation, hierarchy and domination in general and thus the transformation of domestic and international relations. The satisfaction of radical needs is contingent upon the transformation of civil society in general, and upon the development of communities. The creation of new lifestyles is itself a response to radical needs, although these are heterogeneous and not all of them can be fulfilled through the development of communal lifestyles. The need for women's liberation, for example, is completely embedded in this framework, while the need for self-administration is only partly so. The transformation of everyday life and the system of needs is different from such radical needs for "eternal peace" or for solving ecological problems.

The solution to our problems cannot be sought solely by means of changing the state and political institutions. Along strictly Marxist lines, it is clear that, unless a new base is achieved, tinkering with the superstructure is not much help. The best political system for achieving such a base is a puralistic democratic state governed by law. In order to provide this framework with a new content, we must change the base, the system of needs, property relations, forms of human interaction, etc. Contrary to Marx, I do not see the development of productive forces as the moving force. While the forces of production may change the social structure, they do not necessarily do so in the direction of socialism. The turning point at which the development of the productive forces suddenly shifts toward a social revolution will never come by itself. The time is neither not yet ripe, nor forsaken, but rather it is constantly *here*. Our radical needs are the material forces capable of transforming society.

The pluralistic democratic state governed by law is the precondition for social revolution. The preservation and-or realization of this democracy should be the daily task of all leftist radicals. If we cannot create a rational society and merely await some "catastrophe," then we are working *against* our own needs. Catastrophe is the soil for barbarism and tyranny, not socialism. A critique of the comprehensive power of instrumental rationality must be part of radical theory if this critique proposes to limit instrumental rationality through value-rational discussions and goal-setting by all participants. To cast aside instrumental rationality completely or reject value-rational orientation in behavior would be tantamount to an ideology of *Blut und Boden*.

Although the resentment and skepticism toward a system of values within a theory of socialism may be understandable, it nevertheless cannot be condoned. In schools, churches and the mass media, one hears of universal and eternal human values, even though this category has become meaningless or associated with questionable attitudes. Similarly, the concept of "socialism" was identified for decades with tyranny and the extermination of 20 million people. If such was not sufficient reason to give up the notion of socialism completely, then it would be wrong to relinquish the category of value. We cannot avoid the task of redefining concepts.

Assuming that no social life is possible without value judgments, let us consider whether we should seek value neutrality (*Wertfreiheit*) in theory. The positivist ideal

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of value neutrality regards society as an independent object, a "second nature," and describes its functioning according to quasi-natural laws. The only existing positivist conception of Marxism maintains that capitalism *necessarily* leads to socialism. Indeed, Marx undeniably opens himself up to such an interpretation in which the role of historical subjects is accidental and ephemeral. Only one materialist conception coincides with this interpretation, namely, one which seeks the driving material force exclusively in the development of productive forces. But if we regard *radical* needs as the material base of our system, then our theory precludes all positivist consequences. A radical need is, as such, a critique of the world which creates radical needs but cannot satisfy them. The function of radical needs is to evaluate the world negatively and positively in terms of transcending the given and creating a world in which these needs can be satisfied.

Needs are always directed toward objectifications, whether existing or ideal and thus objectifications not immediately realizable. Socialism is not an ideal objectification, but rather an existing reality substantiated by specific human needs and actions. For this very reason it is extremely important to define "socialism" carefully. To ask what socialism means is primarily a question of goals and of redefining values such as equality, freedom or brotherhood. In addition to certain desirable values, there is equally a need to identify negative values such as repression and to strive toward making these obsolete. We could not criticize or reject any type of "realized socialism" if we do not see socialism as a value. The lack of values and critique based on values would lead to an implicit legitimation of tyranny representative of the "natural necessity" of the progress of productive forces. Capitalist apologists argue similarly, with even greater empirical impact, since capitalism indubitably promotes the development of productive forces. Positivism is at best a liberal, perhaps even a conservative theory, which we may reject while retaining the element of rationalism.

Q: The presence of ethical norms distinguishes your treatment of everyday life and radical needs from those of authors such as Lefèbvre and Marcuse, though their standpoints are otherwise similar to yours. Are your accounts and theirs either directly or indirectly related? In particular, what do you think of the Marcusian hypothesis of a new "biological base" for socialism?

A: A "new biological base" for socialism is untenable, for there is *nothing* present in human nature that either *ab ovo* excludes socialism or *requires* it. We are social beings in all respects; even our biological endowments can be developed fully only within a social context. The biological result of our acculturation is the *a priori* capacity for such symbolic modes of behavior as language, rational thought and ethical behavior, which function entirely through social interaction. The instincts have been replaced by social objectifications which must be appropriated for social existence. Biology asserts itself in setting *limits*, the ultimate of which is death. Relative limits are defined by the need to reproduce both individually and as a species. For example, eating and drinking pertain to individuals and sexual intercourse to species reproduction. The quantity and forms of such drives are socially determined such that we cannot rationally distinguish the biological from the social.

Thus, I cannot concur with any "natural philosophy of man," nor with Marcuse or such neo-Freudians as Fromm. Marcuse views all human civilization as an impediment to the development of happiness, joy, and enjoyment. Obligations and limitations that require renunciation of wish fulfillment are by nature alienating. Thus, Marcuse envisions a future where such duties and restrictions no longer exist. I do not regard

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civilization with its duties and restrictions solely as an inhibitive factor. Without culture we cannot be human nor can we feel human pleasures and joys since both obstacles to pleasure as well as the ability to experience pleasure are created through the civilizing process.

Marcuse has recently argued that our biological constitution itself has been so ruined by civilization that a world worthy of human beings would require a biological transformation of the race. Although this view would certainly entice adherents of a totally negative dialectic, it should be stressed that our biological constitution as it pertains to human *behavior* is very malleable. Our development is contingent on the mode in which we incorporate the world into our biological system and the course of history has shown that totally different systems of needs and behavior have already been built into our biological constitution. The system of needs has biological preconditions and limits, but is not contained or inherited in any genetic code. We are free to develop an entirely new system of needs from these biological preconditions.

Q: Your relation to psychoanalysis distinguishes your research from that of Freudo-Marxians, whose remote origins rest with such figures as Reich, Fromm, Horkheimer, Lefèbvre, and Marcuse. What is your opinion of this "school" and is attempts to "integrate" Marx and Freud?

A: One should distinguish between Freud's theory and psychoanalytic practice. My knowledge and experience of the state and possibilities of current psychoanalytic practice are limited. Actually, Hungary once had a very significant psychoanalytical school which was abolished after World War II. Psychoanalysis was condemned as a bastion of imperialism and psychology was restricted to Pavlov's doctrines. To this day there are no new editions of the writings of promiment analysts and Freudians, and only in recent years have possibilities opened up for psychoanalytic practice, although many of the practical techniques have been forgotten.

At any rate, on the basis of information acquired through literature and personal experiences in the Western world, I do sense a danger in viewing ethical problems in purely psychological terms. If someone betrays a friend, another acts cowardly, or a husband beats his wife, all this is deemed a "sickness" and not condemned. One has to take into account, after all, the fact that the traitor had an authoritarian father, the coward came from a broken home, and the husband himself was often beaten by his parents. While Lukács' statement to the effect that the "soul has no prehistory" is exaggerated, we are still responsible for our deeds. We learn and we can behave contrary to inclinations. Also, the soul *does* have a prehistory. But everyone had a childhood which might have been more or less difficult, and ultimately we should judge a person by his actions. The psychologization of ethics is an act of *injustice,* for when we fail to condemn the traitor because he had an authoritarian father, we are unfair to those who had authoritarian fathers and remained faithful to their comrades. If there is no wrong, then there can be no virtue or merit. Furthermore, psychological legitimation precludes catharsis. Only a person aware of his or her own freedom can achieve catharsis.

It is not my intention to criticize psychoanalysis as such, but rather the excessive dependency on professional analysis. I certainly recognize the need for psychoanalysis and agree that it should be fulfilled. From this viewpoint, I would criticize social systems in which this need cannot be satisfied. In my utopian framework I envision a society made up of communities in which such needs would be eliminated through active mutual assistance of members within the community.

The philosophies of Marx and Freud are incompatible. Their answers are contra-

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dictory. Either one assumes Marx's position and tries to answer Freudian questions from this viewpoint, or one assumes the Freudian position, and tries to answer Marxian questions from that standpoint. Of course, these two are alternatives only if one is consistent. Habermas, for example, understood psychoanalysis as a process of enlightenment within the Marxian philosophy of history without ever accepting Freudian anthropology or ontology. Sartre replaced Freudian psychoanalysis with existential psychoanalysis and thus cast aside the Freudian interpretation of the subconscious for its incompatibility with existentialism. Likewise, the most consistent Freudians regard the combination of a natural philosophy and a philosophy of history with justifiable skepticism. Roheim, for example, was right in warning neo-Freudians that the elimination of the Oedipus complex from Freudian philosophy would weaken or compromise it.

Some have attempted to circumvent the controversy between Freud and Marx by declaring one the ultimate authority in psychology and the other in economics. It should be pointed out, however, that on many occasions Freud's psychology and Marx's economics have been proven false in their respective disciplines. In spite of this, their thought retains its relevance. Moreover, such a view unjustly reduces both thinkers to mere specialized scientists. The contradictions between Marx and Freud persist and a conscious choice must be made. *Either* I define the species as id and superego, against which the ego tries to assert itself, *or* I posit a unified species characterized by sociability, work, consciousness, freedom and universality. *Either* I assume that work and creativity are erotic sublimations, *or* I understand eroticism itself as a consequence of self-becoming and creativity. *Either* I hold a pessimistic anthropology, *or* an optimistic one. Empirical evidence exerts no decisive influence here, for both theories can be verified empirically. We can choose between the two only on the basis of our values. For my part, I have chosen Marx.

Q: Can your aloofness from Freud be attributed to Lukács' influence and such works as The Destruction of Reason*? How would you assess that particular work both in terms of cultural history and your ideological development?*

A: Although I have written about Freud from an inevitably critical perspective, Freudian thought has not fundamentally influenced me. Long before my exposure to Lukács or *The Destruction of Reason,* I read Freud in school and reacted then as I would now. My attitude may be described as "existential," for I simply had no need for Freud. I was educated in a ratioanlist and feminist tradition with great freedom, and soon realized that most frustrations in life are the result of social problems such as poverty, violence, and coercion. Not *The Destruction of Reason* but rather the dangers I had survived and the murder of my father and best friends were the reasons why Freud seemed irrelevant to me and why I sought the origins of irrationality in the social structure.

I heard *The Destruction of Reason* in the form of lectures Lukács delivered at the university, before I read it. The book was original because Lukács substituted the distinction between materialism and idealism with that of dialectics and metaphysics, and because it raised the question of how Nazism was at all possible. This work, along with *The Young Hegel,* led me to Hegelianism. It gave me the incentive to interpret Marx from a dialectical viewpoint.

Today I regard *The Destruction of Reason* as a one-sided account and a document of a period during which there was a search for philosophical or ideological scapegoats for some totalitarian practices. Popper's *Open Society* and statements made by Horkheimer, Adorno and Bloch are characterized by this type of approach.

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Undoubtedly a great number of distortions, but also some important and valid partial analyses, can be found in *The Destruction of Reason.* To this day I still agree essentially with Lukács' analysis of Nietzsche, whose prophetic attitude always seemed suspect to me — although I do not regard him as a forerunner of Nazism.

Q: The influence of Lukács' controversial Aesthetics *is evident both in your book on* Everyday Life *and the one on* Renaissance Man. *How would you assess this work both in terms of your personal indebtedness to Lukács as your mentor and in the critical light of its historical background?*

A: As early as 1956, the philosophical discussions within the Petöfi Circle resulted in a resolution to address certain fundamental problems of philosophy in order to re-establish Marxism's relevance. The Hungarian revolution showed us how decisive political praxis was and we felt the lack of sound theoretical foundations by which to guide our political activity. Lukács' *Aesthetics* was a revelation and proved to us that great philosophy was still possible, even in our time. Not only the fact that such a book could be written, but also its structure and content influenced us greatly. Its primary significance rests with the theory of objectifiaction developed from the perspective of art objectifications. The treatment of art as a world of objectifications provided us with a *universal methodology* that enabled us to understand the question of historical continuity. In my book *Everyday Life,* I undertook to broaden this theory into a general theory of objectifications. Furthermore, the *Aesthetics* addressed the question of the validity of values *vis-à-vis* a theory of objectification. The validity of art works was defined by the "memory of mankind" and "self-consciousness of mankind"; and although the word value did not occur, it was precisely what was at issue. Basically, Lukács' aesthetics was a philosophy of history and a philosophical alternative to *History and Class Consciousness.* In many respects, Lukács returned to the fundamentally phenomenological and hermeneutic categories of the Heidelberg aesthetics. The forgotten category of the species (*Gattung*), once rehabilitated on the context of a theory of objectification, reconciled the holistic and the individual perspectives. The dilemma of the isolated subject-object and the collective subject could be resolved without recourse to the transcendental subject and without conceiving of the sphere of objectifications as totally alienated.

There are several reasons why the book was not understood in the West despite its enormous importance. The first and most important reason is that it was not read at all. Goldmann, Bloch and Adorno admitted to me that they had never read the *Aesthetics,* and their unanimous objection was that it was too long. In the Western world many are obliged to keep up with current ideological developments because they engage in public discussions and must be able to respond critically to such phenomena. To spend four months on a book is out of the question. Once Lukács asked Mannheim why he quoted Marx from *History and Class Consciousness* rather than re-reading Marx himself. Mannheim answered: "I have to read my colleagues' books. How can I spend months reading Marx?" I concur with Adorno, Bloch and Goldmann in criticizing the excessive length of Lukács' work, the ideas of which could be expressed more succinctly. But even an abridged version edited by Feher met with no real response, such that the causes for the indifferent reception must be of a more substantial nature.

One reason may be that Western readers have become accustomed to a reflective philosophy that addresses methodological questions. The *Aesthetics* is an unreflected work which creates a new methodology without being aware of it. Its approach to the object, to art, is naive and not ideologically mediated. The objective structure of the

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world as "appearance" and "essence" is presumed self-evident, as is the objectivity of theoretical categories.

Another, perhaps more plausible, reason rests with Lukács himself. In the Stalin era, Lukács had accepted dialectical materialism as his philosophical understanding of the world, and could not suddenly give this up. In several passages of the *Aesthetics,* Lukács uses antediluvian categories that he sought to endow with a new content. This holds true for the concepts reflection and realism. Reflection is generally equated with the Greek category *mimesis* as imitation of mores, or *ethos,* not of reality. Realism is identified with the unity of species and individual, and understood through the formal category of particularity. The dichotomy between essence and appearance and between species and individual are not always reconciled successfully, but this does not detract from the work's basic value.

Q: What do you think of the way Western Marxist culture in general has evaluated Lukacs' works? Have they been critically assimilated? To what extent do ideological reservations and prejudices pertaining to Lukács' controversial "Stalinism" affect the partial or total evaluation of Lukacs today?

A: What happened and still happens to Lukács' work is typical of the fate of all significant thinkers. We cannot speak of a unequivocal evaluation of Lukács by "the" Marxist culture. There are numerous Marxian schools, among which several either reject or remain indifferent to Lukács' ideas or regard Lukács' works as having great relevance and appropriate his ideas to further develop them. But even in the latter case, there is no unified reception. We all have our "own Lukács," and attach varying degrees of significance to his different works and concepts.

The changing function of historical materialism that Lukács discussed in *History and Class Consciousness* is evidenced by his own works, which fulfilled many different functions in the socialist movements over the last 50 years. It is perhaps less well known that the fucntion of the theory of realism also changed several times. It was first formulated against the *Proletkult* as a defense of democratic reception of art against the aristocratic and elitist sectarianism. Later it became a stronghold for the cultural tradition against a Stalinist revolutionary romanticism, and still later represented a conservative ideology of the total rejection of modern art. Although all three interpretations were possible from the outset and even existed simultaneously, the function of the theory was ever changing. The change in function always involves a time factor. Generally, a work may be totally forgotten, only to be revived later by the masses. For example, the radicalism of *The Soul and the Forms* and *The Theory of the Novel* was understood only by Goldmann, whereas now both works are widely known.

As for the appropriation of Lukács by the Marxist movements, he recently has become just as much an academic in the West as an "official" thinker in the East. The first is a fate which no thinker can avoid. In the academic world, his thoughts are regarded and taught as "knowledge." A great number of students will write dissertations on Lukács and thereby gain a foothold in the academic world. But with regard to Lukács' posthumous official career in the East, especially in Hungary, the question of his "Stalinism" or "anti-Stalinism" remains unresolved. Only after Stalinism has become a part of the historical past will we be able to regard Lukács' work without bringing up the question of responsibility. Lukács was both a Stalinist and an anti-Stalinist. He always confronted Soviet society and the Party with their own ideal type and was a Stalinist insofar as he advocated this type. He was an anti-Stalinist because he never saw his own ideal realized in his own society, and was therefore always in the opposition — even against his own will. He was neglected, mis-

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understood, persecuted, even arrested and deported, by a system he considered essentially just. That his *own* persecution did not cause him to abandon an ideal of government is an indication of his high moral standard. That the mass persecution of others did not shake his faith, however, was a moral crime.

But posterity has no right to judge Lukács. It is not that we cannot understand his past and the historical period in which his existential choice fell, for he himself maintained that "the soul has no prehistory." Rather, we cannot judge him because he condemned himself. As early as 1956, he began gradually to understand his own responsibility and concluded during the last year of his life that, as he used to tell us: "My life has been a failure." Already a living classic, he of course was not a failure, but only too old and too close to death to transform this catharsis into written work. But he did experience it. When I read a posthumously published interview with Heidegger that came out a couple of years ago, I found in him no trace of responsibility, and I again appreciated that man who could admit "My life has been a failure." Lukács spared us from judging him.

Although he is now a saint in the official Hungarian pantheon, Lukács still is condemned to silence. Official censorship extends to his role in 1956, his protest against the Czech invasion and his last inverviews. After the events of 1968 he wrote an essay that he called his "democracy pamphlet," in which he maintained that the Soviet Union, though "objectively" a socialist country, was not so "subjectively." This essay was confined to the archives for 50 years after his death. This shows that the place reserved for Lukács in that pantheon is *not rightfully his,* for he keeps protesting from his grave, so to speak.

Q: How do you explain this persistent diffidence of Marxist culture, including the critical and revolutionary contingents, toward ethical questions?

A: The rejection of ethical questions within Marxism is due to several things. People who represent conflicting standpoints often stand in unison against "ethical views." They may *say* the same thing, but not *mean* the same thing.

The rejection of ethics is sometimes due to a mere misunderstanding. The emphasis on values in Marxist theory and on the moral implications of our social actions is understood by some as a *causal relation* insofar as the generalization of moral modes of behavior is misinterpreted as the *cause* of socialist transformation. They assume that the function of ethics implies insipid moral commandments to improve oneself and be honest and good, with the understanding that such improvement will suffice in overcoming capitalist society. The ethical implications of Marxism, however, have nothing to do with this conception. In order to change the moral character of human beings, we need new *institutions,* in particular rational communication and living communities.

Rational communication brings individuals into a situation which obliges them to think about their particularity: the living community obliges them to act with a view toward transcending their particularity. Institutions that foster thinking with and for one another can further the elimination of greed and the ambition to dominate. Not by human goodness alone, but through institutions can people and society change.

Thus, the moral implication of Marxism does not mean that individual ethical change could lead to social change. It does, however, contradict Lenin's thesis that we must build socialism on the legacy of capitalism, for people change in the revolutionary process. Revolution is not a *coup d'état,* which changes no one and merely redistributes. Long-term revolution of lifestyles and institutions of human coexistence — in short, a total social revolution — is conceivable only by changing

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selfish and ambitious men.

Another rejection of ethics argues that ethics is identical with false consciousness. All moral values merely reflect class interests. The reverse of the same thesis maintains that for socialists, the good is identical with the interests of the proletariat. This theory, first formulated by Engels, merely applies bourgeois theories of egoism to social classes. Its point of departure is the acceptance of the bourgeois *alienation* of ethics, expressed in the identification of the "good" with the "useful." Engels tried to solve the problem by correlating self-sacrifice with class interests, but instead of salvaging ethics from its alienation in the socialist movement, this alienation was incorporated into socialism. If one identifies the good with the useful, then *everything is permitted,* and we would be preparing the way for a new barbarism, not socialism.

Another argument against ethics states that decisions must be *politically* and not *morally* motivated, that the political consequences of our decisions, not their moral implications, are paramount. The difference between political and moral decisions, however, rests merely with the distinction between direct and indirect responsibility.

In my opinion, however, responsibility for the fate of others is a matter of ethics. In cases of decisive action *all men* possibly affected by the decision should participate equally in the process of decision. Dialogue as the basis for decision-making relativizes the differences between direct and indirect responsibility. Even in cases where decisions can exert only an indirect influence on the fate of others, we should act as though this effect were direct. We should assume modes of behavior that can be universalized. Without this norm, socialist politics is absolutely impossible.

Allow me to cite an example. A few professors from Lower Saxony published the complete text of the Mescalero letter, only to revoke that letter under pressure from the Christian Democratic Party of their state. One professor, himself uninvolved in this incident, commented on the choice of submission or disobedience by distinguishing between political and moral motivations. Had it been meant merely as a moral gesture, it would have been acceptable to retract the original letter; but as an act of political resistance, the act deserves condemnation. The professors mentioned above retracted their previous position with the argument that other, more reactionary professors would replace them were they to maintain their original stance. This is a completely unacceptable consideration. If we judge our options only in terms of what may be politically wise, then we can justify everything, even those acts that may be morally questionable. Political utility cannot be our sole criterion and has not been the foremost consideration of many courageous individuals.

Neither civil disobedience nor moral protest is a "mere" gesture. American youths who *refused* military service in the Vietnam war, often risking prison sentences, did so out of moral conviction. To retract my conviction *under pressure* is not morally permissible. *Not* to retract under pressure would be equivalent to a categorical imperative for all to conform. Moral gestures are also *political* ones because of their exemplary character. Socialist politics, like consistently democratic politics in general, cannot be based on political prudence alone. Political utility, devoid of ethical content, makes the task of oppression easy. Without civil courage — which is after all a *moral norm of civil society* — there is no hope for changing society.

The last argument against the moral implications of Marxism objects to basing decisions on moral conscience that may fall prey to "moral evil." There is such a thing as moral evil and it has done no little harm to the socialist cause. When enthusiasts of abstract ideas enforce their ideas against the conviction and will of others in the name and interest of others, we are confronted with moral evil. The moral intentions of such

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zealots can be much more dangerous than any political opportunism. The moralistic terrorism of the Jacobins and Hobbes' anthropology belong historically and structurally to the two extremes of alienation. Moral evil can be eliminated only in a society which has realized the institution of rational communication and living community.

Q: The question of ethical Marxism has had a long history in the tradition of the Second and Third Internationals. For example, the reaction to the positivization of ethics in orthodox Marxism caused neo-Kantian socialism to retreat into a purely subjective morality. *Do you think this was an inevitable outcome and, if so, what is your judgment of this theoretical change which, among other things, indirectly influenced Lukács?*

A: At the time of the Second International, moral issues were introduced not only by the so-called "neo-Kantian socialists;" Sorel and the Russian nihilists and the anarchists also raised them. Almost all were hostile to positivistic Marxism, but for completely different reasons. Neo-Kantian Marxists formulated their ethics for the "common man," in particular, the worker. Their arguments against Kautsky had not only a theoretical but also a practical justification. Their point of departure was that ethics cannot be derived from science. The workers,, so they reasoned, do not join Social Democracy because they are *scientifically* convinced that the future belongs to socialism, but because they conceive of class struggle toward socialism as being *justified*. Without this moral conviction, no socialist movement would be possible. This viewpoint contains no "subjective morality;" it is only a defense of the workers' common sense against positivistic interpretations.

Another assumption of neo-Kantian socialists was that every worker makes moral decisions as an *individual* and not merely as a member of a class. This is not a position of subjective morality, but the first sign within the social democratic movement indicating a rejection of the alienation of morality. Luxemburg, Pannekoek and to some extent Jaurès, shared this view, though they never were neo-Kantians. In accepting the categorical imperative, they understood the true motivations of workers better than Kautsky, For, if a worker sees the cause of socialism as justified, he *wants* others to see this too, so that this will provide a universal maxim for their actions.

But the neo-Kantians reached a deadlock when they tried to apply the categorical imperative to cases of *conflict of duty*. This was not at all orthodox Kantian, because Kant excludes the very possibility of a conflict of duty. But they, especially Otto Bauer, could not evade this problem, since conflicts of duty arose so often in the social democratic movement that the theory would have lost its relevance had it refused to interpret thsese decisions ethically. The famous paradigm is the case of a worker torn between letting his children starve to death or being a strike-breaker. Bauer tried in vain to base the decision on the categorical imperative. Here, Kautsky is better off than Bauer, not because the former resorts to his own positivist theory, but because he rejects the Kantian model. The worker should reveal this conflict to his comrades, who *themselves* would not continue toe strike at the cost of such a sacrifice. This discussion showed how meaningless the catgorical imperative is in cases where moral duties conflict with other moral duties. It is to Kautsky's credit that he did not counter Bauer's absurdity with yet another absurdity, namely that the worker necessarily should choose class interests at the price of human life.

Sorel's reintroduction of morality was completely different from the arguments of the neo-Kantian Marxists. He formulated his conception *against* Kautsky and positivism, but from the standpoint of class morality. Interests have nothing to do with

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morality. For Sorel, the greatness of a class depends on its sense of determination, which in turn expresses the new morality of the proletariat. Rational thought belongs to the *bourgeoisie* and not to the working class. By its *élan vital* this class should develop militant qualities motivated by the myth of the general strike. The working class should overcome the "cowardly decadence" of the capitalists by its aristocartic, heroic virtues.

The nihilistic, and later the *Eser*, movement influenced the moral discussions of the time in another respect. Here attention centered on the moral heroism of individuals, and on the tormenting question of whether the cause justified killing and moral sin.

In 1919 Lukács was influenced more by the last two tendencies than by the neo-Kantian Marxists. That an individual makes moral choices was self-evident to him.

At that time he was the spiritual leader of the "ethical" group in the Hungarian Communist Party during the first Soviet Republic, and his ethical position embodied two distinct tendencies. On the one hand, ethical problems became identical with the development of a new collective morality. Like Sorel, Lukács too believed in a collective morality but based it on a rationality deriving from the Englightenment and German Classicism. The harmony of ethical inclinations and reason was intrinsic to his moral ideal. The moral education of workers and the appeal to moral conduct were for him the only alternatives to *coercion*. This was a democratic theory based on the association of free and equal individuals. On the other hand, Lukács also represented another tendency, for which the moral sin of the "hero" was central. An idealized "being unto death," illustrated by the parable of the Biblical Judith, was really just a continuation of Romantic "hero worship." The former tendency in Lukács' theoretical efforts is still relevant today, whereas the latter tendency should be discarded.

Q: What relation is there between your idea of a permanent discussion concerning values in socialist society and Habermas' theory of communication free of domination? Are your ideas on socialist society in any way related to the Habermasian theme of the "public sphere?"

A: My conception of a permanent discussion concerning values openly adopts Habermas' idea of "communication free of domination," with the understanding that the latter cannot provide a basis for *consensus* before and for decision. Rather, consensus is conceivable only in terms of the *infinity* of discourse itself. Without such a consensus there is necessarily repression, and even under optimal dircumstances the will of the majority is implemented *against* the will of the minority. A true practical consensus is possible only if we presuppose the universal validity of a few *material* values. For socialist societies, consensus concerning material basic values is simultaneously the conclusion of prior discussions concerning value. This is possible because there are values which can be related *without contradiction* to the *already existing* value of freedom. Three material values can be integrated into the context of freedom. The first is rational communication free of domination among free citizens dealing with truth; the second is the recognition and satisfaction of the needs of all, constituting *the good*; the third is the development of human potential as *the beautiful*. The last two were formulated by Marx: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs. These three basic values, which are both individual and universal, make a consensus preceding the practical discourse possible and consequently, also allow for a society free of repression.

Socialist society presupposes praxis as a developmental process and it also

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presupposes new types of public spheres, new levels of discussion and institutions. These cannot be reduced to the concept of a "proletarian public sphere." There are three interconnected, yet very different spheres in which the material values mentioned above can be realized. One is the public sphere of the *counter culture* in theory, in art, and in education. The goal of the counter culture is to create a new public sphere. The partisans of counter culture do not form a community nor do they comprise a unified movement. The counter culture must have its own institutions, while striving to participate in established institutions, such as the mass media and the educational system. The counter culture should, in the long run, constitute itself as *the culture* or, to use Gramsci's terms, achieve hegemony. Another sphere for which the three basic values can become constitutive is the *community*. It is a mocrocosm of new lifestyles and new systems of needs. The third sphere is the institution of self-management, in factories and elsewhere. This is the domain of *democratic procedure*. Communication free of domination means here the discussion concerning values which repeatedly enter into concrete decision-making, and thus govern instrumental rationality.

The universalization of the institution of self-management provides a basis for the universalization of the first two spheres. When private property is abolished and replaced by public ownership, the material basis for a system of self-management and for a democratic public sphere is created. It is important to criticize Habermas' *formalism*, but not his basic idea, which allows us to hypostasize a few material values for a socialist public sphere.

Q: Your work makes an implicit reference to the current situation in socialist countries. In particular, you forcefully articulate the issue of the distribution of power and of political pluralism. On this issue, your position differs from one expressed recently by the Hungarian socialist Andras Hegedüs, another representative of the Budapest School. What is your relationship to Hegedüs' ideas?

A: Without pluralism there can be no democracy. The pluralistic system of institutions may vary, but in large states, this pluralism functions on the political level only as formal democracy. The tried and proven form of formal democracy today is the parliamentary, multi-party system with the division of legislative, judicial and executive powers. The abolition of institutions of formal democracy leads not to socialism, but to a new form of despotism. Historical developments in Eastern Europe have confirmed this. I do not mean to deny that new institutionalized forms of democracy will be possible, nor that the established forms could be complemented by others, e.g., a workers' council system. Political pluralism and the guarantee of human rights are, however, essential to any workers' council system. It is not surprising that, after the Bolshevik Party seized power, it abolished not only the parliamentary system but at the same time stripped the workers' councils of power. Only when bourgeois society undergoes change can there be any talk of changing political institutions. Institutions of formal democracy are the preconditions for a socialist transformation, and new institutions can prove to be viable and democratic only by a process of trial and error.

My current controversies with Andras Hegedüs center precisely on this issue. Between 1965 and 1968, our goals were essentially the same. He participated in economic reform efforts in Hungary, hoping that these would introduce political reforms. His proposals included the restoration of civil liberties and the socialization of ownership, through workers' participation. The end of the reform period, however, caused our ways of thinking to diverge. I concluded that the Eastern European regime

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could not be reformed under the present circumstances, and he thought that the reform proposals should be adapted to real possibilities and existing frameworks of Eastern European systems. He did not accept political pluralism, or, more precisely, he distinguished between the West and the East, in terms of what was possible and suitable for one or the other. He accepted the bisection of Europe as a fact, and incorporated it into his program. In the East, the one-party system and the supremacy of the Party are not questioned. For Hegedüs, the Party embodies the general interest and should mediate between particular interests — especially economic ones. In his view, popular movements can and should exert pressure on the Party. In this respect his position resembles that of Bahro, with the difference that for Bahro the Party should be dynamic and integrate new lifestyles. For Hegedüs, the Party's function is to maintain social equilibrium. The pitfalls of such a position are quite evident. If power is not distributed and no institutions of political pluralism exist, *the good will* of those in power determines whether popular movements can be tolerated. If they are not challenged by opposition or their power counterbalanced, then the powerful become omnipotent. A society cannot operate on good will. Power would allow for a few concessions now and then, but these can be revoked arbitrarily at any time, particularly if positions of power are endangered. The alternative to such monopolization of political power is civil war. Only in a democratic system can a viable balance be struck between the two extremes.

Q: Your account of socialism includes a critique of wage labor, which you attempt to replace with the concept of work. Is creative work today still possible in the original Marxian sense?

A: In speaking of the "abolition of work" one should specify the abolition of wage labor. Wage labor prevails when people must sell their work in order to create the material conditions for their life and further work activity. In this light the plumber and the natural scientist of our time are identical, for neither the values nor goals of their work are determined by them. Their *need* for work and the *concrete* work they must perform are in conflict. Wage labor results in the negation of work, expressed in the universal slogan "abolition of work."

The slogan, however, overlooks the subjective need for work. Allow me to cite an example from Australia. In a town called Wyalla, factories were shut down for good and workers received a relatively high sum as unemployment compensation from the state. In interviews with workers, most of them spoke of their loss of work as a catastrophe. One worker stated: "To imagine that I may never work again in my life is sheer hell," even though he was fully taken care of by unemployment compensation.

Work is a property of our species, and necessary to the development of our personality. It cannot be replaced by play, as there is *no play* without work. Playing does not involve applying our physical and spiritual energies in accord with a social demand, but to do so without such a demand. Joy in play is imaginable only in contrast to joy in work. Satisfaction of the need to work is joy, joy in success, and in the recognition of success. The pleasure derived from labor is perverted in the alienating conditions of wage labor.

Satisfying the need for work means finding joy in the work porcess, in the product of work itself and in the satisfaction of the needs of others. Only when none of these preconditions exists can we speak of totally alienated work. When all three are present, then work is free and self-fulfilling, though *not all our abilities are involved* in working. Work is creative in the Marxian sense when work is a conscious part of the process of self-liberation.

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Q: What relation does your critique of alienated labor bear to concrete analyses of factory organization in Hungary, such as the one contained in Haraszti's book?
A: Haraszti's book is tremendously important for various reasons. It clearly proves that the need to work persists even under completely alienated conditions. Workers in the factory he describes steal material and time with hopes of saving a piece of meaningful work for themselves or of producing something useful, beautiful and skillful for their family. The book is a unique document for its criticism of Eastern European regimes in one of their fundamental claims to legitimacy, namely the workers' sovereignty. Haraszti shows how workers really live in these countries, and how they reflect on their lives. He documents that workers are deprived of rights that workers in the West won as early as the 19th century, and that the possibility for expressing class solidarity no longer exists for them. The ideology of "working class power" is based on the premise that individual workers can become members of the elite. However, the emancipation of a class is not identical with the seizure of power by a few former members of this class. In the countries of "realized socialism," however, the rise of individuals of one class not only did not emancipate that class or improve its plight, but rather enslaved it and deprived it of *identity*. The attitude that one is "muddling along," the "secret" strike, and outbreaks of rage are all indicative of the impotence deriving from loss of identity and self-consciousness. The only solution is union organization to defend the personal rights of individual workers.
Q: Let us conclude with some personal questions. What are your first impressions of your new working environment? Do you plan to return to Hungary and, if so, under what conditions?
A: It is a great joy to be working in a university again after 20 years. I am now "discovering" that a journey abroad has only financial preconditions, that manuscripts can be taken along in one's pocket or sent by mail, that I can answer a naive question openly without worrying that the inquirer might be a police agent. One who lives in Eastern Europe and wants to be politically involved has three alternatives: to give up one' theory, to give up active politics, or to accept a privileged position. I rejected the third alternative from the beginning, and the first two options are problematic. The political activist can expect to be expelled by the government or to sit in jail for years. The theorist cannot achieve anything of significance by theory alone, except perhaps in a few restricted disciples.

When a politically active theorist from Eastern Europe chooses to live in the West, his political engagement in Eastern Europe will never again be a practical one. One can write what one wants about Eastern Europe, one can participate in all protest without the least risk, although the function of what one says or does must necessarily change.

This is the antinomy of politically active Eastern European theorists: whether they live in the East or in the West, they are always confronted with bad choices.

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SECRETS OF CENSORSHIP IN POLAND*

by Piotr Cygan and Rubem C. Fernandes

The opposition in Poland has had a remarkable success during the last few years. Thus, the publication of the secret documents concerning censorship was celebrated as "one of the biggest unmasking operations of the whole post-war period." A professional censor decided to change sides and to make a gift of over seven hundred pages of classified material to a highly respected opposition group, the Committee for the Self-Defense of Society. The committee confirmed the authenticity of the document, organized it thematically, wrote an introduction, added their signatures, and sent the whole package to ANEKS (ANNEX), a publishing house established abroad by Polish exiles who left in 1968.[1]

The result was a precious book printed in two volumes, the first in 1977 and the second at the end of 1978. *The Black Book of Censorship — PPR,* vol. I,[2] contains daily instructions concerning all the branches of the media and all possible topics. It was issued by the Central Censorship Office of the Press, Publications and Performances[3] between February 1974 and February 1977. At the end of the book a list is attached with a very special type of information: full names and telephone numbers of censors employed in the Central Office and its local agencies in the main cities of the country.

In making the selection of documents for the book, the editors withheld from publication a few articles. Here follows their own explanation for this limited censorship: "We take full responsibility for declaring that, even if the strictest rules and vigilance were to be applied, only five or six pieces of information out of approximately 700 pages of documents issued by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances could have any possible connection with the realm of state secrets. The full texts of those few items which might involve national security have been replaced by a general outline in the documents published below. The documents as a whole, however, disprove the censors' own contention that their existence and activities are justified by the need to protect state secrets and, indeed, prove that the latter are created at the whim of the censor's office. It is intolerable that the label of 'state secret' should be attached to thousands of items of information concerning, for example, the type of parasites attacking our cattle, the hazards confronting people employed in various branches of the chemical industry, the social and pastoral activities of the Church, the names and works of writers and scholars, books and films, historical events, or the many decorations, orders, etc., which cannot even be mentioned in obituaries. We are able to appreciate the social and national function of state secrets in ensuring the defense and security of the country. It is obvious from the documentary testimony of the censor's office, however, that by applying the principle of state secrets to its own operations these functions are directly subverted. Such activities only serve to immobilize society and render it incapable of self-defense."

Besides the daily instructions, the book contains other kinds of material. Among them are pedantic commentaries by the Central Office on particular texts that "should" have

1. By choosing the name ANNEX (an annex to the press in Poland), they have affirmed their link with those who remained in the country and thus set themselves apart from earlier waves of exiles.
2. *Czarna Ksiega Cenzury — PRL. 1* (Aneks: London, 1977).
3. Briefly known as GUKPPiW, for Glowny Urzad Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk.

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been censored but were overlooked, as well as commentaries on texts that were "unnecessarily" censored. Unfortunately, one has to admit that these directives and recommendations are made by intelligent people. Although seemingly arbitrary, censorship regulations do make sense, and in the following section we will try to spell out some of the principles that hold them together.

It was instructive to watch the mother of one of our friends reading the *Black Book of Censorship in the Polish People's Republic*. She is Polish, lives permanently in Warsaw, and came to the United States for a month to visit her daughter. She is a well-educated person, but rarely has time to read about politics and certainly knows little of that ancient discipline of text analysis. She read the *Black Book* in one breath, with passionate involvement, commenting continuously on the text. Her astonishment, and her satisfaction as well, came from the fact that much of what she was reading *confirmed things she already knew from hearsay*.

In fact, although there is plenty of new information here, a substantial part of the book does not make any sense if one is not already aware of its content. A number of directives seem to be formulated as if in direct response to rumors circulating in society. For example: "No information should be released about the construction of a second (wide gauge) railway track between Hrubieszow, Bilgoraj and Katowice" (section of Recommendation No. 65). The railway tracks in Poland are narrower than those in the Soviet Union; when crossing the border, passengers must shift from one train to another, and the freight trains have to be reloaded. For years, one has heard gossip about the Polish tracks being rebuilt in order to accommodate the Soviet system.

Another example: "It is forbidden to publish information that might reveal (directly or indirectly) the scale of production plans and the tonnage of sugar produced in this year's sugar campaign. This directive refers to the sugar industry as a whole as well as to individual sugar mills. It is also forbidden to disseminate information about the size of sugar reserves from previous years. No information is to be released regarding possible utilization by the foreign trade of the favorable export situation created by sugar deficit on the world market" (Recommendation No. 47). For months, sugar was hard to find in grocery stores. People standing in line to buy a couple of pounds of sugar were heard to complain, "There is a shortage of sugar here, but they are continuing to export it!" Or: "The mass media are not allowed to disseminate information about purchases by Poland of licenses from capitalist countries. This regulation applies to licenses already in operation, newly concluded agreements, and all proposals for the buying of licenses" (Foreign Trade No. 6). Polish industry uses Jones construction cranes and Leyland engines; city transportation systems depend on Berliot buses; highways are crowded with Fiat automobiles; individual consumers praise high-quality Grundig tape recorders and radios. Everyone knows it, everyone talks about it. But "excessive information" in the press or on television is forbidden for the "cumulative effect of such information might be to induce a belief in the average reader that the modernization of Poland's economy is based upon the purchase of licenses from developed capitalist countries."

Focusing exclusively on how the mass media and the official press are working gives a *false impression* of total government control over society. To be sure, everything that goes through the media is regulated by censorship, but this does not mean that the various social groupings are unaware of what is happening, at least in matters directly concerning their lives. The relatives of victims of an airplane crash — unreported in the papers — moan the tragedy with their friends; the news of an illegal strike — undiscussed by the press — spreads, traveling to far-off places; the specialists in

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economic planning or cattle breeding do have access to specialized literature including foreign periodicals; anyone can listen to the daily programs of Radio Free Europe broadcasting from Munich news and commentaries on domestic Polish as well as international affairs; and many Poles have direct personal contact abroad — about 5 million (statistically 1 out of 6 inhabitants) travel yearly to foreign countries, including over half a million who visit capitalist countries.

It seems, then, that *the main function of censorship is not to hide information, but to control the way in which information travels around society*. The censorship craft exacerbates a distinction which exists in all societies, between what should be said in public and what should be said only in private. In contrast to government messages, a personal type of communication develops which is done in a special tone of voice reserved for conversations about "forbidden" things. Thus, the secrets of the state are uncovered by civil gossiping which partakes of all the strengths and weaknesses of this kind of communication.

Usually this "gossiping" is limited to private contacts and, as such, is not exposed to the demands of political confrontation. But at explosive moments of open dissent, the distinction between the private and the public spheres is challenged, and the rumors, condensed, break through the tight circuit of official rhetoric. That is what happened in March 1968 in Warsaw, in December 1970 in the Baltic ports, and in July 1976 in Radom. In each of these cases, concrete demands were put forward by the demonstrators. In each of these cases the "scandal" of gossip made public was exorcised by the burning of newspapers justified by the denunciation: The Press Lies!

Under the conditions of state ownership of the mass media and the press, censorship in Poland is able to orchestrate the *visible* sphere of intellectual exchange. This control operates along both vertical and horizontal lines. A horizontal distinction of information determines which of the daily papers should publish what aspects of a given issue, or which magazines should handle specific types of problems. But the more important codification is vertical, running according to the principle: the broader the circulation, the more detailed the control. Specialized periodicals, whether scientific, technical or literary, with the most limited audience, enjoy a greater degree of freedom. Television, national radio and the mass circulation daily press, however, are regulated with the minute attention as to what kind of information is forbidden, what kind of information should be propagandized, and the way this information should be presented.

The layout of the daily papers, for examples, reveals that the headlines and the front pages are reserved for press releases of the official news agencies: the Soviet TASS and the Polish PAP. To the editors remains the composition of the back pages, which are themselves also substantially codified by the Central Censorship Office. The general rule here is, the more touchy the subject, the less space to be devoted to its discussion. Hence, the habit of many readers of starting their morning papers by reading the minute pieces of news....

The newspaper language varies according to a similar principle. The most positive forumlae, the most emphatic adjectives — be they the signs of enthusiasm or of indignation — are reserved for official press releases. The editors, on the other hand, tend to cultivate a subtle art of writing between the lines. Therefore, it is also not surprising that festive occasions, such as the anniversary of the Revolution, or those that are highly charged with emotion, such as recollections of World War II, the topics much written about and in a strong language, are among the subjects that undergo a great deal of scrutiny by the censors.

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Individual authors are also classified according to the space alotted them in the media. There are some who can publish regularly, but whose texts have to pass a special inspection of the Central Censorship Office; others who can publish in specialized periodicals, but who in the mass media should be referred to only briefly or critically; others who are not currently allowed to publish their work, but who can still be reviewed or quoted; and there are some who cannot be mentioned at all. It often happens that among the latter group are the authors and titles most talked about by the intelligentsia — e.g., the books of W. Bienkowski, a former minister of culture who later joined the opposition, are published abroad and, though indexed, circulate from hand to hand in the main cities of the country. In the *Black Book*, vol. I, there are over two hundred authors variously restricted; among them are many of the prominent social scientists and artists in the country.

The orchestration of the media, however, is marked with severe dissonances. In the first place, there are always instances of professional failure, cases in which the things that "should" have been censored escaped attention of the censor. For example, in connection with the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union, a book by A. Czubinski, *The Soviet Union: Years of Strife and Victory*, was published in a large printing of 30,000 copies. The book included a brief overview of the early years of the Communist Party and of the dramatic developments during the 1930s. A second reading by the censors found too much attention devoted to certain revolutionary leaders, such as Trotsky, Bukharin and Zinoviev, and to the conflicts within the party. The book was severely criticized and its publication judged to be a "serious political mistake" (Information Note No. 1 of February 1974). It was then left to the censors to attempt to make up for the earlier oversight: "All information about, references, and reviews of A. Czubinski's book, *The Soviet Union,* are to be eliminated. The content of this note is not to be transmitted to editorial offices" (Culture No. 7).

The Central Office of Censorship covers communication that takes place within various social circles. It must accommodate this diversity in spite of tensions existing among them. A crucial point of tension is in the relationship between the intelligentsia and Party-controlled government. As a rule, the closer one gets to political institutions, the stricter and more uniform are the rules regulating public discourse. Hence, one rarely finds explicit signs of disagreement in official Party periodicals, though journals separated from the general public by their esoteric scientific language serve regularly as a forum for sharp polemics. However, this simple rule is complicated by the existence of periodicals that form a bridge between specialized fields and the culture of the intelligentsia as a whole. Such weekly magazines can transpose a debate of a very limited interest into an issue of general concern, demanding stricter regulation. Borders between the "highly specialized" and the "general concerns," however, are fluid, and the censors cannot rely on clear-cut rules. Too often decisions depend upon a personal judgment which is, of course, a permanent source of contradictory resolutions. Some potentially dangerous controversies are allowed to continue for too long, others are curtailed too soon generating "unnecessary" resentment, and odd situations are created when an intellectual dispute which has just gained momentum is suddenly silenced, as if it had never existed.

The performing arts are also affected by this type of contradiction. Consider the following example: "No materials (notes, discussions, reviews, reports, requests for release, etc.) should be published concerning the movies included in an enclosed list, that will be kept up to date: (the list of over a dozen Polish-produced feature and documentary films)" (Culture No. 1). The scripts for those movies were approved by

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special censors attached to every film agency. Production was state-financed and carried out in state-owned studios, with the state-employed artists. The majority of those films were released for public showing, even if for a short time, and one of the films ran as a serial on television. Another instruction placed discussion of Wajda's *Man of Marble* and of Zanussi's *Camouflage* under special restrictions in spite of the fact that both films were popularly considered to be among the best Polish movies of the last decade. While lines formed around movie houses where those films were being shown, the mass media was to ignore them as much as possible.

The performing arts are marginalized from political power by belonging, as "entertainment," to that sphere of public communication that is closer to private life. One goes to the movies or theater in the evening or on weekends, after the "serious" hours of work, and one goes with family or friends to have a good time. Hence, the censorship of the performing arts can afford to be more flexible, allowing a certain diversity of messages generated by the artists. Cabarets, for example, continue to be centers of political and social criticism. It is, however, their limited range of influence that secures for them this "permission for misbehavior": at night, in dimly lit cafés, sipping drinks, those few who are still not sleeping are invited to make fun at the order of things to which they must submit during the day.

However, some artistic events may spark a debate and set the intelligentsia into motion. They threaten to jump out of a mere "entertainment" zone and affect "serious" public communication. The mass media and the press should not provide the means for this type of invasion; what is said after the movies should not be freely channeled to the weekly and daily papers.

One should also remember that between the public and the private spheres there is an intermediary zone, the existence of which further complicates the situation. The church is the main institution functioning in this unclearly defined area of legitimacy. The following instruction is a good example of problems posed to the censors by church activities: "Eliminate all information concerning the following church centers of education and propaganda that are operating illegally" (Religious Matters No. 8). There follows a page-long listing of various educational institutions run by the church. Among those "illegally operating" are three research centers and two seminaries (full-fledged institutions with students, alumni, the staff of instructors, secretaries, administrators, etc.), functioning regularly in buildings officially allocated to the church by the state. Besides providing instruction, these centers also publish a variety of materials which in turn is examined by the censors!

The directives convey an aura of Kafkaesque absurdity. Even sensational events like an archaeological discovery, a murder case or a large-scale corruption scandal may meet with a directive of public silence. However, there is a logic behind the seemingly arbitrary regulations, and apparent absurdities make sense when one understands the premise upon which rests a definition of the proper role of media in the society. *Public means of communication are first and foremost organs of education and propaganda. They are to serve to transmit messages strictly in one direction, from above down, from government to society.* Thus construed, the media are not to articulate messages generated at lower levels. Such spontaneous manifestations, before gaining public legitimacy, must first pass through a tight mesh of censorial scrutiny.

To be sure, in one way or another, inconvenient news does circulate, but it is not allowed to enter the public sphere, where it might generate public criticism of the authorities or spark public mobilization. Hence, a number of instructions explicitly forbid release of information about acts of individual initiative whether these are

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demands for raising wages, individually organized acts of charity, or the actions of poets painting their words on the walls and street fences (public space). Hence, also, the obvious dislike of the censors for accidents of all types. Airplane crashes, epidemics, work injuries cannot be foreseen and tend to evoke strong emotional responses, demands for accountability, and even irrational accusations.

At times, the logic of central control produces surprising results. Consider, for instance, that beneficient government acts such as the lowering of food prices in certain regions or the raising of wages in some branches of industry, might not be released for publication. Censorship thus limits even the government's propagandistic goals. The reason for these restrictions is explicitly stated in the following directive on the reduction of work time: All information referring to the preparation or the already ongoing transition in some of the industrial plants to the five-day work week should be eliminated from the mass media. *The example of those factories should not be quoted as a model deserving of imitation"* (Wages, Prices and Social Welfare No. 1C, emphasis added).

In a similar spirit, the publication of global statistics is to be avoided, for such information is the privilege of those at the top of the social hierarchy. In short, the instructions convey a *general hierarchical conception of social relations.*

This is particularly clear in those instructions that deal with matters of etiquette. These are norms about how one should talk and behave in public. As in all the etiquette codes, the language is highly ritualized, and it is especially careful when concerned with situations of ambiguity. The official names of the states and frontiers are mandatory, especially in cases that raise any political questions. Thus, "Korean People's Democratic Republic," and not "North Korea," the border between Poland and the German Democratic Republic, not just the "Polish-German frontier"; or "Taiwan," and not "Nationalist China." Respectable language is recommended for any reference to the leaders of countries with which Poland maintains diplomatic relations; no such expression as "guerrillas," "military junta," or "dictatorship" is to be used in these cases. Official pronouncements, even if these are just New Year's Greetings, should keep their elevated value, hence, the mass media may publish only the greetings from the top government executives. Directors of other institutions should use only local bulletins to convey their New Year's messages. Respect is due to the heads of states, therefore only official pictures — or should one say portraits? — are released for publication. Arab leaders tend to use strong language when engaged in polemics, a language not suitable to statesmen. Thus: "great care should be exercised when directly quoting Arab politicians" (Foreign Relations No. 10).

Each of these rules protects certain interests. The last, for instance, tries to play down the internal divisions among Arab leaders. However, the censor's directive is more comprehensive: expressing discomfort with the exuberant rhetoric favored by the Arabs, it reveals the secret of its own impersonal and unitarian concept of social hierarchy.

The basis of the marriage between State Secrets and Civil Gossip is challenged not just by the content of the *Black Book* but also by the form of its publication. In the past, the authors of forbidden books published abroad used pseudonyms and relied on gossip to receive credit for their work. During the last few years, however, the opposition in Poland has grown, become more organized, and has started insisting on its right to public recognition. The publication of illegal material under one's own name is now a common practice. In this provocative gesture, the editors of the *Black Book* sign it with their own names, and add to their signatures their addresses and telephone numbers. It is a daring move that attempts to open new space for intellectual life in the country: *words are made public without the seal of approval of the Central Censorship Office.*

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EXCERPTS FROM THE "BOOK OF DIRECTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS"

Part III. Foreign Relations

P. 24, No. 2. All information concerning diplomatic initiatives or actions taken by socialist countries (especially Poland and the USSR) can only be released after, or simultaneously with, the appearance of appropriate official communiques in the Polish Press Agency (PAP) or TASS. Under no circumstances can information acquired from other sources either proceed or differ in content from official information. This does not apply to matters separately regulated by instructions issued on an *ad hoc* basis.

P. 27, No. 9. All information about the participation of Israeli representatives in international congresses and meetings and other events organized in Poland must be cleared with the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances.

Pp. 27-30, No. 10. In view of the principles governing our foreign policy vis-à-vis countries of the so-called Third World, the following rules should be observed: (a) material favoring any side involved in possible border conflicts in Arab and African countries should not be published [voided July 28, 1976]; (b) it is forbidden to publish information indicating support for the aspirations to a leading role in the Arab world of any one ruling party in the Arab states; for example, Baath, the Arab Socialist League in Egypt, or the National Liberation Front in Algeria; (c) because of our relations with Iraq and the fluid nature of the problem, the Iraqui Baath Party should not be referred to as a rightist Baath movement and criticism of controversies between Baathist factions in Iraq and Syria should not be published. The only acceptable material is that which reports the controversies in dry, factual manner; (d) there must be no publication of information concerning possible limitations on the freedom of action of Communist Parties or their leaders in Egypt, Algeria, the Sudan, Iraq, Libya and Syria; .... (g) it is forbidden to publish information relating to meetings and rallies held by young people and students from Arab and African countries temporarily residing in Poland, if Arab and African regimes are attacked during the course of such demonstrations; (h) no information is to be published about conflicts between non-Arab minorities and the governments of Arab countries if such information would tend to discredit anti-imperialist Arab governments; (i) it is not allowed to publish information concerning visits to Poland of representatives from opposition organizations in Arab and African countries; (j) no information should be published concerning possible trade with Rhodesia and South Africa, or contacts between Polish institutions and South Africa; .... (m) states with which Poland maintains diplomatic relations should not be referred to as military dictatorships or called other names such as "guerrilla" or "military junta" governments. This rule does not apply to Chile, Paraguay, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic; (n) all material (including the briefest references, photographs, etc.) on Iran, past and present, the shah, his family and persons connected with him, or "predictions" on the future fate of monarchy in Iran, should be cleared with the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances. In addition, matters connected with Mossadegh's politics should not be discussed. Emphasis should not be placed on Iran's role in the context of the policies pursued by imperialist forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; (o) publication is not permitted of any expressions of sympathy with Eritrean liberation movements in Ethiopia (new version, January 12, 1976).

P. 30, No. 12. All material (even the shortest references, photographs, etc.) concerning past and present Iran, the shah, his family and persons connected with him should be

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approved by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances. Material prepared by the Polish Press Agency is not subject to this directive. [April 22, 1975; voided January 12, 1976].

Part IV. Comecon

P. 31, No. 1. Information about the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance should not call into question the usefulness and principles of economic cooperation between socialist countries, reveal differences between individual states or criticize stands adopted.

P. 31, No. 3. Cumulative data relating to shortages of raw materials in member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance should not be published.

Pp. 31-32, No. 6. It is forbidden to publish the exchange rates or relative value of the currencies of Yugoslavia and the countries belonging to the CMEA (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the USSR) in relation to the CMEA's common currency, i.e., the transfer ruble, and the comparative exchange rates between the national currencies of the CMEA members. It is also forbidden to publish any statistical data compiled on the basis of the above rates of exchange or comparative values. The content of this note is not for dissemination outside the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances.

Part V. Foreign Trade

P. 37, No. 8. There should be no criticism of drilling equipment produced in the USSR and used for geological purposes in Poland. It is forbidden to publish any suggestions that drilling equipment should be bought from other foreign sources. Soviet equipment bought by Poland is not inferior to that made in the West and, for this reason, we shall continue to import it from the Soviet Union. Unsubstantiated criticism might induce the Russians to stop deliveries. All brief critical references to this subject should be eliminated without trace, while the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances should be consulted about longer pieces.

P. 38, No. 10. No information or data are to be published about the purchase of meat or meat products from the German Democratic Republic. General information concerning the import of meat and specific details of contracts already concluded (outside the GDR) can be released on the condition that other directives are not violated.

P. 39, No. 16. There should be no disclosures touching upon the present polluted state, or emphasis placed on the increasing pollution of Polish sections of rivers with their source in Czechoslovakia as a result of economic activities in Poland. Permission is granted, however, to publish information concerning the pollution of these rivers by Czechoslovak economic activities. [January 27, 1976].

P. 39, No. 17. Until further notice, all information concerning Poland's purchase of U.S. licenses for the manufacture of television sets should be eliminated. [April 9, 1976; voided August 2, 1976].

Part VI. Industry, Raw Materials, Fisheries and Agriculture

P. 40, No. 2. Articles and notes about the electronic industry in Poland should not contain: (a) any comments critical of the program for developing this industry or suggestions that it should be based upon cooperation with capitalist countries and not the USSR.

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Part VII. Wages, Prices, Pensions, Health Services and Social Welfare

P. 45, No. 1. (b) All commentaries, reports, interviews, etc., concerning increases in median incomes throughout the socialist economy, retirement and old age pensions and other benefits, whether already granted or promised during the 7th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, must be confined to the facts listed below. Only those indices appearing in the official releases of the Central Office of Statistics can be quoted. (According to the Central Office of Statistics' figures of January 21, 1976, the nominal net monthly wage of a person employed in the socialist sector of the economy was 3,537 zloties in 1975, having risen by 352 zloties, or 11.1 percent since 1974, while industrial workers enjoyed an increase of 438 zloties, or 13.3 percent. The cost of living for an average working family rose by 2.9 percent between 1974 and 1975).

Decisions concerning wages or current social policies are not to be subjected to criticism. There is to be no mention of any further demands for increases in pay or benefits such as retirement and old age pensions, paid leave, health care, scholarships, etc.

P. 47, No. 3. Demands for immediate reductions in taxes on wages and taxes paid by small businessmen, farmers, etc., are not to be published. Permission, however, is granted to publish analyses of and proposals for changes in the method of computing taxes, reducing the tax burden, etc., if made in the context of future, long-term prospects for change.

P. 47, No. 4. No information is to be released about the special pensions given to various people by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Information concerning such pensions can be published on the condition that the grantor is not identified.

Pp. 47-48, No. 7. Without approval from the Deputy Prime Minister or chairman of the State Price Commission, information relating to reductions and increases in the price of any consumer or durable goods, is not to be published. This directive applies to all printed media, including the Polish Press Agency, whose releases on these subjects also require the approval of the above mentioned officials.

Before publishing any information about local changes in prices (i.e., at the voivodship level), approval must be secured from both the chairman of the Voivodship Price Commission and Party committees. This directive also applies to all changes in sums charged for services supplied by state and local institutions. Material concerning so-called "novelties on the market" must not contain general comments critical either of prices or the government's price policy regarding such items.

Pp. 48-49, No. 9. Articles dealing with the protection of, or threats to, the natural environment in Poland should not contain information about the direct hazards to human life and health created by industry and chemicals used in agriculture.

This regulation applies to specific cases in which pollution of the atmosphere, water, soil and food constitute dangers to human health and life.

All information about pollution by pesticides is also covered by this directive.

Eliminate all material and information about hazards to the health of workers employed in the production of PCV. There is to be no mention of dangers arising from the use of PCV in the building industry or the sale of PCV products on the market.

The Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances should be informed about all material critical of the localization of industrial plants (existing and planned) which might adversely affect the natural environment. (October 18, 1974).

P. 49. No. 10. Cumulative data on the number of road accidents, fires and drownings should be eliminated by the Polish Press Agency, the national press, radio and TV.

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Alarmist comments on these subjects should be watered down. This note is not applicable to descriptions or reports of individual cases or to material concerned with preventive measures (without detailed statistics). (November 14, 1975).

Part VIII. Emigration

P. 51. No. 1. Publication is not allowed of any information about the opportunities to emigrate to the USA of Polish citizens who have applied to the US Embassy for immigrant visas. Possible announcements by the Embassy on this subject should not be printed.

P. 51. No. 4. It is necessary to ensure that reports concerning the progressive changes taking place in Polish émigré organizations in favor of cooperation with the homeland, are written in a factual, restrained and moderate manner.

These changes should be presented as a natural development. Exaggerated emphasis on the activities of those émigré leaders supporting us might only serve to provide hostile elements with additional arguments in their campaign against such leaders.

Part IX. Culture

P. 53. No. 1. Press, radio and television are forbidden to publicize or praise the scholarly achievements of the following people: Bronislaw Baczko, Wlodzimierz Brus, Leszek Kolakowski, Krzysztof Pomian.

Short items concerning, and all polemics against, their works can, however, be released.

Their scholarly work can be printed and referred to (quoted) in nonperiodic publications, academic, socio-political and specialized journals. In such cases, the normal criteria of censorship should be observed. The names of these persons and the titles of their works can be published in bibliographies, lists of names, footnotes and commentaries, etc. Absolutely no works by Kazimierz Orlos are to be released for publication.

Material submitted for publication about this author should be referred, piece by piece, for the approval of the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances.

All Stefan Kisielewski's works can be released for publication following prior consultation with the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances.

Pp. 54-55, No. 26. The names of the following persons and references to their works should be eliminated from the press, radio, television and non-scholarly publications. This directive does not apply to scholarly publications, critical evaluations, bibliographies, indexes and lists of names in which the persons given below and the titles of their works can be mentioned, provided that justification can be offered on academic grounds: (The list of scholars, writers, poets, etc., in the West includes Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Part IX also contains three other black lists and instructions for varying discriminatory measures to be applied to categories as a whole or to individuals singled out for special treatment.)

P. 58, No. 5. It is forbidden to publish not only the works of Vladimir Wojnowicz, Vladimir Maximov and Nadezhda Mandelstam but also any kind of references to, discussions of, or information about these writers and their work.

Permission, however, is granted for the release to all media of short references to the

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person of Osip Mandelstam but if his works are submitted for publication, they should be cleared first with the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances.

This directive is for the exclusive information of the censors. (New version — February 11, 1976).

Pp. 60-61, No. 15. (a) Right-wing interpretations of recent events of Polish history must be eliminated from all books, articles and memoirs. Similarly, all attempts to rehabilitate and popularize traditions hostile to socialism in Poland (e.g., efforts to vindicate policies of the interwar years and leaders of the Second Republic, to reduce their responsibility for Poland's fate in 1939, and to exculpate right-wing underground groups during the occupation by emphasizing their contribution to the battle against occupying forces while simultaneously ignoring the fighting led by the left-wing, etc.), should be suppressed. (b) The Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances should be alerted to the existence of all material, information, obituaries, etc., announcing or giving details about memorial services, meetings at cemeteries, monuments, battle sites of the 1939 campaign or the Warsaw Uprising, etc., either to pay homage to those political and military groups or their leading members who, in the past, had advocated right-wing programs and political ideas, or to military formations (regiments, brigades, etc.) organized during the interwar years and to those who served in such units. (c) The Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances should be notified about all information (including biographical notes and obituaries) concerning the death of leaders and other prominent persons connected either with the various governments of the interwar period or governments in exile. The same applies to active members of those right-wing organizations, associations, groups, etc., now operating abroad. (July 6, 1976).

P. 63, No. 21. The following criteria should be used in evaluating material about the death of Polish officers at Katyn: 1. Any attempt to blame the Soviet Union for the death of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest should not pass the censor. 2. Formulations such as "shot by the Nazis at Katyn," "died at Katyn" or "perished at Katyn," can appear in scholarly works, memoirs and biographies. No statement of this type can be published with a date of death earlier than August 1941. 3. Polish soldiers and officers interned by the Red Army in September 1939 should be described as "internees" and not "prisoners of war." Koxielsk, Starobielsk and Ostaszkow can be named as the internment camps of the Polish officers who were later shot by the Nazis of the Katyn Forest. 4. Obituaries, announcements of memorial services to be held for the victims of the Katyn massacre and information about other means of honoring their memory, are only to be printed after approval by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances.

Whenever in doubt or in the case of matters not covered by this directive, consult the Central Office.

This note is exclusively directed to the censors.

It is forbidden both to reveal its existence or refer to it as justification for censorship. (See Information Note No. 2, 75; January 14, 1975).

Part X. Religious Matters

P. 69, No. 1. All criticism of Marxism should be deleted from religious publications. Theoretical treatises with polemical comments relating to the Marxist concept of religion, communism, the individual and society can only be published in specialized

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books on philosophical and theological problems and in the following specialized journals: *Collectanea Theologica, Yearbook of the Academy of Christian Theology, Yearbook of the Catholic University of Lublin, Studia Philosophiae Christianae, Studia Theologica Varsoviensia,* and *Zeszyty Naukowe of the Catholic University of Lublin.*

P. 73, No. 7. Eliminate all information concerning both intentions to build, rebuild or remodel churches and chapels and efforts to open new parish or monastic establishments.

All information relating to church construction, the opening of a new parish or initiating of a monastic institution, must either be referred to the Department for Religious Affairs in the appropriate voivodship or to the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances.

P. 75, No. 15. It is forbidden to publish information about the present existence of the Uniate denomination in Poland, its subordination to Cardinal Wyszynski or any Uniate activities whatsoever in Poland.

P. 76, No. 17. All claims by Church authorities concerning ecclesiastical property now in the possession of government institutions must be eliminated.

P. 76, No. 19. The following should be ruthlessly eliminated from all Catholic publications (the official Catholic press, lay Catholic press, books, occasional publications, etc): (a) all information about help in the form of parcels (containing clothing, food, medicine) for the people of underdeveloped countries from Catholic institutions and social organizations and individual donors; (b) all exhortations and appeals, including those in letters to the editors of the above publications, to participate in the collection of gifts. March 1, 1976.

Part XI. Varia

P. 82, No. 16. Information about breakdowns of Polish passenger airplanes (operated by LOT), so-called rescue flights (flying ambulances), planes placed at the disposal of foreign and Polish delegations and of airplanes used by directors of industrial organizations, can only be released by the media following the Polish Press Agency's report.

All material on this subject originating independently in editorial offices must be cleared with the Central Office for Control of Press, Publication and Performances. (August 27, 1974).

P. 84, No. 22. It is forbidden to publish material ridiculing both lay ceremonies of naming infants, marriage, funerals, etc., and activities designed to popularize such ceremonies. (January 27, 1976).

P. 85, No. 23. Obituaries with religious motifs are only to be published if signed by individuals, guilds and other trade organizations and unions and associations but not societies of a political or social nature. (March 1, 1976).

Part XII. Recommendations

P. 87, No. 8. Until further notice, material independently acquired on the Watergate affair in the United States will not be published.

All exceptions to this rule (information or comments from sources other than the Polish Press Agency) must be reported to the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances. Every request for permission to publish or reprint such exceptional items in certain journals will be separately considered. (August 7, 1974; voided November 23, 1974).

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P. 87, No. 11. Reports, correspondence and other material concerning Polish military service in the Middle East must not contain information about the lack of cooperation and the bad atmosphere prevailing between, or various incidents occurring among, soldiers of different nationalities serving with the United Nations Emergency Force II.
P. 88, No. 16. It is forbidden to reprint, either in whole or in part, the texts of agreements dropping visa requirements for travel between Poland and Austria, Finland or Sweden. General or detailed comments on the above agreements are to be expunged.

The fact that such agreements have been signed can *only* be recorded by the mass media in the form of brief information items. (Voided October 17, 1974).
P. 89, No. 18. There is to be no publication of any news concerning the archeological discovery (of an ancient cemetery) made during renovation and construction work on the grounds of the Belweder Palace. (Voided January 13, 1975).
P. 90, No. 24. No information is to be released about the murder of a newly-born child by its mother who was a student at the Silesian Medical Academy in Rokitnica-Zabrze, near Katowice. (Voided November 23, 1974).
P. 90, No. 28. Despite the decision of the authorities that cabarets would not take part in this year's Festival of Polish Song in Opole, the editors of the weekly SZPILKI organized a ceremony in Opole on June 28 and presented its award, the "Gold Pin," to Warsaw cabaret "Under the Aegis" ("Pod Egida"), for its long association with the Opole festivals. It is forbidden to publish any information on this subject. (June 28, 1974, voided August 30, 1974).
P. 91, No. 29. No information is to be published concerning the explosion in the "Polkowice" mine. The local press in the Wroclaw area must obtain approval from the voivodship committee of the Polish United Workers Party before publishing anything about this incident. (July 3, 1974, voided July 27, 1974).
P. 91, No. 31. All direct and indirect criticism of the military review in Warsaw should be deleted. Consider as an example of indirect criticism expressions of approval (e.g., in the TV program "The World and Poland" and in the weekly paper *Polityka*) for the decision to exclude airplanes and military trucks from a review in Paris in order to conserve gasoline. (July 13, 1974; voided July 27, 1974).
P. 92, No. 37. Reports about the Polish exhibition organized in Moscow on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Polish People's Republic, should avoid expressions of exaggerated enthusiasm connected with the success of individual exhibitors. Readers might otherwise be led to believe that certain Polish products received a tremendous ovation from Moscow residents and were hitherto unknown on the Soviet market.

An example of this appeared on August 5, 1974, in the *Ekspres Wieczorny* which pompously reported that the exhibition in Moscow "beat all previous records."

The release of unofficial information concerning the possibility of continuing the exhibition beyond the date set, is also forbidden. (August 7, 1974; voided October 17, 1974).
P. 95, No. 51. All information about the consultative conference of the European communist and workers' parties must be approved by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances. (October 30, 1974; voided November 23, 1974).
P. 97, No. 60. Information about changes in the price of certain articles is to be deleted from material concerning the Polish-Soviet agreement signed in Moscow for the exchange of goods and payments in 1975.

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This note is for the exclusive use of the censors. (December 23, 1974; voided January 13, 1975).

Pp. 101-102, No. 80. To forestall an uncontrolled flood of publications about the U.S. Bicentennial and independently organized activities (e.g., "in honor of," "on the occasion of"), the following guidelines are to be observed:

1. Only information provided by the Polish Press Agency concerning celebrations, events and other forms of honoring the Bicentennial is allowed. Information on this subject taken from other sources is to be deleted.

2. Individual remarks (reminders, references) relating to this anniversary can only be released in those publications in which they can be justified by suitable context (for example, the influence of the Bicentennial celebrations on the atmosphere of the American election campaign, or what remains of the values for which the Americans fought 200 years ago, etc.).

3. Mention of and reference to the Bicentennial will only be allowed in publications stressing the Polish contribution to the formation, history, and contemporary shape of the United States, and in historical articles emphasizing the progressive character of revolutionary events while contrasting them with current social and economic problems in the United States.

4. The Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances should be consulted about any material on the Bicentennial not covered by the above directives. (February 21, 1976; voided October 16, 1976).

P. 102, No. 83. Yevgeny Yevtushenko is a member of the official Soviet delegation which arrived in Poland in connection with the "Soviet Culture Days."

He should be treated by the mass media as an ordinary member of the delegation and emphasis should not be placed upon his person. All interviews with him and articles relating to his person or work are to be published only after approval has been obtained from the Propaganda, Press and Publications Division of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party.

This directive is for the exclusive use of all censors. (April 18, 1975; voided May 10, 1975).

P. 103, No. 86. No information should be released about an accident in Slubice killing 2 soldiers, a female teacher and 1 student and injuring 14 other students.

This note does not apply to the daily *Gezeta Zielonogorska.* (May 5, 1975; voided July 13, 1975).

P. 110, No. 103. No information should be released about George R. Feiwel's book, *The Intellectual Capital of Michael Kalecki. A Study in Economic Theory and Policy,* published in the United States. (August 11, 1975; voided January 22, 1976).

P. 112, No. 112. A Polish Press Agency's communiqué and a commentary in *Tass* on the Nobel Prize awarded to the Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov, were marked for exclusive publication in the *Tryvuna Ludu* and *Zycie Warszawy* of October 13, 1975.

Reprints or discussions of the above mentioned communiqué and commentary and information about that prize are not to appear anywhere else in the mass media. (October 13, 1975; voided January 22, 1976).

P. 113, No. 115. All photographs of Comrade Edward Gierek scheduled to appear on the covers of periodicals (weeklies, beweeklies, monthlies, etc.), should not be released before and during the 7th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party without consent from the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances. (November 19, 1975; voided December 22, 1975).

P. 116, No. 127. A group of poets formed in Bydgoszcz under the name "Parkan,"

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printed its works on posters which were pasted on bill-posts, fences, etc. All information concerning this particular method of disseminating poetry should be eliminated from the media as a whole. (February 13, 1976).

P. 117, No. 129. No information should be released on the additional purchase of potatoes for export or their sale abroad. (February 28, 1976; voided September 21, 1976).

P. 117, No. 130. Until further notice, no information should be released about the fire which broke out in the Plock petrochemical works on March 22, 1976. (March 23, 1976; voided October 16, 1976).

Part XIII. Local Directives

Pp. 120-121, No. 144. Until further notice, paid advertisements concerning plans for, or the actual formation of, enterprises and companies by foreigners or emigrant Poles, are not to be released for publication. (August 10, 1976).

P. 127, No. 165. The premier of "Camouflage," a film directed by Krzysztof Zanussi, will take place on January 27, 1977. There are to be no details, references, discussions or publicity either before or after the premier.

All reviews must be approved by the Press, Radio and TV Division of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party.

Prior consultation is not necessary in order to list the film in the movie guide. (January 27, 1977).

Catalyst

Issue 13: *Philosophy, Culture and Society* (Winter 1979)

Cornelius Castoriadis	Hierarchy of Salaries and Incomes
William Ramp	Same and Other: Michael Foucault and the Politics of Discourse
John Shepherd	Music and Social Control: An Essay on the Sociology of Musical Knowledge
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REVIEWS:

Raymond Williams. *Marxism and Literature.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. 218 pages. $2.95.

Whether *Culture and Society* (1958)[1] is better than *Marxism and Literature* (1977) or whether the reverse is true, I cannot decide; at any rate, Williams has produced another excellent book. When the dust finally settles enough so that one can see clearly who made genuinely emancipatory advances in the field of cultural theory during the last three decades, I am sure Williams will be a prominent figure. How many books from the entire 1950s are even worth reading? And the remarkable thing about *Culture and Society* is that it is still a *usable* text. Between Williams' 1958 views and those of 1977 there is a real continuity that I want to elaborate. A chapter in *Culture and Society* entitled "Marxism and Culture" makes some of the points he makes in 1977; at the very least, one can see the outlines of the 1977 arguments. Although he is careful in the chapter to keep separate his own views and those associated with a Marxist view of culture, his discussion of base-superstructure, determinism, and ideology is not disinterested and relates to the overall thesis of *Culture and Society*. He dismisses the possibility of a rigid determinism whereby economic structure determines reality point by point, but he seems to concede as at least intellectually respectable the Marxist view which posits "the economic structure and the consequent social relations" as "the guiding string on which a culture is woven, and by following which a culture is to be understood" (p. 269). The base-superstructure model appears viable only after adding the elements of complexity, mutual interaction, and ultimate, as opposed to mechanistic, determinism (in the 1977 book, he unequivocally rejects the base-superstructure model as erroneous).

Although it appears reasonable to Williams, he cannot use the model because "even if the economic element is determining, it determines a whole way of life, and it is to this, rather than to the economic system alone, that literature has to be related" (p. 281). It is worth noting that in 1958 Williams could not cite any Marxist texts which suggested the idea of revolutionary praxis, of society's human self-creation. The theoretical field was dominated entirely by views of the economic which narrowed the meaning of "production" to the alienated proportions of the capitalist economy. The pathetically feeble state to which Marxist theory had been reduced by 1958 made it impossible for Williams, an intelligent and original critic, to make much use of its concepts. The 1958 chapter ends with a contemptuous rejection of Lenin's notion of ideology. If, as Lenin says, workers cannot achieve the proper revolutionary consciousness without the direct intervention of a party composed of bourgeois intellectuals, almost "anything can then be justified" (p. 284). Williams did not have to tell his audience that there was a great deal that needed justifying by 1958.

Between 1958 and 1977 much had changed, especially what went by the name of Marxism. After the Stalinist debacle, the fate of Marxism could have been like that of Nazism and fascism; it could have lost all intellectual and moral legitimacy, eclipsed forever as a living philosophy and politics. Instead there was a rebirth of Marxism issuing from Third World revolutions fought in the name of Marx, new texts by Marx finally made available, the rediscovery of a heretical Marxist tradition very different from Russian Communism or social democracy, and of course the rise of the New Left. Whether this renewal of Marxism made it easier or more difficult to bury Stalinism

1. *Culture and Society* (New York, 1958).

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and launch an emancipatory socialism is something *Telos* has always been concerned with. An alternative to renewing Marxism was to start anew and to search for other revolutionary traditions, which is what some in the New Left did.[2] I want to suggest, however, that the renewal of Marx had one unfortunate consequence, even if unintended: repackaged Stalinism and authoritarian socialism found new places to conceal themselves once Marxism had become legitimate again.

Today one cannot accuse Marxist aesthetics and literary theory of being vulgar and simple-minded, as so much Stalinist literary theory was. Rather, Marxist theory is as complex and difficult as anything produced by its enemies. This too is an ambiguous development because, although contemporary theory is surely more interesting than the 1930s' exhortations, it is more difficult to comprehend the political practice behind the theory. The work of Machery, Althusser, Eagleton, and Jameson — to name those who come to mind immediately — proves that Marxist theories can be a great success in the academic marketplace without exerting any revolutionary influence whatsoever. Indeed, now literary Marxism is just another point of view, a perspective, an approach, as complex and internally consistent as any other. It is no accident that the turn towards complexity and difficulty parallels the trend in literary theories which make no revolutionary pretensions at all: object-relations psychoanalysis, structuralism, post-structuralism, semiotics, deconstructionism, paracriticism, and so on. As literary discourse gets farther away from lived reality, it increases its value as a commodity. Its complexity and linguistic opacity seem to confer value on itself: if it is so hard to understand, it must be saying things I should know about.[3] Although it is necessary to separate ideas from politics, and evaluate the merits of each, one cannot bracket forever the political issues. Ideas have sociopolitical implications and thinkers have politics; in the cases mentioned earlier (Machery, Althusser, Eagleton, and Jameson), neither the ideas' implications nor the actual politics have struck fear into the hearts of the ruling class. Indeed, both are extremely conventional: old leftism in fancy new bottles. The decorative container within which this literary Marxism is packaged makes it seem benign, as though intellectual agility precluded dubious politics.

Williams, however, is not overly impressed by intellectual agility alone, whose

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2. This was an ambiguous enterprise, producing a lot of counter-cultural drivel, but also a rediscovery of the libertarian tradition. I personally think a critical revaluation of all the socialist traditions — anarchist, syndicalist, social democratic, utopian, communalist, *and* Marxist — would have yielded a more durable radicalism than either an instinctual romanticism or an exclusive focus on Marxism. Furthermore, I think such a revaluation results in a new synthesis, which Murray Bookchin calls anarchist-communism (see *Telos* 36); I agree with him wholeheartedly. Another synthesis, which privileges Marx but in a plausible way, is that of Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher; their concept of transcending alienation, however, and their redefinition of communism are, to me, closer to the libertarian tradition than the Marxist (see *Telos* 32).

3. Precisely when there is an overproduction of Ph.D.'s and severe competition for fewer jobs, academic discourse becomes hermetic. Precisely when academia is recovering from the criticisms of the 1960s and the utopian possibilities disclosed then, academic scholarship becomes tolerant of "new approaches" without altering any of its other assumptions. Something different seems to be working in the world of so-called imaginative literature because the more a work resembles a Hollywood-Madison Avenue version of reality, the more it will succeed as popular art. We are speaking, of course, of two different marketplaces, one academic and the other public. That these two are so out of synch is appropriate in a society whose aesthetic alienation takes the form of high and low cultures; of course, the Ph.D.s speak a foreign tongue because the purpose of their training *is* superiority; of course the masses buy popular junk because they do not know any better, being masses.

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recent performances indeed make one respect the vulgar Marxists, insofar as they can be separated from totalitarian politics, as one never could before (p. 3). *Marxism and Literature* acknowledges its debt to the radical populism Williams acquired from his own working-class family (pp. 1-3). It is here, I think, that his Britishness comes out most distinctly because there is no American equivalent to Williams' radical populism. In his writing and teaching (through the adult education programs), Williams has tried to make literature, as product and activity, accessible to a majority of his fellow Britons. Such an enterprise in the U.S. is difficult even to contemplate because working-class traditions are sustained more by radical historians than by workers. Another instance of Britishness is Williams' acute sense of class-specific traditions and their use in legitimating the social order. In Britain, a certain literary tradition is defined as *the* tradition, which is used to denigrate the oppositional working-class traditions and to mystify the entire concept of literary production (pp. 115-116). In the U.S. la "high culture" tradition of literature never quite developed in the way it did in Europe. So many of the "classic" American texts have been written by the lunatic fringe that elitists have had a hard time coming up with a list of "traditional" texts. In the U.S., the emancipatory initiatives have come more often from avant-garde departures from the cultural norm than from working-class populism, which became so falsely sentimentalized that it lost most of its radical content long ago.

Although Williams seems firmly rooted within a kind of populism, his Marxism is intransigently radical. The format of *Marxism and Literature* is deceptively reminiscent of a handbook, as though this were a kind of "Marxist literary theory made easy"; it is not. The book, divided into three main sections (Basic Concepts, Cultural Theory, and Literary Theory), each of which is subdivided into chapters, is "not a summary," Williams writes, "it is both a critique and an argument" (p. 1). He does do some summarizing, but never without commentary or independently of his overall argument.

Since the first section, "Basic Concepts," contains the theoretical assumptions which are carried out in the rest of the book, I will devote most of my attention to it. In the first chapter, "Culture," Williams utilizes his most characteristic methodological technique, the historical semantics of "keywords," to begin his discussion of culture. Tracing certain keywords — society, culture, economy, individual, civilization, socialism — Williams identifies Marxism's unique contributions to the 19th-century discussion of these concepts. First, whereas the bourgeois Enlightenment offered civilization as the overcoming of superstition and barbarism, Marx defined this civil society as *bourgeois society* "created by the capitalist mode of production" (p. 18). Unfortunately, according to Williams, Marx weakened the force of this insight by retaining a progressivist view of history, which he derived from the Enlightenment. In the romantic and non-Marxist attacks on civilization, the emphasis had been on the contradictory nature of civil society, whose so-called Enlightenment was also destructive of valuable qualities, such as "human brotherhood," which need to be "recovered as well as gained" (p. 18). (The romantics were aware of Enlightenment reason's brutality long before Adorno and Horkheimer.) Marx, however, emphasized the superiority of the bourgeois epoch over what it preceded, insisting further that socialism would supersede capitalism.

Second, Marx made "the most important intellectual advance in all modern social thought" when he asserted that man makes history by making himself "through producing his means of life" (p. 19). The human self-creation of society, the idea that people create their society by producing and reproducing it, was Marx's great

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discovery. This sense of creativity and power goes directly against another current in Marx's thinking, his determinism. If socialism is inevitable, if the train of history is on a progressive line of tracks headed straight for communism, then the role of revolutionary praxis becomes questionable. (Who needs praxis? Wake us up when the train arrives!) This progressivism is the kind of idea Williams calls "residual." Its origin was in the 18th-century struggle against religious and statist absolutism; but in the 19th century this idea only weakened the emancipatory content of socialism. Likewise Marx also failed to extend his concept of praxis consistently to the realm of culture. "Instead of making cultural history material...it was made dependent, secondary, 'superstructural': a realm of mere ideas...determined by the basic material history" (p. 19). Reflection theory, then, is not something only Marxists after Marx superimposed on his philosophy of praxis; rather, Marx himself utilized the base-superstructure model and failed to apply consistently his great insight of human self-creation. Two things follow from the reflection theory, both of them destructive. First, the meanings of "material," "economic," and "social" are reduced to denote the production of commodities within a capitalist economy. This narrow concept of social production generates its obnoxious twin, the superstructure, which "mirrors" or "reflects" the infrastructure, the economic base. Ideas, politics, poems, individual efforts to create aesthetic products, all the multifaceted aspects of social life, are reduced to the status of superstructure or ideology. In countering the idealist mystification of class-specific social relations, Marx frequently created a materialist mystification in its stead, simply reversing the priority of the dichotomy's two poles.

The major theme of *Marxism and Literature* is the overcoming of the false dichotomies (base-superstructure, individual-society, material-ideal) by human self-creation. "At the very center of Marxism," writes Williams, "is an extraordinary emphasis on human creativity and self-creation" (p. 206). Although it is at the center of Williams' Marxism and surely Marx's own thinking, another Marxist current has been in the opposite direction, emphasizing determinism, restricting creativity, expressing tremendous hostility to artistic autonomy. Throughout the book, then, Williams criticizes the numerous and various instances when Marxists, including Marx himself, fail to overcome the bourgeois dichotomies and perpetuate instead the cultural alienation inaugurated by capitalism.

The chapter on language is important because here we see how innovative Williams actually is. He admits that "Marxism has contributed very little to thinking about language itself" (p. 21), that Marxism has demoted language to the role of reflecting a reality prior to it, or that Marxism has adopted a linguistics entirely outside of Marxism. Two things interest Williams: the history of language (which is something he himself has practised ever since *Culture and Society*) and the concept of language as praxis, as a constitutive activity, as a shaping force in social production. Although Vico and Herder had a sense of language's constitutive faculty (p. 24), this emphasis was persistently eroded by a dominant objectivism which posited code, system, text, and grammar as the defining elements of language. The emphasis on linguistic creativity, meanwhile, was salvaged but mystified by idealist theories of expression and high culture.

Williams discussion of Vygotsky and Volosinov, however, is less than satisfactory. Their concept of language as a social activity is preferable to expressivism or structuralist objectivism, but it introduces another problem, that of consciousness. What is the relationship between language and pre-linguistic, non-linguistic experiences, inchoate feelings, memory, silence and dreams? Williams does not ask the

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question, much less provide a satisfactory answer. If Vygotsky's "inner speech" is also social, then I think that objectivism has returned with a vengeance. Especially in the matter of language one must be careful in making distinctions. Although the abstract individual who creates his own expressive language is surely a falsification, the Russians that Williams likes to quote are not discriminating enough. To say we all create language and that all consciousness is social could be a beginning, but only a beginning. Furthermore, I do not believe consciousness is constituted entirely by language; also, calling language "social" is not entirely useful unless one breaks down "social" into its categories: state, school, class, peer group, family, mass media, and so on. Usually "social" means no more than manipulation and coercion, but at other times it represents intersubjective experience. These are the essential differences, I would think. Unless one specifies the social context out of which language emerges, then one is falsely attributing a universal aspect to the "social." That Madison Avenue and other mass media — social institutions all — generate a language is hardly disputable; the problems for a radical rest in discriminating this "bad" language from a 'good" one, in describing the conditions for the emergence of a good language.

Following the chapter on language is "Literature." Just as language is a constitutive activity which creates something that did not exist before, so literature is a means of production (p. 54), a social activity whose status cannot be accounted for by the concept of ideological superstructure. Literature, then, is a shaping of the world, a transformative process by which the author acts upon the world. Of course each author operates within a network of pre-existing social relations consisting of audience, literary conventions, literary traditions, and language itself. Nevertheless, the author produces meanings and contexts, revising here and there the cultural formations he is working within. To demystify literature in order to perceive its essentially productive aspects, Williams identifies historically the social conventions and traditions by which authors create literature (he does this admirably in Part Three). He wants to demystify literature; thus, one can reconstitute it as revolutionary praxis, as creativity without the restraint of inhibiting notions of high and low culture, and false dichotomies such as individual-society, poetry-science, and so on. In other words, his concept of literature leads him to consider Gramsci's notion of hegemony and the possibility of counter-cultural opposition to the hegemonic.

Before discussing Williams' notion of a liberatory culture, one must examine the fourth chapter, "Ideology," one of the best critiques I have ever read of the base-superstructure model and reflection theory. The critique has been done before, but Williams makes two interesting points. The pretense of a "scientific" socialism which can discriminate in an impartial way between true and false consciousness is an "objectivist fantasy" which makes the pernicious assumption that "others are biased but... by definition, we are not" (p. 64). This kind of arrogance we are all familiar with. Second, the Marxist attack on bourgeois ideology was actually a much less difficult and important task than developing a critique of the ensemble of social practices and beliefs that constitutes the social order (pp. 66-67). If the base determines the superstructure, then in a capitalist society the latter always has to be bourgeois; one cannot, using reflection theory, account for the real existence of a living culture. The worst consequence of the base-superstructure model and the ideology concept was the Leninist notion of the vanguard party. Williams shows that this was not Marx's idea ("This is radically different from Marx's thinking" [p. 69]), but clearly one can see the tendencies which lead in that direction. As in the 1958 chapter on Marxism, Williams demonstrates the epistemological absurdity and

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political arrogance of vanguardism; when bourgeois intellectuals privilege their perceptions to such an extent that they can bring revolutionary consciousness *to* the working class, they are acting out the most alienated forms of bourgeois thinking, especially the idealist dichotomy between doing and thinking: workers work, so they cannot think; thinkers do not work, so they can think. Williams' unambiguous rejection of Leninist vanguardism is one of the themes that unites *Culture and Society* and *Marxism and Literature*.

Williams rejects Leninism and the intervention of an outside force to produce a revolutionary proletariat, but he is interested in the creation of a liberatory culture (although he does not use that phrase). Most of the book is a process of demystification directed at both bourgeois and mechanistic Marxist modes of thinking. One precondition for a liberatory culture at this time is to clear the ground of false cultural ideas. Williams' strategy for demystification is always the same: he locates a concept historically, in its specific social context, so that it is clearly the result of a process undertaken by real people. Thus located, specified, and identified, the concept loses its reified, fetishistic quality, hence enabling one to formulate a concept which can embody a socially revolutionary intention.

In his critique of bourgeois cultural and literary theory, it is the dualism and dichotomizing of art that are so oppressive. In protest against the mechanizing forces of cash-nexus and commodity-production, 19th-century romanticism threw up the barricades of "culture" and "poetry" which possessed those qualities marked for extinction by the capitalist mode of production. Although many romantics, early and late (Blake, Shelley, Morris, Wilde), insisted upon the anti-capitalist role of art, their efforts were unable to prevent the mystification of culture as that realm of spirit existing independently of and above the sordid workings of the socio-political and economic realms. The high art concept of culture was institutionalized by the invention of "criticism," the activity by which one separated the high from the low, the geniuses from the Grub Street pretenders. The goal of criticism is to facilitate the "conspicuous humanistic consumption" of a high art tradition and thus to validate the socio-political and economic hegemony of the bourgeoisie (p. 146). It is for a real purpose that in the National Portrait Gallery in London the Major Cultural Figures hang on the walls; against the intentions of some of them, they all uphold the legitimacy of bourgeois social rule. That this high culture tradition is so often critical of the social order is important but understandable because the bourgeois order prefers to accept criticism from within its own ranks; it can appear to be a self-correcting system.

This high tradition oppresses not only as social legitimation, but much more insidiously as the purveyor of standards, conventions and traditions. Williams insists that writing is production, the production of meanings and contexts constituted by the author (in this regard, Williams echoes Deleuze and Guattari's insistence upon "desiring-production" in *Anti-Oedipus*). He almost seems to want writing to occupy a ground that is presuppositionless, yet at the same time he acknowledges as idealist fantasy the notion of a purely subjective, asocial writing. Although writing is always social, class-specific, inevitably employing conventions, Williams implies that if writers increase their awareness of the social nature of their practices, they will liberate their writing from false presuppositions and enable themselves to constitute a literature in a more creative way (although Williams would not like my quantifying

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"creative" as though one could be more or less so).[4] If one frees writing from the presuppositions of bourgeois culture, then the false dichotomies are revealed as such. High culture and popular culture are not evaluative categories, but describe specific social relations and assumptions, specific audience-author relationships, specific points of view. The dichotomies of fact and fiction, poetry and science, real and imaginary, conceal the unnecessary bifurcations of mind and body, theoretical and practical, intellectual and manual. Even a scientific lecture at a meeting of scientists is not simply the transmission of "facts," but it also assumes a specific narrative stance, conventions of diction and allusion, traditions of logic and procedure (p. 149). Although the myth of scientific objectivity has been demolished for many years, practitioners of literature and criticism still operate as though the myth were intact. Indeed, a recent issue of *Salmagundi*, a left-liberal cultural journal, devoted an entire issue to defending the myth of objectivity against attacks from avant-garde writing and certain kinds of literary criticism. This pathetic intellectual performance indicates just how bourgeois the state of cultural studies actually is.

If one dismisses the bourgeois presuppositions, then a new continent of writing is accessible to readers, and of course writers. Although Williams does not elaborate on this issue, it is clearly suggested by the nature of his critique. In the 19th century, for example, there is a large body of literature that has never been considered literature: Chartist poetry, radical pamphlets, working-class newspapers, utopian plans and proposals, socialist propaganda, pleas for atheism, revolutionary songs and speeches, arguments for vegetarianism, pacifism, better housing, cooperatives, and so on. This other literature embodies the 19th-century struggle against the bourgeoisie, but it has never been deemed legitimate as literature. I do not agree with H. Bruce Franklin's idea that we should study only the writings of the oppressed, but clearly there is a need to return to this other tradition without the culturally imperialistic assumptions of high bourgeois culture. An examination of this other tradition could reveal the limits of counter-cultural enterprises. In the chapters on "Hegemony," "Traditions, Institutions and Formations," and "Dominant, Residual and Emergent," Williams launches a Gramscian discussion of cultural hegemony and its limits. Williams wants to discriminate the alternative and oppositional initiatives within the hegemonic; that is, he is interested in defining the nature of counter-culture. He suggests that perhaps "the dominant culture...at once produces and limits its own forms of counter-culture" (p. 114). This needs to be demonstrated, however, with concrete research. A new area of serious study opens up with Williams' discussion of hegemony and counter-culture. If one rejects the Leninist model of revolutionary change, then it is logical to look closely at the emancipatory possibilities of culture.[5]

The new possibilities for writers that are opened up after rejecting bourgeois culture assumptions are immense. The avant-garde has always challenged these assumptions,

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4. One lacuna in Williams' theory is a theory of the avant garde; even though this too is a tradition with conventions, its adversary intentions and playful execution have to be discussed differently. I suspect his radical populism is an obstacle to appreciating the avant garde, but his theory begs for some treatment of it.

5. Marcuse's strategy seems typical of the Frankfurt School's unadventurous cultural theories. His call for a return to bourgeois culture in *Counter-Revolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972) was an unfortunate overreaction against the errors and limits of the 1960s' avant garde and counter-culture. The cultural radicalism of the 1960s must be superseded, separating the useful from the obsolete; instead, virtually all critiques of that radicalism have been of the sledge-hammer variety, obliterating every vestige of 1960s' playfulness and iconoclasm.

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but usually in the matters of technique and content only. If, however, writing is production, then authors might concern themselves more with the entire process of publishing, reception, and distribution. The formation of the Fiction Collective a few years ago is an encouraging development. I think, however, the greatest possibility for emancipation rests with the defetishization of high culture, not just in literature, but all the arts.

An aesthetic education whose goal is to empower people to create their own culture, their own newspapers, films, dramas, and so on, transcends the bourgeois fetish of consumption and the dire consequences of passivity. I insist upon the enterprise as aesthetic education because at present people have been trained to be passive consumers, or discriminating consumers — the difference is minor; as such, they cannot produce much. Skills and techniques need to be made accessible before a genuinely participatory culture is possible. The only way to break down the false dichotomies of bourgeois life is to break them down in fact, in the daily lives of a people who are transforming reality. Although I am not suggesting a cultural radicalism as a substitute for more explicitly economic and political activities, I am adamant that cultural radicalism not be postponed until after the mythical revolution. Such a postponement is recycled Leninist ideology. I also suggest that people whose culture is primarily from high culture and mass culture are thereby incapable of revolutionary praxis. For people to be participants in a society they themselves determine and create, they must also be capable of shaping their own culture.

Williams' use of Gramsci is the most notable case where he actually utilizes the concepts of another Marxist. His discussion of other Marxists reveals his dissent from the Frankfurt School and Marxist structuralism. He convincingly demonstrates how the categories of mediation, correspondences, and dialectical image depend upon a dichotomy of culture and society. Even the most undogmatic procedure, Benjamin's "correspondences," goes from the known (the economic-political realm) to the unknown (culture). This distorts the cultural object by selectively perceiving only those patterns that are analogous to the economic-political order; other patterns are ignored as inessential ("Typification and Homology" and "From Reflection to Mediation"). The concept of mediation, then, although it yields more interesting prose than the reflection theory, is nevertheless firmly tied to a version of reflection theory. Culture and individual are here; society and economy are over there. Williams, however, argues for a culture that is produced by social individuals; literature is a means of production and possesses various social and economic relationships. For there to be mediation, one has to disentangle a process and transform it into two separate spheres, which are then "mediated."

Although he appreciates the Frankfurt School, especially Adorno and Benjamin, he is less enthusiastic about Marxist structuralism. First, he argues, signs are arbitrary only from the perspective of non-involvement and distance — precisely the real situation of the early English linguists who studied the foreign languages of the colonized countries. The structuralist partakes of a "privileged withdrawal from the lived and living relationship which... *make all formal meanings significant and substantial*" (p. 168). By alienating one's self from the immediacy of language, the structuralist cannot recognize instances of "any *specific* kinds of alienation" (p. 168). Structuralism eliminates language as a social practice, as a constitutive activity, inaugurating a permanent stasis. The only kind of creative *parole* the structuralists allow is the "privileged fantasy" (p. 169) of "decoding" or "deconstructing." (Although Williams does not say it, I will: this privileged fantasy is similar to the Leninist fantasy

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of vanguard wisdom; both fantasies are epistemologically absurd.) In place of the structuralists' "sign," Williams offers a replacement, "notation." Spoken words and written notations are different, but related; indeed, the structuralist's concept of sign obscures the difference between the two kinds of langauge (p. 169). Notation carries with it the idea of reproduction or performance, hence communication. Written words are reproduced in the act of reading within culturally specific moments. "It is thus in the whole and complex process of notation that we find the reality of this specific material and social process. Once again the linguistic elements are not signs; they are notations of actual productive relationships" (p. 170).

The theoretical superiority of Williams' cultural and literary theories over those of any other Marxist derives from several factors. First, Williams developed his original ideas and concepts in the 1950s quite independently of the Marxism that existed at the time. He was able to perceive the cultural situation without the distorting blinders of an irrelevant ideology. Second, Williams himself is a novelist, one who actually produces an imaginative literature. One cannot realize how incredibly stupid so much Marxist criticism is until one has actually written fiction or poetry. Third, Williams has refused to soften his view of bourgeois culture as alienated culture; he refuses to forget the transformative process of the industrial revolution which so altered the conditions of culture. Because he has refused to forget, he continues to carry with him an ideal of a culture that is not alienated. This utopianism (although I am sure he would not like the word) has enabled him to transcend both the cultural nihilism of the Frankfurt School and the elitism of bourgeois high culturists, structuralists, and Leninists. The essential difference between Williams and so many other theorists, bourgeois and Marxist, is that he believes in the creation of new forms, new ideas, new experiences, new feelings. "For creativity and social self-creation are both known and unknown events, and it is still from grasping the known that the unknown —the next step, the next work — is conceived" (p. 212).

Michael Scrivener

Göran Therborn. *Science Class and Society: On the Formation of Sociology and Historical Materialism.* London: New Left Books, 1976. Distributed in the U.S. by Shocken Books. 461 pages. $18.95.

Göran Therborn. *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? State Apparatuses and State Power under Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism.* London: New Left Books, 1978. Distributed in the U.S. by Schocken Books. 290 pages. $14.95.

Science, Class and Society is a sprawling, difficult book.[1] The author wants to touch all bases in his effort to explain the history of bourgeois sociology against the backdrop of

1. Göran Therborn is something of an emigma. He is a "hardcore Leninist," disciple of Perry Anderson, unrepenting believer in the "dictatorship of the proletariat," lionizer of the "working class," enemy of Marcuse and Adorno (to the extent that he even acknowledges their work), equally opposed to Lukács and Korsch, not impressed with Gramsci, and absolutely enamored of Althusser, Balibar, and the lesser lights attached to that school. Many features of Therborn's writings would classify him as a "party philosopher" were there not so many other internally contradictory aspects saving him from that ignominy.

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its key rival, historical materialism. Therborn is capable of interjecting baseless generalizations which trivialize the data of history, yet in the next phrase he can successfully elicit thoughtful speculation from the same data. From the very beginning it is clear that Therborn is struggling to represent adequately the development of sociology and social thought while also toeing the Althusserian line. For those who value encyclopedic Teutonic workmanship, the book is a must. In the chapter on "Sociology of Sociology, Marxism of Marxism," one finds predictable critiques of Parsons, Mills, Gouldner, and Friedrichs. Surprisingly, however, the discussion is not a *Diamat* denunciation, but actually betrays Therborn's admiration for much of the work discussed. Cluttered with the usual citations, this opening part of the book provides only slight modifications to the conventional recitations. The "new" tidbits are often culled from ordinary social history, such as repetition of Hofstadter's tale surrounding the fete at the Delmonico Hotel in 1882 for Herbert Spencer, attended by "the cream of American society" (p. 16). Therborn, of course, is not interested in *Wissenssoziologie* and as an Althusserian, he must discount the utility of Mannheim's work (p. 54n). Thus, instead of blending contextual with textual analysis, Therborn is often satisfied with paralleling theoretical accounts with mundane recitals of biographical detail. It is particularly odd that his Althusserian persuasion would permit him this liberty: Althusser's disembodied Marxism minus human beings does not square with Therborn's effort to bring into focus a personal or political position along with a writer's work. Furthermore, to the extent that it deals with dozens of writers, even a long book seeking to do either angle much justice would necessarily fall short of its goal. The result is a rushed hodge-podge.

This does not mean that Therborn's criticism of Parsons, Gouldner, *et al.* is entirely without value. He claims that Parsons' *Structure of Social Action* is conceptually built on Hegelian triads (p. 16), and then proceeds to establish a dubious connection between Parsons' collectivist view of Marx and Althusser's "correction" thirty years later (p. 17). Yet, he manages to provide some insight into American social theory: "There is in all four authors a tendency to present social revolutions as sociological revolutions, to turn economic and political struggles and transformations into questions of culture and morality. It was this tendency that, according to Marx and Engels, characterized the 'German Ideology' " (pp. 31-32).

The author's fundamental theses are that Marxism claims to be a science and that Marxist theory has, virtually without exception, been established by thinkers who were also political leaders." He seeks a "Marxism of Marxism" to combat the bourgeois analogue, the sociology of sociology, and to "prove" that Marxism is the only legitimate, scientifically grounded political and social theory. Simply put, "Marxism is a specific science, related to the working class as a guide to socialist revolution" (p. 40). Were there not other, less embarrassing remarks in Therborn's book, the reader could stop here. When one studies a "Leninist" or Althusserian tract, certain allowances must be made, and one of them is to expect occasional sections in the presentation where the author feels compelled to pour forth utter nonsense. Fortunately, whenever Therborn confronts genuine theory, the dogma relaxes. In fact, the dogma is primarily used as mortar to plug the dike wherever a hole appears in his Marxist "science." As should be clear, Therborn's sanity and his political commitment rage against each other. When the Althusserian jargon is added, contributions to a revised history of social thought often evaporate or end up diluted into mediocrity or absurdity.

Should the unlikely happen with Therborn becoming "important" enough for future historians of Marxist thought, it will be useful to establish how far beyond Althusser he

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has progressed. Amidst a fast rumination about the bourgeois history of sociology (Oberschall and others) and the contrasting visions of Della Volpe, Zeleny and Colletti ("major efforts at elucidation of the scientific basis of historical materialism," p. 41), plus a foray into the philosophy of science *à la* Popper, Toulmin, Gillespie and others, Therborn lays his cards out: "The present work is related to that of Althusser in three ways." First, he uses Althusser's conception of science; second, he wants to "adjust the imbalance of his work, by showing the specificity of historical materialism not only in relation to other developed social disciplines with scientific intentions." And lastly, he will undertake "the social-scientific study of Marxism as a social science" (p. 66). Central to all this, of course, is his definition of "historical materialism." For Therborn's historical materialism, "society" denotes "social arrangements determined in the last instance by a specific combination of forces and relations of production.... We must consider the processes of labor, the arrangements organizing a certain degree of productivity in men's appropriation of nature; and...the system of relations involving the distribution of the means of production, the objective of production, and the relations between the performance of physical labor and the appropriation of the fruits of that labor" (p. 73). If this were not dreary enough stuff, on the following page, the author explains that "The two classes of the capitalist mode of production are the bourgeoisie...and the proletariat...." (p. 74). And lest there by any doubt: "It is the thesis of the present study that the problem of the social disciplines as sciences can fruitfully be analyzed in terms of a search for *patterns of societal determination*" (p. 70, emphases in original).

Happily, most of this is virtually forgotten until the discussion of Marxism.

Therborn's discussion of the growth of political economy since the 17th century is essentially an exercise in *Wissenssoziologie*. It is neither difficult nor original (using sources like Eric Roll, Schumpeter, Peter Gay and other standard histories) to show that political economy arose in league with bourgeois capitalism, and that writers like Alfred Marshall displayed "flaming class hatred" toward the newly unionized proletariat (p. 94). A more ambitious position is developed at the end of the discussion where, taking preliminary whacks at Weberian social science, Therborn announces that "a *verstehende* discipline is an ideological discipline, and bourgeois and petty bourgeois 'common sense' has left its ideological fingerprints on the scientific analyses and intelligible predictions of market regularities. In begging the question — understandable to whom? — this second route to an individualist foundation of market theory is as closed as a psychologistic one" (p. 111). As trenchant epistemological critique, this is laughable — particularly when one recalls the entire *Methodenstreit* up to and after the formal development of *Verstehen*.

Due to Therborn's relative isolation from American intellectual life, some astonishing judgments surface concerning the "Age of Sociology." In hoping to make the point that sociology "might be seen as part of or at least intimately connected to a counter-revolutionary conservatism" (p. 119), he invokes, of all people, Robert Nisbet, whose "very fine book, *The Sociological Tradition*," unit-ideas and all, Therborn reviews with interest. But this is in keeping with Therborn's catholicity of sources. In the first few pages of the chapter, he cites Leon Bramson, Irving Zeitlin, Leo Strauss, C.B. MacPherson, Barrington Moore, Charles Page, Fritz Ringer, and about two dozen other more conventional historians of social thought, excellent sources to be sure, but none of whom can possibly provide the sort of data or arguments Therborn needs if he truly wishes to further Althusser's program. This, on the other hand, is the most useful aspect of Therborn's labor: his summaries of mountainous secondary (and, less often,

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primary) materials concerning the advent of sociological theory and sociology *qua* discipline. Throughout this 200-page dissertation on early sociology, his own polemical position almost disappears or is reduced to random sniping at Sumner's conservatism, Weber's imperialist tendency, and other pedestrian facets of the history of sociology. Like a veritable bloodhound, Therborn smells out and denounces any trace of anti-Marxism or political conservatism in sociologists during the last 150 years.[2]

This brings us to one of Therborn's major premises in the book: "the first sociologists displayed a fundamental yet uneasy attachment to capitalist society .... [the] *sociological contribution has essentially consisted in the discovery and study of the ideological community* — i.e., community of values and norms — *in human aggregates of various types and sizes*" (p. 224). Thus, sociology has demanded from its members a commitment to social order, and has displaced theology and moral philosophy as the key legitimation mechanism of contemporary societies. In short, "It will be contended that the major scientific contribution of sociology is bound up with the analysis and investigation of the ideological community" (p. 225). A thumbnail sketch of the Albion Small generation follows, plus information on later Chicago sociology and some remarks about Fabian socialists.

Here Therborn performs elaborate contortions in attempting to dissect Durkheim and Weber exclusively in relation to economics. While this conforms to his own ideological needs, it cripples the most disappointing part of the book (pp. 244-315), and what ought to have been its core. Especially with Weber, Therborn is in over his head. Students of Weber's work agree that economics was his original point of departure (though of a non-quantitative, historical type). But even *Economy and Society* indicates how ambivalent Weber felt about economic analysis as such, and how much more energy he devoted to non-economic conceptualization. Even though there are numerous indications of an economistic bias, a careful reading makes it clear that, for Weber, "economics" was virtually synonymous with "social science." It is useless to coerce Weberian sociology into an imagined "dialogue" with economics as we know it. Although Therborn's forty-page treatment of Weber is filled with circumspect reasoning and occasional insight, his usual need for praxis vitiates his interpretation. For instance, he repeats the nonsense about "understandable to whom?" (p. 284n), arguing that for Weber "cultural values were, in fact if not in principle, stable in time." This is an impossible reading of the work of a man who underwent repeated attack for his value relativism.

At other times Therborn compares Marx and Engels with Weber, showing Weber to be the inferior social analyst. This is another losing battle, and becomes especially untenable when the author counterposes Weber's ideal typology with the "scientific

2. Such bibliographic zeal, however, does not preserve the author from errors. At one point, he concludes that "The social questions which were the focus of the anxieties, enquiries and remedies of sociologists were obviously economic in nature" (p. 143). He then completely reverses the historical record by asserting that the "emergence" of the field cannot be tied very strongly to economics, but its "development" must be. This contradicts the American record. It is no secret that the earliest American theorists were mightily (though not exclusively) concerned with "the social question" and the structural problems associated with rapid industrialization. Very quickly, however, they broadened their framework to include what became American social-psychology of the Cooley variety. Thus, a pattern develops in the book. An entire chapter will flow by, chocked with facts. Then the last few paragraphs will attempt a theoretical and political rearrangement of the information in order to conform to the strident posture of the first chapter. Almost inevitably this attack fails. The problem is that Therborn is too honest not to present the best material he can find, but too involved with his brand of Marxism to avoid clumsy polemical overlays.

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laws" of historical materialism. This kind of chicanery should have bitten the dust several hundred monographs ago.[3] Finally, Therborn seems constitutionally unable to comprehend *Verstehen* as a method more related to artistic empathy than to the tenets of "marginalist economics" (pp. 292ff) — a shortcoming which pollutes his analysis of Weber.

The failure of Therborn's critique of Weber hardly prepares the ground for what he calls the theoretical victory of historical materialism. He proclaims that while economics and sociology have been "loyal to" the experience of European capitalist growth, "historical materialism developed as a scientific pursuit in frontal opposition to this capitalist world" (p. 317). On the other hand, and here Therborn is satisfied to state an obvious and insignificant truism, "There is not a single prominent sociologist in the capitalist world who, as a sociologist, has been formed by and been part of a militant labor movement" (p. 335). A kind of backhanded result of his rather shabby type of ideology critique is an understanding of theorizing as a human enterprise. Unfortunately, Therborn's ideological lights do not allow the thematization of even this small achievement.

The final chapter, titled "Conclusions and Beyond," provides, very suddenly, a lightly referenced plug for his next book. Therborn claims that a reputable history of social science "possesses a specific object of study": "the possible discovery-production of patterns of determination" (p. 415). Althusser again rears his head. In fact, Therborn prides the study in having "corroborated Althusser's thesis that 1845 saw a decisive break in the work of Marx and Engels, and that working-class politics played a central role in this theoretical rupture" (p. 423). Furthermore, "*the ideological community and the market are the twin axes of post-classical non-Marxist social science*" (p. 424). And in the final two pages of the book, Therborn concludes that "the present situation of historical materialism demands a *critique of sociology*. Since the object of sociology is related to that of historical materialism in the same way as that of economics (the market), a critique of sociology should be of the same type as Marx's critique of political economy. . . . Like the market, the ideological community has been and continues to be utilized for bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideological ends in the class struggle" (p. 428). When the naive reader asks why the bourgeois phenomenon of sociology even merits such careful repudiation, it is because, Therborn says, latent within it is a scientific residue, and the supersession of this component into a scientized historical materialism can only help direct the revolution.

What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? bears only formal resemblance to the earlier work. Therborn's objectives include dismantling the current Frankfurt School claim to legitimacy as the heir to the Marxist theory of the state, undercutting Poulantzas' like claims, and selling his own unshakeable neo-Leninism. The book is actually two long essays,[4] the first of which, "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Class Character of the State Apparatus" (pp. 23-125) is devoted almost entirely to the question: "Was Lenin right?" in *State and Revolution* and *Imperialism*. The answer is yes and no, as one might guess. But mostly yes.[5] Once again Therborn undertakes the

3. Also included in this section are a few of Therborn's bibliographical errors, especially concerning the flood of Weber translations into English which have appeared in the last four or so years. But in a book of 1,263 detailed footnotes, this is not significant.

4. Both essays should be read in conjunction with a third, shorter selection in *New Left Review* 103 (May-June 1977), pp. 3-41, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy."

5. This whole line of argument should be read along with Erik Olin Wright's "To Control or to Smash Bureaucracy: Weber and Lenin on Politics, the State, and Bureaucracy," *Berkeley Journal*

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impossible task of besting Weber with Lenin. The second essay, "State Power — On the Dialectics of Class Rule" (pp. 129-244), is theoretically more important. Curiously, Therborn's debt to Weber (and a host of other non-Marxist theorists of the state) is much greater than to Lenin (or Althusser).

Therborn claims to have come to the defense and elaboration of the "concept" "dictatorship of the proletariat" due to a spat in the 22nd Congress of the French Communist Party, "at which time the concept. . . was deleted from the statutes" (p. 11). The more significant influence, however, is not Paris, but Madison, Wisconsin. Therborn has undertaken the unenviable task of catching the attention of experts on complex organizations (e.g., Etzioni and the standard Weberians), by speaking their idiom in order to direct their attention away from Exxon and toward "the state." Even though Erik Olin Wright's name does not appear in the book, his is the determinant influence on Therborn's radical change of style. What seems to have transpired is that the author accepted the suggestion that, in order to gain an English-speaking audience, he would have to conform to certain presentational conventions and prejudices, including lots of tables and categorization. For the most part, he submits these "improvements" of his Leninism free of Marxist jargon. Unfortunately, he who speaks in the tongue of the oppressor class sacrifies the revolutionary power inherent in counter-expressions. It is not surprising, then, that many of Therborn's typologies bear strong kinship to those of American organization theory, which has dominated research in this area for several decades. While Therborn's acceptance of Wright's challenge is commendable, the cost has not been small.

The book's subtitle indicates Therborn's wish to explore the state through history. Whenever he discusses a particular state, he religiously runs through the feudal, capitalist and socialist phases. He relies heavily upon Perry Anderson's "characteristic erudition and brilliance" (p. 14) for his data on feudalism, upon standard bourgeois historiography for capitalism's chronicle, and on "Marxist theory and research . . . flowing out of the Communist tradition" for the socialist states. The objective is to put forth "positive alternatives" to a faulty conception of the state (pp. 13, 14). He does this by broadening "the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat," which "refers to two fundamental theses. . . the idea that *the very form of organization of the state is a materialization of a particular mode of class rule*. Secondly, in consequence of the first, that *the socialist state of the working class must have a specific form of organization*" (p. 25). According to Therborn, various "official" theorists for the French, Swedish, and East German Communist Parties have all strained to lessen the burden — the "dead weight" — upon theoretical discussion which has emanated from "Weber and the Frankfurt School." He is most fond of Bettelheim's work on the USSR, and notes that the "outstanding exception" to most contemporary muddled thought is Perry Anderson's "great study of the feudal state." Finally he registers his high regard for official publications, like the "Soviet handbook entitled *The General Marxist-Leninist Theory of the State and Law*" and various productions from Peking. Yet, this catalogue of theories serves merely as Therborn's springboard into his own "Analytical Model," since all these works (including Wright's) fall short of providing a comprehensive theory of the state *qua* organization of domination. And what they especially lack, of course, is Althusser's terminology — something Therborn gladly supplies.

One cannot help noticing how far Therborn has come (in which direction remains

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of Sociology 19 (1974-75), pp. 69-108, since Therborn explicitly acknowledges Wright's aid and sympathetic viewpoint.

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unclear) between the first and second books. His reasoning now resembles that of ordinary American sociologists. He even admits that "genuine verification of his theory" cannot be accomplished by the present work, and that he is concerned with establishing real causal relation[s] between the forms of state organization and the particular class relations to which they are linked in the model" (p. 36). Thus, the state must accomplish two functions: coercive defense, political governance, administrative management, and juridical regulation of a given social formation. His plaint is that organization theory is static, does not deal with historical change, and cannot handle the phenomenon of class struggle. This semi-Weberian set of shortcomings he labels the "subjectivist problematic" (p. 37). Therborn's correction, in its simplicity, seems promising: "In order to understand the class character of the state apparatus, then, we must begin to develop a new approach. . . . We should view it [the organization] not as a goal-oriented subject in an environment, but as a formally bounded system of structured processes within a global system of societal processes" (p. 37). He then provides a ludicrous illustrative "diagram" which might warm Etzioni's or Blau's hearts. The state is subject to inputs, outputs, and transformations, which in turn are reliant upon four factors (work materials, personnel, energy, and technology) *which in turn* "yield" tasks of the organization, different types of personnel, material resources necessary to sustain various transformations, and organizational technology (pp. 38-39). Somehow this leads to the hypothesis that "if the basic theses of historical materialism are valid, these procedures [the formal ones necessary to organizational survival] will be produced by the class struggle and constitute crystallizations of class relations" (p. 39) — a stunning example of *non sequitur* Marxism.

The product of this unusual Marxist foray into organization theory is an "eleven variable model" of the state apparatus, which does not claim to deal with the *effects* of state policies, but only with the form and content of the class character of the state. The eleven variables (pp. 39-40) do not bear repeating here, but are "eminently testable," seem reasonably exhaustive of those state activities which might interest the Left, and serve as a virtual outline for the rest of the essay. In abbreviated form, all three master variables (input mechanisms, processes of transformation, and output mechanisms) concern themselves, at varying levels, with the same three sub-variables: tasks to be done, personnel to be selected and manipulated, and money to be spent. It's that simple and the remainder of the essay is given over to illustrations.

Something which Therborn tosses out, almost as an afterthought, is his admission that "In the rest of this text, however, the state apparatus will be generally treated as a single whole" (p. 42). While such a strategy probably makes sense for Lithuania, not much can be said for it when confronting the sheer magnitude and complicity of the State as manifested in advanced capitalist-democratic countries. This is Therborn's Achilles' heel, and a chronic, time-honored undoing of Marxist analyses of macro-politics. The state is not an evil monolith any more than the "revolutionary party" is the pure champion of human liberation. In cheering himself on with quotations from *State and Revolution*, Therborn assumes that little has changed in state formation since the turn of the century and that Lenin's world bears overwhelming continuity with our own. Within this hypostasis of the "state apparatus" as a seamless whole, important developments necessarily fall beyond analysis, or must be distorted to fit within a theory too cramped for the reality it hopes to encompass.

Never does Therborn confront what in the U.S. has for many years been used as the principal battering ram against left-wing analysis of the state. The author admits that the "class rule of the proletariat is. . . troubled by a deep-rooted contradiction. The

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lingering hierarchy of specialization continues to confront the collective supremacy of labor" (p. 45) — all of which leads to Michels' "iron law." Hierarchy is hierarchy, no matter who is pulling the strings, and subordinates are just as subject to manipulation and whimsy even when "their boys" sit on the throne. This elementary fact of complex societies escapes the author, and understandably so, given his political allegiances.

Every ambitious dynamic model needs a motor, and for Therborn it is "the developmental logic of the class struggle." He explains: "The state apparatus feeds back into society a contribution to the regeneration of the class relations that formed it. It does this by reproducing the state-society relationship inscribed within it, and by structuring the way in which the things done by the state are actually performed.... Both the state apparatus and the class relations that formed it are reproduced or transformed by the interventions of the state — by that state power which is the central focus of the class struggle and its changing relationship of forces" (p. 45). This has the ring of circularity. Emphasis on the "articulation" of the modes of production, "conjunctural temporalities," and so on puts severe constraints on the way data can be interpreted. In searching for materials with which to shore up the edifice, Therborn ends up obscuring certain unwelcome relations of power and production, while exaggerating the importance of others. From here the essay concerns itself with "(Provisional) Answers." The most useful aspect of this section lies in Therborn's marshalling recent comparative data from English sources.

"State Power — On the Dialectics of Class Rule" tries to do two things: address the pluralist-elitist debate "raging within Anglo-American political science and sociology" and answer the question of how a "tiny bourgeoisie" has retained control of formal democracies, "marked by legal freedom of opinion-making and equal and universal suffrage" (p. 12). Certainly the latter is the more worthy enterprise, the former having exhausted itself from sheer boredom some years ago. Three major views of political power enjoy some currency among researchers. The "subjectivist approach" (who has power?), the "economic approach" (power to do rather than power over), and the "historical-materialist approach" which, as we have come to learn, is "profoundly different. In contrast to the two others, it starts not from 'the point of view of the actor' but from that of the ongoing social process of reproduction and transformation" (pp. 130-131). Here Therborn accepts Poulantzas' definition of the state "as a separate material institution, functioning as the nodal point of the relations of power within society. The state as such has no power; it is an institution where social power is concentrated and exercised" (p. 132). By also holding to the view that classes and the state condition each other, that "where there are no classes, there is no state," Therborn advances a set of empirically false or half-true axioms, but from which he develops an interesting thesis. The point of embracing Poulantzas to the exclusion of others is to further that Marxist orientation which seeks to "discover the characteristic social structures and relations which are promoted and protected above all others by the material force of the state" (p. 132), with the ultimate hope of hastening the revolution.

The most pointed repudiation of "psychologism" comes in a passage attacking the same "elite theorists" named in the earlier book. In his eagerness to emasculate these writers, however, he mistakenly categorizes them all as biological determinists — an unfortunate simplification. But more important, Therborn here betrays his ambivalence concerning psychological theory. On the one hand, he is adamant that "the task of social science must be to analyze... historical modes and their processes of transformation — a task which cannot be accomplished if the psyche, will and interests of the subjects of power are taken as the starting point" (p. 134). Yet, he realizes that

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"these subjects must be brought into systematic relationship with the historical social context." Therborn is throwing out the baby with the bath water: because he finds psychological theories of dominance and submission obnoxious, he dismisses the important project of formulating a Marxian psychology. The failure to deal with the individual as anything more than a member of this or that abstracted collectivity is a serious flaw in Marxism, and Therborn provides no help in remedying it. In so thoroughly detesting theories of "interpersonal relations" of power, "consensus" and the other components of the "subjectivist approach," he has cut himself off from the possibility of anchoring the individual in the larger socio-political struggle. His haphazard substitution for a developed Marxian psychology —invocation of the "class rule of the proletariat" — merely extends the quasi-religious mistake of many before him. Even more perplexing, however, is his apparent conviction (p. 137) that Marx's emphasis upon examination of "the process of *reproduction*" is the "path out of the pluralist-elitist impasse." This makes no sense: it is a classic instance of apples and oranges thrown together willy-nilly.

The essay also includes another wrestling match with Weber's political sociology and also gives vent to a complaint that has been simmering for a while, directed at the Frankfurt School: "The frequent emphasis on legitimation... appears to be seriously misplaced and should be discarded once and for all" (p. 171). As he writes, the "unwarranted rationalist assumption" behind study of legitimation processes and techniques is that people fail to rebel merely because they consider their subordination justified. The other reasons (fear of coercion, apathy, unawareness of alternatives, ignorance, and so on) are not often enough examined by the legitimation school. Therborn is correct in piercing the "formally universalistic" credo of democratic countries: "But since this mediation takes place in a social web woven by the relations of production, this formally universalistic intervention tends to reproduce the power of a particular class" (p. 170).

It is impossible to summarize the contents of the remaining chapters, where he relaxes pure theory, and mixes speculation with a good deal of comparative data. His goal is to gauge the "precise impact of the long period of Social Democratic rule on the development and world position of Swedish society" (p. 211). This may explain why Therborn is best when discussing northern Europe and East Germany, and much less on target when generalizing about the United States. His basic data source and original intellectual setting deflates universal theoretical aspirations.

Concluding his book, Therborn tries to accomplish a great deal and ends up overpolemicizing, thereby tarnishing whatever was valuable in his earlier analyses. "Taking State Power from Advanced Capitalism" includes "The History of the Present" (on the "revolutionary" labor movement) and "The Future as History" (about tactical difficulties hindering revolution). Both these sections offer a mix of italicized invective, some light history of communism in the 20th century, and a bit of garden-variety cheering for socialist revolution. They make entertaining reading for those who care to observe Swedish Marxism disrobed, free of scholarly camouflage, emotion running high. But with sentiments like *"It is principally due to the Communist parties* and the international detente and balance of power assured by *the strength of the USSR that democratic socialism has become a serious possibility in the advanced capitalist countries"* (p. 254), one's attention automatically reverts to the slightly firmer parts of the book.

Alan Sica

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Robert Agger. *A Little White Lie: Institutional Divisions of Labor and Life.* New York and Oxford: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1978. 193 plus xl pages.

It is not unlikely that the reader may come away from Robert Agger's *A Little White Lie: Institutional Divisions of Labor and Life* with a distinct feeling of discomfort. Such a feeling is warranted in part by the thrust of the argument, which holds that contemporary social institutions do not *fit* the needs and values of "total persons." Such institutions, Agger argues, are not merely inefficient, or even ill-suited to the needs of contemporary persons. Rather, there is a fundamental and radical disjuncture between the very constitution of institutions and the needs and values of individuals in society. This disjuncture leads to a threatening situation. In Agger's words, "...the continuing modern emphasis into increasingly specialized, professionalized institutions is increasingly futile. Such developments are increasingly bad for people: they address pseudo-problems, and at the same time they add to real human problems. Such an emphasis, if continued, may result in the demoralization of whole nations and even of all of western civilization" (xi).

Instead of providing comfortable social clothing for individuals, modern social institutions wrap people in straight jackets. There is, however, another reason for the discomfort. This concerns Agger's view of social institutions and his proposed institutional reforms.

Social institutions for Agger are not suprapersonal, objective and discrete units of social organization as they are often regarded. This conception of social institutions is in fact one of the "little white lies" which distorts the relations of individuals to their institutions, hypostatizing the latter as impervious to human intervention. Social institutions are structures of practical activity which pervade everyday life. Agger thus provides a "social psychology" of everyday life in which institutions are viewed as "no more or less than a set of people performing with each other in a set of operations defined and guided by language...and ideas that mark projects as theirs, projects in which outsiders presumably do not participate" (p. 108). Agger's task is to "open" contemporary institutions and thereby establish the grounds upon which institutions can be reconciled with people's real needs and values.

In addressing the role of institutions in the modern world, Agger treads on a question which transcends the social criticism of his book, and the social psychological approach taken concerning the reform of social institutions. This question entails the distinction between "true" and "false" consciousness, and that point at which social institutions may be seen to have the possibility of embodying the real needs and values of persons. Agger's critique raises basic and ultimate questions about the relations between consciousness and social reality. In fact, the critique of modern institutions is based on these issues. The proposed reforms, however, do not address these issues to any significant degree. There is thus a disjunction in Agger's book, which is in some ways not unlike the disjunction which he claims characterize the modern world. In order to see this more clearly, it is necessary to take a closer look at Agger's critique of social institutions, and the proposed resolution.

"Every person," according to Agger, "is an irreducible indivisible system" (p. 10). Modern institutions, though by "labelling" individuals in a false and arbitrary manner, dissect the individual in unnatural ways and rupture the normal relations which could otherwise grow between "total person." By thinking of ourselves in terms of the typical categories fostered by modern institutions we artificially fragment ourselves and restrict our potential relations with others. These institutional categories

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penetrate our self-conceptions. We think of ourselves as doctors, lawyers, professional sociologists, etc., at the expense of a more holistic conception of ourselves as "total persons" in relation to other persons. A key task, then, is to demystify the ontological certainty that attaches to this conception of modern social institutions: "Discrete institutions do not exist" (p. 13).

The sense of social institutions as objective entities (the "modern manufactured reality") is premised on a fundamental misconception about the nature of values and needs. The modern myth, according to Agger, entails a conception of needs as producing values. This myth presumes further that these needs produce discrete institutions (i.e., needs for food and shelter produce economic institutions).

This view is inverted. Needs have no meaning apart from human valuational processes. "Needs do not entail, encompass or integrate values. Values entail needs. Values integrate needs" (p. 19). The nature of human experience is total and holistic. Needs are partial expressions of this experience. Institutions then are modelled on these partial needs. Because of this, modern institutions are inevitably built to address only a partial conception of the person. In attempting to cope with these partial needs, modern institutions necessarily exacerbate other human needs.

Human experience, Agger argues, shares a deep structure which is lost in the organization of modern institutions. We tend to think of house building and music as parts of two different and discrete institutions: one economic, the other aesthetic. But both houses and music may be seen as beautiful. There are aesthetic and economic aspects to both activities, and each activity, as a totality, cannot be reduced to one or the other institutional framework. There is nothing essential to either house building or playing music that would make the former patently economic or the latter patently aesthetic.

The sense of social institutions as separate and discrete is a complex delusion. This conception implies that activity within the institution is uniform in a sense that obfuscates an underlying complexity. Buying or selling a house, for example, though ostensibly for the purpose of either obtaining shelter or making money, requires a complex assortment of human activities and social relations. These relations are embedded in the fabric of everyday life. Modern institutions are thus based on everyday life. Yet, their very functioning is geared to ignore the "human living" which is encompassed by everyday life.

It is to this "human living" that Agger wishes to re-orient our attention. Where the modern world, predicated on institutions, is oriented to "functioning," the post-modern world, predicated on everyday life, is oriented to "living." Where the modern world is oriented to the saving of huma life, the post-modern world is oriented to the saving of "human souls."

The structure of modern institutions is fundamentally paradoxical. They are built out of the experience of total persons, yet they cannot help but fail to meet the needs of total persons. Even though they persist, they can never succeed. This paradox is the basis for the three types of consciousness which according to Agger characterize modern institutions. First, there is "institutional consciousness." This characterizes "those people whose consciousness is pretty much determined by...specialized and compartmentalized communicative environments" (p. 55). This is the most "false" of consciousness. These are people whose identities are thoroughly encompassed and defined by social institutions.

Next there is what Agger refers to as the "double consciousness." Persons who have this type of consciousness are aware of "the partial and partializing human experiences

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in which they are engaged as members of institutions and also of the truly and totally human experiences in which they are engaged at the same time in the same place" (p. 55). In this case, false consciousness is intermittently interrupted by the realization of the mythical nature of modern institutions. These interruptions though are ephemeral and sporadic.

Finally there is "true" or "total consciousness." This consciousness rejects institutional reality as it currently exists. True consciousness is a maturity which "consists precisely in seeing through and going beyond the specificity pretended by institutions, by their creators, by their current leaders, by their influential directors, and indeed, by many of their rank-and-file members.... Maturity consists of a true consciousness of the multi-faceted human moments experienced in all institutional settings..." (p. 58).

True consciousness is Agger's goal. In the modern institutional setting it is only occasionally realized. People who have true consciousness are often treated as trouble-makers or written off as mentally incompetent. Double consciousness is more typically the rule, and the most interesting if not most important example of double consciousness with which Agger deals is that of Karl Marx who recognized the divisive and illusory nature of social institutions. Yet, he only partially transcended it. In fact, Marx's reliance on economic categories was an instance of a further arbitrary division of the "total person." Because of this, modern institutional reality was able to overcome Marxism. As Agger puts it: "It has been said almost ad nauseam that Marx was betrayed...by Stalin. Instead of a single class taking power...a small elite of bureaucrats and politicians have ruled the working class.... We agree, but our point is different. It is that modernity has witnessed an extreme development of specialized...institutions whose elites justify their continued domination by pointing to the necessary functioning of their own institutions.... Even if the revolution had not been betrayed, then, Marx's own failure to think as deeply about the fundamental institutional categories as he had about so many other illusory objectifications was reason enough for him to miss the possibility of embedding the divisions of labor and life in a more 'real community' matrix by a process other than through a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" (p. 69-70).

What Marx failed to do, was to develop a theory of how institutions may, *sui generis*, develop their own objectifications and thereby reify human experience. To this end, a social psychology of the modern world is required. This entails a more thorough understanding of how modern institutions pervade everyday life and transform human experience.

According to Agger, the power of modern institutions is essentially a matter of language and social psychology. This is not to suggest that some agent has pronounced the dominance of discrete institutions over everyday life, but that modern institutional language has pervaded everyday life to the extent that a conception of the total person has disappeared. Modern institutions dominate everyday life because of a language in which institutions, and, as a result, persons are inherently partialized. This partialization is largely a matter of linguistics: "The method of making institutions discrete is to assign symbols to various objects and activities and thereafter regard them as economic *or* cultural *or* social *or* political *or*..." (p. 76-77). The language of institutions sustains a sense of them as objective and supra-personal. A first step in the social psychology of institutions then is to strip away this language.

This can be seen in Agger's analysis of government as a social institution. The idea of government as a body constituted by laws, which persists over time is a purely

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symbolic artifact. When these symbolic contents are removed, all that is left are people attempting to influence each other in ways that are important and meaningful for them. The nature of this interpersonal influence is not strictly "governmental" but is based upon all of the human resources available to persons in the context of everyday life. The idea of government as a discrete intitution masks the human and interpersonal realities from which government is constituted in the first place. Once this realization is attained, the task is two-fold: 1) to change our conception of government to a more expansive and inclusive one; and 2) to provide complete and total membership to all persons.

A similar dynamic is evident with respect to science as a social institution. Agger contrasts phenomenological and positivist approaches to the question of science, claiming that both share a belief in science as a discrete institution. The distinction between science and everyday life is only one of degree. Even scientists, he points out, must take certain things as a matter of faith. Even scientific findings are produced in the context of the interaction between total persons.

The sense of science as a discrete institution prohibits access to it by many of the people who are effected by its findings. Agger proposes that the distance of science from everyday life can be lessened without diluting the quality of science. We may still have people who do brain surgery, he argues, without people who exclusively think of themselves as brain surgeons. Similarly, we cannot expect all members of society to be jet pilots, though a greater number of people may participate in decisions about the flying of jet airplanes. Changing science, making it more responsive to human needs and values, requires the understanding that science as an institution stems from basic human experiences, and shares the basic qualities that all such experiences share. It is on the basis of these qualities, that the institution may be opened to a wider variety of participants.

Institutions are thus a complex mixture of truth and falseness, of reality and unreality. Because they are rooted in human experience they cannot be completely false. Because they address only part of the needs and values of total persons, they are not completely true either. The unreality of institutions is manifested in the false sense of discreteness and closure which characterizes specific institutions. This conception is real to the extent that individual actions are based upon it. The task is both to demystify and open institutions.

Since institutions are forms of practical activity guided by a particular type of language, the first step in opening institutions is to change their language and to reform the social psychology of the modern world. "Institutions may be opened to many, maybe even all people merely by a change in the appropriate matters of social psychology" (p. 108). This entails a change in the "integral molar units of attitudes — actions." These units are made up by the "experiences of persons, the ways people experience themselves and others" (p. 114).

Opening institutions is now a human need: "The need now, the human need now, is to build new human communities wherein more self-consciously total persons will provide a new, simpler and more unified measure of problems and approaches to problems to avert the paralysis or dictatorships that lie at the end of unsuccessful efforts by the systems analysts and decision makers" (p. 128). Agger proposes three methods of de-differentiating institutions. The first entails the enrichment of existing language, and the construction of new languages that address human problems at the level of total persons. Secondly "ordinary people" should be equipped with technical languages and practices. Thirdly, he proposes the translation of everyday language

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into technical ones, and the de-mystification of technical languages.

Agger cites instances where similar reforms were instituted on a small scale as evidence of the feasibility of these proposals. He cites the "youth movement" of the late sixties as an instance where new terms and slogans came to enrich the common experience as an example of the first type of institutional de-differentiation. A World War II medical training plan for non-doctors, and a women's health collective are cited as examples of the second form. The third type of institutional de-differentiation is exemplified by a legal training program where persons are taught to handle their own defense. (The possible abuses of this should be obvious.) Another example of this third type of institutional de-differentiation involved an urban planning program where residents become involved from the very beginning. As a result, Agger claims that much of the jargon which obfuscates the needs of persons effected by such planning was avoided and the people of the city were better served. These reforms can better involve persons in their own destiny without diluting the scientific and technical mastery which now exists. In fact, this mastery will be enhanced.

It is in the context of these reforms that one can see the problems with Agger's solutions, and hence the uneasiness that his work engenders. Agger provides no discussion of how these reforms are to be implemented in the context of contemporary institutions, particularly with respect to the allocation of power within and among institutions. Agger's book lacks a discussion of the interests which would certainly bear upon the implementation of these reforms. The United States armed forces did train "ordinary" soldiers as doctors during World War II. They did the same thing in Vietnam. In each case, the program went no further than the particular setting in which it was employed, and was dropped almost as soon as the conflicts ended. What are the structural constraints that would ensure the continuation of the similar types of reforms proposed by Agger? Without an analysis of such constraints, these reforms are little more than wishful thinking.

This reflects a more fundamental lacunae in Agger's argument. Institutional de-differentiation is not proposed merely as reform. It is proposed as a rectification of the false consciousness of the modern world. It is supposed to pave the way to "true consciousness." Yet, there is no discussion of the grounds for true consciousness. This is an especially important problem, for without these grounds we have no guarantee that the Agger reforms would not be institutionalized in the same sense that he claims the Marxist revolutions were institutionalized. Would his reforms, for example, require a ministry of institutional de-differentiation, with a department of technical language translation?

Agger's work stands somewhat tenuously in the middle of two intellectual traditions. On the one hand, it represents a type of philosophical anthropology similar to that expressed in Habermas' *Knowledge and Human Interests*.[1] Like Habermas, Agger seeks to liberate consciousness from the illegitimate and unnatural bindings through which it is constrained in the context of modern society. In this vein, Agger wants to move towards "true consciousness." This is necessary in order to ensure the success of his reforms. Moreover, it is warranted by his critique of the false consciousness of modern institutions.

On the other hand, Agger's book stands in the tradition of a kind of radical social work in which human problems are viewed as the result of an inegalitarian and

1. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, (Boston, 1971).

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repressive social system.[2] Radical social work is intervention-oriented. It seeks to solve human problems by mobilizing the consciousness of individuals and making them aware of the conditions of their oppression. The feeling of uneasiness engendered by Agger's book may stem from his failure to bridge the gap between these two perspectives. It may also stem from the inadequacy of social reforms to provide the kinds of answers required for a philosophical anthropology.

William M. Berg

2. See for example David Gil, *The Challenge of Social Equality*, (Cambridge: Shenkman Publishing co., 1976).

George Fischer. *Ways to Self-Rule: Beyond Marxism and Anarchism.* Hicksville, N.Y., 1978.

The New Left's demise generated a plethora of groups attempting to understand its failure and correct its "errors." Jacoby has discussed the reversion of some to orthodox Marxist-Leninist approaches. He accurately pinpointed the weaknesses of the New Left that attracted people to these more rigid views.[1] Yet, other strains of thought emerged and continued to develop. Of particular interest are those which sought to preserve and expand anti-authoritarian and anti-centralization critiques. Those who pursued this path focused on the distortions of socialist ideals by bureaucracies and autocratic party rule. This, in turn, led to other developments. Some rejected Marxism in its entirety for facilitating elitism and centralization. Others sought to recover the humanistic dimensions within Marxism and to combine them with anarchism. George Fischer is one of the latter. Although he sees elements of Marxism and anarchism worth salvaging, he hopes to transcend both by postulating a new alternative: self-rule.

As a collection of six previously published essays, this book provides a disjointed picture of self-rule. Indeed, only the fifth and sixth essays attempt to directly confront the issue. For this reason, the first four essays can be quickly summarized before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of self-rule.

In the first essay, "Questioning Science," Fischer challenges science as the "main myth or religion of our time" (p. 17). His criticism, however, is not as powerful as that of people such as Gramsci, Horkheimer and Adorno. Fischer sees the "Problem of ideology" as the Achilles' heel of science in that it forces an ultimately arbitrary division between objective and subjective forms of knowledge. This is a promising approach, because the definition of legitimate forms of knowledge and the control of this knowledge have important consequences for self-rule. Fischer obviously realizes this, as he refers extensively to Schutz' "well-informed citizen." Partially because of this digression, he eventually gets bogged down in a quasi-ethnomethodological maze of rules to distinguish ideology from opinion-making. The inclusion of opinion-making is necessitated by his definition of ideology as a form of argumentation. This turn in his argument not only weakens the discussion of ideology versus science, but it also side-steps more explosive issues such as the history of this division, its reprecussions and its impact on developing individuals capable of ruling themselves.

1. Russell Jacoby, "The Politics of Objectivity," *Telos* 34 (Winter 1977-78), pp. 74-88.

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The second essay, "Choice in Social Science," in an effort to "spell out a choice for anti-establishment academics" (p. 17). He castigates the major schools of sociology in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as supportive of the status quo — a necessary consequence of their instrumental rationality. The solution is to focus on both subject and object from a theoretical perspective and to move from bureaucracy to communalism on the level of praxis. Both are sound recommendations. But even Fischer seems to acknowledge this idealistic character, as many radical academics are often compelled to leave the university when they attempt to follow his advice. Is the solution to this problem a full break with the academy as Fischer suggests? Here, by oversimplifying a complex dilemma, he falls prey to facile solutions.

The third chapter, "Reform of Urban Colleges," advocates an educational policy emphasizing the learning of public skills in a concrete and active manner.

The fourth essay, "Against All Bosses," is a collection of Fischer's short articles from "Against the Grain." They cover diverse topics such as a polemic for Nazi rights in Skokie and the role of Mao in quashing the democratic side of the Cultural Revolution. One line in the piece on the Nazis typifies Fischer's approach: "Freedom means little, if we don't treat it as indivisible, absolute, sacred" (p. 168). Unfortunately, freedom (in reality) has always been divisible, relative and profane. Of course, we should not consider this a model for the future. Yet, the concept of freedom deserves scrutiny and not platitudes. What are, for example, the social implications in both the best and worst of all possible worlds for the freedom to propagate racism and genocide? "Absolutes" have a curious habit of mystifying and obscuring both their social genesis and meaning.

Fischer sees this book as a programmatic approach to a real historical possibility and stresses that today we face only two possibilities: "1984" or self-rule. But his definition of self-rule remains vague and abstract: ways to self-rule are only cursorily outlined. Self-rule is defined as: "that possibility...for a community consciously chosen, consciously self-governing, consciously free. A modern community that forms the active core of a complex and varied world. A new form of life in which people produce and reproduce not only a freely chosen community but a culture and means of subsistence that makes that form of life plausible in the first place. This second prospect (self-rule as opposed to 1984), a grand finale to many a grand dream, means free individuals running their own lives through free associations. The prospect means direct, participatory democracy in place of indirect, representative democracy. It means not a *better* state, but statelessness: a world-wide web of small and big coordinating bodies run by face-to-face communities from the ground up — as against our helter-skelter of huge states, ever more repressive at home and expansionary abroad, that run our lives and globe from the top down" (p. 187, emphasis in original).

The vagueness of this definition is partially due to the vagueness of Fischer's critique of modern society. Modern civilization is characterized by capitalism, patriarchy and the state. These "must go, if self-rule is to have a chance" (p. 191). Yet, he side-steps much current debate about the nature of contemporary capitalism, patriarchy and the state. The lack of a rigorous analysis of contemporary society leads to amorphous and generalized strategies.

According to Fischer, the key contradiction which opens up the possibility for self-rule is that between scarcity and the means to end it. People continue to starve and suffer in a world where both the resources and technology exist to abolish scarcity. This is reasonable but a bit simplistic and not particularly new. Fischer's

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unsophisticated analysis leads him to minimize the power of bourgeois hegemony to reconcile and mediate contradictions of this type.

At the same time, he maximizes the "dynamic potential for accumulation of conscious community" among the "underclass, declassé college graduates and young factory workers" which he sees at the fringes of late capitalism. As a growing body of literature points out, however, an economically marginal position is often accompanied by a subtle, but nonetheless coercive, internalization of feelings of individual failure and inferiority. An economically marginal position does not necessarily translate into a consciousness critical of the existing social order. The flight into the counter-culture does not mark an increasing distance from the American Dream and, thus, a transformation into active subjects. Rather, the counter-culture can be viewed as a variation on the American Dream emphasizing individualism and consumption of music, clothing and drugs.

Fischer dismisses questions of consciousness, which have been major themes of 20th century neo-Marxist thought. The examination of the role of consciousness has occupied such a position of priority, because the "revolutionary subjects" have not grasped objective contradictions (such as Fischer's) and split them open. Fischer, of course, calls for organizing. But he does not discuss the critical dialectic of organizing and changing consciousness. This is crucial, since organizing individuals into (self-) interest groups does not mean a radical transformation of world-view. Given this account, it comes as no surprise that the three key realms of "original accumulation" (of conscious community) are workplace democracy, neighborhood power and personal liberation. Organization is these three areas counters capitalism, the state and patriarchy. Again, this is reasonable but does not go beyond either Marxism or Anarchism.

Going beyond Marxism and anarchism actually boils down to taking what Fischer likes about these philosophies and discarding what he does not like. What he likes is that Marxism speaks to his mind, while anarchism speaks to his soul. The problem with both is their "millenarian elitism" which leads them to call for a "Nirvana of Rationality" precipitated by a "great social change." This is not very illuminating and could have been further developed.

According to Fischer, the process toward self-rule involves fringe elements which recognize the contradiction in the present socially induced scarcity and then organizing workplaces, neighborhoods and themselves. Their goal is self-rule. But what is this self-rule? It is not socialism. In the introductory chapter Fischer dissociates himself from socialism and in the last one he speaks of a "mixed system." Since capitalism, industrialism and socialism have been eliminated as antithetical to self-rule, it is an exercise in haziness to figure out what this mixed system is. Leaving the production process and the organization of production aside, we have non-hierarchial, freely chosen communities linked together by a "world-wide web of small and big coordinating bodies." This, however, opens up a can of worms. Given current propensities to associate primarily with similar others, how will greely chosen communities avoid become a mass of deadening homogeneity? What prevents using criteria of race, sex or age to limit access into these freely chosen communities? Even more problematic is the concept of coordinating bodies. What prevents them from becoming bureaucracies or the nucleus of a state apparatus? I am left with a concept of self-rule as elusive in theory as it appears to be in practice.

The superficiality of Fischer's approach is not intrinsic to his project. Other proponents of self-rule have been able to provide considerably more substantial

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visions. Thus, for example, Bookchin's work provides the basis of a critique of Fischer from a more purely anarchist position.[2] Like fischer, Bookchin rejects economistic reductions of domination and hierarchy to class relations and sees such reductions as obscuring the full meaning of self-rule or self-management. Yet, Bookchin is able to ground his interpretation of these phenomena in an historical account of the market and its progressive degradation of the biological and social environment. Further, Bookchin presents an historical model of self-management (the Athenian *polis*) and relates it to the township in early America. This provides a more concrete basis for dialogue as opposed to Fischer's ethereal utopia.

Fischer's book has a tantalizing title and provocative chapter headings. Unfortunately, the content falls short of its promises. Had Fischer written a comprehensive book rather than assembling previously published essays, its superficiality may have been avoided. Even then, I suspect that certain flaws such as his avoidance of history and consciousness would still have marred the book. As it is, even though the legacies of Marxism and Anarchism are heatedly discussed, *Ways to Self-Rule* offers little to enrich this debate.

Susan Hegger

2. Cf. Murray Bookchin, "Beyond Neo-Marxism." *Telos* 36 (Summer 1978), pp. 5-28.

Willard Gaylin, Ira Glasser, Steven Marcus and David Rothman. *Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence.* New York: Pantheon, 1978. $2.95.

This is a timely, relevant and a remarkably well-written book. That is as it should be. Billed as the result of a unique symposium-like collaboration between social policy experts and humanists, *Doing Good* certainly must have satisfied its sponsor, the New York Council for the Humanities, by bringing to the concern with policy something that it has sadly lacked: literary elegance.

This is no small matter. A virtual revolution could be wrought in the social sciences if their practitioners could learn to pose problems in much the following manner: "...we recognized that a claim once considered to be of the most virtuous sort, the claim to be acting benevolently, had now become—to understate the point—suspect; if the last refuge of the scoundrel was once patriotism, it now apeared to be the activity of 'doing good' for others, acting in the best interests of someone else.... How was it that a concept of such traditionally high and noble standing, the text for countless ministers to preach on...was perceived as a positively dangerous impulse that ought to be curbed, maybe even eliminated? Could one construct and implement a humane and decent public policy toward the dependent without invoking, if not assuming, benevolent motives? If benevolence were ruled out, were we left with cruelty and neglect? Were we really prepared to say that the sins that could be committed in the name of doing good were the most grievous sins...?"

But, alas, just being able to say that benevolent liberalism has helped manufacture dependency, and to say it gracefully, is not enough. What is required is an analysis of

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the social forces responsible for committing these sins and some indication of how all this can be changed and not just remitted. Unfortunately, *Doing Good* only reaffirms the paradigm of benevolence and thereby gives reformers and the state a new lease oin on life.

The book consists of four separate essays written by a psychoanalyst (Willard Gaylin); a social historian (David Rothman); a literary historian (Steven Marcus); and a lawyer (Ira Glasser) who is currently head of the New York Civil Liberties Union. Although the essays stay close to the authors' realms of competence, traces of the symposium are found in references they make to each other's arguments.

Gaylin's essay is a lucid summation of received psychological wisdom. He roots the sentiment of benevolence in the universally-shared experience of infant helplessness. Our biological survival as a species requires that the necessary dependence of infants be well tended, and not just by satisfying specific organic needs. Of even greater importance to our personal development—and by extension for society as a whole—is that we be loved and cared for in a uniquely dyadic way that has roots in a history far more ancient than that of our own species. In short, everybody needs a mommy, or somebody like that.

One of the most important effects of this experience is that most of us can easily recognize true helplessness, empathize with it, and feel that something should be done to care for those who are as helpless as we were when we entered the world. This is as it should be, and Gaylin sees no problem with our treatment of the "intrinsically" dependent—the senile, the handicapped, the mentally retarded. We should treat these people as infants, and like a loving parent make their lives as comfortable as possible. The real problem with benevolence comes in our treatment of what Gaylin refers to as "the extrinsically" dependent: the poor, many of those judged insane, youth, and so on—those made "dependent by artifacts of our culture." Even here it is not paternalism that is the problem but what Gaylin coyly and evasively refers to as "what is passed off as paternalism." What he seems to be referring to are the priviliges of bureaucracies that lay claim to the exercise of paternalism as their specific property.

Although Gaylin tells us that there is no profound problems in the care of the extrinsically dependent, he really means that it is a problem that can only be resolved by a change in the moral temperment of those who develop policy: "The solution is simply to alter the category. And it is 'merely' a technological problem. Those of you versed in the economic and political mechanisms must come up with a solution."

Steven Marcus, in an essay on British social legislation from the late eighteenth through mid-nineteenth centuries that is easily the best of the contributions to this volume, takes issue with Gaylin on precisely this point. "It is not, as Dr. Gaylin argues, 'merely, a technological problem.' It has to do with such imponderable questions as why men in society and history behave as they do; why, when they act in groups and as representatives of certain kinds of classes, they often act as they never would in other circumstances; why they seek to solve certain problems by constructing certain kinds of institutions, and what it is that such institutions suggest to us about ourselves."

Marcus then proceeds to ponder on the process by which "freeborn" Englishmen and women were politically and economically disenfranchised by the effects of the Poor Laws. The rub was that what was a bit of universally popular legislation in 1795, amounting to a government subsidy of wages, ended by mid-century having given birth to a system of controlling the poor and working classes that was hated by its ostensible beneficiaries with a passion that, Dickens excepted, is practically indescribable.

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Marcus goes on to tell us that there is no evidence that this system was gradually constructed by evil men, whose unhappy childhoods might account for a lack of benevolence. Rather, it seems that these men, the squires and magistrates of the English countryside, ensured that legislation drafted on behalf of others also did not challenge the control over agricultural production and marketing on which their social position was based. The end result, of course, was that the political forces this brought into play served agrarian capitalist interests as directly as if the legislation had been explicitly drafted on their behalf.

While the effect of the round of poor law legislation, economic monopoly, and near economic collapse of the agricultural sector created a vicious circle that called for even harsher legislation with predictably similar effects, Marcus hints that the problem cannot solely be laid at the doorstep of an inevitably misguided political intervention on behalf of the general social welfare. For what would the situation have been like without the small doles provided by the poor laws? The answer, of course, was Ireland and near genocide. And the lesson? Well. . ."We belong to a reformist traditon, and long experience should have made us skeptical by now of some of our best-intentioned efforts. Caring for people in a concerted effort and not caring for them in a concerted effort are each of them, as matters of policy, interventions. All interventions have consequences, and one of the things we should learn to keep in the forefront of our consciousness is that the most important consequences of any intervention almost always turn out to be those consequences that were not intended or planned upon or could not have been calculated beforehand. Dependents, precisely because they are dependent and often unable to help themselves, deserve more than others to be protected from the unintended consequences of our benevolence and the incalculable consequences of our social good will."

David Rothman's essay on social policy in the progressive era, defined as extending until 1965, is pretty pedestrian stuff. Relying on a well-established battery of revisionist studies, Rothman argues that reformers have seen the victims of economic and political competition as needing help most reliably provided by a surrogate parent—an intrusive yet benevolent state apparatus. Needless to say, the bureaucracies thus created have not only been rather ineffective in dealing with the particular social ills they set as their goals, but have also increasingly infantilized and degraded their client populations.

The unique element in Rothman's essay is that he sees this all changing in the mid-sixties. Central to this change is a growing concern with the "rights" of clients as opposed to their "needs." The primary actors in this shift are, of course, the clients themselves who by rejecting their infantilized roles are demanding to be treated in a manner consistent with their constitutional rights as citizens. Whether as welfare mothers, mental patients, high-school students, and the like, these groups have allied themselves with professional advocates—usually lawyers—and initiated a kind of guerrilla war within the caretaking institutions. As one might expect, these are activities that don't endear them to the professional caretakers, but to which these latter are quite vulnerable. Rothman sees a real chance for the rebirth of liberty in those social relationships that deal with servicing hman need, but the prognosis is not completely rosy: "A focus on rights may well give a new legitimacy to neglect, allowing conservatives to join in the chorus for rights, not for the sake of maximizing choice but for reducing tax-based expenditures. An adversarial model, setting interest off against interest, does seem to run the clear risk of creating a kind of ultimate shoot-out in which, by definition, the powerless lose and the powerful win."

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In the final essay, Ira Glasser turns to program. The lengthiest piece in the volume, its message is, nevertheless, brief. Glasser tells us that what is of value in American political traditions is the recognition that the exercise of power is aggressive. hence, political institutions should be constructed to provide individuals with maximum protection from domination. From this he derives three principles of action: "Firstly, the Bill of Rights applies to social institutions of caring and limits the powers of those institutions and their employees over the lives of the dependent... Sēcondly, the enforcement of constitutional limits is not self-executing and therefore requires an external force... Thirdly, every program designed to help the dependent ought to be evaluated, not on the basis of the good it might do, but rather on the basis of the harm it might do. Those programs ought to be adopted that seem to be the least likely to make things worse."

Rothman is right. Glasser's rhetoric attests to a major shift in treating the dependent. Whereas mitigating misery and dangerous conflict once went hand in hand with the expansion of institutions and their paid specialists, de-institutionalization is now on the agenda. But does the universe of social control become any less total, any less degrading, as clients are removed from the confines of hierarchically organized factories of one sort or another? Or is a client, a client, a client, no matter what? And isn't it just possible that the expanded job opportunities for lawyers implicit in Glasser's vision relies as heavily on the social dependence of subject populations as the mandate of doctors, social workers, teachers and policemen did in the bad old days before 1965?

The major problem with the reform tradition discussed in *Doing Good*, and the bad that it did, is that it reflected specific group interests: those of the servants of corporate capital, the new middle classes. Doing good things for the social system as a whole was the way members of this group became conscious of, and established a niche for themselves. Their obsession with the needs rather than the rights of other people was the most effective way they found to protect their own needs and further their own ends. The moral world of the new middle classes is a restricted one. The problems they face always seem to be posed between two inadequate choices: doing good for others or ensuring their constitutional rights. Either-or time.

But there is another reform tradition that lies buried deep in the anonymity of neighborhood and shop and is occassionally unearthed by historians. In this world people do good for themselves. In movements those of the populists (as told for example, in Lawrence Goodwyn's recent *Democratic Promise*) and countless others, a different dynamic is encountered: the establishment of universally applicable rights to have common needs satisfied.

The inability of learned men, such as the contributors to this volume, to explore the potential and experience of reform movements both conceived and controlled by those who called themselves the poor in the eighteenth century, common people in the nineteenth, and today are called so many things—clients, working people, the lower classes, even the middle class—that they might as well be nameless is, in the end, the greatest limit to benevolence.

John Grady

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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS: *

CATALYST 9 (1977)

Otonabee College, Trent University, Peterborough, Ont. Canada. $6 for 2 issues. Issue theme: State and Capital. SIDNEY M. WILHELM, *"The Rise of State Rule: An Exploratory and Interpretive Essay."* The rise of nuclear weapons technology has allowed the state, "previously a mere appendage of capital," to become a focus of power in its own right. ELWIN H. POWELL, *"Promoting the Decline of the Rising State: Documents of Resistance and Renewal from the Alternative Community: Buffalo, 1965-1976."* An anecdotal account of the resistance movements in Buffalo that outlines four "acts of witness" against the state. Powell does not draw out any implications for resistance in the present situation. TOM McLAUGHLIN, *"The Marxist-Leninist Theory of Humor."* An attempt at satire which is not humorous. Or, maybe it isn't satirical? GREGORY RENAULT, *"Mass Culture Revisited (1)."* A critical review of the inadequacies of Alan Swingewood's *The Myth of Mass Culture.* Like breaking a fly on the rack. PM

CINE-TRACTS, 1:4 (Spring-Summer 1978)

4227 Esplanade Ave., Montreal, Que. H2W 1T1, Canada. $10 for 4 issues. STEPHEN HEATH, *"Questions of Property; Film and Nationhood."* Central to questions pertaining to film ownership and the relation of nation and history in cinema is the investigation of cinema's history as an 'institution of representing,' which relies on social, economic and ideological conditions for the production of meaning. *"A Discussion with Johan Van der Keuken."* This Dutch filmmaker's work (*The Palestinians, Springtime*) is discussed as an attempt to confront documentary codes and conventions from within the specific coded instances of the documentary, thereby constituting an important contribution to self-reflexive cinema. HART COHEN, *"A Review of Springtime."* Van der Keuken's film addresses the problem of the constitution of the subject both in filmic representation and in the context of the social institutions of Western European capitalism. Because it links the critique of political structures to a specific formal strategy for its own transmission, *Springtime* can be seen as an eminently political film. JEAN-LOUIS COMOLLI, *"On the Practice of Political Film, An Interview."* Against criticisms that his film *La Cecilia* lacks sufficient gaps in its mode of representation to allow for a critical perspective on the part of the spectator, Comolli contends that his use of a fictional style poses the problem of political enunciation. *"Special Canadian Section."* Articles attempting to restore 'an invisible cinema' and its conditions of production, distribution and consumption to critical attention. NW

DIALECTICA, 32:2 (1978)

Imprimerie Cooperative S.A., 3000 Berne 16, Switzerland. RICHARD H. BROWN, *"Dialectic and Structure in Sartre and Lévi-Strauss."* A search for a synthesis in the opposition of structuralism and existentialism as represented by Lévi-Strauss and Sartre. The ground of their relation is the dialectic and the idea that dialectical thought generates structures. A complete misreading of both authors. J. WOODS, D. WALTON, *"The Fallacy of 'Ad Ignorantium'."* Deals with the dilemma of implying the truth of a proposition by failing to prove its falsehood. MAX BLACK, *"Some Questions about Practical Reasoning."* To get beyond induction and deduction as pivotal elements of reasoning, the author suggests 'deliberative reasoning.' A spin-off from 'decision theory.' GUY LAFRANCE, *"Les deux Principles de la Justice selon Rawls."* Critique of Rawls' *Theory of Justice*, organized around the problematic of Kantian roots. KAI NIELSEN, *"Equality, Justice and Class: Comments on Lafrance."* Further criticizes Rawls, expanding Lafrance's position. Rawls' notions of freedom and equality are shown to be incompatible. FRANCOIS DUCHESNEAU, *"Téléologie et Determination Positive de l'ordre Biologique."* The limits of functionalist analysis, interpreted as goal-directedness, are discussed regarding the problems of history and of what is "beyond the goal" as being an influence on prior activity. JULES DUCHESNE, *"Reflections on a New Perspective of the Evolution of Living Organisms."* Tries to go beyond the "neo-Darwinist position." IH

FEMINIST STUDIES, 4:2 (June 1978)

Women's Studies Program, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. $10 per year (3 issues). Issue theme: Toward a Feminist Theory of Motherhood. RACHEL BLAU DuPLESSIS, *"Washing Blood: Introduction to This Issue."* An essay that treats the experience and institution

*This section has been compiled by John Fekete, Department of English, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario K9J 7B8, Canada; with the help of: P. Akard, D. Gehrke, I. Harvey, K. Hummel, R. John, M. Lacy, P. McCallum, P. Murphy, G. Nelson, H. Prechel, P. Piran, G. Renault, P. Rodas, R. Rucker, J.L. Shaw, B. Singer, N. Wert, D. Wildcat, S. Wheeler.

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of motherhood as an unresolved contradiction: being and becoming, birth and death, subject and object, mother and self, nurturance and autonomy, role and vocation, consciousness and mystification. ANITA BARROWS, *"The Chart."* MARY OPPEN, *"Breath of Life."* CAROL H. POSTON, *"Childbirth in Literature."* Poston argues that the social and literary view of childbirth is an audience experience. Even women writers usually present the birth scene from the outside, in a way portraying the woman as either savage or heroine. SANDRA M. GILBERT, *"Horror's Twin: Mary Shelley's Monstrous Eve."* Intellectual history, Shelley's biography, and literary interpretation are combined to present a reading of *Frankenstein* as a fictionalized rendition of the significance of *Paradise Lost* to women. Shelley takes Milton's "male culture myth" at its full value and rewrites it so as to clarify its deepest meanings for herself in her romantic novel about romanticism, books, writers, and the birth myth. FAYE MOSKOWITZ, *"A Leak in the Heart."* ALICIA OSTRIKER, *"The Mother-Child Papers."* JANET BOGDAN, *"Care or Cure? Childbirth Practices in 19th-Century America."* RUTH BLOCH, *"American Feminine Ideals in Transition: The Rise of the Moral Mother, 1785-1815."* Philippe Aries has argued (in *Centuries of Childhood*) that childhood gradually took on a new significance at the center of the evolving nuclear family during the 18th and 19th centuries. In this article, Bloch examines the evolution of the social idea of women as mothers that corresponded to the increased significance assigned to children within the family. She argues that literary images of women prior to the 18th century stressed their roles as either helpmate or graceful and refined ornaments, and that motherhood received less normative emphasis and symbolic appreciation. During the Victorian period, although women were idealized in roles other than mother, it was primarily as mothers that women were imbued with social influence. Bloch argues that the rise of "moral motherhood" provided ideological justification and incentive for the contraction of female activity into the preoccupations of motherhood although, in the long range, it tended to upgrade the social status of women. JUDITH KEGAN GARDINER, *"A Wake for Mother: The Maternal Deathbed in Women's Fiction."* Examines five modern women's novel, exploring the metaphor of material death as symbolic of the female struggle to attain self-identity. JANE FLAX, *"The Conflict between Nurturance and Autonomy in Mother-Daughter Relationships and within Feminism."* GRACE PALEY, *"Other Mothers."* ANN SNITOW, *"Thinking about* The Mermaid and the Minotaur*."* Reflections on the work by Dorothy Dinnerstein. Plus fiction, poetry, art. SW

GLYPH 1

Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD 21218. $3.45 paperback. SAMUEL WEBER, *"Program."* Introduces this new semi-annual publication, which will focus on the "crisis of representation." SAMUEL WEBER, *"The Divaricator: Remarks on Freud's Witz."* Weber is suggesting that the work on jokes calls for a reformulation of representational thinking in the sense that the subject would be reinscribed within a conflictual situation. PAUL DE MAN, *"The Purloined Ribbon."* In tracing the circuit (as in the path of the famous letter) of the stolen ribbon in Rousseau's *Confessions* and *Fourth Rêverie*, one might discover transitions from "desire to shame to (dis)possession to concealment to revelation to excuse and to distributive justice." However, the intrusion of Marion's name as a totally random possibility explodes the signification. At work in Rousseau's text, then, is an exploration of the "radical irresponsibility" of fiction. The cognitive discourse of guilt does not converge with the performative discourse of excuses. Understanding is always being undone. LOUIS MARIN, *"Disneyland: A Degenerate Utopia."* Disneyland is analyzed as degenerate in its shift from utopia to ideology. JAMES SIEGEL, *"Pramoedya's 'Things Vanished' with a Commentary."* Translation of a short story by an Indonesian writer who has been a political prisoner since 1965. HENRY SUSSMAN, *"The All-Embracing Metaphor: Reflections on Kafka's 'The Burrow'."* WALTER MICHAELS, *"Walden's False Bottoms."* RODOLPHE GASCHE, *"The Scene of Writing: A Deferred Outset.* Reflections on writing and *Moby Dick*. JACQUES DERRIDA, *"Signature Event Context."* The structural possibility of being severed from a referent or a signified — something Husserl saw as the crisis of mathematical meaning — is seen here as lying at the center of language as well as experience in general. Communication as the circulation of meanings is dependent upon that to which it is generally opposed — i.e., the grapheme, the remainder of a mark cut off from its origin. JOHN R. SEARLE, *"Reiterating the Differences. A Reply to Derrida."* KMH

GLYPH 2

EUGENIO DONATO, *"The Idioms of the* Text*: Notes on the Language of Philosophy and the Fictions of Literature."* Explores problems raised by Derridian deconstruction. JEAN-LUC

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NANCY, *"Lavartus Pro Deo."* JEFFREY MEHLMAN, *"Cataract: Diederot's Discursive Politics, 1749l-1751."* Mehlman points to a neo-Lucretian universe shared by Diderot and Michel Serres. The incorporation of Lucretius and thermodynamics in Serres undermines a certain ground of repetition in the Freud-Nietzsche synthesis. MICHAEL RYAN, *"The Act."* ALACIA BORINSKY, *"Repetition, Museums, Libraries: Jorge Luis Borges."* Repetition is seen as the center of Borges' literary theory. The focus on return, however, poses a problem of judgment about what counts as good literature. Borinsky discusses the Borges story of the attempt to rewrite Don Quixote. PHILIPPE LACOUE-LABARTHE, *"Theatrum Analyticum."* Taking Freud's "Psychopathic Characters on the Stage" as a point of departure, certain problems are posed that confront a strict libidinal reading of Freud, i.e., libido as a "univocally 'positive' striving" (Lyotard). TIMOTHY C. MURRAY, *"Kenneth Burke's Logology: A Mock Logomachy."* JACQUES DERRIDA, *"Limited Inc."* In response to Searle (*Glyph* 1), Derrida launches into another deconstruction. KMH

HUMAN STUDIES, I:2 (April 1978)

Ablex Publishing Corp., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, NJ 07648. ARTHUR S. PARSONS, *"Interpretive Sociology: The Theoretical Significance of Verstehen in the Constitution of Social Reality."* The self-understanding of actors in society must be recognized and taken into account by sociologists. The role of the pre-reflective, that is non-critical, or non-objective, in the creation of meaning as the ground for social being is examined as it relates to contemporary communications theory. The author does not manage, however, to get beyond a codificational determinism. STEPHEN P. TURNER, DAVID R. CARR, *"The Process of Criticism in Interpretive Sociology and History."* Interpretive sociology is tested via a legacy of Popperian priorities, so as to achieve a position for interpretation that is beyond infinite relativism. The hermeneutics of sociology and history must be tied to the evidence given by the text, or facts, as the author puts it. HELMUT R. WAGNER, *"Between Ideal Types and Surrender: Field Research as Asymmetrical Relation."* The problem for sociology today is still the relation of facts or data to a theoretical framework, and which comes first. The author sees K. Wolff's theory of 'surrender and catch' as the new direction for this resurgent problem. The notion of 'surrender' entails an involvement by the sociologist in the observed such that one cannot predict the outcome. The Logos will emerge. KURT WOLFF, *"A Very Brief Commentary on Wagner."* The notion of surrender is not to be limited to sociological field research but rather relocated in philosophy and used to ground both social science and natural science. He criticizes Wagner's retention of subject-object dualism of alteration. The application in science, Wolff claims, involves the aim of the scientist (i.e., the questions asked) as influencing the results, whereas in social science what is found is a surprise. THEODORE KISIEL, *"Habermas' Purge of Pure Theory: Critical Theory without Ontology."* A critique of Habermas' and critical theorists' pretensions to be beyond ontology. The author claims ontology is necessary, i.e., that one cannot get beyond but must however recognize it. Further it is suggested that there is a revolutionary potential in the recognition of ontology in that by describing what is, one can reach toward what ought to be. A distortion of the term, to be sure. EARL TAYLOR, *"Lebenswelt and Lebensformen: Husserl and Wittgenstein on the Goal and Method of Philosophy."* A comparison of Husserl and Wittgenstein on the basis of the notions of certainty and language. The argument is thrust at Husserl that subjective certainty is not enough to ground epistemology. Beyond this is Wittgenstein, and the notion that all is mediated by language and language games, hence 'things themselves' are not the last word regarding knowledge or truth. KH

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 7:4 (Wintelr 1977-78)

M.E. Sharpe Inc., 901 N. Broadway, White Plains, NY 10603. A biographical sketch of Amilcar Cabral by Gérard Chaliand leads into Cabral's 1972 UNESCO speech "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence." His conclusion is that it is culture that initiates struggle and maintains individual and collective dignity in struggle, and that struggle itself serves as a culturally progressive prod to those involved in struggle, both the oppressed and the oppressors. ERICH WULFF, *"Colonialism, Ethnic Personality, and Psychiatry."* Describes the traditional Vietnamese view of self and world and the changes effected by colonialism. The goal now is to reconcile and integrate tradition with institutional reality. Psychiatry's task is to treat victims of colonization and war, of course, but also to develop a truly Vietnamese medical paradigm. ERICH WULFF, *"Psychoanalysis — A Science of Control?"* After reviewing the literature on the role of psychoanalysis, Wulff comes to the conclusion that it is largely an ideology of social control and an agency of capitalism. GN

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 8:1-2 (Spring-Summer 1978)
Issue theme: Toward a Qualitative Sociology of the Sciences. Special editor: EIKE GEBHARDT, *"Residual Problems in the Sociology of Science — A Map for a New Field."* A disjointed but suggestive essay. Gebhardt offers the following as areas in which the received tradition of the history, philosophy and sociology of science has come into question: (1) the monistic, static concept of science; (2) the treatment of external vs. internal factors in the development of science; (3) the question of meanings; (4) cognitive motivation in science; (5) the reality of science as a fixed social object suitable for use as a unit of analysis. The article is laden with numerous intriguing but brief arguments, none of which is played out to completion. WOLF LEPENIES, *"Toward an Interdisciplinarly History of Science."* Suggests a theoretical history of science that would link changes in scientific theory and practice with more general changes in the mentality of everyday life, which is itself to be treated with reference to transformations in external factors. Lepenies develops his suggested method by showing how it is anticipated in "historical anthropology" and in the "historical epistemology" of Foucault and Bachelard. A key concept suggested by Lepenies is that of "run-through" categories present throughout the thought of an epoch. Next to Gebhardt's introductory piece, this is the most interesting article of the issue. GERONT BOEHME, WOLFGANG VAN DEN DAELE, WOLFGANG KROHN, *"Alternatives in Science."* An attempt to formulate a theory to deal with the respective influence of internal regulatives and external factors in the development of a science. The authors give particular attention to allowing for alternative lines of development rather than proposing a theory that presents the actual history of a science as necessary after the fact. In doing this, they critically examine the work of Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper, Toulmin, and others. RICHARD D. WHITLEY, *"The Organization of Scientific Work in 'Configurational' and 'Restricted' Sciences."* A typical sociological description of behavior in different types of work organizations characteristic of restricted sciences such as high-energy physics, as compared to behavior in configurational sciences, exemplified here by biomedical science. KARIN D. KNORR, *"The Nature of Scientific Consensus and the Case of the Social Sciences."* Examines the relation of disciplinary consensus in social science to the argumentation typical of the discipline. In particular, she argues that disciplines with a methodology capable of trivializing scientific decisions will exhibit the highest consensus. This and several other hypotheses are tested with conventional survey methodology. The article exhibits a curious marriage of European theory with American empirical technique. MGL

JUMP CUT, 16, 17, 18 (November 1977-August 1978)
P.O. Box 865. Berkeley, CA 94701. $6 per year (6 issues). A selection of articles: From No. 16: Special section on gay men and film. RICHARD DRYER, *"Homosexuality and Film Noir."* The representation of gays in this thriller genre from the 1940s and 1950s speaks to the dominant sexual ideology of the time. The 'abnormality' of gayness, which is articulated through film noir's structures, iconography and visual style, functions to divert attention from the failure of traditional gender relations. WILL AITKEN, *"Leaving the Dance: Bertolucci's Gay Images."* Underlying the manifest political concerns of Bertolucci's films is a constant fascination with and abhorrence of homosexuality. In particular, the connection of homosexuality and death is identified as a consistent theme of Bertolucci's treatment of gay sexuality, perhaps suggesting the director's own sexual anxieties.

From No. 17: EDWARD BUSCOMBE, *"Sound and Color."* The adequacy of traditional theories concerning the coming of sound is challenged. It was the search for a monopoly by film companies — not the desire to improve film technology or combine profit with entertainment — which accounted for part of the impetus behind technological innovation in cinema. However, explanation is not exhausted by economic theories. At the ideological leve, the search for greater realism has dictated the formation of needs which the technology attempts to satisfy. This thesis is tested with respect to color technology, arguing that unlike sound, color could not be easily accommodated into the dominant realist aesthetic. DANA POLAN, *"Brecht and the Politics of Self-Reflexive Cinema."* Recent criticism in film theory is based on a belief in the inherent repression and domination effected by representational-narrative texts through their ideological positioning of the viewing subject. Against this extreme formalist aesthetic, the author suggests that, rather than a "bribe of identity," the spectator often enters into a 'contract' with the text, participating in the interplay of credulity and skepticism inherent in art itself. Though all self-reflexive art accentuates this intrinsic interplay, only the political text can put this to progressive social use.

From No. 18: MARTHA VICINUS, *"The Special Woman."* *Julia* reveals Hollywood's

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particular digestion of women's liberation and validates the American success myth for middle-class women. Nonetheless, the film is partially redeemed by its attempt to evoke the past and to use female friendship as a central motif. ROBERT ENTMAN, FRANCIE SEYMOUR, *"Close Encounters with the Third Reich."* In theme, structure and symbolism, *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* strongly resembles the form and content of films of pre-fascist and Nazi Germany. To the alienation which spawns an attack on ruling elites, nostalgia for America's past glory and various brands of chauvinism, *Close Encounters* proposes a solution strikingly similar to the prognosis offered by Nazi ideology. An attempt is made to account for this similarity, and the film's success in terms of current economic, ideological and political conditions. NW

LIBRE, No. 4 (1978)

GABOR T. RITTERSPORN, *"URSS 1-38: Luttes dans l'Etat."* This illuminating article situates the great trials of the thirties as a consequence of internal struggles within the state apparati between centrifugal and centripetal forces. The latter, conscious of mass disaffection, sought to eliminate the bureaucratic "deviations," arbitrariness and violance engendered by a system which necessarily escaped central control, generalized disorder and fragmented the country into quasi-feudal entities. MICHEL CARTRY, CLAUDE LEFORT, MARCEL GAUCHET, *"Pierre Clastres."* Three homages to the memory of Clastres, summarizing his major ideas, their development and their importance. JACQUES LIZOT, *"Economie primitive et subsistance."* The thesis of M. Sahlins (*Stone Age Economics*) concerning the "abundance" of primitive societies is empirically verified with reference to the Yanomami Indians. KRZYSZTOF POMIAN, *"Catastrophes et déterminisme."* The objections of Hegel, Marx and Engels to the "Axiom of the conservation of continuity" (continuous causes produce continuous effects), while partially correct as regards the mathematics of the period, could have no effect on scientific practice because they failed to move beyond a dogmatic assertion that quantitative changes eventually result in qualitative ones. Now with the recent emergence of "catastrophe theory" within mathematics, the concept of a qualitative rupture and consequently the possibility of indeterminacy, has penetrated the scientific discourse. SIMONE DEBOUT, *"Légitime défence, légitime entente; Sade et Fourier (suite)."* Continuing the discussion in *Libre* 1, this dense, meandering, but insightful article shows how Fourier, after a close reading of Sade, was led to radically transform his own thought beyond the totalizations implicit in the "calculus of universal unity." JACQUES BAYNAC, *"Mai 68: Un Hypothèse sur la stratégie, le temps et la révolution."* Claiming that May 1968, as the first revolutionary struggle based on abundance, introduced a radical disjuncture with the position of power and with the older forms of revolutionary activity which mirrored this position, the author pursues this argument through the oppositions between being and having, quality and quantity, spontaneity and organization, and the temporalization of space and the spacialization of time. MIGUEL ABENSOUR, *"Le procès des Maîtres rêveurs."* A sophisticated polemic against those who, in the wake of the "new philosophers" seek to equate Utopian thought with the Gulag. CLAUDE LEFORT, *"Un monument druonesque."* A critique of an unimportant article by Maurice Druon that appeared in *Le Monde*. CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS, *"Les crises d'Althusser."* A critique of a talk given by Althusser last November at the colloquium organized by *Il Manifesto*. This talk can be found in *Pouvoir et opposition dans les sociétés post-révolutionnaries* under the title of *"Enfin, la crise du marxisme!"*

MARXISM TODAY, 22:7 (July 1978)

GIDEON BEN-TOVIN, *"The Struggle Against Racism: Theoretical and Strategic Perspectives."* An economistically reductionist attempt to examine major anti-racist political strategies. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, *"The Crisis of Marxism."* The crisis of Marxism is not the death of Marxism but both the failure of praxis and a crisis at the ideological level resulting from fragmentation of Marxist theory and practice. SAM AARONOVITCH, *"Eurocommunism: A Discussion of Carillo's 'Eurocommunism and the State'."* FRANKIE RICKFORD, *"The Development of the Women's Movement."* The liberation of women will occur when the sexual division of labor in the family and the political and economic spheres of society has been resolved. GIULIANA PROCACCI, *"Orlov and Detente."* Discusses the Orlov case as the demise of the world view of the Socialist-Communist states and the deterioration of detente. The Orlov case is seen as a violation of socialist theory and practice. JLS

MARXISM TODAY, 22:8 (August 1978)

DOUGIE BAIN, *"Scotland: The Referendum Campaign and Beyond."* Ways must be found to ensure the emergence of a Scottish parliament. COLIN CHAMBERS, *"Socialist Theater and the*

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Ghetto Mentality." Theater is considered as a political tool for raising the level of consciousness among minorities and the disadvantaged. JOHN BARUCH, *"What Energy Policy for Britain?"* Socialism embraces nuclear power. COLIN MERCER, *"The State, the Crisis and Democratic Transition."* A review of Poulantzas' recent work *State Power and Socialism.* Poulantzas' analysis follows that of Gramsci's concept of social and political organization of the state. He sees the process of democratic transition as a passive revolution in all phases of social, political and economic structures within society. JLS

MARXISM TODAY, 22:9 (September 1978)

ERIC HOBSBAWM, *"The Forward March of Labor Halted."* Argues that organizational changes in various structures of working class unions and systems of capitalist production have led to the decline of the working class. MONTY JOHNSTONE, *"Early Communist Strategy for Britain: An Assessment."* JLS

MONTHLY REVIEW, 30:3 (July-August 1978)

62 West 14th St., New York, NY 10011. $13 per year (10 issues); $10 for students; $16 foreign. Special issue: China since Mao. CHARLES BETTELHEIM, *"Letter of Resignation to the Franco-Chinese Friendship Association."* Bettelheim briefly states his "apprehensions for the future of socialism in China." His concerns are with the "revisionist orientation" of the current Chinese leadership in matters ranging from the arrest of the "Four," the conscious falsification of evidence against the "Four," increased repression of revolutionary spirit and liberties within China, and a counter-revolutionary foreign policy. NEIL BURTON, *"In Defense of the New Regime."* Burton responds to Bettelheim's letter by stating his common concerns regarding China's future, but concluding that China is still moving forward to socialism. Burton believes that the Cultural Revolution is too firmly implanted in China to be turned back. He urges Bettelheim to visit China and reconsider his conclusion on the basis of firsthand data rather than Chinese media sources. CHARLES BETTELHEIM, *"The Great Leap Backward."* Bettelheim argues that a bourgeois policy has triumphed in China and explains how it evolved. He cites many examples of what he believes to be the dismantling of the Cultural Revolution and the establishment of the present course marked not only by "economism and productivism but also by liberal demagogy." He concludes that true friends of China should continue to support the Chinese people and their continuing revolution, but above all, they should avoid doing anything that "might strengthen the prestige of the leaders who are dragging China along a road that leads to catastrophe." SFS

MONTHLY REVIEW, 30:4 (September 1978)

PAUL JOHNSTON, *"The Promise of Public-Service Unionism."* Describes the unique political-economic conditions of public-sector work in contrast to private sector work. Begins by defining the main features of a distinctive public-sector unionism and presents the notion that unionism today, directed against the government, is necessary for socialism tomorrow. JAMES L. DIETZ, *"Imperialism and Puerto Rico."* Focuses on the impact of U.S. imperialism on Puerto Rican political economy. The only long-term solution to the Puerto Rican problem is not seen as statehood but as socialism accompanied by a reduction of industry, revitalization of agriculture, and a reversal in urbanization. PAUL M. SWEEZY, *"Harry Braverman's Achievement."* A reconstruction of remarks at a session welcoming participants to a conference on the labor process and the labor movement held under the auspices of the Sociology Department at the Binghamton campus of the State University of New York, May 5-7, 1978. This brief article states some of the issues addressed at the conference that obtained its focus from Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capital.* ANIL K. NAURIYA, *"On the Agrarian Question in India."* Criticizes the Indian Planning Commission for not following through with its own conclusion: that to deal most efficiently with the food shortage problem in India, the "diffusion of the ownership of the means of production" must be accomplished. Presents the argument that drastic redistribution of land is the logical first step in a serious effort to combat Indian poverty. Plus short book reviews of Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen's *The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action,* and Perry Anderson's *Considerations on Western Marxism.* HP

NEGACIONES, No. 5 (Spring 1978)

Atocha 95, Madrid 12, Spain. MICHEL FOUCAULT, *"Powers and Strategies."* Foucault analyzes the relationship between Marxism and the Gulag as raised by the neo-liberals and criticizes their argument as itself prolonging the Gulag through theoretical and historicist

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reductionism, denial of any individual or non-Marxist rebellion against the Gulag, and universalization of a specific historical condition to the point of empirical necessity. Foucault criticizes different theories of power, presents his own, and ends up with a critique of the fear of reformism as espoused by some of his critics. JOSEPH GABEL *"Historical Significance of the Stalinist Phenomena."* Questions the possibility of an egalitarian society and criticizes the predominant egalitarian-hierarchical social dichotomy, proposing a third type to fit the case of China: "equality by contraction" (as differentiated from Sweden's "equality by extension"). Stalinism as an ideology is also discussed, found to be both non-historicist and anti-dialectical, and declared dead, though not in a utopian dimension (the possibility of hierarchical socialism). Last, Gabel focuses on affluence and open competition between different socialist models as some of the conditions playing a major role in the contemporary process of disalienation. XAVIER R. PORTELLA, *"Ideology, Politics and Morals. Reflections on Anti-authoritarian Movements in Communist Europe."* Independent opposition forces are emerging within the communist regimes, with two main common denominators: human rights as the overriding morality, and the rejection of ideology itself, the goal being to overthrow power, *not* to supplant it. The movements find their positivity in the democratic ideas they espouse, such ideas differing from ideology in that they include no definite project for society. PR, GN

NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, No. 14 (Spring 1978)

German Dept., Box 413, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201. $6 per year (3 issues). DALE TOMICH, ANSON G. RABINBACH, *"Georges Haupt, 1928-1978."* Obituary. GEORGES HAUPT, *"Why the History of the Working-Class Movement?"* A critical analysis of the vicissitudes of leftist labor history. Subordinated to factional ideological disputes in the 19th century, and used as the instrument of self-justification by the SPD, Bolsheviks and Stalinists in the 20th century, distorted historical writing allowed the collective memory of the working class to atrophy. With the notable exception of Mehring, historians became the guardians of images created in official legends. Haupt points to new historiography emerging from the 1960s which may be able to grasp history accurately as praxis and tradition, and thus help (rather than hinder) the establishment of a collective memory to further the self-emancipation of the working class. OSKAR NEGT, *"Georges Haupt — In Memoriam."* WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, *"Railroad Space and Railroad Time."* Change in transport technology with the development of railroads in the 19th century had the effect of annihilating the old space-time continuum. Rapid travel both divides and expands space, eliminating that which is traveled over, the in-between, yet at the same time opening up new vistas at the end of the journey. In a similar manner, local idiosyncrasy is lost in the elimination of local times which occurs with the establishment of standardized timetable scheduling. The triumph of abstraction in the space-time continuum is clearly seen in the change from travel as an educational experience, to tourism as a consumption of sites transformed into commodities. RAINER STOLLMANN, *"Fascist Politics as a Total Work of Art: Tendencies of the Aesthetization of Political Life in National Socialism."* Stollman further develops the themes present in Eichberg's analysis of the Nazi *Thingspiel* and Knödler-Bunte's discussion of the Nazi public sphere in NGC 11, by focusing on the integration of aesthetics into Nazi politics. The aestheticization of daily life occurred via the ritual celebrations and artificial folklore of the Nazi civil religion, evident in the fate of the *Thingspiel,* and the function of Third Reich architecture. OSKAR NEGT, *"Mass Media: Tools of Domination or Instruments of Liberation? Aspects of the Frankfurt School's Communications Analysis."* A sympathetic evaluation from the standpoint of Negt's concern with the various forms of the public sphere. While positivist communications research was unable to locate distortion due to interests, Horkheimer's analysis, rooted in a larger social theory, revealed the collapse of connections between communications and experience. This led, with the revival of critical theory in the 1960s, to an ill-fated strategy to create a new public sphere by intellectuals. Practical possibilities for critical use of the media were sketched out in Brecht's radio theory, Béla Balazs' emphasis on film's ability to break cultural abstraction, and Benjamin's notion of political aesthetics. Unfortunately, these authors presupposed the critical proletarian audience as part of radical culture, precisely that group that Horkheimer and Adorno show to be subject to the culture industry. Critical theory is thus forced to locate its radical cultural dynamic within the hermetic world of the intelligentsia's own mode of production, avant-garde theory and art. Negt notes that preservation of negativity is still an important function for today's radical culture, and thus the work of the Frankfurt School is an important starting point. SARA LENNOX, *"Women in Brecht's Works."* A concise treatment of the sexist and instrumental treatment of Brecht's women characters, a theme that is shown to contradict the basic thrust of his drama. Portrayal of

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women as objects for men's use in his early period, or as instruments of party policy in the Marxist period, leads to a presentation of the role and status of women as unproblematic and natural, even though the project of Brecht's drama is the unmasking of precisely such ideological abstraction. Lennox suggests that this self-contradictory treatment of women is a function of the neglect of the private sphere and the productivism that are characteristic of Marxist theory in general, noting that this raises problems for any attempt by feminists to make use of Marxism. Unfortunately, this fine immanent critique is followed by a ridiculous, self-contradictory conclusion which attempts to resurrect Brecht (and implicitly Marxism) for feminists by asserting that sexist stereotypes contain a hidden utopian element. Reversing the values associated with such stereotypes, however, does not eliminate the stereotype's abstract and ideological character; it merely reproduces the mystification within the categories of feminist thought. DEBORAH HERTZ, *"Salonières and Literary Women in Late 18th-Century Berlin."* Documentation of the prominence and significance of Jewish women in intellectual life. MARION A. KAPLAN *"Women's Strategies in the Jewish Community in Germany."* A discussion of the League of Jewish Women (1904-1938) as a case study of a women's movement organized along religious lines. An ambiguous blend of perspectives, the group sought political suffrage within the Jewish communities; in the course of their activity, however, they created a feminist separatist organization which provided solidarity and strength — a reality of power next to the suffrage campaign's illusion of political equality. ATINA GROSSMAN, *"Abortion and Economic Crisis: The 1931 Campaign Against Paragraph 218 in Germany."* The failure of the coalition involved in the German abortion campaign is said to show the need for an autonomous, class-conscious women's movement. MOLLY NOLAN, *"Commentary of Herz, Kaplan, Grossman."* In what may be seen as a rejoinder to the Lennox article, Nolan argues that the Harz, Kaplan and Grossman articles show the predominance of class factors in determining women's social position and ideological perception. *"Bibliography: Part II."* The second part of an annotated bibliography of materials in German relevant to women's studies, begun in issue No. 13. Covers articles on documentary literature, women and self-help, women and education, women and the law, women and politics, handbooks, miscellaneous, women in East Germany. HUGH MOSELY, *"Report: Third International Russell Tribunal on Civil Liberties in West Germany."* Discussion of the problems involved in the first stage of the investigation into *Berufsverbot* abuses. GR

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 108 (March-April 1978)

7 Carlisle Street, London W1V 6NL, England. $16 per year (6 issues). ISTVAN MESZAROS, *"Political Power and Dissent in Post-Revolutionary Societies."* Meszaros locates two problems post-revolutionary societies must deal with in order to handle the problems of political power in the period of transition. First, decentralization, diversification, and autonomy must become 'political' principles if structural domination of individuals by their own class is to be overcome. Secondly, the rule of capital, not merely capitalism, must be critically examined in totality; in concern with this, a self-regulatory mechanism allowing the positive development of dissent must be introduced into post-revolutionary societies. ERNEST MANDEL, *"On the Nature of the Soviet State."* An interview. The Soviet state is examined as it manifests itself today in the light of Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed*. Nothing new. With a few qualifications, Mandel concludes that the Soviet Union is under the dictatorship of a bureaucracy. WALTER BENJAMIN, *"Surrealism: the last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia."* An essay that draws heavily on the work and ideas of André Breton. The Surrealist tradition, Benjamin contends, offers the only radical concept of freedom since Bakunin. Benjamin argues that the Surrealists are the only tradition to have understood how the "bodily innervations of the collective become revolutionary discharge." NICOS MOUZELIS, *"On the Greek Elections."* Mouzelis argues that the significant gain of power by the Left in the November 1977 elections is a result of the populist Panhellenic Socialist Movement's ability to mobilize the urban and rural underprivileged population. This mobilization of urban and rural only became possible after the bloody civil war where both exploited classes faced dictatorial controls. The dictatorship allowed for the first time the rural and urban underprivileged to identify their class interests and to transcend the Royalist debate which had been the focus of Greek politics before the civil war. FRANCIS MULHERN, *"Marxism in Literary Criticism."* This piece evaluates Terry Eagleton's *Criticism and Ideology*, the first substantial work of Marxist criticism to come out of England in a long time. The breadth of this book is commendable: poetics, literary history, and literary criticism, etc. Ironically, Mulhern points out, although Eagleton criticizes the historicist context of value, Eagleton's own alternative finally collapses value into a historical context: "valuable art comes into being not *despite* its historical limitations. . . but by virtue of them." DW

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NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 109 (May-June)

RAYMOND WILLIAMS, *"Problems of Materialism."* Williams addresses *On Materialism* and *The Freudian Slip* by Timpanaro. Although Timpanaro is credited with having done a good job of raising general difficulties surrounding materialism, Williams criticizes Timpanaro for failing to move from general categories to more specific, differentiated questions. The discussion of the dialectic between man and nature "is presented as an account of the true 'human condition' " while it actually is a version of *response*. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, *"What Must Change in the Party."* Althusser accuses the PCF leadership of responsibility for the defeat of the left in the 1978 French general elections and declares that the Party must bring Marxist theory back to life, cast away the stultifying dogma of the 'party line,' and change the internal organization of the Party and its mode of functioning so as to serve, not dominate, the revolutionary mass party. ROY MEDVEDEV, *"Bukharin's Last Years."* A poignant, sympathetic account of the last years of Bukharin's life. Even today his name is not mentioned in the new Complete Soviet Encyclopedia. NICOS POULANTZAS, *"Towards a Democratic Socialism."* Argues that "it would be a fundamental error to imagine that more integration with the current of self-management and direct democracy is sufficient to avoid statism." BEN FINE, *"On the Origins of Capitalist Development."* A brief discussion. DW

OUR GENERATION, 12:4 (Fall 1978)

3934 rue St. Urbain, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. $7.50 per year (4 issues). MARC RABOY, *"The Future of Montreal and the MCM."* Good analysis of the development of the two factions in MCM (one reformist; one seeking structural changes in the society at large), but outdated because it contains no anticipation of the striking defeat of MCM in the fall 1978 municipal elections. BILL FREEMAN, *"The Welfare Business: Hamilton Style."* An empirical account of corporate welfare subsidies during three key periods for capital expansion: the era of railway building, 1850-60; industrial expansion, 1890-1918; the real estate book, 1962-76. STEPHEN SCHECTER, *"Strategies for Urban Socialism."* Argues that the multiple perspective in urban struggles calls into question the formulation of a "principal contradiction" between labor and capital by refocusing on contradictions in the sphere of reproduction. BERT YOUNG, FRANK HARRISON, GEORGE WOODCOCK. Reviews of Leo Panitch's *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power*. PETER BAKVIS, WALTER JOHNSON. Debate on workers' control. Plus book reviews. PM

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITICISM, 5:1

Formerly *Cultural Hermeneutics*. Philosophy Dept., Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167. $12.50 per year. TOM ROCKMORE, *"Marxian Praxis."* Unexciting conceptual analysis of the ambiguities in Marx's use of praxis. Argues that since Marx's usage is primarily Aristotelean, he encounters the problem of praxis being associated with the activity of citizens while poiesis denotes the productive activity of slaves. Calls for a revised form of Aristotelean praxis which does not require that some persons be slaves. MARTIN A. BERTMAN, *"The Natural Body and the Body Politic."* A bland essay on Hobbes, maintaining, as if it were noteworthy, that Hobbes provides "a physiological explanation of human nature which dovetails with his political prescriptions whose fulcrum is the civil law." CLAUDE GANDELMAN, ITSHAQ KLEIN, *"Hegel's Dialectic of Master and Slave as a Model for the Relation between Artistic Creation and Aesthetic Appreciation."* Applies the allegory of master and slave to the artistic relationships of artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation. Maintains that the achievement of self-consciousness and the production of the art object are simultaneous and concomitant processes. Actually, this process involves a double dialectic; first, the master-slave relation between the artist as creative consciousness and the object as artistic tradition, then, once the work of art is created, the artist as object (embodied in the work of art) and the appreciator as master, wherein the synthesis of mutual recognition takes place. BRUCE WILSHIRE, DONNA WILSHIRE, *"Robert Wilson's Theater as a de facto Phenomenological Reduction."* Claims that Robert Wilson's theater provides a de facto phenomenological reduction. As a bracketing of the act in the act the fictive varieties possible in any life situation are concretely presented for cognitive consideration. Wilson's theater is also social criticism as his absurdist variations reveal real possibilities for transcending the present. JEFFNER ALLEN, *"Husserl's Communal Spirit: A Phenomenological Study of the Fundamental Structure of Society."* A rather trivial argument employing phenomenological techniques to arrive at a conceptual "solution" describing the relationship between individual and society. A cumbersome way of saying that there is a dialectical relationship between society and individual consciousness. V. TEJERA, *"Plato's Politics: An Eleatic Sophist on Politics."* A dull exegesis of Plato's 'Piliticus.' DD

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PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 8:1 (March 1978)

Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ont. N2L 3C5, Canada. $15 for 4 issues. TRONN OVEREND, *"Enquiry and Ideology: Habermas' Trichotomous Conception of Science."* Submitted in 1974, this empiricist critique of Habermas' rationalism shows its age. NORMAN STOCKMAN, *"Habermas, Marcuse and the* Aufhebung *of Science and Technology."* Seeks to reformulate a possible overcoming of science and technology via a realist critique of empiricist science. PAUL K. FEYERABEND, *"From Incompetent Professionalism to Professionalized Incompetence — The Rise of a New Breed of Intellectuals."* In characterizing the phenomenon of institutionalized incompetence, Feyerabend turns for evidence to three reviews of *Against Method* which appeared in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences.* PAUL TIBBETTS, *"A Response to Feyerabend."* One of the "incompetent" reviewers again shows he has missed the point. J.N. HATTIANGADI, *"Playphilosopher."* An embittered response to Feyerabend, accusing him of dogmatic onanism and claiming that the real problem is Feyerabend's deductive notion of the structure of scientific theory. The parasitic character of Feyerabend's discourse is an unacknowledged problem. MARTIN BUNZL, *"Language, Logic and Piaget: A Comment on Johnson."* JUDITH POSNER, *"Erving Goffman: His Presentation of Self."* IAN CRAIB, *"Erving Goffman: Frame Analysis."* ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, *"Hollis and Nell: Rationalist Economic Men."* Plus reviews. KMH

PHILOSOPHY TODAY, 22:3-4 (Fall 1978)

Messenger Press, Society of the Precious Blood, Celina, OH 45822. $9 per year (4 issues). PAUL RICOEUR, *"The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy."* A good Hegelian argument for the grounding of ethics in freedom and action leading to law, not the reverse, as Kant claimed. A brief concluding note locates the issue in terms of Christianity and hence claims (1) that to 'save' is to 'liberate freedom,' and (2) that there is a paradoxical ethic 'taught' in the Bible, hence subject to a dialectic of interpretation. ALPHONSO LINGIS, *"The Last Form of the Will to Power."* An attempt to restore Nietzsche's philosophical credibility via the notion of the will to power as the will to create, and hence to live (fully). Sees Nietzsche as the answer to the problem of contemporary scientistic epistemology and its ethical implications. JAMES A. LEIGH, *"Deleuze, Nietzsche and the Eternal Return."* Discusses the current displacement of Hegel by Nietzsche in French thought, i.e., Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze. The author claims that Nietzsche's position, as non-totalizing, transcends the closure of Hegel and provides a philosophical place for both chaos and multiplicity. The reason for Nietzsche having been "so misunderstood until now" is the form of his work as dramatization through metaphor. It is not surprising that parallel to this development in France is the problem of metaphor in the philosophy of language. BERNARD FLYNN, *"Michel Foucault and the Husserlian Problematic of a Transcendental Philosophy of History."* Foucault's anti-essence and anti-continuity theories of philosophy and history are contrasted with the "traditional" theories as represented by Husserl (as a legacy of German idealism). THOMAS SHEEHAN, *"After Philosophy: A Protreptic."* A self-examination of the definition of Western philosophy as it relates to 'Eastern Thought.' The dilemma is that philosophy itself is defined by the Graeco-European tradition; hence, can a world-dialogue be philosophical, or would it be something else? DEBRA B. BERGOFFEN, *"Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego."* A review of Sartre's answer to Husserl in the book of the same title as the article. The old problem of historical ego vs. transcendental ego, or being-in-the-world vs. over-and-above it, is revisited. The author definitely sides with Sartre in attempting to show his transcendence of Husserl. IH

POLITICAL THEORY, 6:3 (August 1978)

Sage Publications Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. $15 per year (4 issues). MICHAEL FREEMAN, *"Edmund Burke and the Theory of Revolution."* A synthesis of Burke on revolution is gleaned from his writings and offered as more enlightened than empirical theories of revolution. Freeman refutes the widespread view that Burke held a conspiracy theory of revolution and asserts that Burke believed both material conditions and a revolutionary ideology were necessary to cause revolution. TED GURR, *"Burke and the Modern Theory of Revolution: A Reply to Freeman."* Responds to four main points raised by Freeman. Main defense of empirical theory is the familiar; empirical theory is not wrong, merely incomplete. PHILLIP ABBOTT, *"Philosophers and the Abortion Question."* Brief synopsis and critique of arguments that have recently appeared. ROGER WERTHEIMER, *"Errata: A Reply to Abbott."* A systematic but not wholly convincing rebuttal to Abbott. NEAL WOOD, *"The Social History of Political Theory."* Assumes that political participation is motivated by individuals and groups

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seeking their own advantage in the name of public interest, and that all works of political theory are ideological. Focuses on the character of the ideal political actor as a key to understanding the content of political theory, and provides a gloss of political theorists' human ideals from the Greeks to Marx. Dismisses the possibility that this method is historicist. REX MARTIN, JAMES W. NICKEL, *"A Bibliography on the Nature and Foundations of Rights, 1947-1977."* Plus communications and reviews. RJ

POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 7:4 (1977)

Geron-X Publishers, Box 1108, Los Altos, CA 94022. $14 per year (4 issues). ADAM PRZEWORSKI, *"Proletariat into a Class: The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's* The Class Struggle *to Recent Controversies."* Kautsky's book is seen as a key to understanding Marxist theory in its political form as a guiding doctrine of the socialist movement and as the basis to understanding present controversies concerning the concept of class. The thesis is that the proletariat is not being formed into a class but a variety of persons, some of whom are separated from the system of production. MARTIN SHEFTER, *"Party and Patronage: German, England and Italy."* CHRISTOPHER CHASE-DUNN, RICHARD RUBINSON, *"Toward a Structural Perspective on the World System."* Based on the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, the basic structural elements of the world system are isolated and used to formulate a preliminary descriptive schema. The primary focus is on the factors that tend to stabilize and reproduce the capitalist world system. LEO PANICH, *"Profits and Politics: Labor and the Crisis of British Capitalism."* The recent debate on the crisis of British capitalism reveals the tension between the Labour Party's dual role as working class party and as an integrative national party. The apparent contradiction between the shift to the left of the party in the early 1970s and the conservative policies of the current labor government is examined on the basis of the political location of class conflict in the party itself. PM

RADICAL AMERICA, 12:3 (May-June 1978)

P.O. Box B, North Cambridge, MA 02140. $10 for 6 issues. JIM GREEN, *"Holding the Line: Miners' Militancy and the Strike of 1978."* The recent history of the miners' militancy and its deeper roots in the past help us to understand whether their strike should be viewed as a total defeat or a strike in which the rank and file minimized its losses through a long and militant industrial action. Its effect on the "reform" administration of Arnold Miller, as well as the rank and file movement within the UMW and the implications for the left are also discussed. The sources of combativity among this group of workers and whether their militancy is similar to other groups of workers is examined. JACK RUSSELL, *"The Coming of the Line: The Ford Highland Park Plant, 1910-1914."* This history of the early years of rationalization of the Ford industry in Detroit concentrates primarily on the workers' reactions. As the first workers subjected to the assembly line and mass production, the significance of who they were and what they did is examined. CHESTER HARTMAN, *"San Francisco's International Hotel: Case Study of a Turf Struggle."* Beginning with a brief history of this 10-year struggle and the political forces involved in it, the innovative tactics of the eviction night and other incidents are discussed. PM

RADICAL AMERICA, 12:4 (July-August 1978)

ANN WITHORN, *"Surviving as a Radical Service Worker: Lessons from the History of a Movement-Provided Services."* The various types of service work done by the left since the 1930s illuminate the situation of a radical or socialist service worker employed in state or private agencies. MARY BULARZIK, *"Sexual Harassment at the Workplace: Historical Notes."* Though briefly describing the early struggle of 19th-century women labor organizers against sexual harassment, the primary focus is on the female labor force before the 1940s. Suggests that workplace harassment is used to make wage labor, like all public activity, uncomfortable for women. GUY BRETT, *"Patchworks from Chile."* This popular art of resistance was invented by the people because of an overpowering need to express the bitter experiences they are going through and to find a channel of communication with the world outside. Though the earliest ones were made by prisoners, now they are nearly all made by women; either the wives or mothers of political prisoners. JOHN LIPPERT, *"Shopfloor Politics at Fleetwood."* Description of a wildcat strike at Fleetwood that emphasizes the actual experiences of the "vanguard" workers. PM

REVIEW, Nos. 3-4 (Winter-Spring 1978)

Fernand Braudel Center, State University of New York, Binghamton, NY 13901. These issues

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contain the papers given at the inaugural conference of the center, May 13-15, 1977. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEON, *"Annales as Resistance."* Explores the purpose of the conference as an attempt "to discover *Annales,* to celebrate *Annales,* to learn from *Annales."* JACQUES REVEL, *"The Annales: Continuities and Discontinuities."* Revel tries to summarize the concerns of the school in its 50 years of existence. TRAIAN STOIANOVICH, *"Social History: Perspective of the* Annales *Paradigm."* Attempts to describe the *Annales'* search for *histoire globale* with special reference to Braudel. Stoianovich sees a need for returning to this practice, but makes such a return contingent upon resolving three obstacles: "the mode and functions of the human mind, of individual and collective memory, of signs and symbols, of language and writing; the relationships between social forms and spatial forms; and the appropriate modes and functions of social history." The next four papers deal with the impact of *Annales* in the Mediterranean, on Ottoman studies, in Eastern Europe, and in Quebec. Authors are MAURICE AYMARD, HALIL INALCIK, KRYSZTOF POMIAN, and ALFRED DUBUC. After these papers PETER BURKE attempts to compare the *Annales* and British social history with regard to the French Revolution. ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, adds to Burke's argument. RICHARD ANDREWS discusses the compartmentalized, descriptive empiricism and event-oriented historiography dominant in the U.S. and the possibilities of perking up such a hopeless scene by using the lessons of *Annales.* H.L. WESSELING deals with the writings of contemporary history as treated by the *Annales* and ANDRE BURGUIERE sees an increase in the "anthropological-oriented" studies in "new *Annales*" (1960). CHARLES TILLY unsuccessfully tries to show the possible linkages between anthropology, history and the *Annalles.* NORMAN BIRNBAUM, *"The Annales School and Social Theory."* Points to the a-historical nature of contemporary social theory, seeing in *Annales* a way out. FERNAND BRAUDEL, *"En Guise de Conclusion."* PP

SALMAGUNDI, No. 42 (Summer-Fall 1978)

Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY 12866. $10 for 2 years. Issue theme: The Politics of Anti-Realism. ROBERT BOYERS, *"Preface."* The debate over the relation between cultural radicalism and political action is traced to Gerald Graff. GERALD GRAFF, *"The Politics of Anti-Realism."* Cultural radicalism is defined as a "romantic theory of history which sees the progressive evolution of objective rationality as a fall from the organic unity of prereflective stages of being." Graff attempts to group neo-Marxist aesthetics, formalism and theories of para-literature together on the basis of their assertion of art's autonomy. This argument is based largely on an examination of apparent inconsistencies in Marcuse's conception of art as the negation of norms governing reality and in the implications of Marcuse's analysis of repressive desublimation for modern art forms. Tries to demonstrate that cultural radicalism suffers from Kantian hangovers; its impulse to separate art not only from society but from rational, conceptual thinking excludes the possibility of critical thinking in art and art criticism and leads to a formalist definition of art that makes art appear to be a mere extension of the over-administered, over-rationalized society which art seeks to negate. Graff thus concludes that our tradition of cultural radicalism has not only fallen victim to repressive desublimation, but is fundamentally "misconceived" as well. LESLIE A. FIEDLER, *"The Politics of Realism: A Mythological Approach."* An amusing exposition of myths of realism fashioned as a retort to the "culturally retarded" as well as to serious-minded critiques of anti-realism penned in the name of realism. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, *"Recovering Reality."* In that bourgeois repressive culture is no longer the evil against which the avant-garde can be pitted, Lasch commends Graff for pointing to the marginalization of art (as anti-reality) as the condition of art's repressive desublimation. ELISEO VIVAS, *"Two Comments on Professor Graff's Essay."* Vivas concurs with Graff but questions the mimetic basis of Graff's critique of Marcuse. PATRICIA SPACKS, *"Statues of Daedalus."* While criticizing Graff's distorting conservatism, she concedes that the resolution of dilemmas posed by the current intellectual scene remains a contradictory task. EUGENE GOODHEART, *"The Fate of Realism or the Teleology of Narrative."* Graff's argument is revised so as to assert the priority of the mind and imagination over objective reality. TAYLOR STOEHR, *"Realism and Ethics."* Sympathetic reflections on Graff's article. CHARLES MOLESWORTH, *"A Response to Graff."* Molesworth believes that, unlike cultural radicalism, political radicalism has not abandoned its belief in objective reason; further, Molesworth considers this current split to be the cause of that conceptual inconsistency in cultural radicalism which Graff points out but allegedly fails to analyze. GERALD GRAFF, *"Reply to Some Commentaries."* Because Molesworth and Goodheart have "*no* means of bringing 'mind' or 'fantasy' down to earth," they affirm the very separation of art from politics which they intend to

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criticize. Assumptions regarding possible distinctions between literary and scientific truth claims remain hazy in Graff's reply. Plus poems, reviews. DJG

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, No. 41 (Winter 1977-78)

Room 4331, John Jay College, CUNY, 445 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019. $10 per year (4 issues). JOAN B. LANDES, *"Women, Labor and Family Life: A Theoretical Perspective."* Marxist-feminist interpretation of the women's liberation movement, hoping to transcend the approaches of Mitchell and Firestone. IAN RUTLEDGE, *"Changes in the Mode of Production and the Growth of Mass Militancy in the British Mining Industry, 1954-1974."* The re-emergence of the coal miner in Britain as the vanguard of the working class is examined. A critique of the "new affluent pro-capitalist worker" myth, and an articulate summary of the shift from piece-work systems to production relations and management in mining. MICHAEL LEBOWITZ, *"Capital and the Production of Needs."* Lebowitz links Marx's definition of commodity to human needs, suggesting that the whole process of production must be re-examined in terms of production needs as well as social needs. TONY FLOOD, *"Jürgen Habermas' Critique of Marxism."* Examines Habermas' theory of cognitive interests as related to his critique of Marxism. Plus communications, reviews, notes. NJW

SOCIAL RESEARCH, 45:2 (Summer 1978)

66 West 12th Street, New York, NY 10011. $12 per year (4 issues). Issue theme: The Production and Distribution of Culture. WALTER POWELL, *"Publisher's Decision-Making."* Concludes that publishers' criteria include an author's location in a "queue discipline," a system of priorities that reflect the author's relation to the company, company tradition, organization, etc. GAYE TUCHMAN, *"The News Net."* Argues that the system of news gathering in the U.S. "imposes order on social reality" because of a pattern of centralized coverage at key institutions, a news hierarchy giving priority to stores according to their source or geographic territory, centralized gathering services (the AP and the UPI), negotiated standards between editors, etc. Thus items from illegitimate sources are often excluded. PRISCILLA P. CLARK, *"The Beginnings of Mass Culture in France: Action and Reaction."* Argues that the abrupt shift of traditional popular culture into "mass" culture in 19th century France (due to increased leteracy, growing hegemony of the French language, and urbanization) led to intense resistance by the literary elite. Though a few authors were able to develop a mass following (e.g., Dumas, Zola), insufficient public support for most forced a turn toward the market place, and the development of "literary criticism" geared to *creating* a supporting public. RICHARD A. PETERSON, *"The Production of Cultural Change: The Case of Contemporary Country Music."* An argument against the conventional views of cultural change as the product of "innovative creators" or "evolving consumer demand," which the author says "tend to ignore the influence of an increasingly complex apparatus which is interposed *between* culture creators and consumers." This refers to the culture industry, which Peterson traces in the transformation of country music from a localized folk genre to "new country" created by programmers interested in blending country with pop and rock to create a nation-wide listening audience for advertisers. PAUL M. HIRSCH, *"Production and Distribution Roles Among Cultural Organizations: On the Division of Labor Across Intellectual Disciplines."* Distinguishes the study of the "production" of cultural ideas and symbols from the study of their distribution, calling for a collaboration between the social sciences and humanities in research which would take *both* behavioral "effects" of the cultural industry and meaning or aesthetic analysis of the cultural artifacts into account. DAVID E. MORRISON, *"Kultur and Culture: The Case of Theodore W. Adorno and Paul F. Lazarsfeld."* A look at the Princeton Radio Research Project of the late 1930s and the failure of Lazarsfeld's attempt to operationalize Adorno's critique of music in the tradition of "administrative research." PAUL DIMAGGIO and MICHAEL USEEM, *"Cultural Property and Public Policy: Emerging Tensions in Government Support for the Arts."* Notes that in spite of government support, the "arts" in America are not a "public good" but mainly an elite province. Democratization of the fine arts seen as unlikely due to elite dominance of control of arts organizations, participation in arts events, and use of the arts for reaffirming class identity. MARCIA BYSTRYN, *"Art Galleries as Gatekeepers: The Case of Abstract Expressionists."* Traces a "division of labor" in the New York art market of the 40s and 50s between studios emphasizing "invention" and creativity, displaying works of new artists and forms, and studios emphasizing "innovation," exposing these new works to the public and developing a *market* for these new arrivals. PA

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SOCIALIST REVIEW, 37

Bimonthly, Agenda Publishing Co., 4228 Telegraph Ave., Oakland, CA 94609. $12 for six issues. The "*Introduction*" expalins why the name of the journal has been changed from *Socialist Revolution* to *Socialist Review* and includes the strategic arguments one has come to expect from this journal. DAVID PLOTKE, "*American Politics and Class Forces in the 1970s.*" Economic decline, with only limited politicization, still leaves room for socialist developments. A lack of organizational coherence and political strategy has led to a dissipation of the Left movements of the 1960s. ELLEN MALOS, "*Housework and the Politics of Women's Liberation.*" ANDREW FEENBERG, "*From the May Events to Eurocommunism.*" Feenberg criticizes Carl Boggs' North-South grid in favor of polycentrism. The collapse of a leaderless and organizationless May 1968 led to an electoral program. A more ambiguous reference than radical class polarization is needed for a new theory of revolution. In short, Feenberg argues for a sense of continuity from May 1968 to Eurocommunism. HAROLD BARON, "*The Retreat From Black Nationalism: A Response to Robert L. Allen.*" ROBERT L. ALLEN, "*A Reply to Harold Baron.*" ROBERTA LYNCH, RICHARD HEALEY, "*The New American Movement, 1977.*" Report on 6th Annual Conference of NAM. The same old syndrome: since we have the truth, why won't anyone follow? Plus reviews. KMH

SOCIALIST REVIEW, 38

NICOS PAULANTZAS, "*Interview by Henri Weber: The State and the Transition to Socialism.*" Poulantzas criticizes essentialist views of the state and rejects the notion of dual power. A certain play *within* the state must be exploited. Representative institutions and formal guarantees of civil liberties (Bobbio) are crucial. A freely elected parliament is the only alternative to the "ideal party" or to power centered in work communities which involve the problem of technocratic despotism. No road is possible outside or alongside the common program. RED APPLE COLLECTIVE, "*Socialist-Feminist Women's Unions: Past and Present.*" Overview of several women's groups across the U.S. Need to focus on intersection of capitalism and patriarchy. EUGENE GENOVESE, "*Reflections on the 1960s: Preface to the Italian Edition of* In Red and Black." Genovese points to the connection between utopianism and repression. Social change "within the bounds of reason and social safety" is necessary. MICHAEL A. LEBOWITZ, "*Marx's Falling Rate of Profit: A Dialectical View.*" WALTER COHEN, "*The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism: A Reply.*" MARTIN MURRAY, "*On the Value of Irrepressible Theorizing.*" JUDY MACLEAN, "*Toward a Balanced Approach to the New Populists.*" Plus reviews. KMH

SOCIALIST REVIEW, 39

BARBARA EASTON, "*Feminism and the Contemporary Family.*" Contrary to trans-historical critiques of patriarchy, Easton suggests that the contemporary family structure reflects a certain decline of patriarchy. The questions this situation poses, e.g., the status of personal identities, have to be addressed by the left. MICHAEL REICH, RICHARD EDWARDS, "*Political Parties and Class Conflict in the United States.*" A bit of free play in the State and in the Democratic Party provide arenas in which a socialist movement can struggle. Recognizing parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary means as ultimately necessary, this latest brilliant answer to the time worn question — what is to be done? — concludes with "electoral activity is very significant for a viable socialist movement in the present day United States." Is this Devo? BRUCE DANCIS, "*Safety Pins and Class Struggle: Punk Rock and the Left.*" Dancis shows a wide command of the punk spectrum; however, this journal's tendency to pack everything into a narrow framework of right and left takes its toll. The "problem areas" in punk are left hanging, while the "progressive tendencies" are neatly deduced. DAVID MANDEL, "*Making the Connections: Ideology, Consciousness, and the Left in Israel.*" HORST MAHLER, "*Terrorism in West Germany: Interview with Horst Mahler.*" Terrorism, rooted in a vehement moralism, took on a simplified social analysis and eventually became empty in its recapitulation of massacre — something it originally condemned. Plus reviews. KMH

SOCIALIST REVIEW, 40, 41

HARRY BOYTE, "*Building the Democratic Movement: Prospects for a Socialist Renaissance.*" The "democratic impulse" provides the drive which needs organization to be effective. JUDY MACLEAN, "*Democracy and Social Decay: A Response to Harry Boyte.*" The crisis of the individual and not "democracy" should be a point of departure. Unity through a shared vision is called for. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, "*Comment on Boyte.*" The Left must prepare itself for

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much greater political relevance in the next few years. MIKE DAVIS, "*Socialist Renaissance or Populist Mirage? A Reply to Harry Boyte.*" Boyte has lost the revolutionary side of Marxism. The Leninists who are also democrats — Internationalist Socialists and Socialist Workers Party — have to be included in the dialogue. DANIEL MARSHALL, "*The Miners and the UMW: Crisis in the Reform Process.*" RICHARD A. GARCIA, "*The Chicano Movement and the Mexican-American Community, 1972-1978: An Interpretive Essay.*" TOMAS ALMAGUER, "*Chicano Politics in the Present Period: Comment on Garcia.*" ANDREW FRASER, "*The Legal Theory We Need Now.*" This is an effort to broach many of the interesting issues surrounding the status of law. Fraser surveys the Marxist literature from Marx through Pashukanis and the structuralists. The central weakness has been a failure to recognize the intersubjective aspect of the constitution of law. Such a recognition would point the way to a coming together of morality, rationality, intersubjectivity and law. JOEL KRIEGER and DAVID HELD, "*A Theory of the State? A Comment of Block's 'The Ruling Class Does Not Rule'.*" JOHN L. HAMMOND, "*The Consciousness of the Ruling Class: Comment on Block.*" FRED BLOCK, "*Class Consciousness and Capitalist Rationalization: A Reply to Critics.*" Plus reviews. KMH

SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, 18:1 (Summer 1978)

M.E. Sharp Inc., 901 Broadway, White Plains, NY 10603. V.S. GOTT, "*The Material Unity of the World and the Unity of Scientific Knowledge.*" The theme is essentially that dialectical materialism has the answer to a) the unification of "multiplicity" in the world; b) the unification of knowledge; and c) the interrelation of the first two. A traditional Marxist position claiming that thought is a "reflection of material conditions." V.M. GLUSHKOV, "*The Mathematization of Scientific Knowledge and the Theory of Decision.*" Surprisingly the author attempts to justify the increasing technologization and mathematization of our world and our being within the classical Marxist framework. He claims that this movement toward the computerizability of life is "progress" in the best (or worst) sense of the word. Remnants of Platonism are to be found in this notion of mathematical supremacy. N.S. KARDASHEV, "*On Strategy in the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Civilizations.*" A proposal is laid out to ground space research so as not to anthropomorphize the universe. What "man" is and life on earth is should not pre-formulate our search for "life" and civilization "out there." The reason scientists have not yet found either is perhaps a function of our definition of them as being earth-bound. A.D. URSUL, "*The Human Being and the Universe.*" The concern for a space-age philosophy is expounded upon. We are still within a cosmological and astronomical way of thinking, the author claims, and this involves a "cosmicizing" of humans (i.e., religion) and humanization of the cosmos. This archaic formulation must be replaced, he says, by a "cosmonautics," which involves the notion of "man conquering space," so as to become "master of the cosmos" just as we have become "masters of nature!" A.F. SHISHKIN, "*On Moral Values in Today's World.*" A discussion of "today's world" in terms of transition and change regarding the polarity of "bourgeois individualism" and "socialist communism." An examination of ensuing values for each side is given in the hope of clarifying contemporary conflicts within a framework of morality. IH

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 6:1 (July 1978)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., P.O. box 330, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, $18 per year. ROBERT E. LANE, "*Waiting for Lefty: The Capitalist Genesis of Socialist Man.*" Lane is concerned with "environment-personality" fit. He focuses on human needs that resist domination by institutions, yet serve as agents of change. Socialist man is a good creature stunted by institutions; new socialist institutions will set man free. Socialism is pictured as a high risk, high gain system. ANDREW FEENBERG, "*Remembering the May Events.*" Feenberg re-examines the French workers' and students' movement of May 1968. The May events are reconsidered in light of four themes: 1) struggle against technocracy; 2) a new and more libertarian image of socialism; 3) the rejection of authority relations in the workplace; 4) the ideological crisis of the middle strata. He provides an interesting theoretical discussion of student-faculty: worker-brougeois relations. DARYL E. CHUBIN and KENNETH E. STUDER, "*The Politics of Cancer.*" Attempting to examine questions about the organization of science as it impinges on biomedical research policy, funding, and the disposition of knowledge. Research has become contract, product-delivery oriented rather than patient, systematic discovery-oriented, resulting in dissonance of cognitive, institutional and rhetorical norms. JOHN FRIEDMANN, "*The Epistemology of Social Practice: A Critique of Objective Knowledge.*" The epistemology of technology is presented in a Popperian framework of three worlds where tentative theories are rendered vulnerable to criticism. This position is criticized using the ideas of Feyerabend.

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Friedmann proposes a new epistemology of social practice based on a single world beginning with the problem of human social existence. TIMOTHY McDANIEL, *"Meaning and Comparative Concepts."* McDaniel deals with one central problem of a comparative methodology; how the relativity of cultural meanings can be reconciled with comparisons. He discusses what can be done with objective and hermeneutic models of comparisons, differing in approach and conclusion from Radnitsky's work. He incorporates the ideas of Winch, Levi-Strauss, Gadamer, and Dumont. W.PETER ARCHIBALD, *"Using Marx's Theory of Alienation Empirically."* Archibald argues that Marx's theory of alienation is both normative and descriptive. He sees a problem in that Marxists write about alienation while disregarding comparative-quantitative research and have mistakenly claimed that alienation has nothing to do with individuals, psychology, or consciousness, and that Marx's theory is unprovable. JOHN CARROLL, *"In Spite of Intellectuals."* Carroll sees seven types of intellectuals in history, vain, power-hungry, and obsessed by the need to control. While cloaked in the ideals of scientific progress, social reform, and the like. RER

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 6:2

ALVIN GOULDNER, *"The New Class Project, Part I."* Gouldner lays out six theses to support his claim that a *world historical* New Class is emerging. This class, composed of intellectuals and technical intelligensia, is said to base itself on the possession of "cultural capital" and a common ideology of "careful and critical discourse." This class struggle against the Old Class, the moneyed bourgeoisie, to gain autonomy for itself and to realize its context-free rationality. Parsons and Habermas are the apolitical ideologues of the New Class — Habermas representing the conscience of this "morally ambiguous" class. Chomsky appears to be its biggest critic but is really its vanguard. TODD GITLIN, *"Media Sociology."* A critical look at the dominant theory in the sociology of media, Katz and Lazarsfeld's "two step flow of communication." Reveals its behaviorist asumptions. Examines Lazarsfeld the positivist sociological administrator prepared by his Social Democratic past to be attuned to the needs of the marketplace. ALAN MACFARLANE, *"The Origins of English Individualism."* From new book of the same name. Announces discovery that England may have been an anomalous society in terms of the shift from feudalism to capitalism. If so, macro-social theories which used England as a proto-typical case must be re-examined. The historical relationship between individualism and "modernity" is cast into doubt. ADRIENNE HARRIS and EDWARD SHORTER, *"Besieging Lasch."* Criticizes Lasch severely for his alleged attempt in *Haven in a Heartless World* to plea for the restitution of the bourgeois patriarchal family. Accuses him of crankiness and careless scholarship. Finds some merit, however. ALAN WOLFE, *"Analyzing the Welfare State."* Review of Harold Willensky's *The "New Corporatism," Centralization, and the Welfare State* and Morris Janowitz' *Social Control of the Welfare State*. Finds that these two studies fail to explain the crisis of the welfare state. Ascribes failure to sociology's inability to develop sound theory of our political economy. JW

EL VIEJO TOPO, 21 (June 1978)

Caspe, 78, 3.0 2.a Barcelona, Spain. FERNANDO CLAUDIN, *"Validity and-or Crisis of Marxism."* Provides evidence of the existence of crisis in Marxism even while its method is both more useful and used than generally admitted. His solution to the crisis is self-criticism and re-evaluation of the historical conditions under which communist and socialist parties abandon Marxist theory. Specifically, he critizes the Spanish Socialist Party for having repudiated Marxism. FERNANDO SAVATER, *"Nietzsche, the Recovered Passion."* An interview. Savater views Nietzsche as the culmination of the Enlightenment, having developed and gone beyond the idea of happiness impoicit in the French Revolution. Several other of his most important contributions are delineated. PR, GN

YALE FRENCH STUDIES, 55, 56 (1978)

323 W.L. Harkness Hall, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520. $6 for onc year (two issues). Special double issue: *Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise.* With this massive issue, *YFS* continues to explore the relations between psychoanalysis, philosophy and culture in modern French thought, a project initiated in such earlier issues as No. 36-37 "Structuralism," No. 48 "French Freud," and No. 52 "Graphesis: Perspectives in Literature and Philosophy." This issue is intended to 1) acquaint the American public with Lacan-inspired psychoanalysis, 2) begin a French-American dialogue on common interests, via juxtaposed articles, 3) de-center and displace both French and American established discourse in order to open up new possibilities. Lacanian themes are explored in the following areas: "The Practice of

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Reading: Psychoanalysis with Literature," "The Practice of Reading: Literature with Psychoanalysis," "The Practice of Writing with Psychoanalysis," "The Status of Theoretical Discourse: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, Literature." SHOSHANA FELMAN, "*To Open the Question.*" This issue is presented as an attempt to reverse the conceptual domination of psychoanalytic theory by considering its relationship with literature from a literary, rather than psychoanalytic viewpoint, thus subverting the deceptive transparency of analytical language, and introducing dimensions of irony into the discussion: literature is seen as the unconscious of psychoanalysis. JACQUES LACAN, "*Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in 'Hamlet'.*" In a manner similar to Lacan's seminar on Poe's "The Purloined Letter," this seminar from April 1959 uses literary texts to illustrate psychoanalytic points — in this specific case, the topology which makes desire intelligible as the dependence of the subject on the signifier. Notions explored include imagination and fantasy, perversion and neurosis Hamlet and Ophelia), desire and mourning, the tragedy of desire (*Hamlet* contrasted with *Oedipus Rex*), and phallophony (Polonius as substitute for Claudius, figure of potency and authority). DANIEL SIBONY, "*'Hamlet': A Writing-Effect.*" SHOSHANA FELMAN, "*Turning the Screw of Interpretation.*" Henry James' *The Turn of the Screw* in the light of interplay between psychoanalysis and literature. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, "*The Letter as Cutting Edge.*" Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* tested by the rules of the new psychoanalysis. ROGER DRAGONETTI, "*The Double Play of Arnaut Daniel's 'Sestina' and Dante's 'Divina Commedia'.*" CHARLES MELA, "*Perceval.*" PETER BROOKS, "*Freud's Masterplot.*" *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* is read as a psychoanalytic text on narrative; Freud's "masterplot" is thus reduced to the demands of fiction (this is the best example of Felman's editorial intent discussed above). JEAN-MICHEL REY, "*Freud's Writing on Writing.*" PHILIPPE SOLLERS, "*Freud's Hand.*" A series of enjoyable comments on such topics as the contradiction between the project for a psychoanalytic community and the dissolution engendered by analysis itself, and philosophy speaking of psychoanalysis in the name of literature. FREDRIC JAMESON, "*Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject.*" Despite the promising title, a rather inconclusive discussion of Lacan's notions of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. The exposition does not clarify the problem Jameson sets out to explore, the "transformational praxis" from the realm of the private (psychoanalysis) to that of the public (Marxism). JOHN BRENKMAN, "*The Other and the One: Psychoanalysis, Reading, the 'Symposium'.*" BARBARA JOHNSON, "*The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida.*" A clear and closely argued discussion of Poe's "The Purloined Letter," Lacan's seminar on that text (*YFS* 48), and Derrida's response to Lacan, "The Purveyor of Truth" (*YFS* 52). GR

ANNOUNCEMENT

I am planning to publish an essay-type newsletter — "Comment" — that will try to assess many key problems of our time from a radical libertarian perspective. My hope is that "Comment" will deal with the compelling issues of lifestyle, non-hierarchical forms of organization, feminism, ecology, economic problems, and the need for a truly relevant American radical movement — issues that were so dramatically raised but left in such incomplete form by the sixties "New Left."

"Comment" will try to re-open these issues, assess them in the light of present developments, and carry them forward toward a new resolution. It will pose the need to integrate countercultural values with the harsh material realities of our day, urban issues with the problems of grass-roots community organization, concepts of self-management with centralization, non-hierarchical structures with the possibility of developing new, non-sectarian radical forms of organization, revolutionary visions of a truly free society with the wealth of experience we can draw from the past.

Above all, "Comment" will be concerned with the development of a critical and coherent consciousness that is so essential for the creation of a meaningful radical practice.

Readers who may be familiar with my books, notably *Post-Scarcity Anarchism, The Limits of the City*, and my essays in *WIN, Liberation,* and *Telos*, and who would earnestly like to share this exploration in the possibility of a new radical libertatian theory and practice are invited to write to "Comment," P.O. Box 371, Hoboken, NJ 07030. The first three issues of "Comment" will be sent free of charge to potential subscribers. A stamped, self-addressed envelope will be appreciated.

Murray Bookchin

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THEORY and SOCIETY Bimonthly

RENEWAL AND CRITIQUE IN SOCIAL THEORY

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